



**UNILU**

Université de Lubumbashi

# **MIGRATORY DYNAMICS IN THE DRC: RATIONALE AND IMPLICATIONS IN LUBUMBASHI**

---

Final Report for the MacArthur Funded Project on:  
*“African Perspectives on Human Mobility”*

---

Prepared By:

*Germain Ngoie Tshibambe  
Guy Mbuyi Kabunda*

**DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
UNIVERSITY OF LUBUMBASHI,  
LUBUMBASHI, DRC**

AUGUST 2010

*Disclaimer:* This report is the work of the Department of International Relations, University of Lubumbashi. Any comments or questions about the report should be directed to the research team in DRC, not to the International Migration Institute in Oxford.

**MacArthur  
Foundation**

International  
Migration  
Institute

**IMI**

UNIVERSITY OF  
OXFORD

## FOREWORD

This report is the result of teamwork. The team was based around a group of researchers and assistants in the city of Lubumbashi. They agreed to take part in this project to collect data from migrants and other actors connected with the main field of our research. There are a great number of them, and their names are given at the end of this report. We would like to take this opportunity to thank them for the sensitive work to which they showed such commitment, freely giving of their time and energy.

The launch of this work was marked by the organisation of a two-day methodological seminar in June 2009. This seminar was an ideal opportunity to create an environment which would stimulate an exchange of ideas and dialogue between the research team and certain people with expertise in studies of migration in the city of Lubumbashi. Those involved in the research needed to say what they would be doing and were expecting to follow up during the investigation. Meanwhile, the human resources and those invited along were expected to give their comments and critical evaluation of the work. Within the calm environment of the seminar, we were able to gain much from those present.

Two people are worthy of mention, having come from Great Britain and Morocco respectively to join us for this forum; they were Gunvor Jonsson from the International Migration Institute (University of Oxford) and Professor Mohammed Aderghal from the Mohammed V University (Rabat). As partners in this research programme, these two people know a great deal about the spirit and general economy of research in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Their contribution to the work of this seminar was significant: we would like to thank them for it. For a number of hours, they went with us into the field for some pilot interviews. In Lubumbashi, people who had already acquired some expertise through tackling the problems of migration in this city were also able to make their contribution to the success of this seminar. These were Professors Dibwe dia Mwembo, Kanku Mukengeshay and Nkuku Khonde, all from the University of Lubumbashi. We are grateful for their readiness to help us and the interesting insights they were able to give to those attending the seminar.

This research is part of the MacArthur Programme looking into human mobility through the activities of the International Migration Institute at the University of Oxford. For this reason, we cannot name all those people who have worked tirelessly to bring this research to fruition, but we are very grateful to them. The staff of the International Migration Institute deserve a special mention. For it was during a workshop in Oxford, when we were all trying to do our methodological and epistemological groundwork to find a field for empirical research, that the IMI's researchers drew our attention to the fact that the scale of the research work on which we had embarked in the DRC was simply too big for us to bring the project to completion. This is also an opportunity for us to thank them for as long as they remain with the IMI. They are Hein de Haas and Oliver Bakewell.

During the course of this research, we also benefited from the input of Professor Vwakanakazi Mukhoya. The fact is that for health reasons he was unable to come with us on our travels, but he can still be sure of our gratitude for his readiness to help and his support leading to the success of this joint project. Professor Mbuyi Kabunda worked with the coordinating team. Fruitful exchanges with him about migrations in the city of Lubumbashi

enriched our reading and interpretation of the complex and ever-changing situation which we were studying.

The picture which emerges in this report is the result of the interpretation of field data and comments from a number of people. When it came to writing the report, we could not fully agree on everything, but one thing is certain: the authors' subjective reading of the data is a distinctive element of this summary. So we are sending it out into the public domain, where it may stir up some debate. It is in this debate that we hope to find the answers we seek. What better place to leave our work? Jean de la Fontaine asked the question, and so do we.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>FOREWORD .....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS .....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>LIST OF TABLES.....</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>LIST OF FIGURES.....</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>DRC RESEARCH TEAM: .....</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1:INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1    STUDY CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES .....	1
1.2    THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH AND DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS .....	3
1.3    METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES OF THE RESEARCH .....	7
1.4    ABOUT LUBUMBASHI AND THE SHAPE OF MIGRATION IN THE CITY .....	12
<b>CHAPTER 2:MIGRANTS IN THE CITY OF LUBUMBASHI.....</b>	<b>18</b>
2.1    CONGOLESE MIGRANTS RETURNING TO THE DRC .....	18
<b>ANSWERS .....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>FREQUENCY .....</b>	<b>24</b>
2.2    AFRICAN MIGRANTS .....	28
2.3    ASIAN MIGRANTS .....	35
<b>CHAPTER 3:DISCUSSION .....</b>	<b>44</b>
3.1    SOCIAL DIVERSITY: AFRICAN AND ASIAN MIGRANTS IN LUBUMBASHI .....	44
3.2    LUBUMBASHI: LIVING SPACE AND SIGNS OF MIGRATION .....	48
<b>CHAPTER 4:CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>APPENDIX: RESEARCH PROTOCOLS .....</b>	<b>61</b>

**LIST OF TABLES**

Table 1. Countries of residence of Congolese migrants .....	22
Table 2. Sending funds to the country of origin .....	23
Table 3. Assistance received to migrate .....	24
Table 4. Reasons for returning to the country.....	25

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Map of Lubumbashi in Katanga Province, DRC.....	1
Figure 2. City of Lubumbashi.....	9
Figure 3. Map of Kamalondo Town in Lubumbashi .....	9
Figure 4. Map of Katuba Town in Lubumbashi .....	10

## DRC RESEARCH TEAM:

### A. SENIOR RESEARCHERS:

- **Germain Ngoie Tshibambe** (Project Leader): tshibambengoie@yahoo.fr
- **Guy Mbuyi Kabunda** (Assistant Project Leader): mbuyikabunda@yahoo.com

### B. JUNIOR RESEARCHERS (INTERVIEWERS):

- **John Abelungu**, Law graduate, UNESCO Chair in Human Rights, UNILU
- **Kayeb Kakez**, Assistant in International Relations, UNILU
- **Musevu Kawel**, Politics graduate, Researcher for the Centre of Excellence for the Study of Local Democracy (CEDEMOL-UNILU).
- **Charles Kunda**, History graduate, independent researcher
- **Makoki Lubangi**, Graduate of the ISES, independent researcher
- **Balibutsa Maniraguha**, Supervisor at the Open University, Lubumbashi
- **Namwana Ngambu**, Assistant at the Central African Centre for Political Studies (CEPAC-UNILU)
- **Kaburap Ngomb**, Assistant at the Central African Centre for Political Studies (CEPAC-UNILU)
- **Muteba Ngoy**, Assistant at the Open University, Lubumbashi
- **Mwanza Ngoy**, Assistant in International Relations, UNILU
- **Shimbi Ngoy**, Assistant in International Relations, UNILU
- **Okolonken Ozoza**, Assistant at the Central African Centre for Political Studies (CEPAC-UNILU)
- **Kayombo Rukan**, Law graduate, Researcher for the Centre of Excellence for the Study of Local Democracy (CEDEMOL-UNILU).
- **Ramazani Tukumbi**, Assistant in sociology, University of Lubumbashi (UNILU)
- **Kakiranya Wasukundi**, Sociology graduate, independent researcher

# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Study context and objectives

As part of the MacArthur Programme concerning African Perspectives on Human Mobility (APHM), the DRC research team decided to base its foundation work on the theme of: “Migratory dynamics in the DRC: forms, rationale and implications in Lubumbashi”. The choice of this theme came about from one of the conclusions reached by the DRC team at the conclusion of its activities during the first year of the project: while Katanga province, of which the city of Lubumbashi is the main administrative centre, was an area for immigration in the colonial and even post-colonial periods (from Belgium in particular, and from Europe in general), with immigrants being drawn by the exploitation of the area’s mineral resources, a review of the literature revealed that there was a lack of analysis of long-term migratory trends in the post-colonial era, and at the same time, the current trend which has reaffirmed this city’s predominance as a site for migratory attraction (Ngoie and Vwakyanakazi, 2009) has received little or no attention. In this research, we have been looking at international migration, but we have not overlooked internal migration because there is evidence that the dynamics of internal and international migration are interlinked.




Figure 1. Map of Lubumbashi in Katanga Province, DRC

Our study of migration in the city of Lubumbashi (Figure 1) has led us to focus attention on the issue of interaction between the urban space and migration. The choice of Lubumbashi came about because of the attractiveness of this city relative to other urban centres in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in view of the demographic effects resulting from the constant coming and going of the population. Judging by the evidence, the attractiveness of the city of Lubumbashi is a driving force which makes it a kind of interface, as an urban space which attracts the population and enables a culture of mobility to develop. As an urban space, Lubumbashi emerges as a postcolonial African city marked by crisis and failures in urban government, which has led to the extremely precarious living conditions of the population and the informal nature of the socioeconomic activities taking place there (Nkuku, K.C. and Rémon, M., 2006). The failure of urban governance has led to a less ordered use of space, which is one of the signs of the innovative behaviour in African cities according to Le Bris (1987: 268), in other words a strategy of bypassing and distorting the official standards which apply to building and urban development. The culture of mobility, one of the markers of urban life, has turned Lubumbashi into a sort of gateway on a migratory continuum within which *internal* and *international* migration present themselves as possible alternatives within the social field and horizon of individuals.

Lubumbashi is perceived as a dual-function site: a place for both sending and receiving. Indeed, from Lubumbashi, Congolese people set out to explore the opportunities offered by the transnational space, with their knowledge of how to move around “circulatory territories” (Tarrius, 2001). The sending function applies in two ways: the first of these – the fact of sending people out as a country of origin – is seen as the trigger for mobility, at the end of which the migrant sets out from this site to realise his or her migratory activities elsewhere; the second arises from the place’s role as a transit gateway. Lubumbashi is attracting more and more migrants from other countries as a transit place to multiple destinations. This city’s location on the southern fringes of the DRC places it in the corridors from which it is easy to reach the English-speaking African countries: one only needs to travel a few kilometres to cross the border into the southern African countries. Lubumbashi is their exit point. The door leading into the vast migratory area is either Zambia or Angola. The receiving function derives from this city’s migratory attractiveness: it welcomes migrants from all corners of the country. Those displaced by war have boosted the numbers of the urban population against the backdrop of numerous conflicts which have rampaged through the DRC.

There are a great many foreign migrants who have chosen to come to Lubumbashi, which is still a mining town. Attempts by the Mayor of the city of Lubumbashi to restore a colonial administrative measure which involves imposing controls on the movement of both the national and foreign population is an effective indication of the extent of immigration into this city. The outcry provoked by this decision explains the complex overlapping of official relations coupled with the informal networks/umbrella organisations which guide or derail public political activity in this country<sup>1</sup>. It should be remembered that during the Second Republic, the Mobutu regime imposed a requirement for the possession of documents authorising movement by the population across the national territory, particularly the “exit authorisation”. They were not expensive but failure to hold them exposed people to police harassment at the hands of the official State party. Control by the public services of

<sup>1</sup> The mayor published this decision in May-June 2009, to control the movements of the national and foreign populations, to strengthen the public services with responsibility for the movement of the population, and to enable the generation of public receipts, with a charge on each administrative document issued. The outcry from Human Rights NGO<sup>s</sup> was such that the mayor’s decision was suspended by the minister for the interior and national security before he was removed from his post in 2009.

population movement is part of the lasting colonial heritage. Obotela attaches great importance to this in his evocatively-titled work: *Democratic Republic of the Congo. A State without papers in a global village* (2002). In fact, in the colonial era, if a native wished to move from one corner of the colony to another, he had to carry a “transfer passport” (Obotela, 2002: 59).

The objectives of this research revolve around the following three key areas:

1. Examine the changes and constants of migration from and to Lubumbashi,
2. Characterise the immigrants currently living in the city, and
3. Evaluate the impact of migration on social relations and the city of Lubumbashi.

### **1.1.2 The research questions**

The way in which this research was conducted was guided by concepts linked to the following research questions:

- a. What has been the shape of migration in the city of Lubumbashi from the 1980<sup>s</sup> onwards?
- b. How have the immigrants in Lubumbashi managed their presence and visibility, what networks support them, and in what types of activities have they involved themselves?
- c. What is the perception of migration among those resident in Lubumbashi?
- d. What changes have resulted from migration in the urban area and the relationships between the local and foreign populations?

## **1.2 Theoretical framework for research and definition of concepts**

This research starts out from a number of pertinent concepts whose definition could allow advances to be made in understanding the dynamics of migration and urban life in the DRC. This conceptual exercise helped us prepare the ground for our study, pointing us to three different areas. The first of these comprises the conceptual elements such as mobility/migration and the transnational area. The second area arises from our interest in revisiting theoretical certainties and aims to explore the theoretical impact of a number of phenomena such as transnationalism, integration and migratory networks. And thirdly, we shall base this whole analysis on the ongoing debate about the effects of “crowding”, “a veritable moving architecture of the urban being-together” (Moncomble, 2009:353) and the interactions between migration and the transformation of urban space. The notion of crowding, as constructed by Moncomble, is intended to capture the dynamics of urbanisation, the basis of which is the gathering of the population, the concentration of the crowd on a particular site, in a particular place, and at a particular time.

In general terms, the notion of mobility tries to compensate for the implied finality of the word migration. Migration refers to the movement from one place to another for a long period, and often without the intention to return to the place of departure. Such a perception has consequences. To start with, at the political level, states are not prepared to open themselves up to such movements; hence the restrictive measures taken by them, measures intended to “discipline” population movements. Then, the local populations (in the receiving countries) may develop xenophobic reactions as can be seen in South Africa (Bouillon, 1999) or Congo-Brazzaville (Whitehouse, 2009a). In Lubumbashi, when welcoming a foreigner, people can often be heard asking “how long will you be staying here?”, “when are you going

home?” Such questions convey a sense of reserve or coolness of reception towards migrants (tourists and others alike).

The notion of mobility implies taking the initiative to move, whether for the long or short term. It also embodies the permanent dimension detached from any barrier to the very act of moving by and through which the globalised world, which has become “a big global village” in the words of Canadian sociologist McLuhan (1968), can be subject to constant circulation. Our understanding of the meaning of mobility is close to that of a similar term used in discussions in sociology, namely social mobility. Social mobility refers to the possibility of anyone being able to achieve a coveted position in society regardless of social origin, this circulation being based on the equality of opportunity, with the use of individual strategies. In the DRC, the mobile subject, the migrant (internal or international) is described as *moto ya movement*, a term from the local language which means “the man in movement”, i.e. the one who is moving at that point in time. With mobility, the meaning of the term is broadened to consider movement as a “normal” act (Jónsson, 2009), and not as part of the escape from misery and crisis. Another dimension of mobility is that it leads to the disappearance of the distinction within the migratory territory between the transit country and destination country. Interviews with migrants in this city make it clear that they want to explore different places with a view to realising their ambition through the migratory adventure, if possible. This definition of mobility leads us to talk of the transnationalised area.

Authors such as Alain Tarrius (2001), Bertrand Badie and Marie-Claude Smous (1992) and Dominique Schnapper (2001) each use this expression or imply it in their analyses. But first and foremost, it is better to note that Raymond Aron (1962) introduced a distinction in the international scene between “transnational society and international system”. According to Aron’s distinction, while the international system illustrates “the inter-state aspect of the society to which populations subject to distinct sovereignties belong”, “the transnational society can be seen in trading exchanges, the migration of people, shared beliefs, organisations which extend across borders, and finally ceremonies or competitions which are open to members of all these (state) units. Transnational society becomes all the more vital when the freedom of exchange, migration or communication is greatest, shared beliefs are strongest, and non-national organisations are most numerous...” (Aron, 1962: 113). Alain Tarrius sees the transnationalised space as being marked by “crossings, flows, journeys between territorial staging points, between worlds of norms, diversities and cross-fertilisations” (2001a: 3). According to Bertrand Badie and Marie-Claude Smous, the transnationalised space arises from setting the end of the national territory, jolted and jostled by flows and all kinds of tangible and intangible transactions, into its proper perspective. These influences represent a tough test for the sovereignty of the territorial nation state (1992). Dominique Schnapper (2001) sets out from the limits of the nation state to record the multiplication of activities undertaken by transnational actors. These activities stand out not only at the nation state level, but also in the transnational world. The latter only has any meaning in relation to the contraction of time and space, a contraction which drives the dynamics of globalisation. A relative freedom of mobility of the population is only possible if one has a sense of transnationalised space. This is the space in which circulation takes place, or in which circulation is attempted as migrants implement their acquired circulatory skills.

Our theoretical groundwork on notions of mobility and transnationalised space led us to identify a position enabling us to transcend the binary view which sets the regularity against the irregularity of migration, and the permanence against the temporary nature of movement. In fact, in the migratory act, the migrant emerges as a moral subject, hence the importance of

identifying his “modus operandi”, or to put it another way, in the words of Michel de Certeau, the practical measures by and through which an actor uses ingenuity to act and obtain certain outcomes in society (quoted by Bayart, 1981:61). The different migrant subjects encountered in the city of Lubumbashi have adopted ways of acting whose secrecy is due to the widespread adoption of the informal activities which have shaped the DRC’s economy.

“In these transnational spaces,” write Rosita Fibbi and Gianni d’Amato (2008), “migrants set up social and economic relations, activities and political identities which transcend traditional borders and benefit from global economic processes within a world divided into nation states. Transnationalism represents a displacement of identities – and particularly national identities – and political and social demands beyond the usual territorial allegiances based on the nation state scale” (Fibbi & d’Amato 2008: 7). According to the evidence, transnationalism as a theoretical concept is, in the field of migration, a means of expressing a third way, which fits between the options of assimilation and return. The first option – that of assimilation – means refusing one’s own openness to other things, while the second option places restrictions on one’s freedom to achieve one’s potential elsewhere. The term of assimilation has fallen into disuse among many European sociologists since the 1960<sup>s</sup>, for a number of reasons. “Firstly, the difficulty of dissociating the sociological process from its prescriptive content: assimilation is an injunction aimed more at the new entrants than the welcoming society, whose duty it would be to assimilate them. And then the crisis among integrating institutions (school, the army, the trades unions, for example) raises questions about how new arrivals could be integrated into a society which, moreover, is characterised by disintegrational tendencies. Finally, it is noted that after decolonisation it has appeared politically incorrect to talk of assimilation in respect of migrants from the former colonies, given the use made of the notion during the colonial period.” (Réa and Tripier, 2003: 92).

The relegation of assimilation from the debate means that the theme of integration is open for debate once more. While theoretical literature about transnationalism or integration is well developed, research on migration in relation to these themes has remained somewhat limited, especially in Africa (Whitehouse, 2009b). This is particularly true for the DRC, where research into these issues is non-existent. A revisit of these theoretical frameworks *in situ* in the city of Lubumbashi has enabled us to see the real situation through new eyes. It is clear that, due to the local historical circumstances, aspects arising from transnationalism and integration have led to an understanding of the actions undertaken by migrants on the ground, through the mobilisation of social capital which is their own personal secret, and the care they take to transform it into an economic benefit and to provide political support (Leung, 2006: 5). The notion of economic benefit does not raise any questions, insofar as it refers to the general understanding of financial gain realised by an economic actor in a productive activity. The notion of political support or political umbrella only has any meaning in the DRC in relation to the general predominance of networks creating an overlap between official structures and private or personal relations. In the social sphere, an individual defined by a concrete reference such as their ethnicity or relationship with a given official (political, administrative or military), benefits from security. Emmanuel Terray, explaining this product of political power in Africa talks of “the veranda and the air-conditioned room” (1986: 37,40). The veranda refers to the world of networks and patronage, while the air-conditioned room refers to officialdom and modernity. Where these two worlds meet is the basis of the “disorder paradigm” about which Chabal and Dalloz (1999) wrote to explain how the State works in certain sub-Saharan African countries.

In this sham regime, individuals do not flourish and businesses do not prosper unless they are supported by networks which slot into both “the veranda and the air conditioner”. Hence the importance of the “umbrellas”, namely official and unofficial relations which protect and help with escaping the daily annoyances produced by official political structures. In another context, United Nations experts have used the notion of “power-holding elite networks” to portray the complexity of relationships between the political sphere and other areas of Congolese society to express the resilience of the political umbrellas which predominate in the DRC (UN, 2002: 6).

Profits and political support go hand-in-hand in the DRC. Foreign migrants living in the DRC have understood these practices and constantly embark on new initiatives to obtain political umbrellas so that they can be sure of obtaining economic benefits. It is within the transformation of social capital into economic profit under the protection of political umbrellas that we can see the challenges of transnationalism and the theory of networks. In this regard, it emerges that Congolese people, struck by the precariousness of living conditions display a strategic nomadism. In other words, they are constantly moving both within the nation and externally, looking for opportunities to get by. This strategic nomadism would explain internal migration, and once he is in a town or city, the Congolese national will broaden his horizons by attempting international migration. Likewise, foreign migrants in Lubumbashi display a multiplicity of activities in which they will indulge, which tend to develop with the overlapping of formal and informal activities.

This brings us to the third level of the theoretical framework: all these behaviours result in social transformations within Lubumbashi’s urban space, and can only be better understood if we turn to the ongoing debate about the links between migration and the urban space. According to the evidence, Lubumbashi is a city born out of internal and international migratory flows. At present, the extension, if not the urban expansion of the city, revolves around the mobility of the population. We also want to look at the role played by social diversity, namely how the relationships between the local population and the foreign population, and between the Congolese living in the country and those migrating back, are experienced. The urban space is traversed by the call of globalisation: the spreading of images and value through the means of modern technology such as the Internet and television drives the multiplicity of needs, such as the desire to circulate, for example. This desire to circulate maintains the culture of mobility of which urban spaces such as Lubumbashi seem to contain all the ingredients. Turning to Kant, who defines culture as a process, it is worth noting that the culture of mobility is the expression of this aptitude which predisposes an individual to have the will and initiative needed to circulate (Ngoie, 2010). We could compare the culture of mobility with that which Vertovec calls “the cosmopolitan outlook” (quoted by Landau and Freemantle, 2009: 381).

As a receptacle for foreign migrants, the urban space of Lubumbashi, when used by the Congolese as a space in which to circulate, maintains the current of mobility. Moreover, foreign migrants living in Lubumbashi are not subjected to a strong stigmatisation, which would give rise to a refusal of contacts and violence as is the case with the xenophobia in South Africa. In Lubumbashi, rather than resorting to violence as an expression of xenophobia against migrants, the local population resorts to mockery<sup>2</sup> which thus becomes a

---

<sup>2</sup> A comedian starring in a widely followed programme from Lubumbashi performed a sketch to show the non-durable nature of Chinese products, telling a story about a Congolese woman who had married a Chinese man and become pregnant. Arriving at the maternity ward, she gave birth, but the child only lived for seven days before dying. The distressed woman was inconsolable. The comedian, to console her, reminded her that things

means of protest and stigmatisation. The expression “made in Guangzhou” – which causes great hilarity among the people – is part of the way of voicing this stigmatisation, particularly regarding Chinese products. In a study of humour in Nigeria, Obadare clearly demonstrated how this weapon used by the people works, namely laughter as a means of building and knocking down a reality which is highly surreal (Obadare, 2009: 241-261). Moreover, an occupation of space is slowly developing, creating internal frontiers between the local population itself and between the local and foreign populations. Property speculation in this city, even if it has not resulted in the bubble bursting, is still one of the aspects linked to the strong demand for housing expressed by foreign migrants upon arrival. This demand and the attractive prices offered by migrants to landlords are one of the ingredients of internal discrimination against residential inclusion in this city. A segmented integration is thus in progress. It is on this that we shall concentrate in this research.

## 1.3 Methodological approaches and challenges of the research

In order to give a clear picture of this area of the report, we shall present in turn: the data collection methods, the sample, the research protocol and the difficulties we encountered.

### 1.3.1 Data collection methods

It is important to note that this field research was based on targeting the four categories of subjects from whom we obtained our information. These were: i. Migrants of African origin living in Lubumbashi, ii. Migrants of Asian origin, iii. Congolese migrants (internal and international returning to the country), and iv. Congolese non-migrants living in this city. The first category of migrants covers African nationals coming from certain countries such as Zambia, Mali, Senegal, Nigeria, Angola and Burundi. The choice of these countries is the result on the one hand of the visibility of these countries' nationals in Lubumbashi's demographic landscape (in the case of Nigerians, Malians and Senegalese), and on the other hand of their sheer numbers as reflected in the statistics produced by public services dealing with the population (in the case of Zambians). The second category consists of Asian nationals. Asian nationals are those from China, India and Lebanon. Alongside these three nationalities, whose presence is part of the human landscape in Lubumbashi, there are the more marginal examples of South Korea, Palestine and Yemen. The third category covers the Congolese, who are both internal and international migration subjects. When it comes to the international Congolese migrants, attention has been paid to those who are returning to the country, not those who have come back for holidays or family visits, but those who, at the time of the survey, had returned to the country for good. The fourth category is made up of those Congolese who have not migrated, and who live in Lubumbashi. From them, we obtained opinions about their concept of migration and various issues linked to the ongoing urban changes. Among this category of Congolese non-migrants, we looked at adults, parents whose children are in the DRC; they also include adults who have houses which are being rented by foreign migrants.

To do this, we used an approach which was both qualitative and quantitative. As far as the qualitative approach is concerned, use was made of a questionnaire including semi-open and open-ended questions. During unstructured interviews, life stories helped us to flesh out our general picture of certain details of the migratory experience. Observation also had an

---

made in China, including the fruits of their relations, do not last. This sketch was shown on the Mwangaza television channel ([www.mwangaza.org](http://www.mwangaza.org))

important part to play: it was used to see *in situ* the way of life and practices used by the migrant subjects. During the survey period (three months), we made a number of friends among the Chinese, Indians and Africans, so that we were able to frequent them from time to time. This time spent together enabled us to get an idea of the lives lived by these migrants.

In order to explore the data obtained through the questionnaire in greater depth, detailed interviews were held with certain migrant subjects from each of the target categories. It is worth pointing out that group discussions (focus groups) took place. These helped us to be exposed to the points of view expressed by non-migrant Congolese. It is important to note that we made a number of journeys abroad before and during the field research period. During these journeys, we looked at the situation of Congolese migrants living abroad. This was the case for Congolese living in Zambia and South Africa. Two visits took us to the cities of Ndola and Lusaka (November 2008 and November 2009). We also spent a month in Cape Town and Johannesburg (October 2009): interviews were conducted to look at particular aspects of the migratory experience; they provided information about this survey. In Cape Town, we visited a disused building where a number of Congolese nationals live, with whom we talked.

The quantitative approach, meanwhile, consisted of establishing the sample from which interviews and information were obtained. Information on this aspect can be found at point C.

### **1.3.2 The research protocol**

A single research protocol was designed for the work as a whole, so as to find a single common denominator (Annex n°1). Thus it comprised four parts. The first was centred on the identity of the subject. The second part of the protocol was devoted to the motivation for migration. The third part dealt with the socio-analysis of migratory flows. The last part analysed the impact of migratory flows.

### **1.3.3 Sampling**

According to the available data on the population of Lubumbashi in 2008, of 1,450,000 people residing in the city, the foreign population numbered 4,776, i.e. 0.3% of the total population (Archives of the Provincial Internal Affairs Division, 2009). The foreign population is unevenly distributed across the whole of seven communes. The annexed commune, the latest to be created, has a considerable number of the migrants. These are priests and missionaries from Catholic and Evangelical-Missionary churches. The latter were excluded from our survey. We selected three communes: Lubumbashi, Kamalondo and Katuba. The choice of these three communes is for historical reasons which are particular to each of them. The commune of Lubumbashi is the city centre (Figure 2); this is a commune which is both commercial and residential. The security of the area attracts foreigners who have chosen to live there. A commune created to house expatriate colonists during the colonial period, Lubumbashi still retains its feeling of colonial heritage. Kamalondo (Figure 3) was created in the colonial period as the first commune to house the Congolese recruited to work for the mining companies which proliferated in this city. It is difficult to find European foreigners here. There are many African migrants, particularly Malians and Senegalese. Kamalondo is a commercial commune. The commune of Katuba (Figure 4) is currently the most populous, with many Zambians and other African nationals.

Looking at the figures for the foreign population of these three communes, calculated to be 2,568, we took a sample of **12 per cent**, i.e. **325** foreign migrant subjects. It is the individual migrant who constitutes the relevant sample unit. As far as sampling strategies are concerned,

following our field observation, we chose three (3) communes for our research. Within these three communes, we chose a number of districts, concentrating on two districts per commune where, according to empirical observations, there was a strong presence of foreign migrants.




Figure 2. City of Lubumbashi




Figure 3. Map of Kamalondo Town in Lubumbashi




Figure 4. Map of Katuba Town in Lubumbashi

This spatial choice enabled us to target the following migrants: in the commune of Kamalondo, the chosen district – a district with a number of commercial avenues (butchers, bars, jewellers) – is supposed to house the majority of the African migrants (Malians, Senegalese). In the commune of Lubumbashi, two districts were chosen: the city centre and the Golfe district, a residential district. It was in the commune of Lubumbashi that one finds Asian nationals. The third commune is Katuba, the largest commune in terms of population numbers in the city of Lubumbashi. Here many foreigners can be found, particularly Zambians. Thus the sample was spread across the area. Where sampling methods are concerned, we opted for a random sampling approach. It was in the residential districts, which are also places of work, that the interviewers were able to talk to migrants.

#### 1.3.4 The field survey

This took place over three months from mid-July, through August and September to mid-October 2009. Seventeen interviewers took part. To collect the data, each interviewer was allocated a set number of individuals by the local coordinating team, and it was their task to interview them. This number ranged from 10 to 15 individuals per commune. The typed

questionnaires and other materials (notebooks, pens) were distributed among the interviewers, and four tape recorders were provided for the team. Every month, a meeting was held, where the interviewers were to submit the individual and collective reports and discuss the difficulties they had encountered, along with any improvements which might be made to the research. The team enjoyed methodological support from members of the local coordinating team, one of whom would go out into the field to obtain more detailed information from certain migrant subjects (particularly Chinese and Indian migrants).

The returned sheets, along with the individual and collective reports, were typed up in Word. The French language was used for this survey.

### **1.3.5 *The challenges of the field research***

In this section, we talk about the difficulties encountered during the course of this survey. Firstly, there was the issue of administering the questionnaire to all the available people while they remained among the sample subjects in the target communes. But some survey subjects had difficulty in answering some of the questions in a precise manner. This can be explained by the fact that these survey subjects had difficulty in understanding French, while others seemed to stand out for the excessive length of their answers.

It was difficult to conduct the survey among women migrants. Married women preferred to resort to the views expressed by their husbands. There were no foreign single women. Moreover, those who had rejoined their husbands were reticent about describing their husbands' migratory journeys. Similarly, their reluctance to talk about sending money back to their country of origin should be noted.

As for the relations between interviewers and interviewees, the difficulties in meeting Asian migrants were similar to those encountered in our study of the Africans' migrations. A serious problem emerged, namely the availability of information providers. Indeed, it was difficult to meet up with individuals for interviews on set dates. This meant that interviewers were then obliged to make a number of journeys to and fro to collect the necessary information. We worked hard to separate the Chinese migrants to conduct interviews. However, it turned out that many of them, within a single "stable" or enterprise, would give virtually identical accounts of their migratory experiences. In the case of the Chinese, the word "stable" is often used to refer to a group of people who team up together; they work in a single enterprise or for a single individual. Generally speaking, they all come from the same province.

The majority of Chinese people we met had considerable difficulties with the language: they do not speak French, and even their English is barely intelligible. So we had to go to their "gate-keeper" to translate the views stated by these Chinese people.

Interviewers sometimes encountered mistrust on the part of the survey subjects. To meet this challenge and establish a real climate of confidence, interviewers tried to reassure them by showing their mission statement or business cards. The cases of mistrust arose more among survey subjects of Chinese or Indian origin. They suspected the researchers of being agents working for the migration services and seeking information. Their reticence made them less talkative about what they were doing in the DRC. Questions such as "Have you had any problems renewing your residency permits?" provoked incomplete answers or made some subjects very uneasy about answering. Some interviewees, fearing possible negative repercussions from the interview, would adopt certain attitudes in the way they responded,

with the result that the interviewer came away with a very confused idea of the migratory experience they had recorded. There were even some refusals to answer questions. These figured among the responses of some of the Chinese and Indian target migrants. These people proved to be rather uncooperative about participating in the research, the reasons for this being unclear. Despite these obstacles, the interviewers managed to get the survey subjects to understand the real reasons behind their being there, in the majority of cases.

The majority of the difficulties we have mentioned were able to be overcome, which enabled us to gather the information we wanted. These difficulties were overcome over several meetings, once we had managed to break the ice by convincing them that this was a genuine university research programme, that the information would be recorded anonymously and that no information would be published that was liable to compromise them directly.

## 1.4 About Lubumbashi and the shape of migration in the city

Lubumbashi, the administrative capital of Katanga province, is located in the southeast of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, at an altitude ranging from 1220 to 1240 metres. It covers an area of some 747 km<sup>2</sup>. However, roughly 139 km<sup>2</sup>, roughly 18% of the total area, is urbanised. Named Elisabethville in homage to Queen Elisabeth, the city received its official recognition in Order n°20 of 16 November 1910 (Dibwe dia Mwenmbo, et al., 2005: 19).

This city is celebrating its centenary year in 2010. It is one of the cities created under the colonial regime as a site of administrative and economic interest, whose dynamism led to its growth both in demographic and spatial terms. Lubumbashi's demographic growth is not a result of the demographic growth of households; it is a phenomenon brought about by internal and international migrations which have led to this city's development. The long tradition of interaction between this city's urban expansion and the migratory movements can thus be expressed as follows:

“According to an adage which was widely repeated in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, ‘Lubumbashi is the daughter of copper, fathered by the railway.’ In other words, this city, like many others in the Congolese and Zambian copper belt, was born out of the mining industry and saw its population growing year on year thanks to the railway which linked it to southern Africa, East Africa and the Atlantic Ocean, via Lobito and Matadi. Thus Lubumbashi's population has always been made up of economic migrants.

Situated where it is as a result of two decisions, the first economic and the second political, Lubumbashi was created on an uninhabited site. All it took at the start was for the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga to decide to set up its plant on the banks of the Lubumbashi river, attracted to the region by the Ruashi mines and a river allowing it to carry out preliminary processing of the Kalukuluku mineral ore, creating added value and minimising the costs of transporting the unrefined ore from Ruashi to Bulawayo in Zimbabwe, as was done from the time of its first discovery.” (Dibwe dia Mwenmbo, et al., 2005: 7).

This city has long served as a centre for mining and industry. This double secular calling was one of the elements which shaped the movements of the population attracted to this city. Up to the 1990<sup>s</sup>, the population was generally employed, making a living from working for

mining companies such as the Générale des carrières et des mines (Gécamines), or the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Congo (SNCC), and other companies whose activities revolved around the dynamism of the mining sector. Lubumbashi's urban attractiveness grew stronger during the era of the Second Republic, due to the government's development strategy, which made it a centre for growth<sup>3</sup> on the country's southern flank, bringing new life to other areas (or cities/urban centres) located in the centre of the country. With the collapse of the mining sector in this country from the 1990<sup>s</sup>, against the backdrop of the end of the Mobutu regime and poor governance, Lubumbashi became a ghost town. Lubumbashi's decline against the backdrop of the postcolonial crisis moved up another gear when, at the end of 2008, the financial crisis which had started in the United States led to a collapse in the price per tonne of copper. Attempts to re-launch the mining sector in this province were brought to a standstill by the crisis, and this means that a large proportion of the population are in a precarious position both socially and economically. Whilst the Congolese people have embarked on the route of the "migratory breakaway", as described by Rosny (2002: 624), the foreign immigrants, and particularly Asians, have packed their bags to return to their home country. Despite this crisis, it should be recognised that the migratory spirit which opened up the city of Lubumbashi to Asian migrants will have created a break in this city's migratory pattern. In what terms can the migratory continuity and discontinuity of this city be expressed?

The visibility of Asian migrants in the city of Lubumbashi gives us good reason to look at the interplay of continuity and discontinuity which can be seen in the field of migration. Thus continuity can be seen as the expression of the incessant arrival of foreigners attracted by the mineral wealth issuing from beneath Katanga's soil. Meanwhile, discontinuity is evidenced by the changing nationality of these migrants, because Lubumbashi has seen a switch from the preponderance of Whites (called *Muzungu*, the Swahili word for white) arriving from Europe, who are being replaced these days by the "Yellows" from Asia. The complex reality of continuities and discontinuities in relation to immigration to Lubumbashi cannot be seen better than in the light of the postcolonial events which have tainted national political life. Whether centred on violence or not, these events have accelerated migratory movements, either in the form of an inward flow or in the form of a flow back in the opposite direction.

It is from these events that we can identify the existence of an "immigration cycle" in the DRC. This concept of an "immigration cycle", whose meaning we have borrowed from Bastenier and Dassetto, "is intended to give a precise definition of the whole of the process by which migrants enter, establish themselves and settle in the space of a nation state, giving rise to changes there and a new sequence of events over time." (Bastenier and Dassetto, 1995). Although it is sensible not to fall into an evolutionary or historical perspective of this term, we shall start by looking here at the moment of entry and establishment of the immigrants, which could bring us to an "ethnic/group biography".

Following independence in 1960, the foreign migrants most in evidence in Katanga province were European nationals, with Belgians – the former colonists – heading the list, followed by the Greeks, Portuguese and Italians. A division of labour under colonial rule governed the shape of social relationships. The Belgians were white-collar workers in the large chartered mining companies and the public administration; the Greeks, Italians or Portuguese were traders. The industries belonged to the nationals of all the European countries due to the

<sup>3</sup> The Second Republic adopted a development strategy based on three main areas for growth: Kinshasa, in the West, Kisangani, in the North, and Lubumbashi, in the South of the country. Each of the three cities played a driving role in respect of other areas in the country.

investments made by those countries' nationals in this country. This arrangement arose from the regime resulting from the Final Act of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), which settled the problem of how Africa should be shared, and most importantly established this territory as a state independent from the Congo, the private property of King Leopold II of the Belgians (Ndaywell, 1998). In Katanga, there was a significant Jewish colony in the city of Lubumbashi. The existence of a synagogue used as a place of worship by the Jews, and located in the centre of the city, is evidence of this presence. In the city centre, there is currently a synagogue belonging to the Greek Orthodox church. Those European nationals whose presence dates back to the colonial period have left landmarks behind. These are buildings enclosing their private clubs where they would meet in the evenings and in their spare time.

In the city of Lubumbashi, there is also a private club for Italians (Casa Degli Italiani), a private club for Greeks and a private club for Belgians. Moreover, these clubs are all located close to one another along the same street (Avenue Lumumba in the commune of Lubumbashi). "Zairianisation", i.e. the nationalisation of the country's economic life undertaken by President Mobutu's regime in 1973, put the brakes on foreign "migratory" expansion in the country. Another brake came from the pillage orchestrated by President Mobutu's regime in a strategy set up to obstruct the call for democratisation in the 1990<sup>s</sup>. Acts of pillage dealt a blow to the national economy and discouraged the last batch of expatriates who were still engaged in business in the DRC. This account by Bill Berkeley (1993) of the pillage gives as an idea of the scale of the political use made of these activities against the backdrop of a Mobutu regime which was by now running out of steam:

Then came the "*pillage*." In September of 1991 an astonishing week-long spree of looting and destruction by underpaid troops of the national army laid waste to major cities across the country. More than 200 people were killed. Much of the modern productive sector of the economy was destroyed. The sidewalks next to major military bases became thriving markets for looted goods. Most press accounts described these horrendous riots as the work of "mutinous" troops. But whether the *pillage* was aimed at toppling Mobutu remains a mystery; no soldier was ever prosecuted or disciplined.

These two events (the Zairianisation of 1973-1975 and the pillage of 1990) had an impact on foreign immigration into the Congo, resulting in a complete turn-around of foreign migration into the Congo. As happened in 1960 when relations between Belgium and the newly independent Congo deteriorated, with the Belgians all withdrawing suddenly from the Congo, and likewise after 1973, all the foreigners, or at least virtually all of them, left the Congo (Braeckman 2010). All that remained were a few Catholic or Protestant missionaries. The consequences of these events can still clearly be seen. Thus, as far as the economy is concerned, western economic operators, even Belgians, are few. In the words of a Congolese newspaper, "Belgian interests in the economic sphere are virtually non-existent; Belgian economic operators are few in the Congo." (Le Phare, 30 June 2005) In the migratory landscape, the low profile, if not the total absence, of Belgian immigrants is more than evident now. The same is true of the other Europeans, such as the French or Italians. Be that as it may, European expatriates now come to the Congo in connection with international non-governmental organisations. This is the case with a few Spanish nationals in Katanga, heading up "Médecins sans Frontières/Espagne", French nationals with "Médecins sans Frontières/France" or Belgians working for NGO<sup>s</sup> whose funding is from Belgian sources. Among this group of externally-financed NGO<sup>s</sup>, we could mention the NGO of Belgian

origin called “Groupe Number One” etc.. Greeks are still present, but in reduced numbers in the economic sector. The first shop to be described as a supermarket was built by a Greek national in the city of Lubumbashi.

We have discussed European migrants even though they were not initially one of our main concerns; however this has been done to enable us to identify the continuities and discontinuities in migratory flows according to the people involved. Migratory flows (in-migration) continue, but the people involved have changed: it is this displacement which explains the way that the Europeans’ place in Lubumbashi’s migratory landscape is remembered, with the city currently being conquered by Asian migrants.

While immigration by westerners has turned round with a significant drop in numbers entering the DRC after the 1970<sup>s</sup>, empirical observation confirmed by information coming out of our survey shows a significant influx of immigrants of Asian origin. Thus there has been a move from the period in which European/Western immigration predominated to a new period of Asian immigration. These changes must be seen in the context of the international political economy with the rise of new emerging countries whose thirst to conquer the market in raw materials is being driven by both state and private concerns. This is the case with China, where the government and Chinese immigrants rub along happily side by side, having shared interests on the international scene (Veron 2008, Chaponnière and Jozan 2008). This is also the case with India, whose rise on the economic scene has led to an expansion of its diaspora on a worldwide scale. It is also worth mentioning the presence of the Lebanese in this city: they are becoming increasingly prominent. Indeed, following the elections in 2006, a Lebanese man who had taken Congolese nationality, a businessman with a chain of petrol stations and restaurants, was elected to the post of provincial MP.

But in the popular imagination, according to our cross-checking of information from the field surveys, Lubumbashi’s attractiveness as an urban centre is, generally, still strong: it is better to try to get by in the city than to stay in the village. Although it has long since lost its capacity to make dreams come true for the population which has been hit by the socioeconomic crisis, Lubumbashi has continued to draw young Congolese people due to its geographical position on the very border with the southern African countries. For those tempted by the migratory adventure, being in Lubumbashi means positioning oneself by the exit door. And in this country where everyone believes in miracles, once you have already made it to Lubumbashi, you will look for an opportunity to leave the country and thus “escape” the nightmares of the DRC.

Evidence shows that Lubumbashi’s attractiveness cannot be explained solely by its magical power as a city; it is also a place of transit to a multiplicity of destinations, to which young Congolese people hold the key. Lubumbashi’s function as a transit place is not just of benefit to the Congolese; even foreign nationals want to exploit this resource which Lubumbashi offers as a transit place. Among these many different destinations, the countries of southern Africa, including South Africa, Angola or Zambia, but also countries as far away as China or Indonesia are the end-point of the migratory adventure for many migrants. An interview with an official from the General Directorate of Migration (DGM) brought home to us the new transit role now being played by Lubumbashi to the benefit of certain migrants who come from Africa and Asia (Interview in Lubumbashi, December 2009).

Harking back to the words of a fable entitled *The Animals Sick of the Plague* by Jean de la Fontaine (1958), “They did not all die, although they were all sick”; one could also say that

although made sick by the crisis, Lubumbashi still has the power to attract. This attraction is evident in its popularity with ever-increasing numbers of foreign migrants, even though this situation is not reflected in the official statistics which, moreover, paint a misleading picture of a reduction (Rubbers, 2006 : 57-58), upsetting the demographic landscape and this city's spatial makeup. Districts which used to be home to Congolese nationals alone are becoming home to more and more foreigners. There are even districts with a majority migrant population and niche areas of business which are monopolised by nationals from certain foreign countries. This demographic and spatial makeup is visible to the naked eye and requires scientific analysis to identify its exact shape, hence the value of this research.

The city of Lubumbashi, in its secular migratory tradition, is characterised by a remarkable conviviality, particularly towards foreigners, judging by the information from our survey. It was a Zambian migrant who summed up the hospitality of the Congolese people living in Lubumbashi in these terms:

*“You know, I’ve spent a large part of my life here in the Congo. The Congolese are hospitable people. It’s a beautiful country. These people give foreigners a warm welcome. As far as I’m concerned, I’ve faced some difficulties in my life. Even in Zambia, there are always frictions between Zambians. In business – what’s the word they use here, the “coop”? – there’s no shortage of problems. But the foreigner isn’t hassled too much here.”* (Mr A, 65, interview in Lubumbashi).

While the use of primordial feelings can lead to violence between Congolese, as in 1960 and 1990, people's otherness is viewed differently when it involves a foreigner who has come from another country. Their acceptance is easy, even though it is sometimes marked by social distancing or denigration. Lubumbashi's population sees the Chinese man as someone who likes to live in a group and has little respect for the property he rents. This acceptance is based on the fact that this non-Congolese foreigner does not play a political role and offers no competition in the political sphere.

Moreover, many ethnic groups whose members find themselves being broken up and trapped between the borders of several neighbouring states, have relatives on both sides. Thus, the Bemba find themselves within the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia, the Lunda can be found in the Congo and in Angola; Congolese Tshokwe people have relatives who have been living in Angola for a long time. The confinement of these peoples and ethnicities within several different countries does not prevent them from developing and maintaining primordial links with their relatives on the other side of the borders. Luc Sindjoun sees this situation created by the artificial state borders as paradoxical, with a single people being enclosed within two or more different states; thus he uses the term "community transnationalism" (Sindjoun, 2002). This works in the favour of the easy integration of the Bemba (from Zambia), the Lunda and Cokwe (from Angola) when they meet up on Lubumbashi and vice-versa.

During the course of our survey, we got to know a young man aged 28, who completed his university studies in Lubumbashi by passing himself off as Congolese. Once he had finished his studies, his family, whose members live in Zambia, advised him to go there so that he could explore the labour market. He is currently living in Zambia as a Zambian. Zambians have been living in Lubumbashi for a long time, passing themselves off as Congolese.

The city of Lubumbashi, when it comes to social cohesion between the local population and migrants, has not seen any outbreaks of xenophobia. In May 2010, following mistreatment inflicted on players in a football team from Kinshasa (the Vita Club) in Nigeria, much greater tension was experienced in Kinshasa than in Lubumbashi; for several weeks, Nigerians could not be seen on the streets of Congolese towns and cities. Similar animosity was also seen against the Chinese following a report in South Africa on the behaviour of Chinese people living in the Rainbow Nation against Congolese nationals working with them. This report was shown on Mwangaza, a local television channel (cf. its website: [www.mwangaza.org](http://www.mwangaza.org)).

Chinese immigrants' homes are scattered across a number of districts. Some of them have learnt the local languages; others have difficulty in speaking French and even more so when it comes to the local languages. Indians and Lebanese people in Lubumbashi live together. It is unusual to find a Lebanese or Indian national living alone on a plot of land. The nationals from these two countries can be found in the commune of Lubumbashi and the commune of Kampemba. The majority of Asian migrants work with Congolese who are thus their "right-hand men": a "right-hand man" is a trusted individual (a man, but it could be a woman), who spends time with a foreigner, providing assistance as a guide and interpreter. This "right-hand man" term can be seen as equivalent to "gate-keeper".

Public opinion, when it comes to migration, varies between strongly positive and relatively neutral. In the 1970<sup>s</sup>, migration was the dream and ambition of Congolese families. Young and old would struggle along the difficult routes of migration. Within this context, the clandestine route seemed to be favoured and in the popular imagination, and terms in the local language such as *Ngulu*, *kobuaka nzoto*, and *kobuaka ngunda*<sup>4</sup> were meant to express the new self-image which the Congolese migrant should adopt to realise their personal potential as a migrant. This self-image has a particular morality based on bravura and risk. The high opinion of migration among the people of Lubumbashi has now changed; a realistic perspective can be found in popular discourse; the worsening of the crisis in the country and reports on the precarious existence of Congolese migrants abroad has led to a time of disenchantment, while the horizon closing in has led to feelings of impotence in the face of the many-faceted crisis which has taken up residence in the country.

For foreign migrants living in Lubumbashi, the perception is one of acceptance, indifference or denigration. The resident of Lubumbashi will welcome the foreigner with open arms. This acceptance can switch to indifference or denigration. Indifference comes from this attitude towards the other who has come to the city: they let him get on with what he is doing; they do not approach him due to certain internal divisions arising from social and economic asymmetries which have come about in this post-colonial city. As for the attitude of national and local politics towards Congolese migrants, there has still not been any great awareness of the creation of a synergy between the authorities and the Congolese diaspora. The strategic document on growth and the reduction of poverty in the DRC (DSCRP), contains a clear statement that the central government has included the diaspora as an element which is expected to contribute to the development of the national community (DRC, 2006); but this stipulation is just wishful thinking.

---

<sup>4</sup> *Ngulu* means pig, a dirty animal who likes to wallow in the mud. This recalls the inhuman conditions under which illegal migrants travel. *Kobuaka nzoto* and *kobuaka ngunda* means "throw away the body", in other words changing identity in such a way as to obtain residency documents during the journey as an illegal migrant.

## CHAPTER 2: MIGRANTS IN THE CITY OF LUBUMBASHI

When presenting the data gathered, it is important to make a distinction between the basic categories of subjects from whom we obtained the information. Thus we shall present the data in turn for returning Congolese migrants, then African migrants, then Asian migrants. Congolese non-migrants were interviewed so as to widen the scope of the information about this complex situation which is still developing and which we are trying to understand.

### 2.1 Congolese migrants returning to the DRC

The category of Congolese migrants returning to the country includes Congolese who have lived abroad for a certain period of time and have now returned to the country. This return is often linked to disappointments experienced by the Congolese migrant subject during their stay abroad. In general, returned Congolese had to leave the foreign country where they were staying when they encountered problems with renewing their residency papers. There are also others returning to the country of their own volition. Here it is not a question of looking at the determining factors behind their departure and stay abroad; instead, we are more interested in the conditions surrounding their return to the DRC and the process of their integration into society.

On this subject, it is important to stress that the Congolese state public services do not have statistics on Congolese migrants returning to the country. Thus it was difficult to establish a sampling basis for this category. Moreover, returning Congolese migrants will not make themselves easy to identify. This difficulty arises from the fact that in the Congolese popular imagination, returning to the country to live after being abroad seems to be viewed as a failure in their attempt to try to live somewhere else. As can be seen from an (undated) IOM document on "*the image of migrants in society*": "Sometimes, migrants returning to the country are seen as people who have failed abroad. Their return may be seen as the result of an inability to integrate into the host country." Thus, Congolese migrants returning to the country will present themselves as having arrived for a brief stay, giving the impression that they are going to go abroad once more.

To obtain information on this category, we had to interview 92 people. These were young people, both male and female. Their ages ranged from 25 to 42. Their average level of education was between secondary and university. In our sample, more than 80 per cent said that they had finished their university studies in the DRC. But in fact the complexity of the migratory situation for Congolese nationals is such that absolutely anyone, with absolutely any level of education, can jump on board the migratory bandwagon from the DRC. It is worth pointing out that there are many Congolese scientific and technical experts who have migrated abroad. This is the scientific and technical diaspora resulting from the brain drain highlighted by Nkuku and Rémon in their research into family life in the city of Lubumbashi (2006).

This figure of 92 Congolese is the result of a choice imposed by the constraints of the research within a context where the state public services lack the statistical data from which a sample could have been constructed. What was striking was the fact that the majority of

returning Congolese – at least those whom one meets in Lubumbashi – are to be found on the streets, not like street children, but they get by through money changing activities, where foreign currency is exchanged for the national currency. We used a snowball sampling technique to reach these interviewees. In this sample, there are 76 male subjects, i.e. 82.6 per cent, and 16 female subjects, i.e. 17.4 per cent. The most represented age group within this sample is from 28 to 32 years, i.e. 35 per cent. The second largest age group in the sample is from 38 to 42 years: this accounted for 26 per cent. A breakdown by marital status gave 50 per cent single, and 44.5 per cent married. The distribution by level of education is as follows: 46.7 per cent have completed their university studies and received a degree: 2.1 per cent have studied for two years at university (thus they have no degree), 36.9 per cent have completed their secondary level studies, while 14.1 per cent have received no formal training.

From the Congo, many individuals have taken the route of “escape from misery” (De Rosny, 2002), embarking on their migratory route in the 1990<sup>s</sup>: Congolese scientific and technical intellectuals headed for countries in southern Africa, and South Africa in particular. Doctors, metallurgical engineers etc. left the city of Lubumbashi against the backdrop of the interethnic conflicts of the 1990<sup>s</sup>, which set the people of Katanga and Kasai against one another. Following this conflict, “more than a million people originating from Kasai were ejected from Katanga Province to their own provinces, and a number of them were massacred. This ethnic cleansing was encouraged by the late President Mobutu, whose objective was to divide and rule. Some victims of these brutalities fled to South Africa, and a great many asked the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for asylum.” (Kadima, 1999). This rush to the Rainbow Nation (South Africa) was, moreover, encouraged by the opening in 1989 of official diplomatic channels between De Klerk’s government and President Mobutu’s regime, and the launch in February 1990 of the political transition process by the South African regime. The adoption of liberal admission procedures by Pretoria for asylum seekers and refugees also had the effect of increasing the number of appeals to that country (Kadima, 1999, 106).

It was from 1990, against the backdrop of the poor handling of calls for the democratisation of the country under the Mobutu regime, followed by deterioration in living conditions in the country, that Congolese people resolved and managed to embark on their migratory experience. Mass migration and the feminisation of migration from the DRC first became evident at that time. When one talks of mass migration, this is the increase in the number of migrant subjects who embark on the migratory adventure, while the term feminisation stresses the visibility of female migratory subjects in the migratory field. This latter notion expresses the presence of increased numbers of women among Congolese migrants leaving the DRC (Sumata, et al., 2004: 134-150).

The feminisation of migration from the DRC has arisen from social transformations taking place in this country, whose postcolonial crisis brought the menfolk to their knees as they were forced out of the economic sphere by unemployment, with the end of the wage-earning lifestyle and the development of informal activities. The pillage orchestrated by the Mobutu regime as it drew to a close (1992-1993) accelerated the destruction of the economic fabric and forced many now unemployed Congolese men out onto the streets. This growing informality of the economy shook up the patriarchal social structures and helped propel Congolese women to the forefront in daily life and the survival of households. These transformations in the internal social sphere have also spread to the field of migratory activities, since these are deployed as a continuation of the informal activities. One of the effects of these transformations is that the Congolese woman has become engaged in the

process of autonomisation, namely the increase of her capacity to manage activities which bring her financial resources of her own without the need to rely on a husband/man. Thus the feminisation of migration is empirically evident, at least within the Congolese context: one simply needs to observe the most prominent actors in cross-border economic activities, whether in Kasumbalesa or Kipushi, two border posts in Katanga province, or even in Bukavu and Goma, two border crossings in the east of the DRC, to realise the visibility of Congolese women in this movement.

At this point in time, Congolese nationals can be found in several countries across America, Europe, Asia and Africa. The number of Congolese nationals abroad is not clear. The varied status of Congolese migrants abroad is complex, as shown in the Migratory Profile of the DRC (Ngoie and Lelu, 2010). But, all things being relative, one thing should be noted: the social situation of Congolese migrants is marked by the precariousness of their existence abroad. This situation could be linked to the fact that the Congolese manage to migrate by using irregular means.

Whatever the reason, it would be wise to make a distinction between the desire to migrate and live abroad and the practice of trade mobility, the two acts which make up the picture of migration from the DRC. On this point, it is worth noting that migration destinations are large in number, due to the opportunities available to Congolese migrant subjects and the networks whose information and relationship resources they can use. One could cite African countries such as South Africa, Zambia, Angola, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville or the Central African Republic, but also distant countries such as Ghana or Morocco. As for the other continents, people from Lubumbashi also want to go to Europe, but also Canada, the United States or Great Britain. When it comes to destinations linked to trade mobility, there are a great number of these, which change depending on the capacity to offer goods and merchandise in new trading centres such as Dubai, Guangzhou, but also other cities in Thailand or Malaysia. It is not just the main trading cities which prove attractive, but there are also other centres/rural settings in certain African countries which can attract Congolese people questing after trade mobility. One example of this is Congolese people travelling to certain villages in Zimbabwe, looking for rugs to sell in the DRC. Another example is that of Congolese people travelling to certain centres in Zambia or Tanzania to buy wood or fish to sell in the DRC.

Among the Congolese returning to their country of origin after having lived abroad, two categories need to be considered. The first includes Congolese people, generally of advanced years, who have spent a lot of time abroad after having amassed a lot of resources, and who decide to return to the country to spend their “twilight” years. This return is well prepared; they invest in the Congo and have one foot in the country and the other abroad. This is because they return alone, their offspring remaining in Europe. In relation to this first portrait, we look back to the words of M. B., 64, a Congolese man who, having lived for a long time in Belgium, spends more than half of the year in the DRC, and more specifically in Lubumbashi:

*“I’ve already spent a lot of time in Belgium. My children, who are still young, can stay there. I’d like to spend the rest of my time finding somewhere to settle down here in Lubumbashi. I want to spend my twilight years here in Lubumbashi. The house I’m building at the moment will be for that purpose.”* (Mr B., interview in Lubumbashi, March 2010).

The reality is much more complex than that, because it is not only elderly people who think this way. During one interview, a 39-year-old Congolese man, who had left the city of Lubumbashi when only four years old, told us that he was coming to explore the possibility of preparing to return to live in the city. In answer to the question, “Why do you want to return to the Congo while you’re still young?” he said:

*“I’d like to prepare my return to the Congo now while I’m still young, rather than doing it when I’m already old. Coming back to live here isn’t a bad thing. You yourself have been to Europe. What’s so special about that place? In my view – and you won’t deny this – living conditions are good there, there’s freedom and it’s a healthy environment in which to live. But after that, what else is there? Work? They work you into the ground! Money? You can get a job which brings in 2,500 to 3,000 euros a month! And then you have to pay the bills, the rates (water, electricity, phone), and all you have left is 300 euros! It’s really stressful. I’d rather come back and live here. But I need to prepare properly. Set up a business employing 10 to 20 people; manage it properly so that I can get out.”* (Mr C., 35, interview in Lubumbashi, December 2009).

The basis of the subjective views expressed by these two speakers must be found in the problem of “happiness” in the migratory act, as raised by David Bartram (2010). In his article, Bartram starts his text with a provocative question. He writes: “Does migration to wealthy countries make immigrants themselves better off?” (2010 : 339). Looking at this question from both the economic and psychological angle, this author acknowledges a great deal of subjectivism in the field of knowledge about migration, where it is hard to know how to assess the impact of migration, namely the presence of migrants in the rich destination countries: they are there, but they are far from living happy lives (2010: 339-361). It is this lack of happiness, expressed variously as “pervasive dislocations” (Parreñas, 2001) or “transnational disaster”, according to Smith (2006: 237), which explains the frustration of Congolese migrants when they evaluate their migration and stay in Europe or the United States and their desire to return to their country of origin.

The second category includes Congolese nationals who have been turned away/expelled and/or whose living conditions abroad have become untenable. In this category, we find the young people. Thus they have returned to the country in spite of themselves and dream of nothing other than going abroad again. These two portraits constitute a sort of ideal type. Thus, other pictures can be painted of the situation in which returning Congolese people find themselves.

As for the countries in which they have lived and from which they have returned, the distribution is shown in Table 1.

According to this information, it appears that the foreign countries from which Congolese migrants in our sample have returned are African countries. These are South Africa, Angola and Zambia. The western countries, particularly Belgium, Spain or Italy and the United States turn up very little. The preponderance of neighbouring African states results from the geographical proximity which the city of Lubumbashi enjoys in the migratory continuum: this city is a gateway into the vast migratory territory used by migrants as a site from which they can live out their migratory dream. If unsuccessful, the migrant returns to this city, which becomes a kind of drop zone.

Table 1. Countries of residence of Congolese migrants

	Returning Congolese
<b>Former country</b>	
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Angola</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>Belgium</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Cameroon</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Congo Brazzaville</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Spain</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Senegal</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Tanzania</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>USA</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Zambia</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>N</b>	<b>92</b>

As for South Africa's dominance as a destination country in the sample, the views collected from the Congolese migrants themselves show that, in relation to the DRC, while young people dream of migrating to Europe, this quest becomes more and more difficult and uncertain with the stepping-up of restrictions on the granting of visas from within the Schengen area; the Rainbow Nation has come to be seen as a destination country which can act as a substitute, as something of a default solution. If they cannot go to Europe, then they will go to South Africa which thus becomes a final destination country. One 36-year-old Congolese man tells his migratory story this way:

*“When I left Lubumbashi after 1995 to go to South Africa, for me it was a way of distancing myself from the hell of my own country. For me, Johannesburg was a transit place, because I wanted to get to Canada, following information from a network that I was to make use of in the south. Once I was there in South Africa, the situation became more and more complicated. I started to find ways of getting by there. I married a Congolese woman. I dreamed of getting to Canada. The more time that passed, the more difficult it became, and I spent more than ten years in South Africa. I returned to the Congo. We'll see if I can afford to go back, because it's an attractive place to be.”* (Mr D., interview in Lubumbashi, June 2009).

According to this account, South Africa would appear to play a role as transit country to a number of destinations. When difficulties are encountered in getting the networks working to continue one's migratory project, the transit territory becomes a final destination territory. Sindjoun (2002) referred to the role played by South Africa in attracting people following the end of apartheid, as a place of transit, but turning into a final destination for many African migrants coming from French-speaking and English-speaking Africa.

We shall look at six themes which are most likely to throw light on the issues when discussing migration. These are: the sending of funds to the country of origin, assistance received in acting upon the decision to migrate, the routes of migration, the reason(s) for returning to one's country, the (non-)ownership of the house of residence, and the impression

that returning migrants retain of migration. The issue of migrants sending funds is central to the debate when discussing migration and development. To check the real situation regarding this point, Congolese subjects returning to the country were asked whether, during their stay abroad, they regularly sent funds (cash or goods in kind) to the country. The following table shows a breakdown of the answers to the question.

Table 2. Sending funds to the country of origin;  
Question: Did you send funds back to the country when you were abroad?

Answers	Frequency
<b>Yes</b>	<b>43.5%</b>
<b>No</b>	<b>32.6%</b>
<b>Not often</b>	<b>5.4%</b>
<b>On the contrary, my family helped me</b>	<b>16.3%</b>
<b>No answer</b>	<b>2.2%</b>
<b>Total (N=92)</b>	<b>100 %</b>

It is clear that the percentage of Congolese migrants sending funds to their country of origin, high as it is (43.5%), seems low if you add together the responses from those who sent none and those who, while abroad, were helped instead by their families in the country (48.9%). The complexity of the situations in which Congolese emigrants live explains the fact that sending funds to the country occurs infrequently among this sample. The precarious living conditions of some Congolese emigrants means that they can ill afford to send funds to their country of origin. According to observations in the field during a visit to South Africa (October 2009),<sup>5</sup> there are young Congolese nationals who have come to the country using a clandestine route to get in. Once there, they put themselves forward as refugees. Refugee status puts them in precarious situations socially. During our stay in Cape Town, we met a young 26-year-old Congolese woman, whose level of education was such that she held a state diploma (having finished her secondary studies): she had just completed her third month. She was waiting for a response to her request to be formally recognised as a refugee. She told us the following:

*“I came here to experience a new way of life. The journey started in Lubumbashi, where I got onto a vehicle. My visa expired the day I left Kasumbalesa. It was my faith that saw me through my journey. I arrived in Cape Town after three days on the road. I’m still trying to find my feet. I bought a South African SIM card so that I can chat to my family, who are in Kinshasa. So I get regular calls from my family. If I want to talk to them, I sent them a text message, asking them to call me. I know I’ll make it here. My family at home still support me and send me a bit of money if I need it and ask them.”* (Ms E, 26, interview in Cape Town, October 2009).

The second question asked was about the assistance received to act upon the decision to migrate. More accurately, we wanted to know whether the Congolese migrant received financial assistance from their family, enabling them to travel, the family in question being the nuclear family. The possibility of stating another source for the assistance received was left open. Thus there were three categories of answer: yes, in the case of assistance being

<sup>5</sup> In October 2009, we paid a three-week visit to Cape Town and spent one week in Johannesburg.

received, no if the opposite was true, while the third option covered foreign travel after receiving a study/retraining grant. The positive response was split into “help received entirely from the family”, “partial assistance received” and “help received from friends”. Where the answer was no, this was therefore a personal decision involving personal financial resources.

**Table 3. Assistance received to migrate;**  
**Question: Did you receive financial assistance to act upon your decision to migrate?**

<b>Answers</b>		<b>Frequency</b>
<b>Yes</b>	Assistance entirely from the family	32.6%
	Assistance partly from the family	10.9%
	Assistance from friends	2.2%
<b>No</b>	50 %	
<b>Study grant</b>	4.3%	
<b>Total (N=92)</b>		100.0%

It is clear, judging from our sample, that the majority of Congolese nationals who managed to migrate (50%) took the decision to migrate and managed it themselves without having received assistance from family or friends in the country of origin. Those who received (full or partial) assistance from their family accounted for 43.5%. Within the context of socioeconomic developments in the city of Lubumbashi, it is important to consider the deterioration in household living conditions. This poverty has led to social relationships being dropped, and instead of parents looking after their children, it is the children who look after themselves and support their parents. Studies on street children in a number of cities across the DRC have demonstrated a reversal of social roles: in some families, the children are sent out onto the street to find the means of survival; boys are sent out to do little jobs, hawking goods, while girls head out onto the streets, either to work as prostitutes, or to do housework and bring some money back for their parents every evening. The migratory adventure of young Congolese nationals is a result of their own initiative. Clearly, this aspect must be put into its proper perspective, because although among the returning Congolese migrants we interviewed in Lubumbashi, many said they had left on their own personal initiative, we came across other accounts of the migratory experience when we talked with Congolese migrants living in Cape Town during our visit there. For some young Congolese nationals who had become “Xhosa” (South African ethnic group), the role of the family had been a determining factor in their migration.

The third theme is that of the migratory route. Migratory routes tend to vary depending on the migratory territories to which the Congolese migrants are heading. Looking at the southern African area, the most commonly taken route is by road. In two or three days, a bus can leave Lubumbashi, passing through Zambia and Zimbabwe to arrive in South Africa; this is the south-south-east route. Another road route passes through Zambia, Namibia or Botswana and on to South Africa; this is the south-south-west route. Looking at more distant areas, the most common route is by air. So when Congolese nationals want to migrate to continental Europe, they might leave Lubumbashi and go to Angola, which they see as a transit country. From Angola, they will take a flight to Portugal, and from Portugal the other countries in the Schengen area are open to them, depending on their migratory project. Whatever the case

may be, there is no single route. There is a multiplicity of routes and directions taken by the Congolese when they want to attempt the migratory adventure. This information was gathered and unpicked following interviews with Congolese nationals whom we met during our visits to South Africa and Zambia. Returning Congolese who have already acquired some experience of migratory matters are able to provide valuable information in this regard.

The fourth theme is to do with the reasons for returning to the country. Answers were not presented in terms of voluntary or non-voluntary return, which would have tended to play down the complexity of the real situation. Ten items were presented as open answers, as shown in table n°4. On analysis, it appears that the most plausible reasons given by the Congolese for their return are linked to the difficult living conditions facing the Congolese migrant. The following items, when put together, can be seen in this way (items A, C, E and F). The primordial pressure is from the family which remains behind in the country, urging the Congolese migrant to return home; this was cited in 5.4% of cases. This pressure occurs when the migrant subject finds himself or herself in a neighbouring country such as Angola or Zambia or in South Africa. When the migrant subject is in a much more distant country, the pressure is there, but its force reduces with distance. Congolese migrants finding themselves in Angola and South Africa told us about their migratory experience, which they had to cut short, and they ended up returning to the country because of the incessant pressure from their families.

Table 4. Reasons for returning to the country;  
Question: What are the reasons to explain your return to the country?

Items	Frequency
<b>Expulsion</b>	<b>21.7%</b>
<b>End of study</b>	<b>6.5%</b>
<b>Broken dreams (victim of a swindle)</b>	<b>4.4%</b>
<b>Difficulties of day-to-day living</b>	<b>21.7%</b>
<b>Insecurity (xenophobia, violence)</b>	<b>6.5%</b>
<b>Difficulties in renewing residency papers</b>	<b>7.7%</b>
<b>Fitting in/getting by in the country</b>	<b>10.9%</b>
<b>Family pressures</b>	<b>5.4%</b>
<b>Reorganising before setting off again</b>	<b>6.5%</b>
<b>Homesickness</b>	<b>8.7%</b>
<b>Total (N=92)</b>	<b>100%</b>

The fifth theme comes from the issue of “residential integration”, in the words of Dupont (quoted by Lututala, 1995). This comes from the mechanisms by and through which a subject in a state of mobility tries to have a space where they can take up residence, with the ambition of having a house of which they are the owner, rather than renting in town. The substantial research needed to become the owner of a house rather than a tenant becomes the driving force behind urban life and, paradoxically, explains the spatial extension and expansion of housing developments and the proliferation of peri-urban areas and squats. The report on migration in Lubumbashi (Dibwe dia Mwembo, et al. 2005) from the University of Lubumbashi’s Urban Change Observatory successfully identified this outcome of the search for autonomy in terms of housing for the majority of those living in Lubumbashi. In the words of the report:

“In recent times, the tendency has emerged to build a house of one’s own in order to escape the annoyances of the landlords. These results confirm those provided by the MICS2 survey conducted in 2001 across the whole country. In urban areas, there is a slight tendency towards housing ownership. For Katanga province as a whole, 67.6% of households own their own accommodation, 12.1% are sub-leasing, 15.5% are tenants, 4.1% are housed by their employer and 0.7% fall into the “building site holding” category (Unicef 2002:29). The search for a home leads the town dweller to move out of the centre, where they rented or lived with others, to the outskirts, where they try to buy their own plot of land. This movement leads to the proliferation of self-build districts which do not adhere to urban development standards. This residential adaptation is one of the innovations of African towns and cities (Le Bris 1987: 268), namely a strategy of bypassing and distorting the official standards which apply to building and urban development.” (Dibwe dia Mwenmbo, et al., 2005).

For the Congolese national returning to the country, having a house, i.e. being the owner of a house to provide accommodation, is proof of the success of their time abroad. It is for this reason that in some towns and cities in the Congo, such as Kinshasa or Lubumbashi, Congolese migrants who are still abroad send funds to their families who have remained in the country to build houses. This desire for property ownership is so strong that families are currently throwing themselves into the construction of hotels (flats).

The last point that we wish to cover for this first category of returning Congolese concerns the impression they retain of migration. The impression they retain of their migratory experience is highly realistic, far removed from the rose-tinted idea that Congolese nationals who have not yet travelled abroad have of migration. The realistic impression of the migratory experience pushes Congolese nationals who have returned to the country to favour trade mobility, which leads people to move to do business. In this regard, the notion of “residential ubiquity” used by Lututala (2005) to explain the migratory dynamics of the Congolese people is most appropriate. Drawing on what was written by Jean de la Fontaine (1958), “he who has travelled much has learnt much”, returned Congolese migrants intend to exploit the circulatory know-how they have acquired to see how they can do business in the transnationalised space.

As part of this residential ubiquity, returned Congolese migrants dream of travelling abroad from time to time to find goods which they can sell on in the country, and making use of the information that they have acquired, they can conduct business through certain networks capable of managing relationships so that they can buy goods over there and sell them on in Lubumbashi. They value the fulfilment which results from the freedom and ability to improve people’s living conditions; they are also aware of the pressures which come to bear on them, such as the absence of community spirit and human contact with neighbours; but most of all, at the fiscal level, they have too many bills, rates and taxes which have to be paid regularly. The tale of Mr. C.’s migratory experience, quoted above (p.31), gives a general impression of migration. Another element which underpins this realistic impression is, in the case of Congolese migrants who have lived in South Africa, the permanent climate of instability in which they lived. In this respect, it should clearly be noted: this realistic picture of the migratory experience is far from resembling that painted by a Congolese national who has not travelled abroad.

So what is the popular perception of migration? It is important to note that this perception does not remain constant (Trefon *et al.*, 2004 ; Boeck, 2001a and b). It has changed a great deal over time. So we shall present the situation in relation to the phenomenon of migration in general and in relation to foreign migrants living in the city of Lubumbashi. Regarding migration, the people of Lubumbashi have a perception which has varied over time. In the 1980's, migration was seen as a valuable and longed-for possibility by the people of Lubumbashi. Having a child abroad was an insurance policy (Trefon, 2004). This rose-tinted perception has changed: while it is still an ambition to have a child abroad, the enthusiasm for such an investment is currently turning around. This change has arisen from the effects of the economic crisis which is shaking the world today, both in the developed and developing countries. We will present two accounts on this subject, which reflect the complexities of the perception of migration among the people of Lubumbashi. The first account is from a returned Congolese migrant. He lived in South Africa:

*"When I went to South Africa in '93, the situation there was good. There were good jobs and many opportunities to find work. I was living in Johannesburg; I was renting a flat with friends, and a week and a half's work was already enough to cover the rent. I managed to save up and send something back home. Now times have changed so much. It's no longer easy to get by in South Africa. Jobs have become thin on the ground. Sometimes, I had to turn to my family at home to support me financially. I knew that asking for money from home made things difficult for my family, and they complained..."* (Mr F., 35)

The fact that this migrant was asking for money from his family must have had an effect within that family. This impact would have affected the impression this family had of migration. Living every day with the difficulties of their son who was abroad, the members of that family would have reassessed their own situation and their point of view on migration and living abroad. This altered impression swings from fantasies about escaping from misery to the promises of possible success of one of their family members living abroad. In the search for a different future, the Congolese national tends towards the migratory solution as a way of providing for the future. The account given by Mr G. (33), a resident of Lubumbashi, expresses this changing impression of migration within the Congolese population:

*"I've finished my studies at the University in Lubumbashi. I'm getting by, doing business of all kinds, the "co-op", as we call it. I have friends abroad. I envy them, but I'm not getting carried away. Chatting to them, I realise that I could do better to stay here rather than going abroad. Besides, when you're with friends, you discuss the issue and find that life's getting more and more difficult everywhere. You might as well try to survive where you are."* (Interview in Lubumbashi, June 2009).

During the contacts we made in our research, we came across a 55-year-old man, a former worker for the Générale des carrières et des mines, which was the pride of the city. He has children who live abroad; he was not keen to say where they are living. His point of view on migration is very interesting:

*"My children are abroad. I've retired from the GECAMINES under their "voluntary redundancy" scheme. At the time, I really fought for them to go. It wasn't easy. They're getting on well. But I'm not very happy with what's become of them. Of course, they send me money. If there's a need, they won't think twice*

*about helping me. They've invited me to visit them where they are. I understand the difficulties they're going through. They're in a highly competitive world. They have to work really hard to keep their heads above water. Beyond the satisfaction and pride of a father who has children abroad, I must admit that my excitement about migration has changed. And I believe that migration isn't the solution to the country's problems.”* (Interview with Mr H., 55, Lubumbashi, March 2010).

As the impression of migration among the population changes, there are a number of factors which highlight this change. These factors include the effects of the campaign organised by NGO<sup>s</sup> in the DRC, such as “*Vanda na Mboka*”, an expression in the Lingala language which means “stay in the country”. This campaign, initially started in the capital of the DRC has been extended to other cities around the country, and particularly the city of Lubumbashi. The Congolese media have really taken this campaign on board, with reports about the various activities being organised to raise Congolese public awareness of the risks of clandestine migration. It is also worth mentioning the effects of the reporting of Africans who have died in shipwrecks after boarding the makeshift vessels that European coastguards come across from time to time in the waters off their coasts.

## 2.2 African migrants

Migrants of African origin are a part of the demographic landscape which contributes to the fluctuations in urban life in the DRC in general and the city of Lubumbashi in particular. Some of them were present before 1960, as is the case with the Malians and Senegalese, for example, in the city of Lubumbashi. It is chiefly Africans from the neighbouring countries who are most in evidence in Lubumbashi. This is the case with the Angolans, Burundians, Rwandans and Zambians. Some Angolans have ended up in Lubumbashi against the backdrop of forced migration, as refugees – this situation falls outside the scope of our work. Some Burundians and Rwandans have been directed towards Lubumbashi to work in the mines as part of the Belgian colonial policy of importing labour to make up for a shortage in Katanga (Ndaywell, 1998). Some Zambians, whose ethnic ties are very strong with the ethnic groups to be found in Lubumbashi will happily travel to the DRC and congregate in large numbers in the city of Lubumbashi. According to statistical data on the population of the city of Lubumbashi, Zambians come top of the table of this city's foreign populations (Archives of the population department, 2008).

Following the war which shook the DRC from 1996, a war in which some of the neighbouring countries were implicated, Burundian and Rwandan nationals were subject to a systematic persecution and the majority opted to leave the DRC. African nationals from other countries appear on the migratory stage in the city of Lubumbashi in the context of the socioeconomic restructuring which has affected the whole of Africa. As Wa Kabwe-Segatti (2009) writes: “While the (intra-African migratory) phenomenon is substantial, it is nothing new in Africa. These migrations have long been a strategy for survival and revenue diversification. Replacing or sometimes overlying the great trading systems of western Africa or the migrant labour systems of the mining areas of southern Africa, today's mobilities are distinctive because of their diversity, feminisation, relative spontaneity and close connection with the urbanisation process. Africa's growing integration into a globalised economy, but also the crisis in the agricultural sector in the face of the liberalisation of markets, the low level of industrialisation in the majority of African countries, the chronic political instability and the crisis in public services under the influence of successive state reforms are the main

driving factors.” (2009: 115). The context currently shaping intra-African migrations explains then why African migrants are following their own individual strategies.

We are going to present the data on African migrants, highlighting the length of their stay, their demographic breakdown, their level of education and their activities. We shall also show the perceptions that the people of Lubumbashi have of them. Integration and transnational links, insofar as they apply to them, will be dealt with later, once we come to talk about the situation with Asian migrants. In this category of migrants, we shall look at nationals coming from Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Nigeria and Zambia. Among this selection, the West African nationals tend to be lumped together by the Congolese population, who call them “Ouestaf”.

In addition to the “West-African” term, people also refer to “*Bahoussa*” (or *muhussa*, in the singular). In Kinshasa, the popular term to refer to West Africans is “*Dingari*”. The expression “*Bahoussa*” appears to be a corruption in the local language of the term “*Haoussa*”. This people from the south west of Lake Chad, who live principally in the north of Nigeria and the east of Niger are known as a trading people. In the past, their commercial network has extended as far as Tripoli in the north and has joined up with Swahili commerce in central Africa on the banks of the river Congo. For the Congolese people, nationals from the west of Africa are referred to in this way, either as shorthand or as a sweeping generalisation. There are two plausible explanations of this term “*Bahoussa*”: it is possible that the first migrants from West Africa to arrive in Lubumbashi were *haoussa* traders; hence the use of this term to refer to all comers. Thus the term “*Bahoussa*” means someone who is of *Haoussa* origin, of course, but in Swahili “*kuhuza*” means “to buy”; “*bahuza*” or “*muhuza*” means one who buys and sells. The expression *Ndingari* comes from the Yaka language of Bandundu province, and means witchdoctor. This reference is applied to nationals from West Africa because, from among their ranks, the first to come to the Congo passed themselves off as marabouts who were capable of inflicting curses and/or resolving all kinds of problems for Congolese people (Biaya, 1998: 342).

The business spirit which encouraged the first West Africans to come to the Congo is still a determining factor in their presence, and indeed in the arrival of others. According to a study of the migrations of West African nationals in Central Africa, it is reported that Malian and Senegalese nationals arrived in the DRC in the 1960<sup>s</sup> and have become more and more involved in dealing in raw materials such as diamonds and gold; others came as marabouts, consulted for advice by African political leaders. Congolese historian Ndaywell (1998) talks of the use made by President Mobutu of West African marabouts, who became major players in his circle in the 1980<sup>s</sup> and apparently helped him to get the better of the socialist French president François Mitterrand when he came to power in 1983 (Ndaywell, 1998). This culture of business and marabout activities has coloured the impression that Congolese people have of the “*Bahouza*” living in the country. This is certainly the point of view given by Mr I., a 69-year-old Congolese man who lives in Kamalondo, who says:

*“I was born here in Lubumbashi before the end of the second world war. I’ve lived for a long time in the Albert commune, now Kamalondo commune. In the 1960<sup>s</sup>, West African nationals started turning up in this town. They set up shop as jewellers and goldsmiths. They were also traders, bringing in goods which the Congolese people loved. They were very good at selling things on the streets. Some were marabouts; their religion was Islam. I remember they were also known for their taste for business, dealing in precious materials. They would buy*

*and sell diamonds, gold etc.. They had networks they could use to pass on these precious materials. Under President Mobutu's regime, when the trade in precious materials was banned, the "Bahouza", which is how we would refer to these people from West Africa, were experts at dealing in these goods. When it came to smuggling, they were a good match for those we called the "Bapostolo"<sup>6</sup> (Mr I., 69, interview in Lubumbashi, September 2009).*

According to an academic colleague whom we questioned during this survey about West African nationals being described as "bahoussa" and "ndingari":

*"West African nationals came to the Congo for business. I think their business spirit led the Congolese to refer to them as people who buy, which in Swahili is "bahuza" (derived from the Swahili verb *kuhuza*, to buy). This interpretation is not inconsistent with the theory that the first to arrive called themselves "Haoussa". Besides which, almost all of them passed themselves off as marabouts, or master enchanters, bringing charms and other items with magic powers. The term "witchdoctor" might be a better way of expressing it. In fact, they were malicious: to maintain the respect of the Congolese people and prevent them from stealing their business, they portrayed themselves as having the ability to read hidden things and to curse anyone who dared to steal their goods. The Congolese residents of Kinshasa, the country's capital, understood that and used a term from the local Yaka dialect, "ndingari": witchdoctor. A Congolese musician popularised the term *ndingari* in a song that people danced to."*

(Interview with Professor Kazadi Kimbu, sociologist, October 2010, Lubumbashi)

At present, West African nationals are both men and women, whose ages range from 18 to 70. There are not just West African nationals in Lubumbashi; neighbours from the country's southern borders are also present. These include Zambians. There are also Angolan, Burundian and Cameroonian nationals. Zambians can be found in Lubumbashi because of the close family ties which they share with the Congolese people of Bemba origin. This is the "community transnationalism" of which Sindjoun (2002) speaks. They also cross over into the Congo because of the makeshift economy which prevails in the country. The Angolans, meanwhile, coming from a Portuguese-speaking country, end up in the city of Lubumbashi having fled the consequences of a lasting conflict which has ravaged their country; they are found in their greatest numbers in the city of Dilolo, roughly 300 km from Lubumbashi. Those who are in Lubumbashi are former refugees who have changed status and are currently scraping a living in this city. According to empirical observation confirmed by real-life accounts, the African nationals most in evidence on the migratory scene in Lubumbashi are increasingly young; the length of their stay is no more than ten years.

Nigeria is also a key player in Africa at the demographic level: one African in every seven is Nigerian on this continent (Sindjoun, 2002). Not only that, but Nigeria plays a key role in the demographic arena in Africa; since the 1990<sup>s</sup> the Nigerian population has demonstrated a great amount of initiative in terms of migration, being found almost everywhere on the African continent and other continents too (Bouillon 1999). The diversification of destination countries for Nigerian migrants has led to Nigerian immigrants being found in the DRC and also in the city of Lubumbashi. Nigerians are highly prominent in the DRC because, as in the

<sup>6</sup> The description *Bapostolo* is used to refer to worshippers from an Apostolic church, whose members shave their entire heads, wear white or red robes and let their beards to grow. They pray in the desert; since there is no desert in the DRC, they pray under the sun in a cleared area like a football pitch.

city of Kinshasa, they are very numerous: they occupy a whole district, which has become the Nigerian district; in particular, this is where they sell replacement vehicle parts. In a working class district of Kinshasa known as “Rond-point Victoire”, there is a street full of small shops owned by Nigerian businesses. In Lubumbashi, the presence of Nigerians is evidenced by kiosks selling films on CD-ROM known as “*Karachika*”, Internet cafés and vehicle spare part shops.

The age of the migrants is one criterion which helps gauge the length of their stay in the country. The recent wave of African migrants to Lubumbashi shows the complexity of the mobility whose constant comings and goings is its key feature. When we interviewed some Malian nationals, it came to our attention that some had only just arrived in Lubumbashi from Angola. Their stay was brief: they were coming to visit family members living in Lubumbashi, while trying to explore business possibilities. One 35-year-old Malian who had just arrived said he intended to visit the city of Kolwezi before returning to Mali after a month. We are going to look at the issue of the length of their stay in this city.

This issue can be dealt with by looking at a wide range of information given by the migrants we interviewed. The length of stay varies, judging by the sample (N=78) we took. There are African migrants of advanced age (over 60) among the Senegalese and Malian nationals living in Lubumbashi. But there are also those whom we might call the new generation: they are younger, aged 35-49. It is among the Malian, Senegalese and Zambian migrants (those in our sample, of course) that we find those who have already been staying in Lubumbashi for a long time. “More than twenty years living in Lubumbashi” is the phrase we heard most often among people of these three nationalities.

Among African nationals, the demographic breakdown is dominated by men, in our sample at least. The majority of men are either married or single. The men who have already been living in Lubumbashi for a long time “have roots”, which means that they are very settled, having married. Those who have just arrived, and are being looked after by their elders, are single. Zambian, Malian, Senegalese and Nigerian nationals are for the most part married. It is among the Burundians and Cameroonians that the single people can be found.

From our observation, the explanation for this is as follows: Zambians, taking advantage of community transnationalism links, along with Malians, Senegalese and Nigerians have come to this city with the intention of conducting business and living here, because that is linked to the success of their business. To do this, they want stability, and this manifests itself in family life with one or more wives. The Burundians deserve particular attention. Most of them have come to Lubumbashi as refugees. Having left the DRC to escape the xenophobic persecution which affected them between 1998 and 2001 with the outbreak of the second war in the DRC, the Burundians are starting to return. Some are students, sent by their parishes with a view to completing their university studies; others are there to make a living. The Cameroonians are a new category among migrants appearing in Lubumbashi. So that they can try to explore the territory, most arrive as single people. And it seems that it is men more than women who take advantage of information networks to explore the field and attempt their migratory adventure.

Analysis of the situation regarding Zambian migrants in Lubumbashi shows that the predominance of men in our sample should be seen in the context of a complex set of interactions which render the migrant Zambian woman practically invisible. In our sample, the migrant Zambian woman is even more under-represented. According to sociological analysis, the Zambian migrant woman’s invisibility could be one outcome of the strategic

discretion employed by the Congolese husband of a Zambian wife. At the time of one-party politics under the second Mobutu regime, foreigner status carried a high cost and would expose people to harassment; hence the use of pretence and the concealment of foreign wives by their Congolese husbands, especially when they were nationals of neighbouring countries. This is the view of a Zambian migrant (aged 50) who talked about this issue:

*“I’ve spent most of my time here in Lubumbashi. I worked for Gécamines, the big mining company which was the pride of this city. Zambians from the Bemba tribe were in the majority here. For us men, that wasn’t a problem; we wanted to show our identity and nationality. I know there are a lot of women of Zambian nationality who have married Congolese men. But they prefer not to let people know they’re Zambian. They don’t want to be seen as such.”* (Mr J., Zambian, interview in Lubumbashi, July 2009).

Details of marital status are shrouded in some confusion within the Congolese context. It is clear that Congolese legislation recognises monogamy; but when it comes to polygamy, the situation is complex in this country. In this regard, even African migrants living in the city may officially be single; but to fit into their environment, they have Congolese women as partners/wives. In Senegalese and Malian circles, most have more than one wife. They enter several marriages, because they are Muslims. Mr K. (45), a Malian originally from Kayes, talks about this situation in these terms:

*“I’ve been living in Congo for a long time. I have one Malian wife and two Congolese wives. I have a lot of children. I send nearly all of them to Mali, which they know very well. It is the very young children who stay with me and live with their mothers here in Lubumbashi”* (interview in Lubumbashi, July 2010).

Another important aspect in the profile of African migrants living in Lubumbashi concerns their level of education. On the basis of this sample which we have analysed, we have found that the majority of African migrants coming to this city have complex educational profiles. On the basis of the interviews and information available to us, we have found both high and elementary levels of education. It is among nationals from Mali, Senegal and Zambia that one finds migrants with an elementary level of education. This is explained by their age profile and the type of activities in which they engage. Among Zambians, this is explained by the fact that some of them have left their villages in Zambia to come to Lubumbashi and try to meet up with relatives on the Congolese side, and thus get by here. The Angolan, Burundian and Cameroonian nationals we interviewed have studied to university level. One Cameroonian national gave an account of his migratory experience where he said that he had finished his university studies in his country. Having tried without success to get to France, he decided to come and “break rocks” here, hoping to get enough money together in the DRC to go to Europe. For him, the DRC is very much a temporary residence, where one could say that he is living a life in transit, because he says he hopes to get to South Africa. This attempt to go to South Africa ended in failure. As for the Zambian nationals, the majority of Bemba origin have left the border villages to work in the mining companies which were this city’s chief attraction. A high level of education is unnecessary for activities of this kind.

What are the activities of African nationals? These activities vary. In general, they cover a range of activities falling within the informal sector. In an environment dominated by informal activities, people often engage in several activities at once. The main activity may mask a whole range of others. Added to which, it is unusual for a survey subject, even among

the Congolese people scraping a living, to have a single economic activity upon which they depend. The Malians and Senegalese specialise in butchery; they open jewellers' shops; they run small shops and groceries. This is the prominent part of their activities. In the background, they engage in all sorts of dealing in precious materials to be found in Katanga. During the pilot survey organised shortly after the research launch seminar, we met up in Kamalondo, the West African ethnic district. We talked with a Malian man who runs a shop and a jewellers'. Before we went on our way, he was keen to take us home, and there he showed us a quantity of precious materials he was trying to sell on. He gave us some samples in the hope that we would find a market for them abroad. This double life of economic activities is virtually the rule among West Africans. One Malian shared an old adage with us, which says "when you're abroad, you should never walk on one crutch; you should try to walk on two crutches." Here, the crutch is an activity which you undertake; one activity is safe enough; but you are even safer if you have more than one.

Nigerians have established themselves in the sale of CD-ROMS of music and films made in Nigeria, as well as the sale of spare parts for vehicles of all makes. The operation of Internet cafes is also a part of their initiatives. Nigerians have also moved into the religious sector: there are Nigerian pastors, founders of Pentecostal and Revivalist churches which they have opened in Lubumbashi. The flock, of Nigerian origin, will meet in such churches to support their brother-pastor. The emergence of the religious sector provides a new focus, where new relationships are worked out between the Congolese residents of the city and the Nigerians present among them. A pastor of Nigerian nationality has set up a church in Lubumbashi: here, Congolese people can be found, but also Nigerians. This church seems to carry on from other churches planted by this same pastor in Nigeria and Namibia. This pastor lives a globe-trotting life: he will spend a few days in Lubumbashi, splitting his remaining time between Nigeria and Namibia.

The Cameroonians have thrown themselves into the sale of raw materials and women's clothing from China and Dubai. One case worthy of mention is the presence of young Cameroonians who have come to enrol at the University of Lubumbashi. Information about these Cameroonian students who have registered with higher education establishments in Lubumbashi is well recorded in the DRC migratory profile of 2009. It is the human medicine faculty which appears to attract young Cameroonians (Ngoie and Lelu, 2010).

Before we bring our presentation of data about African migrants to a close, it is important to analyse the migratory project of African migrants living in Lubumbashi, and also to explore the impression that the population in Lubumbashi has of African migrants. In Katanga province, Lubumbashi is an urban area; but it is not the only centre to attract internal or international migrants. With this in mind, we wanted to find out whether African migrants living in Lubumbashi felt any desire to migrate to other areas in the DRC, or even to migrate to other countries in Africa or elsewhere outside of Africa. In addition to this issue, we also had questions about the city of Lubumbashi's position as a transition area or final destination. We shall start by asking African migrants whether their migratory experience in Lubumbashi is the very first of their lives.

For the majority of African migrants living in Lubumbashi and with whom we had contact, this was not their first migratory experience in this country. It was among the Senegalese and Zambians that we encountered a high percentage of people having their first experience. In our sample, more than half of the Senegalese and Zambians are living in Lubumbashi as the venue for their first experience of migration. The Cameroonians and Angolans are in

Lubumbashi after having other migratory experiences elsewhere. This is it not a hard and fast rule, but it is possible to infer that when a migrant is in their first migratory experience in a place such as Lubumbashi, where there are a number of business opportunities, such as breaking rocks, they have little inclination to migrate elsewhere; meanwhile, a migrant who has had migratory experiences, with Lubumbashi as a stopping-off point in the migratory space, is a truly mobile subject who may leave Lubumbashi and go elsewhere. Lubumbashi can also be seen by those people as a transit place where they can try to get by, to attempt their migratory adventure; if there are difficulties, or it does not work out, then they are ready to engage in further mobility. This is what we believe to have found in talking to a Cameroonian subject (39), holder of a university qualification from his home country, who acknowledged that he was here in search of financial resources/money and if he accumulated enough he could then decide to head off to South Africa, and from there to Canada or Australia.

It is in the accumulation of migratory experience that migratory know-how is acquired, and what we call the culture of mobility can develop. This mobility should not be seen as one-way, namely only moving to cross the border and go elsewhere. The culture of mobility manifests itself in the fact that, even when settled in the city of Lubumbashi, African migrants devote themselves to activities which encourage them to embark on constant trips to and fro between the city of residence (Lubumbashi) and other areas within the province or in other provinces where there are niche markets for their particular business.

Questions were asked to explore what migrants think of the possibility of staying where they are in Lubumbashi or going elsewhere. This is a delicate issue, because deciding to migrate when one is already abroad is not easy. One needs resources to do it. But the context of the international financial crisis which shook the world in 2008 has clearly destabilised a number of businesses and individuals. And the city of Lubumbashi, whose attractiveness is based on the mining sector, was shaken even more by that crisis. At the time that the crisis struck the mining sector in Katanga, more than 30,000 jobs were lost, setting people in this city on the road to unemployment (Journal Le Lusois, 2009). In addition, one 40-year-old Congolese businessman, having succeeded in signing a contract with a Chinese businessman to construct a copper processing plant, told us he had invested 50,000 US dollars in setting up a furnace. With the furnace construction work completed, just a few days from the plant's opening, the 2008 crisis struck Lubumbashi. Everything stopped; his investment has not produced a single penny! (Interview with Congolese man Z., June 2009 in Lubumbashi). Hence many migrants with hopes of making money from businesses linked to various niches in the mining sector have looked again at their dreams of living out their lives in Lubumbashi: somewhat disappointed, they are looking for opportunities to try their luck elsewhere. Two questions on this issue were put to migrants, to find out whether they have plans to leave Lubumbashi and try their migratory adventure elsewhere in another country, and whether they are in the habit of moving around within Katanga province or to other provinces in the DRC.

The majority of respondents say they do not want to migrate and go elsewhere, while the proportion of those giving no answer is also large. The answers obtained from our sample seem not to portray the complex contradictions of migrants in Lubumbashi. In fact, the revelation that these people do not want to head off elsewhere is worthy of note, because this contrasts with what is happening in other countries such as South Africa where, according to Loren Landau and Iriann Freemantle, "tactical cosmopolitanism is expressed through a strong orientation towards unknown and as-yet unvisited places both outside the country of origin and the country of destination" (Landau and Freemantle, 2009: 381). While the migrant is

seen as a hero, a subject who has coped with difficulties, it is difficult for him to express his disappointment, namely the fact he is ready to pack up his bags and try the migratory adventure elsewhere. Lubumbashi is an Eldorado, inspiring the dreams of many.

The will to return to the country of origin is strong among Angolans, Burundians and relatively strong among Zambians. Angolans want to return home against the backdrop of the end to the conflict in the country, while Burundians, much affected by the situation of violence which has torn through their country are homesick for the country, to which they feel they must return. One Burundian migrant spoke to us in these terms:

*“I’m here in Lubumbashi for my studies; this has given me some perspective on the future for my country. But I prefer to live where I have my roots. I really believe that once I’ve finished my studies here I’ll be returning to Burundi. You know, when you’re here and you hear all the sad news about violence and armed attacks on the population in Burundi, that stops me sleeping. I feel too much remorse and I’m homesick.”* (Mr L., 25, interview in Lubumbashi, January 2010).

Now we are going to explore the perception that the population in Lubumbashi has of the African migrants. The city of Lubumbashi has not experienced waves of xenophobia as has been the case in cities across South Africa. Relationships are played out in a spirit of conviviality.<sup>7</sup> This conviviality is founded on the neutrality of African migrants in the local political issues. But this conviviality has been bought by African migrants who have adopted certain “ways of doing things”. These acquired habits are part of the tactic of creating relationships of trust because in Lubumbashi the way in which otherness is managed is based on the idea which says that “anyone who behaves like we do is not a foreigner.” So behaving “like us”, as far as an African migrant is concerned, means marrying a Congolese woman; living on the same plot as other Congolese people; it also means sharing in their joys and sorrows, for example by visiting the bereaved. During the course of our interviews, we learned of a Malian man who has a place on the management board of a big local football team. The involvement of such an African migrant in the board of a local team can only enhance the prestige of nationals from the migrant’s country.

Observations of integration and transnational links will be tackled in a comparative perspective contrasting the situation of African migrants with that of Asian migrants.

## 2.3 Asian migrants

In tackling this point, we would like to explore a number of aspects through which it is possible to break down the profile of Asian migrants in the city of Lubumbashi. Thus we shall look at their date of arrival, their demographic makeup, their marital status, level of education, professional activities and approach to residential integration. Migrants of Asian origin (Lebanese, Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis etc.) have been present only since recent times. While the presence of Lebanese people in Lubumbashi dates back a little further, a lengthy presence which can be seen in a number of other African cities such as Dakar (Tarat-Najib, 1995), the Chinese have appeared on the migratory scene in Lubumbashi since the year 2000, according to the information available to us. Whereas against the backdrop of the Cold War the West talked of the threat of the “yellow peril”, the current visibility of Asian nationals has not produced the sort of debate which would lead to any kind of hue and cry among Africans.

<sup>7</sup> This conviviality can be turned around, as was the case with increased tensions felt against Nigerians in Kinshasa in May 2010.

There is no yellow peril from them living here; the peril arises from the European migrants abandoning the DRC.

Looking at the demographic breakdown of the migrants in our sample, it is clear that men are in the majority. This predominance of men is also evidenced by documents from population services department of the city hall in Lubumbashi (2008). For those attempting the migratory adventure, many male migrants arrive alone at the start. This situation, seen among Asian migrants, has also been seen among African migrants. It is once their integration has proved successful that migrants opt for marriage, either by bringing in their spouses who had remained in the home country, or by marrying local women. The first option applies in the majority of cases to Asian migrant subjects, while the second option, which is frequent among African migrant subjects, is very rare among Asians. While there are very few Asian migrants who bring their spouses with them to Lubumbashi, there are a great many with Congolese girlfriends or mistresses. Those who are married are mainly monogamous.

Those Asian migrants we interviewed either had no children or an average of two children. Migrants with a lot of children – whether monogamous or polygamous – tend to settle where they are. Those with no children where they are keep more developed or intimate ties with their country of origin. Migrants in the first category are in the DRC without the intention of returning to their country of origin, while migrants in the second category have come to the DRC to work, with the intention of returning to their country of origin. It is among the Indian nationals that we find migrants working where they are, all with families in the city of Lubumbashi.

There are few single female migrants who come to this country. Foreign women of Asian origin come to Lubumbashi following their husbands. Prior to October 2008 (before the international crisis which shook the mining sector in Katanga), the presence of a number of Chinese women began to be noticed in the city of Lubumbashi. According to information gathered in the course of this survey, we were told that there were Chinese women going to nightclubs as prostitutes. It is certainly difficult to confirm this information at the present time since there are no longer any single Chinese women to be found in the nightclubs of an evening! Clearly, before the latest financial crisis, Chinese-owned restaurants and casinos were set up in the city. When the crisis struck the mining sector in Katanga with its full force, a number of restaurants and casinos run by the Chinese shut down. Women are rarely seen, if not totally absent, since the start of the crisis. In 2010, a slow recovery in economic activities in Katanga's mining sector was observed. Thus the return or, more accurately, the arrival of Asian migrants in the city of Lubumbashi has also been seen. During a parade held on 1 May 2010 in Lubumbashi at the Place de la Poste in the city centre, various privately-owned companies joined forces for a procession of workers, both Congolese nationals and foreigners. A mining company called Bazano, which belongs to a Lebanese-born naturalised Belgian, stood out: in its ranks it included a number of foreign workers, particularly Lebanese and Belgians.

Within Asian migrant circles, we have seen the same sort of sociability that we would normally ascribe to inter-African relationships: group-based living predominates among the Asian migrants living in Lubumbashi. These people live in groups; Lebanese nationals house members of their extended family until these latest arrivals are fully fledged. Chinese nationals also live in groups; these links are founded upon interwoven professional interests which revolve around employers who have recruited them before arriving in Lubumbashi. The majority originate from the same part of China. Some Chinese or Indian nationals live in

annexes with their Congolese partners. Links with the countries of origin are not completely broken. The tendency to regroup, creating ethnic/national/religious associations, is powerful among Asians, as among Africans. Asian nationals have organised themselves into associations run by small committees: it is businessmen in each community who take on the role of president. This is the case in the Lebanese and Indian communities. The Chinese, who have arrived a little late in terms of visible migration in Lubumbashi will not delay to do the same, if they have not done so already.

While African migrants largely live as tenants, there are – particularly among the Chinese – three different residential patterns in the city of Lubumbashi. They live either with their Congolese associates in annexes to the main house, or if they are tenants they live together in complete promiscuity, causing frustration among the owners of the houses. Finally, under the third residential pattern, they practise “the spatial combination of home and business” (Bertrand, 2010: 18). It is the consequences of the second residential pattern which have led to the Chinese in this city being perceived in a very different manner from the others. A first-hand account from the owner of a house leased to a Chinese man is most eloquent:

*“I signed an agreement to lease my house to a Chinese man at an attractive price. When I went to make a routine visit to my property a short time later, I was astonished at the number of people living there. It was hard to work out exactly how many of these Chinese tenants there were. All the bedrooms had been transformed into dormitories and refectories. The deterioration in the house was such that I was sorry to have agreed to rent it out to the Chinese man. He came to sign the contract on his own. But the house was being occupied by a whole crowd of his countrymen. Poor house.”* (Mr M, 50, interview March 2010 in Lubumbashi).

Mr M.’s account shows how people consider the Chinese living in Lubumbashi – not all Chinese, but those who rent: according to the information in our possession, Chinese people living in a group in a house expose it to great wear and tear and end up ruining it. Now, for some Congolese people who have houses to rent out, these houses make up a portfolio which helps them to keep their heads above water in the midst of crisis in the country. Within the context of the triumph of millennial capitalism, it is clear that when faced with the choice between people and things, and particularly things of an intrinsic value, it is the second of these which takes priority. The Congolese national cannot make an exception to this rule: if made to choose between his house and the tenant, his house will come first. This stigmatisation of the Chinese comes from the way in which they use or abuse the rented house.

The Chinese way of living and doing things has stirred up a reaction among the Congolese. Within the context of the social precariousness which is the fate of urban life, there are some Congolese who will agree to rent out their houses to Chinese people, just so long as they pay well; but other Congolese people will be reluctant to have a Chinese person renting their house. A Congolese national living in Belgium has, after a number of business trips to the Congo, built a large house. Seeking a tenant for his house, he would rather have it rented by a mining company belonging to Westerners than sign a lease agreement with a Chinese national. He is categorical about it:

*“I’ve worked hard to find a good tenant among the expatriates. I wouldn’t want to have a Chinese tenant. Clearly I’ve been approached by a number of Congolese*

*go-betweens trying to get my house for some Chinese people. I've turned down any such offers. Now a mining company, Tenke Fungurume Mining (TFM) is renting my house. It's a short-term contract. But I'm happy." (Mr N, 39, interview in Lubumbashi, August 2009).*

What is the impact of this stigmatisation of the Chinese which we find in these two accounts? Do they result in xenophobic or distancing behaviour against them? It is not easy to give a clear-cut answer to such questions. What is important to note is the fact that the stigmatisation is found in certain segments of the population, consisting of those renting out houses; elsewhere, for other segments of the population, it is more a stereotype based on hearsay. We know that words can create a reality; but this stigmatisation has yet to harden to such an extent that it would create impenetrable barriers between the local population and the Chinese. In this city where the local grapevine is the main source of information, what is said about the Chinese on this issue is based on what others have previously said. But one thing is sure: the fact that Chinese people can be found living together in groups reinforces the view that by living in large numbers in a small space, Chinese people will eventually ruin a house. Added to this, the third residential pattern, with its combination of home and business premises, does little to improve the local view of the Chinese. While this stigmatisation has not taken on the extreme form of xenophobic violence, it still leads to the social distancing exhibited towards this community. This social distancing is found in conversation only for the time being, and takes the form of mockery, in a negative impression of the Chinese among the local population. To this end, it is worth remembering the question raised by a Tanzanian employee amazed at the contrast with the Chinese community in Tanzania: "Why are there two kinds of Chinese in Tanzania? One kind wears dirty clothes, looks poor, but works very hard; another kind wears a good suit, rides in a modern car with a camera on his shoulder, and looks like an American." (Sautman and Hairong, 2007: 90)

How does the profile of Asian migrants compare with their levels of education? According to information gathered during the course of our survey, Asian migrants who have settled in the DRC will not have studied a great deal at home. Once here, they get by; they work for whoever has brought them over to Lubumbashi. This is explained by the fact that the migrant subjects falling into the target group did not come here in the context of work migration in the formal sector. Moreover, even those who have come here as recruits to work in mining companies seem to have been recruited within "ethnic" or "friends" networks. Thus, as far as the Chinese are concerned, some of the people we interviewed were recruited from a single area through contact with relatives or friends to come and work in the DRC. Migrants, such as they are in the DRC, have come there as a result of the businesses proliferating under the shadow of the informal economy. In this respect, they are "adventurers", a term to be understood in its noble sense; adventurers who, having studied little at home, have taken the route of migration to explore the alternatives to improve their living conditions here in the DRC, when they could not have afforded to do so at home.

The account given here by a Chinese man demonstrates the modest, even rustic origins of some Asian immigrants living in Lubumbashi:

*"I come from China. I haven't been in any other country before. The DRC is my first experience of migration. When we were in China, they taught us that this is a very rich country. There are several kinds of ore and basic and other products, such as good quality timber. One brother recommended coming here to the DRC to be with his Congolese partner. I was recruited in China. I left my province to*

*come straight here. I haven't studied much in my country: it's expensive to go to University in China. In China, I was working in a shop where we sold windows. The crisis in China led to that shop being closed. Can you understand my French? I'm going to improve my French over time. I'm going to look for money here in Lubumbashi."* (Mr O., Chinese migrant, 40, interview in Lubumbashi, September 2009).

The many business opportunities are one of the crowning attractions of this country; as one Indian migrant told us: "I'm going through some difficult times at the moment, but I believe that one day I'll have a lot of money in this country. And I'll be calling you to say I'm going back to my country now." (Mr O.A. interview in Lubumbashi, September 2009).

Over the course of interviews with some Chinese nationals, it emerged that some Chinese and Indians had been recruited by networks which seemed to give the impression of vassalage contracts. Rather than talking of vassalage, it might be better to flag up the existence of a virtual "coolie trade", "in other words, the recruitment, sometimes under duress, of workers signed up to miserable contracts to replace slave labour..." (Ma Mung, 2006: 235-236). In any case, the Chinese or Indian national falling into this category gave the impression that he was working for his boss and was totally reliant on him; often poorly paid here, he would resign himself to his fate, in the hope of accumulating enough money in Lubumbashi before returning to China or India.

How do these recruitment networks operate? It is in China and India that the recruiters operate. They recruit workers who must come and work in the DRC; they receive their pay once they have fulfilled their task of providing labour. One interesting thing to note on this point is the fact that the recruitment information in China and India circulates around groups of people who find themselves in the same situation in their country of origin, namely unemployed or people originally from the same ethnic community or brotherhood. The rationale by which dependency and exploitation are part of relationships that lead to the accumulation of capital (Ma Mung, 2006: 234-236) by Chinese and Indian nationals creates a sort of discipline among the Chinese and the Indians recruited to work in the DRC. One Chinese national told us about the difficulties he experienced with the employers who helped him come to the Congo the first time he came to Kinshasa. He says:

*"For the first time, I arrived in Congo to work with people from my home area in Kinshasa. They looked after me. They housed me and fed me. The working conditions were very difficult. I wanted to end my contract with them and return to China. They took my passport to restrict my movements. The situation got worse. One day, I ended up with them at our embassy in Kinshasa, where I complained about them. The embassy official advised me to sort myself out and keep working with them. I refused to continue work at their place. I slept out in the open in Kinshasa, and it was difficult finding food to eat. After that, the situation improved. Now I'm in Lubumbashi."* (Mr P., 41, interview in Lubumbashi, September 2009).

The activities undertaken by foreign migrants help us gauge the creation of "ethnic economic niches". This question is relevant to our understanding of the professional activities in which migrant subjects living in the city of Lubumbashi are engaged. On the whole, Asian migrants are involved in businesses across all sectors of local economic life. This is general or specialised commerce. General commerce includes the sale of clothes, cosmetics, bread-

making, household furniture or electrical and IT products. This is not an exhaustive list. Specialist commerce here is understood to mean the sale of products in certain special sectors such as electrical products, IT products, spare parts, CD-ROMS with music or films (this last field being almost exclusively a Nigerian monopoly), and vehicle repair garages.

The Chinese can be seen running construction firms; the Chinese also own restaurants; just as the Indians specialise in running hotels and setting up vehicle repair garages. The Lebanese specialise in bread-making and running hotels and restaurants. A new sector offering added value is public health. Indians and Chinese are competing in the health sector in the city of Lubumbashi: there has been a certain division of labour, because while the Indians are becoming more prominent in the pharmaceuticals, the Chinese are opening up hospitals where they use medicines straight from China; the Congolese workers used by these hospitals play a secondary role, assisting the Chinese doctors during consultations with Congolese patients. Across the city of Lubumbashi, more than five hospitals (described variously as clinics and hospitals) belonging to Chinese nationals display Chinese symbols on their buildings. In these hospitals, they employ Chinese medicine and acupuncture, and all the products they administer come straight from China. The services provided by Asian migrants in certain niches such as construction, the health sector, architecture or garages are generally quite expensive.

The city of Lubumbashi, which has seen a rapid rise in the use of goods vehicles is kept going by garages of all kinds. There are some belonging to Congolese nationals, and they are generally found on individual plots of land under the trees. There are good garages which belong to foreigners, Indians and Lebanese. In the commune of Lubumbashi, the TATA garage is well known: it belongs to Indians and sells Tata vehicles. It also provides a high-quality servicing department. The Lebanese have a number of garages. Unlike the garages run by the Congolese, those belonging to Lebanese or Indian immigrants have buildings and modern equipment. They have conquered the market by offering services to State institutions in the provinces and to international organisations working in the city. European and Asian expatriates living in the city of Lubumbashi make use of these modern garages. Similarly, the provincial government has its vehicles repaired at the TATA garage.

The quality of the service provided by these modern garages belonging to migrants creates asymmetry and exclusion areas. For they seem to be open to people with high incomes, thus excluding the average Congolese person who cannot afford to have their vehicle repaired here. This kind of service creates exclusion zones and contributes to what we refer to as areas of social non-diversity. A 40-year-old Congolese man working in a customs office often comes into contact with Asian migrants for professional reasons. In July 2010, he was involved in a road accident while driving to Kasumbalesa; his vehicle was seriously damaged. Through his contacts, the Congolese man was introduced to a garage in the Commune of Kamalondo which belonged to a Lebanese man. His vehicle was repaired well. We shall let him continue the story:

*“I’m happy with the work they did in this garage owned by a Lebanese man. They managed to fix almost everything. There’s just one thing I’m unhappy about, and that’s the high price I had to pay for this service. Those people (the Lebanese) overcharge. They’re very expensive. For example, when it comes to a small dent removal job, they’ll ask for more than 100 USD, but if you go to a Congolese panel beater 20 USD will get the job done. It cost me a lot of money, this work to repair my vehicle.”* (Mr P., 40, interview in Lubumbashi, September 2009).

This observation about the high prices charged by garages belonging to Lebanese migrants for services rendered was also encountered in relation to Chinese people who have moved into and taken over the construction and architecture sectors. It should be remembered that the city of Lubumbashi has experienced considerable spatial expansion. This expansion has arisen from the housing developments being awarded to the people by the state and the construction of houses and buildings, which are springing up like mushrooms. In this area, the Congolese are looking for something new in the architecture, and the Chinese are rated highly for the quality of the work they do and, more specifically, for the finish they bring to houses. Finish in this context means the work of fitting windows and tiles and installing the interior fixtures and fittings. Alongside this perception of high prices being set by Asian migrants for services they render in the city of Lubumbashi, it should also be mentioned that there is a stigmatisation of products made in China. The market in Lubumbashi has been flooded with items coming from China. In fact, when a Chinese product is bought and presented to a friend, a comment which is frequently heard is that it is a “Guangzhou” product. The “Guangzhou product” label is synonymous with poor quality. This label makes people laugh!

Even in the health sector, the services offered by the Chinese, despite admiration for them, create frustration and discontent among the population of Lubumbashi. We visited a hospital belonging to Chinese people, and located in Lubumbashi city centre. One educated (university graduate) Congolese woman, whose husband was admitted for diabetes and loss of appetite tells us this, during an exchange in this same hospital:

*“We’ve just completed our fourth day. We’ve already paid 700 USD. Tomorrow, we’ll need to go and get some more money for the continued treatment. These Chinese people do good work. But they’re too expensive. They work using Congolese people as auxiliary care personnel. You know, when you have a consultation with them, the notes are filled in by the Chinese doctor in Chinese writing. They prescribe medicines and the prescription is all in Chinese characters. Worse than that, when you go and look for these medicines in the city pharmacies, you can’t find them. So they prescribe medicines which you have to buy from their pharmacy which is next door in another lot of buildings. It’s all very expensive. One surprising thing: the consultation rooms have beds where the Chinese care workers sleep at night. It’s here in the hospital that the Chinese people who work here are housed. Over there you can see a restaurant, which is for all the Chinese people in this building.” (Mrs Q, 45, interview in Lubumbashi, December 2009).*

This account puts the mixed picture painted of the Chinese by the people of Lubumbashi into context. Both valued and denigrated, the Chinese are the subject of divided opinion. This divided opinion leads to the finding that the Chinese are perceived as both good and bad, and to be kept at a distance. “They’ve simply come here to make money,” people say of the Chinese.

In July 2010, with the dry season hanging over the city, while walking in the city centre, we saw Asian migrants from all strata of the economic life of Lubumbashi. On a very windy day, a tractor and trailer laden with sand and gravel for construction work was being driven by an Indian accompanied by a fellow countryman. We learned that these Indians had just set up a business selling sand and gravel for construction. All that is needed is large lorries capable of

transporting loads of sand and gravel to get such a business up and running. And it brings in a lot of money in a city where construction work proliferates, particularly during the dry season. This sector, where sand and gravel are sold, has also attracted African nationals of Tanzanian origin, who have brought heavy dumper trucks capable of transporting high tonnages into the city. According to the Congolese legislation on economic matters, retail activities are reserved for Congolese nationals only. The migrants simply trample all over this rule. The Chinese, Lebanese and many others engage in all sorts of businesses, including commerce and retail. In Lubumbashi, an Indian woman has opened a fashion boutique, and produces a wealth of outfits and skirts for Congolese women. Along any street in the city of Lubumbashi one can find little shops run by Asian migrants selling goods of all kinds, such as rat poison, household gadgets and so on.

As in the case of African migrants, we interviewed Asian migrants about their migratory experiences in this city. The majority of Asian interviewees living in Lubumbashi are engaging in their first migratory experience in this city. They have come to this city and this country looking for opportunities to improve their quality of life. As one Chinese man says, he came because he was offered some work to do in this city. He says this:

*“I was working in China in a glazing shop. The crisis came; the shop was closed. Before that, I studied in college; but university education is expensive. I couldn’t afford my studies and neither could my parents. I found out that there was work in the DRC. I learned that this country is very rich. I was tempted by that, and I came. Before making this journey, I’d only ever lived in my town in China. I went from my town to Guangzhou, and from there I got a flight to Nairobi, and from there I came to Lubumbashi.”* (Mr R., 35, in Lubumbashi, January 2010).

Two other questions on this issue were put to migrants, to find out whether they would leave Lubumbashi and try their migratory adventure elsewhere, and whether they are in the habit of moving around within Katanga province or to other provinces in the DRC. In answer to this question, migrants of Asian origin living in Lubumbashi do not, for the most part, dream of migrating elsewhere. The majority will state this, and answers in the negative are more numerous than non-responses. The Chinese, Indians, and even Lebanese who have come to Lubumbashi have migrated through networks. For this reason, they seem to be tied, and have no room for initiative in their migratory activities, as is the case with African migrants. A Lebanese man, aged 40, expressed his migratory experience to us in these terms:

*“I spent my youth in Lebanon. I haven’t studied much. I went to the Qur’anic school. I spent a year at University studying electricity. The war which tore through my country stopped me from carrying on. My parents lost everything in a series of clashes between the rival militia and following the Israeli invasions. I was led to believe that I could make a living in the DRC. In the town where I was, I was recruited to come to Lubumbashi. They took care of my ticket and visa application. I was assigned to a restaurant as a cook. When business is good, you can make a nice living. But up until now, everything’s going well for me. I look back over my life, and it’s ok. As for leaving Lubumbashi to go somewhere else... oh no! I’m not tempted.”* (Mr S., interview in Lubumbashi, November 2009).

Another question is whether the migrant subject has any ambition to return home. Having arrived alone or having summoned their spouses at a later date, Asian migrants display a

spirit of stability in the midst of mobility across the transnationalised space. When a space offers them opportunities to flourish, they drop anchor and try not to be too mobile. This desire not to return to their country of origin seems to be founded on difficult life experiences that they must have endured in their own country, and the business prospects on offer here. One Indian man aged 48 told us that this city has huge wealth-giving possibilities. He tells us:

*"I was in business in my country. But when certain circumstances changed, I lost everything. I came here. There are highs and lows. But this is a wonderful city and a wonderful country. There are lots of things you can do here. I've tried selling maize flower imported from Zambia. It worked. But I think I might turn to other activities. I have a niche market in mind and, with time, it will work. There are things you can do here on the ground, and it can bring in the money."* (Mr T., interview in Lubumbashi, February 2010).

## CHAPTER 3: DISCUSSION

### 3.1 Social diversity: African and Asian migrants in Lubumbashi

The problem of migrant integration can be assessed in the light of certain aspects such as social diversity (*la mixité sociale*), namely a particular way of life among the migrants which puts them into contact and a state of ongoing exchanges with the native population. This social diversity can be seen across a wide continuum, and here we shall look at the way in which living space is used. Other aspects could be matrimonial exchanges, i.e. marriages between migrants and natives, or knowledge of the local languages.

The routes taken towards integration and involvement by the migrants will help us identify differences between what the African migrants and Asian migrants do. On the whole, there are both social mixing and social ghettoisation for the migrants and the Congolese population. Social mixing seems most in evidence among the African migrants and local populations, whereas social ghettos exist where the Asian migrants and the people of Lubumbashi are concerned. African migrants, with their lifestyles and mastery of the local languages, particularly Swahili and other local dialects, manage to mix easily with the local population. This mixing is made manifest by the marriages which are easily entered into between African migrants and Congolese women. One Malian migrant, an “adventurer”, told us he had married a Malian woman and two Congolese women; this enabled him to put down stronger roots in this land.

At this level, it is important to place the concept of the adventurer in its proper context, divorcing it from the negative connotations it carries in some analyses. In these analyses, the migrant adventurer is generally an illegal immigrant trying to get into the territory of “Fortress Europe”. Joceyline Streiff-Fenart and Philippe Poutignat (2006) flag up this negative meaning of the term “migrant adventurer” when they write:

“‘Adventurers’ – this description, which is widely used in most of the French-speaking African countries, is generally applied to migrants looking for illegal entry into Europe, but it can take on very different meanings depending on the context of the discussion and the people speaking, particularly depending on whether it is used as a self-referential term or as an externally-imposed categorisation. In a looser, though no less meaningful manner, this term means a migrant for whom the plan to travel, the desire to see the world and personal motivations such as self-fulfilment override the economic aspect of the plan. It can also be said that the adventurer is the person who has left “without reason”, with no reason other than the desire for adventure, which can also mean that their migration cannot be explained by situating it within the family structure or within a migratory chain” (2006).

This is also the viewpoint given by Sylvie Bredeloup (2008), although she tries to go beyond the common European perceptions of this issue when she places the risks encountered and the intensity of life experiences at the heart of the migratory adventure, which allow the person to

win through and become tough. For our part, the notion of the adventurer is seen in the context of the cunning, bravura and accomplishment, or “tactics” in the sense used by Michel de Certeau (quoted by Bayart, 1981, 60) which enable the individual to make a success of their migratory act. Going beyond what Certeau says, the tactic is not just the weaker person’s knack for doing things, but also the use of devices and initiatives to deal with the harshness of daily life by dealing in the short-term.

Other Malians from Kamalondo, like tenants, live alongside other Congolese nationals. Besides, the presence of West Africans occupying houses in the working class commune of Kamalondo is a good demonstration of this mixture based on living space which eliminates social distance between these foreigners and the natives. The elimination of social distance between African migrants and the Congolese is clearly seen by a Congolese man, who tells us:

*“I’ve been working in a shop for many years. I’ve already worked with several foreign bosses. I’ve known Senegalese, Malians, Indians and now Chinese. I live with my family in Kamalondo, known as Kamal. I’m aware there’s a distance when I work with the Indians and Chinese, but with the Senegalese or Malians, everything runs smoothly.”* (Mr U., 45, interview in Lubumbashi, January 2010).

Asian migrants maintain a social distance between themselves and the Congolese. Even when working with Congolese people in the same shop, Asian migrants still exist as a group; the Congolese people are either their guides or workers. With these people, relationships stop at the shop door. Indians and Chinese alike in Lubumbashi have the same practice of distancing themselves from the Congolese. Upon assessing the Indians’ and the Chinese people’s lifestyles and approaches to interaction with the Congolese, one notices two levels in the lives of Asian migrants. In the professional sphere, Asian migrants will develop close relationships with the Congolese. Beyond the professional world, these are social ghettos. The Asian migrants will bunch together, recreating a way of life among themselves which resembles the way of life in their own country. This two-sided approach to social mixing creates a segmented integration which works at different rates, enabling Asian migrants to impose conditions on the Congolese people with whom they interact, without opening themselves up fully to Congolese culture and society.

It is because of this stratified lifestyle adopted by Asian migrants that we talk of “social ghettoisation”. While they share the same urban space, there are areas for Asian migrants and the local population where they look after themselves, and others where social diversity comes into play. These areas are linked to the time spent in one’s professional life or in one’s social life, devoted to family and personal leisure. The time spent in one’s social life corresponds to the area of social diversity; the time spent in one’s social life is time spent living with one’s own, giving rise to social ghettoisation. Signs of the latter can be seen in the city: Chinese and Indian restaurants and casinos are primarily frequented by Chinese and Indian nationals. One simply has to visit such restaurants to see that Congolese people rarely go there alone; they often only go there in the company of Chinese or Indian nationals. Thus the primary function of Chinese and Indian restaurants is to mark the presence of these foreigners, and this presence becomes a show of difference. The signs above the thresholds of these establishments carry a message. When a Congolese person enters, they realise they are somewhere else, even though the physical space they use to cross the threshold is familiar to them. Mr V., 45, is a Congolese businessman. He travels a lot on business. During a discussion on this issue, he told us the following:

*“The presence of the foreigners’ restaurants and casinos in the city of Lubumbashi demonstrates the changes this city has seen. While I’m impressed by the transformation, I feel more and more of a stranger in my home city. When I see signs in Chinese outside a restaurant, I have the feeling that I’m entering a different place, that this is no longer Lubumbashi.”* (Mr V., interview in Lubumbashi, March 2010).

The social distancing under which the Asian migrants live is a result of the way in which these Asian migrants are recruited in their country of origin, based on the dynamics of networking and cronyism. A Chinese man whom we interviewed told us that his arrival in Lubumbashi was arranged from his home town through contacts there. He told his family about it. This Chinese boss brought him here. This boss sorted out his board and lodging in Lubumbashi. Many others are in the same situation. Others came under a contract between the Congolese government and a consortium of Chinese businesses for the 5 major projects of the Republic. They are working in Lubumbashi for the Chinese Railways Engineering Company (CREC). The account of one Indian man’s life working as a representative in Lubumbashi for an Indian boss is reminiscent of neo-feudal labour conditions: he works in Lubumbashi; he receives a food allowance from his boss in Kinshasa. His salary is paid to him via a bank account in his country of origin. It is his boss who takes care of renewing his residency papers.

The majority of Asian migrants live in a separate world in Lubumbashi. This could be due to cultural differences and the failure to master the local languages, but also to the peasant origins of some Asian nationals, particularly Chinese. Some Chinese people whom we met seemed to have come from prison and thus had come to finish serving their sentence by working for the “bosses” who had brought them here. One such rumour about Chinese people leaving prison and being sent directly to Lubumbashi has had some currency in the city of Lubumbashi. In research in Mali, Bourdarias drives this point home, reporting a rumour according to which “the Chinese government may be sending prisoners to work in Mali” (2009: 49). One thing is certain, though, the sobriety with which some Chinese people live here is surprising: a lifestyle where behaviour is reined in as it would be in a military camp: they barely eat, or they eat on the run; in other words, they buy food which they can eat en route or under a tree; they buy doughnuts, bread rolls and peanuts. In answer to a question about how well he knew his own country, China, one interviewee, who could speak neither French nor English, told us this: “I left my village to come straight here... (Do you know your country’s capital city?) No. I haven’t visited my country’s capital yet... I left my village and came straight here from Guangzhou.” (Interview with Mr W., 39, November 2009 in Lubumbashi).

Our attention was also drawn to transnational links and the sending of funds by migrants living in Lubumbashi. Foreign migrants living in Lubumbashi maintain a close attachment to their countries of origin. The majority say that they regularly travel to their countries of origin. Some are in Lubumbashi and have left their wives and children in their home country. Once here, they reconstruct key links by setting up associations to bring together nationals from one specific country or another. In the case of African and Asian migrants, associations for Malians, Lebanese, Nigerians, Indians etc. can be found.

When it comes to the Chinese, the existence of restaurants with Chinese signs is clear evidence of key attachments between them. It is here that many Chinese people spend the

majority of their leisure time. One Chinese man expressed his satisfaction and lack of homesickness when in Lubumbashi, due to the atmosphere he finds there when he is in places such as Chinese restaurants and casinos. The only thing he is sorry about is that there are no dragon carnivals in Lubumbashi yet! This “feeling of being at home” is maintained by the atmosphere created by associations and clubs that incoming migrants find in the city.

Modern technological gadgets such as the Internet or mobile telephone are often used to maintain contact with members of the family who have stayed in the country of origin. The sending of funds is common among migrants and the channels used for these transfers are complex. The use of agencies is infrequent. Chinese migrants have said that their salaries are paid to bank accounts in China to their spouses; while here their board and lodging were provided by the company employing them. Some Malians transfer funds by telephone: they pay the money to another Malian in Lubumbashi; he then notifies his family in Mali to release a specific amount to the recipient family. There are also migrant subjects who do not send funds to their families who have stayed in the country.

The knowledge of local languages helps to gauge the degree of integration by migrants into their environment. According to empirical observations, African migrants are much more open than Asian migrants when it comes to knowledge of the local languages. A failure to master local languages by Asian migrants, although not preventing interaction between them and the local population, is an indication of how difficult it is for them to integrate into this setting. This explains their use of “gatekeepers”, who help them in their interactions with those around them. However, it seems that some Chinese nationals, like some Indians, can fit into their surroundings even if they do not speak the local languages; they can use a mixture of Chinese, English and local languages.

In a study conducted in China on the presence of African migrants and the issue of means of communication between African nationals and the local population in a few cities in China, including Guangzhou, Bodomo mentions several conversational strategies such as the use of bilingual secretaries and the use of calculators (Bodomo, 2009, 18-19). These practices, seen by Bodomo in China, are reproduced here in Lubumbashi by the Chinese and Indians. The latter use “gatekeepers” in the role of translator-guide and in certain transactions they resort to the unspoken language of the calculator to communicate.

Among those factors which contribute to the attractiveness of Lubumbashi for African and Asian migrants, it is worth mentioning the “everything can be sorted out” culture. Reference is made to the amount of money changing hands in transactions between migrants and the various state departments dealing with them. This is the case, for example, with the General Directorate for Migration (DGM). The regularity of someone’s residence or the irregularity which can complicate their stay arises from the period of validity of their papers and their renewal by migrants. To explore this aspect of the situation, a question was given to migrants about the ease or difficulty of their dealings with the migration services in Lubumbashi. Overall, the “no problem” (in renewing papers or resolving problems with the DGM officials) turns up a number of times. “Everything can easily be sorted out here” is a key part of the place’s attraction to migrant subjects. Some migrants find it a haven of peace and prefer to live here away from the harassment they could face when having residency papers checked or renewed. There is another facility on offer to migrants living here, concerning Asian migrants: the “political and administrative” umbrellas represented by their bosses and local allies, who will obtain and renew their residency papers.

Since we are talking about political umbrellas, it is important to mention that the creation of foreign nationals' organisations (African and Asian) works on several levels. These organisations enable migrants to recreate their key associations; but they also act as a shop window to demonstrate the presence of these migrants; they are also gateways to maintaining links and contact between foreign nationals and the local authorities. They are certainly an aspect of transnationalism; but they are also a part of the quest for involvement/integration in putting down roots. Besides which, these migrant organisations are always run by the most important (and thus successful) businessmen in a given migrant community.

### 3.2 Lubumbashi: living space and signs of migration

We want to move on to considerations of an analytical nature, to tackle issues linked to the topic of migrants in Africa and in the city/town. Armelle Choplin and Jérôme Lombard (2008), studying the Mauritanian city of Nouadhibou, make the relevant point that migration plays "a role in urban and economic restructuring of a place." This empirical evidence of transformations in a place following migration can be seen in a general way virtually everywhere within the context of globalisation. This interaction between migration and urban space can work out in two directions, the first acting on the second, and the second maintaining the dynamics of mobility. But first, an important remark on this point. Mongin (2008) writes on this very subject:

"The current territorial reconfiguration, one of the drivers behind globalisation which can only be gauged in the light of the economy, is characterised by at least three tendencies: the prevalence of flows of all kinds (technology, information, communication, pictures, wealth, populations, finance etc.) on site, and the dominance of the private over the public and of the closed community over social diversity."

In this respect, it is appropriate to see Lubumbashi as a receptacle in which some of the three effects identified by Olivier Mongin can easily be seen; we would like to look at two aspects of these effects: the first and third effects. Lubumbashi is part of the melting pot, receiving nationals from all countries. Flows of all kinds end up there. At the human level, Lubumbashi sees the arrival of people coming in not by chance, but from the most distant countries. Such as a number of Chinese nationals encountered in the city who came straight from their village in the west of China to work in Lubumbashi. They barely speak English; they do not know a single word of French. When the mining sector was experiencing a boom before the 2008-2009 international financial crisis, the city of Lubumbashi saw the arrival of the Ukrainians. They were recruited as pilots to fly Antonov aircraft, which Congolese businessmen bought with a view to setting up aviation businesses. They brought these aircraft which had been bought in the former Soviet Union to the DRC, where they were to maintain them until they had trained Congolese mechanics to service them.

The circulation of goods, images and fashions can be seen in the city of Lubumbashi. While the computer (and particularly the laptop) used to be a rare commodity in this city, it is now to be found widely across the city. The Congolese people who are migrant subjects are keen to bring laptops of all makes (and particularly second-hand models) into the country to sell them on in Lubumbashi. Moreover, Chinese migrants walk around with bags which sometimes contain food, but also miniature laptops which they sell at an affordable price. Thus it is possible to find laptops at prices to beat any competition in the city of Lubumbashi.

The population of Lubumbashi manages to consume products coming from many places. In the city's supermarkets, you can find Chinese products, but also Indian, South African and even Brazilian products. Here, chicken and cooked meat products come not just from South Africa or Zimbabwe, but from Brazil too.

In the business world, as part of trade mobility, a number of mobility corridors or routes should be noted. The first is the "European and American corridor". Congolese nationals have business networks which enable them to circulate goods between the United States or Europe and the city of Lubumbashi. The second is the "African corridor": this allows the circulation of goods and merchandise between Lubumbashi and places as far afield as Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya.

It is important to note that the dynamics of the second corridor have given rise to the emergence of the conceptual category of "*Bana Luunda*": these are those young Congolese people who decided to move into Angola, risking their lives for diamonds. A particular self-styling has created a new moral subject who will not hesitate to do what they need to do in order to succeed, using shadowy means and breaking taboos (de Boeck 2000a and 2000b). The third corridor is that of the Asian countries: it is just as large and covers various countries such as the United Arab Emirates, China (in which the city of Guangzhou has become famous in popular local imagery). This multiplicity of directions provides an example of the complexity of the dynamics of mobility from the city of Lubumbashi.

The last effect whose signs we can see is the dominance of the closed community over social diversity. This issue goes back to the use of urban space which creates disparities terms of secure space versus disputed space. Safe or secured spaces are those spaces occupied by certain categories of migrants who have succeeded at the economic level and whose residences receive a high level protection from the security companies which are very much *en vogue* in African cities. The city of Lubumbashi is characterised by disparities and asymmetries within residential districts. The higher-class districts are occupied by Congolese nationals who have succeeded in the economic, political or administrative sphere. It is in such districts that migrant businessmen can also be found. Generally speaking, houses rented by foreign migrants are well-appointed and stand out from the other residential accommodation in the street or district.

What is most interesting to note is the social non-diversity of which Olivier Mongin (2008) speaks: migrants live in communities which are closed in upon themselves. Contact with Congolese people is governed by work or particular relationships due to certain activities. Thus a Congolese "gatekeeper" may go around with a Chinese man all day long. Migrants frequent public places such as markets or certain private hospitals; but here too there seems to be a certain social "ghettoisation" in evidence.

This can be explained by looking at the example of Lebanese people living in Lubumbashi. There is a system whereby employment is offered according to national preference: this situation can be seen in the fact that Lebanese businessmen work with their fellow Lebanese nationals. One such case is that of a restaurant located at a petrol station in the city of Lubumbashi where the head chef is a Lebanese man and the man responsible for billing and collecting the takings is also a Lebanese man. In a supermarket called "Jambo Maart", which belongs to Indian individuals, the chief accounting posts are also held by Indians.

What about the links between the city and migration (internal and international)? The links are complex. First of all, there is clearly the fact that the majority of cities in the DRC are colonial creations. In the post-colonial period, the cities have had a role to play at the political and administrative level. It is in the cities that the state and the institutions representing it are most in evidence. Thus, if a man has political ambitions, he can only fulfil them by staying in the city. The presence of state institutions in a city creates an employment opportunity along with other advantages. In this regard, being in a city creates an opportunity to experience the social mobility familiar from urban sociology. The possibilities glimpsed through social mobility as experienced in the city mean that it plays an attractive role in migratory matters. Rural or urban migration is part of the dynamics of cities in the DRC which are attractive sites. Migration from cities to the country only happens if the country/rural areas concerned become centres of economic interest, for example where there is quarrying or mining or a border post which represents a possible exit out of the country. 32 km from the city of Lubumbashi is Kipushi, a border post, and a popular location for cross-border trade between the DRC and Zambia. People living in Lubumbashi, looking for business, may decide to settle or work in Kipushi. Roughly 120 km from Lubumbashi there is another city, Kasumbalesa, an obligatory waypoint on the route to Zambia and South Africa. The life of this city is associated with activities linked to the border crossing between the two countries: state departments operate there, attracting a high concentration of the population for all kinds of business.

Among those rural areas which become sites/centres for the population to live are the site of Karoano-Mbola, roughly 90 km from the city of Lubumbashi: an attractive quarry because it has a wealth of ore with a high copper content, which the provincial government has decided to grant to small-scale prospectors for exploitation. Between 14,000 and 17,000 people live on this site; there is no provision for public sanitation or other infrastructures to support community life (hospitals, schools etc.). The prospectors come from other urban and rural centres in Katanga province, but also from Maniema and Kasai province.<sup>8</sup>

By taking in those active in internal migration, the city of Lubumbashi also plays a role as a place where migratory projects can be planned out at an international level. Young Congolese nationals move from rural areas or other towns to Lubumbashi and manage to develop or take advantage of the social networks in order to work out their plans for mobility beyond the national borders. The city represents a number of business opportunities. Whether in Kinshasa or Lubumbashi, the predominance of the informal sector brings with it the practical inventiveness needed to deal with the crisis. In this way, the Congolese, businessmen with considerable capital or those getting by in the informal economy, can opt for and engage in international mobility for business reasons. This is the case for two young Congolese former university students. We met them at Lubumbashi airport as they were about to set off for Nairobi on business, with Dubai as their final destination. This is what one of them told us:

*“I completed my degree course in the Faculty of Law at Lubumbashi University. I started out by exchanging currency. Then I opened a stall in the market to sell merchandise. A helping hand from my family and a particular set of circumstances, and I was able to get somewhere in business. I have a shop in the city and I go to Dubai at least twice a month. I go to buy particular goods in person in Dubai, and I sell them on in Lubumbashi. In Dubai, I’ve met Congolese*

---

<sup>8</sup> See press communiqué from the League Against Corruption and Fraud, an NGO based in Lubumbashi, regarding the Mbola-Karoano incident. 10 May 2010.

*nationals and I speak to them when I arrive and they help by showing me round the city and the transport system. Business-wise, things are going well, but I have to be on the move all the time.”* (Mr B., interview in Lubumbashi, March 2010).

Thus the city becomes a laboratory where makeshift economic activities and survival strategies can be worked out. So it is possible to consider migration as being part of those strategies for getting by. Getting by, the makeshift economy, is at the heart of urban life in the DRC in general and Lubumbashi in particular. Now one of the consequences of international migration for the city of Lubumbashi can be seen in its architecture. As we have said: Lubumbashi is a vast building site with houses springing up like mushrooms everywhere one looks. This spatial enlargement has caused the city to spread. The belt around the city of Lubumbashi is being capitalised upon by the people of Lubumbashi, who build houses there. Looking at the types of houses currently being built there, especially the roofs, there are styles copied from various houses abroad. So there are roof styles from Dubai, Tanzania, South Africa and even from China. The current consumption of foodstuffs is supported by imports from Brazil, India, China, Tanzania and other places which are geographically distant but close at hand in the context of globalisation.

## CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

At the close of this report, it is our task once more to present the broad lines in the general economy of the research that we have undertaken in the city of Lubumbashi. First of all, an observation: the city of Lubumbashi's calling as a mining city is the foundation of this city's expansion, a city which has attracted and continues to attract both Congolese (internal migration) and foreign migrants. The birth and expansion of this city in the colonial period are intimately linked to the exploitation of the underground resources of this province, which has been seen as the site of a geological scandal, and this city maintains its attraction as a centre for migration. The demographic growth of the city of Lubumbashi is mainly due to internal or international migration. Lubumbashi, as a mining town, is a ghost town: linked to the fortunes of the mining sector, the highs and lows it has experienced in its role as a centre of attraction, but also as a centre of social vulnerability, are chiefly dependent upon the challenges of the international political economy. Mining booms lead to relative prosperity and large amounts of money in circulation, while crises (such as the one which struck the world in 2008) have had significant repercussions for the socioeconomic life of the population in this city. Whatever the situation, Lubumbashi plays a multipurpose role in relation to migration, as a place for emigration and immigration. It is also a place of transit.

The presence of Asian migrants on the demographic scene in Lubumbashi is a new element, although bearing in mind the Latin saying "*Nil novi sub sole*", we could also recognise that the presence of Asian nationals in the city of Lubumbashi is also something old. The Lebanese have been present in the DRC since the 1970<sup>s</sup> and their predominance in the city of Lubumbashi can be seen in the conduct of commercial activities such as trade, vehicle maintenance and repair, bread making and now restaurants. Indians can also be found in Lubumbashi, and they are making more and more of a mark in the business sector. In the early 2000<sup>s</sup>, the Indian presence was noticed with the emergence of massive investment in the mining sector by Chemical of Africa (CHEMAF) and the warehousing of pharmaceutical products "made in India".

In addition, Indians can be found among the teams from the United Nations Mission to the Congo (MONUC). The TATA car construction company has opened a dealership in Lubumbashi, and their vehicles are coming to be a common sight on the roads of Lubumbashi.

It is the Chinese whom we can consider to be the latest arrivals on the migratory scene. They are highly visible in Lubumbashi. As Ma Mung writes, recalling an ancient proverb: "Wherever the ocean spreads its waves, Chinese people come ashore" (2009: 235). Whatever the case may be, Chinese nationals, like the Indians or Lebanese in Lubumbashi are part of the dynamics "of a new form of the migration of labour (which) has developed since the 1990<sup>s</sup>: temporary and contractual migrations for big Chinese firms working abroad in major public works projects and the construction of road, rail or oil infrastructures, particularly in Africa... Contractual migrations are also undertaken for Chinese agencies who sell this workforce to countries seeking labour..." (Ma Mung, 2009: 241).

Meanwhile, African migrants are both new and old on the migratory scene in Lubumbashi. Let us start with the long-established ones: these are the Senegalese, Malian and Zambians; among the new arrivals, we should mention the Nigerians, Cameroonian and many others. Having arrived in Lubumbashi in the immediate wake of its independence, the Senegalese, Malians and Zambians have mixed with the local population; yet they still hold onto signs of their identity, particularly the Senegalese and Malians: having occupied certain residential areas which are now seen as the West African districts, they have managed to have a Mosque built close to where they live in Kamalondo. According to the information we have, the Imam at this Mosque in Kamalondo is a Malian.

The city of Lubumbashi is an area in the midst of expansion characterised by the predominance of the mining sector and informal activities (Wa Kabwe-Segatti 2009: 115-118), as is also the case with other cities in Africa. In this field, immigrants have moved into all sorts of activities which bring added value: they bring in their social capital and know-how. They manage to take control of supply chains thanks to transnational networks which they keep for their own use. These activities are numerous. We could mention the retailing of all sorts of products (CD-ROMs, films, technological gadgets and electronic and electrical products), restaurants, the hotel sector, garages, bread making, construction, and the medical and pharmaceutical sectors. While African migrants mix in with the Congolese and devote themselves to a multitude of informal activities such as jewellery or the trafficking of precious materials, as is the case with the Malians, Senegalese or Nigerians, it seems that Asian migrants keep their distance from the Congolese, due to cultural differences, but also their difficulty in mastering the local languages and sometimes the precarious nature of their living and working conditions.

Continuities can be found in the dynamics of migration to Lubumbashi: a mining town, it continues to attract foreign migrants. In the colonial period, European migrants populated Katanga province: they were mainly Belgians, as well as nationals from other European countries, including Italians, Portuguese or Greeks, but also Jews. European nationals have left their mark on the place. These marks can be seen in the architecture of the synagogues and buildings housing private clubs. During an international symposium organised as part of the centenary celebrations for the founding of the city of Lubumbashi, Johan Lagae and Sofie Boonen (2010) recalled the impact of the presence of nationals from a number of countries on Katanga province and in terms of the architecture, with the buildings in this city displaying this diversity of styles.

Discontinuities can be seen in the makeup of the migrants: while it was European migrants who dominated the scene in Lubumbashi during the colonial period, European migrants now have a low profile, while Asian nationals are becoming more and more numerous. Surely this is a reflection of the forces in play on a global scale with the rise of Asian nations such as China and India. This rise to power of these two Asian nations has pushed their populations into great dynamism and visibility in the field of mobility at a global scale.

Currently, as in the past, it is the international political economy which sets out the roles played by different areas according to the resources they can turn out. Moreover, the economic crisis currently reigning in this country can be seen to account for the adoption of migration as a safety outlet for the population, whose young people are trying to emigrate. Moreover, the prevalence of informal activities in the DRC explains the dynamics of the commercial mobility of a number of migrants leaving or coming to this city.

The transformations brought about by migration can be seen in the urban space through the social and economic reorganisation underway in this city. We have seen that the city of Lubumbashi has its roots in the influence of migratory flows. This city is both a sender and receiver. By attracting people as part of the rural exodus or urban-rural migration, Lubumbashi supports the dominant culture of mobility. Complex relationships based on social (non-)diversity and internal social divisions are created slowly, making the urban space more and more varied.

Social ghettoisation, exclusion areas and times of social distancing are a characteristic of daily life in this city. There are as yet no recorded xenophobic movements directed against foreigners in this city. But at the internal level, ethnic conflicts are frequent, be they open or latent. They hinge upon political issues, in a field where foreign migrants are not represented. Social transformations are also underway in this city, arising from the dynamics of migration. While Lubumbashi was a city whose patrifocal families depended upon the predominance of men, the economic crisis has demolished the monopoly men had when it came to family life and survival. Unemployment has hit men hard. The crisis has caused women to stand on their own feet and become important actors in the economic sphere. This activity by women has led them to embark on the route to migration, and they are increasingly in evidence. It can be seen that the women of Lubumbashi have acquired a certain amount of autonomy. There are many shops which belong to women. "Benz girls" (*nanas Benz*), the very embodiment of the successful woman, are appearing, and they have businesses in which they are engaged as players in the field of migration.

Another side of the transformations caused by migration should be evident in the consequences of migration (immigration) for the city of Lubumbashi. Migrants are starting to hold a sort of monopoly, if not a virtual monopoly, in certain sectors of this city's economic life. This seems to be driving development in certain sectors and services, but these are services which are priced too highly for the local population to obtain them.

Added to which, Asian and even African migrants manage to create a sort of "entrepreneurial diaspora", a notion used in this context by Ma Mung (2009). Taking note of the reorganisation of economic activities resulting from the arrival of migrants of all origins, particularly Asian migrants, it is worth thinking about the social reach of activities undertaken by "ethnic enterprises" (Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990). Do they have a positive role to play on the labour market to the benefit of the local population? Have these ethnic migrant businesses been set up to reduce the unemployment which has struck the local population? An indication of the rate of employment of Congolese staff within a Chinese medical establishment gives us an idea of the answer to this question. Eight Congolese people are employed in a Chinese hospital as nursing staff, while there are forty Chinese people including even the gardener, according to information gathered during a visit to this establishment which is located in the centre of the city of Lubumbashi (October 2010). Among the care staff, it is these Congolese people who work the night shifts, looking after the patients in this hospital.

The economy of the DRC has often been depicted as crumbling under the weight of dependency. This has prevented the rise of a middle class of Congolese entrepreneurs. The inroads made by foreign migrants moving into all areas of economic life have not helped with economic growth and the improvement of living conditions among the local population. Local labour is not used; units of local production are being undermined by the know-how, and even the counterfeits, of the Chinese, who see the country as the grand "workshop of the

world". The presence of all kinds of products, which are often sold at low prices, discourages local production, not to mention the mediocre quality of the products offered to local consumers.

Which fields require additional research? Studies conducted in the city have helped us achieve a mapping of migrant subjects for certain nationalities. But research needs to continue to analyse the case of those migrant subjects who are marginal in terms of numbers. This is the case with European migrants, whose numbers are practically insignificant. French and Belgian people try to get by in Lubumbashi. Research targeted on these nationals could help us obtain biographical information about their varying migratory experiences. The issue of the integration of migrant subjects is almost a challenge which needs to be met. While in Europe the issue of integration dates back to the emergence of the concept of citizenship and the involvement of foreign migrants in the public sphere (Magnette, 2001), such issues are not seen as clearly in Lubumbashi as elsewhere. In this regard, research into naturalisation would be a way in to understanding the ambitions of migrants living in this country over time.

Research into the specific integration of foreign migrants by nationality would be an approach to use in the future to arrive at a comparative assessment of the ways in which integration is tackled by the Chinese, Indians, Greeks, Belgians etc. in the city of Lubumbashi. We have yet to appreciate the influence of the media on the perception that the population of Lubumbashi has of international migration. Here, it would be appropriate to extend the research to explore this last issue. It seems that there is still too much evidence which would require an empirical review. The best way for this to happen would be to have a database containing exact statistics on the migrants living in Lubumbashi: hence household surveys to identify the number of foreigners living across the whole city would be a priority for the future.

Finally, how can mobility be redefined? This is an open question, and will not be answered by this report, because the evidence shows that the word migration implies intentional departure from one place to another, a prospect which will immediately cause the barriers of protectionist and anti-migratory measures to be raised. Mobility fits with the idea of acquiring knowledge through the adventure: "*ubi bene, ibi patria*" (where I am at ease, that is my country) seems to be the refrain of individuals who embrace mobility. In the DRC, the predominance of informal activities broadens the scope of the research into the connection between near and distant spaces, linked in a logical pattern: the search for an income from translocality. Congolese migrants intend to make use of price differentials across transnationalised space to increase their earnings. In certain public places such as bars or on buses, it is possible to hear conversations between people from Lubumbashi who do not talk about the weather or the football results, but simply goods and merchandise and their prices on the markets in Dar es Salaam, Dubai or Guangzhou. Working locally but acting globally seems to be the pattern by which Lubumbashi's migrants define themselves.

Mobility brings life to the city of Lubumbashi: it enables it to be "globalised"; faced with the harshness of life, which encourages people to try to survive in a number of ways, including migration, the residents of this city (thus migrants and non-migrants alike) can access goods, ideas and practices from elsewhere, while remaining firmly stuck in this tightly-packed urban space which is continually spreading and modernising in its own particular way.

## REFERENCES

Aldrich, H.E. and Roger Waldinger, (1990), “Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship”, in *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol.16, pp. 111-135.

Aron, R., (1962), *Paix et guerre entre les nations*, Paris: Editions Calmann-Levy.

Badie, B. & Smous, M.-C., (1992), *Le retour du monde. Sociologie de la scène internationale*, Paris: Editions Dalloz.

Badie, B., (1995), *La fin des territoires. Essai sur le désordre international et sur l'utilité sociale du respect*, Paris: Editions Fayard.

Bartram, D., (2010), “International Migration, Open Borders Debates, and Happiness”, in *International Studies Review*, 12, pp.339-361.

Bastenier, A et Felice Dassetto, (1995), “L'intégration des immigrés en Europe: un cadre conceptuel”, in Gérard, H. et V. Piché, *Sociologie des populations*, Montréal: PUM/AUPELF-UREF, pp. 423

Bayart, F. (1981), “Le politique par le bas en Afrique. Question de méthodes”, in *Politique africaine*, n° 1(I)

Berkeley, B., (1993), “Zaïre: An African Horror Story”, in *The Atlantic Monthly*, August, available online at:  
<http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/flashbks/rwanda/zaire.htm>

Bertrand, M., (2010), “Mobilité, pauvretés: les villes interrogées. introduction”, in *Revue Tiers Monde*, n°201, janvier-mars, pp. 7-23.

Biaya, T.K., (1998), “Ethnicity and the State in Zaire”, in Nnoli, O. (ed.), *Ethnic Conflicts in Africa*, Nottingham: Russell Press Ltd, pp. 327-350.

Bodomo, A., (2010), “The African Trading Community in Guangzhou: An Emerging Bridge for Africa-China Relations”, in *China Quarterly*, vol. 203, , pp. 693–707.

Boeck, F. (de), (2000a), “Comment dompter diamants et dollars: dépense, partage et Identité au Sud-Ouest du Zaïre (1980-1997)”, in Monnier, L. et al., *Chasse au diamant au Congo/Zaïre*, n°45-46, Tervuren: Institut africain/Cedaf, pp.171-208.

Boeck, F. (de), (2000b), “Des chiens qui brisent leur laisse: mondialisation et inversion des catégories de genre dans le contexte du trafic de diamant entre l'Angola et la République Démocratique du Congo (1984-1997)”, in Monnier, L. et al., *op. cit.*, pp.209-232.

Bouillon, A. (éd.), (1999), *Immigration africaine en Afrique du Sud. Les migrants francophones des années 90*, Paris & Johannesburg: Editions Karthala & IFAS.

Bourdarias, F., (2009), “Mobilités chinoises et dynamiques sociales locales au Mali”, in *Politique africaine*, n°113, Mars, pp.28-54.

Braeckman, C.(2010), *Congo 1960. Echec d'une décolonisation*, Bruxelles: André Versailles.

Bredeloup, S., (2008), “L'aventurier, une figure de la migration africaine”, in *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, vol. 2, n°125.

Chabal, P. et Daloz, J.-P., (1999), Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument, London: The International African Institute.

Chaponnière, J.-R. et Raphael Jozan, (2008), “Introduction thématique”, in *Afrique contemporaine*, n° 228/4, pp.21-34.

Choplin,A. et Jérôme Lombard, (2008), “Migrations et recompositions spatiales en Mauritanie. ‘Nouadhibou du monde’, ville de transit... et après ?”, in *Afrique contemporaine*, n° 228/4, pp.151-170.

Dibwe dia Mwembo, D. et al., (2005), *Les migrations à Lubumbashi, rapport des recherches de l'Observatoire du changement urbain*, publications de l'Université de Lubumbashi et de l'Observatoire du changement urbain.

Fibbi, R. et Gianni d'Amato, (2008), “Transnationalismhhe des migrants en Europe: Une preuve par les faits”, in *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, volume 24, n° 2, pp.7-22.

Fontaine, J. (1958), *Les Fables de la Fontaine*, annotées et commentées par C. Hanlet, Bruxelles: Office de Publicité.

Global Witness, (2006), *Digging in Corruption. Fraud, Abuse and Exploitation in Katanga's Copper and cobaltmines*, Report, July, accessible sur l'Internet: <http://www.globalwitness.org> consulté le 3 Juillet 2006

Jónsson, G. (2009), Bilan comparatif: tendances migratoires africaines, rapport, Programme des perspectives africaines sur la mobilité humaine, IMI. Voir [www.imi.ox.ac.uk](http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk)

Kadima, D. (1999), “Motivations à l'émigration et activités économiques des immigrés congolais (RDC) en Afrique du Sud”, in Bouillon, A. (éd.), *Immigration africaine en Afrique du Sud. Les migrants francophones des années 90*, Paris: IFAS-Karthala, p. 107

Lagae, J. et Boonen, S., (2010), “L'architecture, l'urbanisme et la géographie sociale d'une ville (post)coloniale. Une lecture critique des paysages urbains de Lubumbashi à travers le vocabulaire d'Elisabethville et la construction de l'architecture hospitalière des années 1950”, communication au Colloque international: *Lubumbashi, cent ans d'histoire. Littérature, cultures urbaine, débats intellectuels*, 9-11 septembre 2010, Faculté des Lettres et Sciences humaines de l'Université de Lubumbashi.

Landau, L.B. et Freemantle, I., (2009), “Tactical Cosmopolitanism and Idioms of Belonging: Insertion and Self-Exclusion in Johannesburg”, in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, n°36, pp.375-390, url: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13691830903494901>, site consulté le 6 octobre 2010.

Le Bris, E. et al., (1987), *Famille et résidence dans les villes africaines (Dakar, Bamako, Saint-Louis, Lomé)*, Paris: Editions L'Harmattan.

*Le Lushois*, (2009), journal hebdomadaire, Mars

Leung, M. W.H., (2006), *Overseas Chinese as Agents for Economic Development in China*, communication présentée to expert meeting ‘International migration and national development: Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin’. Radboud University Nijmegen.

Lututala, M., (2005), “L’élargissement des espaces de vie des familles congolaises sur des migrants à Paris”, in Vignikin, K. et Patrice Vimard, (sous la direction de), *Familles au Nord, Familles au Sud*, Bruxelles: Editions Bruylant Academia, pp. 409-429.

Ma Mung, K. E. (2009), “Diaspora et migrations chinoises”, in Jaffrelot, C. et C. Lequesne (dir.), *L'enjeu mondial. Les migrations*, Paris: Presse de la Fondation nationale des Sciences Politiques, pp.235-244.

Magnette, P., (2001), *La citoyenneté. Une histoire de l'idée de participation civique*, (Préface de John Dunn), Paris: Editions Bruylant.

McLuhan, M., (1968), *Message et massage, un inventaire des effets*, Paris: Editions Jean-Jacques Pawert.

Mongin, O., (2008), “Introduction. Quelle reconfiguration territoriale ? Quelle reconfiguration démocratique ?”, in *Esprit*, n°384, Octobre, p.62.

Moncomble, F., (2009), “Mobilité, réseaux et flux”, in Stébé, J.-M. et Hervé Marchal (sous la dir.), *Traité sur la ville*, Paris: P.U.F.

Ndaywell, è N., (1998), *Histoire générale du Congo. De l'héritage ancien à la République Démocratique*, Bruxelles & Paris: De Boeck & Larcier s.a.

Ngoie, T., (2010), « Congo. Modern Era Migration », in *Encyclopedia on Global Human migration*, New York, in press.

Ngoie, T. et Lelu, D., (2010), *Migration en RDC. Profil migratoire national 2009*, Genève, Publications de l'Organisation internationale pour les migrations, available on the website of the IOM: [www.iom.int](http://www.iom.int)

Ngoie T. and Vwakyanakazi, M. (2009). Profil migratoire par pays: cas de la RDC. Lubumbashi: Université de Lubumbashi/Katanga.

Ngoie, T. et Kenneth Omeje, (2008), “Rentier Politics and Low Intensity Conflicts in the DRC: The Case of Kasai and Katanga Provinces”, in Omeje, K.(ed.), *Extractive*

*Economies and Conflicts in the Global South? Multi-Regional Perspectives on Rentier Politics*, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp.135-148.

Nkuku, C., & Remon, M. (2006) *Strategies de Survie a Lubumbashi (R-D Congo)*. Paris: Harmattan.

Obadare, E., (2009), “The uses of ridicule: Humour, ‘infrapolitics’ and civil society in Nigeria”, in *African Affairs*, vol.108, n° 431, April, pp. 241-261.

Obotela, R.N., (2002), *République Démocratique du Congo. Un Etat sans papiers dans le village planétaire*, Kinshasa: Editions du Centre d’Etudes Politiques.

Organisation des Nations Unies (2002), *Rapport final du groupe d’Experts sur l’exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles et autres formes de richesses de la République Démocratique du Congo*, New York, Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, S/2002/1146

Parreñas, R.S., (2001), *Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press.

OIM, (sans date), *L’image des migrants dans la société*:

[http://www.iom.ch/javia/webda/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/policy\\_and\\_research/policy\\_documents/MCINF277\\_FR.pdf](http://www.iom.ch/javia/webda/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/policy_documents/MCINF277_FR.pdf) accédé le 20 août 2010.

Rea, A. et Maryse Tripier, (2003), *Sociologie de l’immigration*, Paris: Editions La Découverte.

Rosny, E. (de), (2002), “L’Afrique des migrations. Les échappés de la jeunesse de Douala”, in *Etudes*, n°3965, Mai

Rubbers, B., (2006), “Les mesures de la dissimulation. Les méthodes de recherche en sciences sociales face à la falsification de l’économie congolaise”, in *Civilisations*, vol. LIV, n° 1-2, pp. 57-65

Sautman, B. and Yan Hairong, (2007), “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa”, in *African Studies Review*, vol. 50, n°3, December, pp. 75-114.

Sindjoun, Luc, (2002), *Sociologie des relations internationales africaines*, Paris, Editions Karrthala.

Schnapper, D., (2001), “De l’Etat-nation au monde transnational. Du sens et de l’utilité Du concept de diaspora”, in *Revue Européenne des migrations internationales*, volume 17, n°2, pp.9-36 accessible sur le web sur <http://remi.revues.org/document1943.html> site accédé le 7 avril 2010.

Smith, R.C., (2006), *Mexican New York. Transnational Lives of New Immigrants*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press.

Sumata, C. et al., (2004), « Images et usages de l’argent de la diaspora Congolaise : les transferts comme vecteur d’entretien du quotidien à Kinshasa », in Trefon, T. (sous

la direction de), *Ordre et désordre à Kinshasa ? Réponses populaires à la faillite de l'Etat*, Paris, Editions l'Harmattan.

Streiff-Fenart, J. et Poutignat, P. (2006), “De l'aventure au commerçant transnational, trajectoires croisées et lieux intermédiaires à Nouadhibou (Mauritanie)”, in cahiers de la Méditerranée, n°73/2006 accessible online au <http://cdlm.revues.org/index1553.html>

Taraf-Najib, S., (1995), Territoires migratoires, territoires de familles chez les Libanais de Dakar. Espace en mouvement et culture locale, accessible sur l'url: [http://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins\\_textes/divers08-09/010014865-61.pdf](http://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/divers08-09/010014865-61.pdf)

Tarrius, A., (2001), “Au-delà des Etats-nations: des sociétés de migrants”, in *Revue Européenne des migrations internationales*, volume 17, n°2, accessible sur le web sur <http://remi.revues.org/document1944.html> site accédé le 10 avril 2010

Terray, E., (1986), “Le climatiseur et la véranda”, in *Afrique plurielle, Afrique actuelle. Hommage à George Balandier*, Paris, Editions Karthala.

Trefon, T. (ed.) (2004). *Reinventing Order in the Congo: How People Respond to State Failure in Kinshasa*. London: Zed Books.

United Nations (UN). (2002). *Twelfth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. S/2002/1180.

Véron, J.-B., (2008), “Editorial”, in *Afrique contemporaine*, n°228/4, pp.5-9. Chaponnière, J.R. et Raphael Jozan, 2008, “Introduction thématique”, in *Afrique contemporaine*, n°228/4, pp.21-34

Wa Kabwe-Segatti, A., (2009), “Les nouveaux enjeux des migrations intra-africaines”, in “”, in Jaffrelot, C. et C. Lequesne (dir.), *L'enjeu mondial. Les migrations*, op. cit. pp.115-122.

Whitehouse, B. (2009a), “Discrimination, Despoliation and Irreconcilable Difference: Host-Immigrant Tensions in Brazzaville, Congo”, in *Africa Spectrum*, 44, 1, pp.39-9. Available online: [www.africa-spectrum.org](http://www.africa-spectrum.org) accessed on 28th April 2010.

Whitehouse, B. (2009b), “Transnational childrearing and the preservation of transnational identity in Brazzaville, Congo”, in *Global Networks*, vol.9, n°1, pp. 82-99.

## APPENDIX: RESEARCH PROTOCOLS

### A. Target group: African / Asian migrants in Lubumbashi

#### 1. About the interview:

Interview date: ..... Interview location  
 (address) : .....

#### 2. Interviewee's identity

1. Name and forename (post-name): (optional).....
2. Age:.....
3. Gender: M/F
4. Marital status: (Single/Married/Divorce/Widowed).
5. If married, to what nationality? ..... Did marriage take place before or after migration?  
 ....
6. Profession / business activity: .....
7. Level of education: (primary/secondary/higher/university)
8. Year first settled/arrived in DRC: .....
9. Place of residence in Lubumbashi (address): .....
10. Composition of interviewee's family (if married) (Number of children and other persons living at same address)

#### Family members living in the same house

N°	Gender		Age	Level of education (1-2-3-4-5)	Relationship to interviewee	Marital status (1-2-3-4)	Business activity (sector)	Place of work
	M	F						

Level of education: (1) Illiterate; (2) primary school; (3) secondary; (4) University; (5) other (please specify)

Marital status: Single, Married, Divorced, Widowed

#### II. Migrants' motivations

1. From which country did you come originally? Country :.....Ethnic group.....
2. How did you choose to settle in this country?
3. Are you in contact with any of your compatriots living in this country? (details)
4. Are your business activities profitable? (Details)
5. Would you advise others to migrate? (immigrate or emigrate)

### **III. Socio-analysis of migratory flows**

1. Who or what gave you the idea of emigrating/immigrating?
2. How did you travel? (Show the route taken) What reception did you get?  
What was it like settling in? What was it like integrating?
3. In what countries have you lived before coming to the DRC? (list them with years of residence).
4. Are you in contact with your family members in your home country and how do you maintain this contact? (post, telephone, Internet, visits, associations etc.)
5. Do you travel to your home country: once a year:..... Rarely:.....
6. Are you thinking of migrating again to a different country? Or do you want to return to your home country?
7. In your opinion, are there countries, and towns or regions within those countries, which would be more welcoming than others? Which ones?
8. In your opinion, what are the main or most common business activities among immigrants or emigrants?
9. Do you rent or own a house to live in?
10. Do you have houses or developed or undeveloped plots of land in Lubumbashi?
11. Is Lubumbashi the only city in which you have lived in the DRC or have you already lived in other towns or cities in the country? (Provide more information and comment on these details).

### **IV. Impact of migratory flows**

1. How have you been treated in the host country?
2. Are the business activities in which you are involved viewed positively by the citizens of the host country? (Any personal accounts?)
3. List the advantages of the host country and the difficulties you have encountered here.
4. Are you in contact with your country of origin? How do you maintain this contact?
5. Have you had any problems renewing/obtaining residency permits and papers? How have you resolved them?

6. Are your country's embassy/consulate interested in the fate of their nationals who live in the DRC? (examples)
7. Do you send goods in kind or money to your country? How (through what channels)?

## ***B. Target group: QUESTIONS TO RELATIVES OF MIGRANTS***

### **Migrants' motivations**

1. How are you related to the migrant? (father, mother, brother, sister, cousin etc.)
2. In what country is your migrant relative?
3. How long have they been there?
4. Why did the migrant leave? (Prime objective: study, work, business, security etc.)
5. Was your relative's decision to migrate taken alone or in consultation with the family?
6. If the family played a part in the decision to migrate, how did it help with the preparations for the journey? (Money, administrative procedures, basic essentials, advice, recommendations).
7. Has the family sold any property to support the migratory project? (plot of land, vehicle, loans) (explain)
8. How did the emigrant relative travel (air, sea, road etc.)?
9. How were they received in the destination country? (by whom? what was easy / difficult for them?)
10. What are they doing now (study, work, business, living by their wits, what has been easy/difficult?)
11. Are they in contact with the family left behind in the DRC (do they return regularly? do they write? Internet? telephone)?
12. Do they send goods in kind or money? ..... Through what channels? .....
13. Does the emigrant relative hope to return to the DRC, settle for good in the host country or emigrate further afield?
14. (In their correspondence, messages etc.), what is the relative's assessment of the welcome they have received in the destination country? (hospitable, inhospitable, xenophobia?)
15. Are you able or expecting to help other family members to emigrate?

The questions finish here for the first category of interview subjects.

**C. Target group: QUESTIONS TO RETURNING CONGOLESE NATIONALS**

1. How long have you been back in the DRC? (specific date or year)
2. Why did you return to the country? (emigration objectives fulfilled, difficulties during the stay, expulsion etc.)
3. From which foreign country have you returned?
4. How long were you there?
5. What business activities did you do there?
6. How did you travel to the foreign country? (Show the route taken) what reception did you get? What was it like settling there? What was it like integrating?
7. During your stay abroad, did you send goods in kind or money to the family remaining at home? Through what channels?
8. Talk about your happy and unhappy memories of your stay abroad. (free comment)
9. Are you still in contact with other emigrants you met abroad?
10. What are your current occupations here in the DRC following your return?
11. Do you have a house here in this country? Or do you rent?
12. In what district do you live?
13. Would you go off abroad again if the opportunity arose?
14. Would you encourage other Congolese compatriots to return to the country?
- 15. Would you encourage other members of your family to emigrate?**
- 16. How do other Congolese compatriots (with whom you are in contact) who have never emigrated view you?**

***D. Target: internal migrants*****1. About the interview:**

Interview date: ..... Interview location  
(address) : .....

**2. Interviewee's identity**

1. Name and forename (post-name):  
(optional).....
2. Age:.....
3. Gender: M/F
4. Marital status: (Single/Married/Divorce/Widowed).
5. Profession / business activity: .....
6. Level of education: (primary/secondary/higher/university)

**3. Questions about internal migration.**

7. How long have you been in Lubumbashi?
8. What is the last town you lived in before coming to Lubumbashi?
9. What drove you to come to Lubumbashi?
10. Were you alone or accompanied by others when you first arrived in Lubumbashi?
11. Who welcomed you to Lubumbashi the first time?
12. In what district do you live at the moment?
13. Are you a landlord or tenant?
14. Are you involved in any socio-cultural associations?
15. Do you want to go to another city in the DRC? Which one?
16. If so, what reasons do you have for leaving Lubumbashi?
17. Do you want to leave the DRC and go somewhere else? If so, to which foreign country?
18. What business activity were you involved in before coming to Lubumbashi?
19. Do you know the places where the internally displaced persons are accommodated?
20. Do you want to return to your former centre or live there?