

**Theorizing the Evolution of European Migration Systems
(THEMIS)**

**The Evolution of Ukrainian
Migration to the UK**

Scoping Study Report



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Sources

A number of sources were used for the writing of this report. The quantitative picture was provided by the analysis of UK census data between 1901 and 2001, and Annual Population Surveys (2001–2007) using the country of birth variable. The data on the Ukrainian arrivals in the UK in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War were provided by the European Volunteer Worker scheme sources. The qualitative analysis was based on in-depth interviews with key actors from the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain (the largest organisation of the Ukrainian community in the UK): Lubomyr Mazur (former President of the Association), Oleksa Semenchenko (Editor of the AUGB journal – *Ukrainska Dumka*), Ludmila Pekarska (Curator of the Taras Shevchenko Library and Archive, the largest collection of books about the Ukrainian diaspora in Europe outside Ukraine itself) and Lessia Dejakowska (PR Officer for the Association of Ukrainian Women in the United Kingdom). The picture was completed with the use of academic publications and online reports on Ukrainian migration to Europe (cf. the Bibliography).


1. Theoretical Framework of THEMIS

With the available data on Ukrainian migration to the UK, based on the census data (1901–2001), it is difficult to place Ukraine definitely within one of the THEMIS theoretical categories. The available data (from 1991, when Ukraine gained its formal independence from the Soviet Union) seem to suggest that this is a ‘starter’ migration to the UK, one which has not yet established a clear pattern of growth (cf. Chart 1).

Trends and Types of Migration

However, the qualitative part of the scoping study demonstrated how far from the actual situation this initial categorisation would be. The fieldwork revealed that Ukrainian-born persons (despite the formal lack of Ukraine on the European map), or people calling themselves Ukrainians have been present in the UK at least since the beginning of the twentieth century. A group of Ukrainians from Eastern Galicia (Galicya – Ukrainian) – then part of Austro-Hungarian Empire (cf. Map 1) – bound originally for the US, landed in Liverpool, and began their new life around the city of Manchester instead (AUGB 2010). This initial pioneer migration had very much a labour character.

Chart 1: Ukrainians in the UK, Source: Census Data, Annual Population Survey (Indexed, 2008 = 100, 2008 = ~15,000)



After the First World War, through the 1920s and 1930s, there were Ukrainian diplomatic missions in Great Britain (AUGB 2010), although Ukraine did not officially exist on the map of Europe (cf. Map 2), except for the Ukrainian Socialist Republic (Eastern Ukraine, cf. Map 3). Economic emigration was complemented by political emigration to the West. With the disintegration of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires in 1917 and 1918, Ukraine declared its independence in 1918. In 1919, the state had to defend itself on three fronts: from the 'Red Bolsheviks' and their puppet Ukrainian Soviet Republic, from the 'White' czarist forces, and from Poland. Ukraine lost the war. In 1920 Eastern Ukraine was occupied by the Bolsheviks and in 1922 it was incorporated into the Soviet Union. Western Ukraine was partitioned between Poland, Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (cf. Maps 2 and 3).

Further economic and political migration following the failed attempt to establish an independent Ukrainian state took place. Pirozhkov (2006) estimates that forced migrations of the 1920s–1950s cost Ukraine the best of its *intelligentsia* and also many workers and farmers. Entire ethnic groups were deported on the basis of their nationality, including Crimean Tatars, Germans, Greeks, Armenians and others. Although the UK might not have been the most natural destination for most of these refugees, some of them might well have settled in the UK, perhaps abandoning the original idea of heading for the US or Canada. We cannot however make an informed statement, as the initial pioneer economic migration and the political migrations during the Soviet rule are both absent from the quantitative British census picture.

Map 1: Austro-Hungarian Empire, Eastern Galicia where the Ukrainian pioneers came from to the United Kingdom (light green colour – north-east of Austro-Hungarian Empire), Source:

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/shepherd/austria_hungary_1911.jpg



Distribution of Races in Austria-Hungary.

Map 2: Europe after the First World War, Source: Infoukes.com



Map 3: Ukrainian lands during the interwar years (1918–1939), Source: Historical Atlas of Ukraine (1991)



The major population of Ukrainian migrants in the UK, absent from the quantitative statistics, is the post-1945 wave of displaced persons from the camps in Germany, Austria and Italy. They were mostly recruited from Western Ukraine, Poland until 1939 (cf. Map 3 – white field to the west of Ukrainian SSR, within the light grey borders). They created the core of the Ukrainian community in the UK (with its institutions as we know it today). Between 1946 and 1951, after registration and screening, Ukrainians were awarded European Volunteer Worker (EVW) status and allowed to come to work in Britain (AUGB 2010). The EVW scheme attracted relatively large labour migration to the UK after 1945. The scheme was put in place with the aim of rebuilding the UK after the the Second World War.

Tannahill (1958) reveals that out of the 91,151 EVWs who arrived in Britain between October 1946 and December 1949, the largest group were Ukrainians – 29,250 (32 per cent). The group was, however, internally diversified: it consisted both of the Ukrainians captured by Germans, as well as Ukrainian ex-prisoners of war (POWs), who fought with the Germans and surrendered to British troops in May 1945.¹ The latter were brought to the UK by the War Office in March 1947 and given civilian status as EVWs.

The qualitative evidence has it that Ukrainians who arrived in the UK in the post-Second World War wave were mostly young people, up to their mid forties, both female and male (interview 1, 2010). They must have been young and fit, when forcibly recruited by Nazis to work in the labour camps during the war. The dominant discourse has it that the post-Second World War Ukrainian migrants were mostly males, while the migration of women has frequently been assumed to be due to the fact that they were dependants. However, over a quarter of the Ukrainians who came to the UK in the 1940s under the EVW scheme were women recruited in their own right for the textile industries and hospital domestic work (cf. Table 1).

Table 1: Ukrainian European Volunteer Workers, Total Arrivals in the UK by National Origin (Oct 1946–Dec 1949), Source: Tannahill 1958, p. 139

Category	Male	Female	Total
Ukrainian	16,210	4,720	20,930
Ukrainian ex-POWs	8,320	-	8,320
			29,250

As for the type of migration, there is again some ambiguity here. Although Ukrainians – after the Second World War – found themselves as displaced persons in various Western European countries, where they were forcibly transferred during the war, they did not come to the UK as refugees, but as workers. While the political origins of the incomers could not be ignored completely, in the public discourse official

¹ The 14th Grenadier Division of the Waffen SS (popularly named *SS-Galizien*, later *1st Ukrainian*) was a Second World War German military formation made up of volunteers initially from the region of Galicia. Ethnically it was made up mainly of volunteers of Ukrainian ethnic background from Galicia (Armstrong 1963) but also incorporated Slovaks, Czechs and Dutch volunteers and officers (Logusz 1997). Formed in 1943, it was largely destroyed in the battle of Brody, reformed, and saw action in Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Austria before being renamed the first division of the Ukrainian National Army and surrendering to the Western Allies by 10 May 1945.

emphasis on the EVWs as either 'refugees' or 'workers' shifted according to context and audience. The most contentious was the question of the deportability of EVWs. The migration of the EVWs to Britain is an earlier instance of political struggle over these labels, although the specific economic and political context of the migration ensured a rather different set of claims and counter-claims by the protagonists (Kay and Miles 1992, p. 7). While deportation was regarded by the Home Office as a final control mechanism, in this context the Home Office encountered the legal difficulty of deporting stateless persons, who could not therefore be returned to their country of origin (Kay and Miles 1988, p. 218).

The Ukrainians who arrived in the UK as EVWs created the core of the post-Second World War Ukrainian community in the UK. Any future movement between Ukraine and the UK was halted until 1991, due to the political situation in the Ukrainian Socialist Republic.

Current Trends – Diversification

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the independence of Ukraine in 1991 saw a renewal of Ukrainian immigration to the UK. Between 1991 and 2004, the Ukrainian government counted 2,537,400 individuals who emigrated; 1,897,500 moved to other post-Soviet states, and 639,900 moved to other, mainly Western, states (Malynovska 2006).

The number of Eastern Europeans admitted for settlement in the UK doubled between 1990 and 1991. The figures were not however particularly high (in 1990: 640 persons; in 1991: 1110 persons; in 1992: 1180 persons), and it is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions about the actual number of Ukrainian settlers due to the aggregated nature of the data (Home Office 1993, p. 15). Kyambi (2005) reports that between 1991 and 2001 the number of Ukrainians born in the USSR and living in Britain increased by 16,000.

Although since 1991 Britain has seen a rapid growth in communities from non-traditional immigration countries – the number of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia has tripled to 33,500 persons; those from Sierra Leone, China, South Africa and Sweden have doubled (Kyambi 2005) – Ukrainians were not particularly noticeable among them.

The immigration of Ukrainians to the UK became more diversified: the legal economic migrants (migrant workers) stopped being the predominant category among the Ukrainian migrants, due to limitations in the UK immigration policy towards low-skilled migrants. That is not to say that the economic migrants from Ukraine are non-existent in the UK – instead they are largely found in the irregular sphere. As a result, the number of 'illegal' economic migrants surfaced as an issue that needs to be addressed (interviews 1, 2, 2010). The 1990s and 2000s saw more tourists, professionals, students and posted workers coming to the UK (interview 4, 2010). Many of them are here as visitors or contract workers; some are classified as highly skilled migrants and business people. There were 300 Ukrainian citizens seeking asylum in 2003, 120 in 2004 and 55 in 2004. Asylum, exceptional leave or humanitarian protection was refused in almost all cases (Home Office 2005a).

Quantitative Picture

According to the 2001 Census there were 11,204 Ukrainian-born persons in the UK. According to the Annual Population Survey estimates the number of Ukrainian-born persons in the UK between 2004 and 2008 fluctuated between 12,000 and 15,000.


Table 2: Ukrainian-born persons in the UK, Source: Census 2001, Annual Population Survey

Year	Number	Source
2001	11,204	Census Data (OECD)
2004	12,000	Annual Population Survey (estimates)
2005	14,000	Annual Population Survey (estimates)
2006	19,000	Annual Population Survey (estimates)
2007	21,000	Annual Population Survey (estimates)
2008	15,000	Annual Population Survey (estimates)

The census data also gives some indication of the age structure among the surveyed Ukrainian-born persons in the UK (as of 2001). The majority of them (6,537) were in their sixties and seventies. This group comprised those people who arrived in the UK after the Second World War under the EVW scheme (and their families) from the displaced persons camps in Germany, Austria and Italy. Another significant cluster was of Ukrainians between 15 and 44 years old (4,158), most probably representing the immigration after Ukrainian independence in 1991.

Table 3: Age Structure of Ukrainian-born persons in the UK, Source: OECD, Census 2001

Age	Number
0-14	699
15-29	2,310
30-44	1,844
45-59	518
59-74	1,587
75 or older	4,950

Chart 2: Age Structure of Ukrainian-born persons in the UK, Source: OECD, Census 2001

The Census 2001 data also reveals that the majority of Ukrainian immigrants were male; the ratio of men to women was 58 per cent to 42 per cent. The Census figures demonstrate also that there was a large proportion of Ukrainians in the UK with unknown labour force status. As the responses given in the Census are largely declaratory, this could indicate that large proportions of Ukrainians worked in the UK, but due to the irregular character of their employment preferred to conceal this information from the surveyor.



Chart 3: Sex Ratio of Ukrainian-born persons in the UK, Source: OECD, Census 2001

Chart 4: Labour Force Status of Ukrainian-born persons in the UK, Source OECD, Census 2001

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated in their mapping exercise of 2007 that at the end of 2005, 100,000 Ukrainians and Ukrainian-speaking people lived in the UK. By December 2006, there were **about 120,000** who considered themselves Ukrainian, and called Britain home (IOM 2007, p. 7). These are however unofficial and highly approximate estimates, which are not formally confirmed by any authority, including the Home Office. According to Ukrainian sources there are about **70,000** Ukrainians in the UK (Bilan et al. 2010, p. 1).

IOM produced its estimates on the basis of figures relating to other aspects of migration. One analysis, for example, took into account the numbers of issued visas, approximate numbers of Ukrainian citizens returning to their country (giving a rough estimation of how many have overstayed) and numbers of asylum applications approved and refused (IOM 2007, p. 7). In 2000, for example, 87,000 visas were granted to Ukrainians; by 2003, the number had increased by 46 per cent (**to 127,020**) (IOM 2007, p. 7).

Due to these complexities, as well as the availability of data, it is therefore extremely difficult to place Ukraine within the theoretical categories of THEMIS. The qualitative study demonstrates that the 'starter' category attributed to Ukrainians initially, after the analysis of the available census data, is completely inadequate, as the Ukrainian community in the UK has a well-established history and its own institutions (associations, newspaper, archives, community Saturday school, etc.). The various functions within the community associations are now carried out mostly by the children of the original post-Second World War migrants (British born), who are in their fifties and sixties.

Just how arbitrary and misleading the 'starter' category is, could be demonstrated by the views of the migrant organisation representatives on the shape of the Ukrainian community in the UK. Many say that the 'golden years' of community evolution and development might well be gone, and – with the exception of religious gatherings – the community is actually in decline or stagnation. The newcomers who arrive from Ukraine display different patterns of settlement and community involvement. While the

Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain (AUGB – the largest umbrella organisation of Ukrainians in the UK) clearly stated that it ‘has seen and welcomed the arrival of a new wave of Ukrainians to live and work in the UK and has tried to embrace the different needs of young people who are of Ukrainian descent but also British’, the two major waves of Ukrainian immigration to the UK seem to be rather disengaged from each other. As one of our interviewees stated: *‘My parents and the Ukrainians who arrive now – they came from two different Ukraines. We even speak different languages.’*

2. Policy Changes

The importance of broader migration policy – the legal environment as both enabling and constraining international movements – is well known.

1900–1945: Aliens Restriction Acts

The pioneer Ukrainian migrants’ entry and residence in the UK were administered by the **1905 Aliens Act, 1914 Aliens Restriction Act, and 1919 Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act** (which later became Aliens Order 1953). These provided a system of work permits for aliens seeking employment in the UK, registration with the police and deportation for the public good. It applied to aliens but not to commonwealth citizens.

It is worth noting that in British immigration law, aliens have traditionally been divided into alien friends and alien enemies (Macdonald and Toal 2010). Alien enemies had no civil rights or privileges unless they found themselves in the UK under the protection and by the permission of the Crown. Alien friends, on the other hand, have long since been treated, with regard to civil rights, as if they were British subjects. All British subjects or commonwealth citizens (terms used interchangeably until 1983) as set out in the Nationality Act 1948 were free to come and go from the UK as they wished under what might well be described as a Common Law right of abode.

Ukrainians were in the other category and for the purpose of British immigration law were considered aliens (alien workers). As a result of the Aliens Act 1905, 1914 and 1919, individual aliens seeking employment in Britain had to be in possession of a work permit, which was granted by the government to a named employer on a condition that no suitable British person was available to fill the vacancy (Kay and Miles 1992, p. 2). These measures ensured a level of protection for the domestic labour market and, inasmuch as work permits were restricted to certain sectors of employment, a degree of direction of foreign labour (Kay and Miles 1992, p. 2).

On the sending side, the emigration of Ukrainians was not regulated by any particular policy. The pioneers who landed in Liverpool, and settled in and around the Manchester area in the early twentieth century, constituted part of the over 10 per cent of the population of Western Ukraine (then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) who due to poverty and lack of land emigrated to the US, Canada, and Latin American countries between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. In

the interwar period, when the western Ukrainian territories belonged to Poland and Romania, emigration continued apace.

1945–1951: European Volunteer Worker Scheme

The major wave of Ukrainian migration to the UK, as already mentioned above, took place after the Second World War, under the auspices of the European Volunteer Workers Scheme. In essence the EVW was the UK's first low-skilled economic migration programme (Somerville 2007, p. 14), aimed at the dispossessed and displaced workers in Europe's post-war cities and camps. It created a legal environment that differed vastly from the one put in place by the earlier Aliens Acts. In the economic context of the post-war period the individual work-permit system could not respond quickly enough to alleviate critical labour shortages in vital sectors of the British economy (Kay and Miles 1992, p. 2). Consequently, the state took a more active role in the organisation of the labour market by sending out Ministry of Labour officials to the displaced persons camps in Germany, Austria and Italy, and directing those recruited into the 'essential' industries or services in Britain (Kay and Miles, 1992, p. 2). In place of individual work permits, which were cumbersome and time-consuming to administer, the Home Secretary used his powers to vary the Aliens Order and granted the EVWs, as a group, entry on a specific set of conditions, the most important being that they had to accept and remain within the employment assigned to them by the Ministry of Labour (Kay and Miles 1992, p. 2).

Recruitment under the EVW scheme was however short-lived. It began in earnest in early 1947, and had largely come to a halt by early 1949. Part of the explanation for its short duration might come from the fact that – as already indicated above – the scheme did not fit easily into the dominant explanations of migration policies within the capitalist world economy. These explanations – as reviewed by Kay and Miles (1992) – tended implicitly or explicitly to dichotomise migration policies into asylum policies (aimed at refugees and forced migrations) and those determined by state and international economic factors (labour migrations). The EVW scheme incorporated elements of both and therefore raised question marks about the theoretical usefulness of those binary classifications (Kay and Miles 1992, p. 4). While the European Volunteer Workers had a clear conception of themselves as refugees, the terms of recruitment drawn up by the Labour government defined them primarily as labour migrants, whose rights to settlement, family reunification, and freedom on the labour market were qualified.

With regard to settlement rights both the pioneer Ukrainian migrants, and those allowed into the country under the EVW scheme (known in the legislation as 'Alien Workers') had no right of settlement in the light of the legislation of that time, yet might have been allowed to settle after four years (which the vast majority of them did, subsequently applying for British citizenship). After entry, primary workers had to register with the police and report any changes of address. Their work permit was valid for one job only, and – in the case of the EVW scheme participants – the work permit was assigned to a particular employer designated by the Ministry of Labour.

Their dependants – spouses – also had no right of settlement, and were temporarily admitted to the country for the same period as the primary workers. Their legal status did not grant them the right to work. They were subject to control after entry in the same way as the primary workers (registration with

the police, reporting any change of address). Similarly to the primary workers, the spouses had the right to settle permanently in the UK after four years. Alien dependent children up to the age of 18 were admitted conditionally for the purpose of settlement; those between 18 and 21 received conditional residence after four years. Other alien dependants – parents who were over 60 in particular – were allowed in to the UK for the purpose of settlement only if the head of the family had been resident for four years. With regard to the Ukrainian post-Second World War migrants, the regulations concerning the admission of other family members for the purpose of residence were effectively an empty law, because after four years the political situation in the Ukrainian Socialist Republic meant that family reunion was practically impossible.

Sending-Country Perspective – Relaxing Emigration Policy

As for the sending country, strict exit restrictions were put in place, and obtaining a visa was very difficult, with the nearest British embassy situated in Moscow (interview 4, 2010). The Soviet regime relaxed its emigration policies only during *perestroika* in the 1980s. In 1987, 5,400 Ukrainian residents received permission to emigrate, and, in 1989, 36,500 were allowed to leave. By 1990, this number had already reached over 90,000 including minors (Malynovska 2006).²

Ukraine declared itself an independent state on 24 August 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and was a founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent States. On 1 December 1991 Ukrainian voters overwhelmingly approved a referendum formalising independence from the Soviet Union. The Union formally ceased to exist on 25 December 1991, and with this Ukraine's independence was officially recognised by the international community. The Ukrainian government abolished all exit restrictions in January 1993, and, in February 1994, the 'Law on the Order of Exit from Ukraine and Entrance to Ukraine for the Citizens of Ukraine' was adopted. It guaranteed Ukrainian citizens the right to depart and return to its territory freely. Additional guarantees of free movement were provided by the 2003 'Law on Freedom of Movement and Free Choice of Residence in Ukraine'.

1980s–1990s: UK Response – Tightening Immigration Control

The relaxation of the emigration policy in Soviet Ukraine in the 1980s, and then the independent Ukrainian state in the 1990s, were however met with a tightening of the borders and a limiting of the channels of entry on the part of the British immigration authorities.

The **tightening of the visa controls** (and their extension even to Commonwealth citizens in the 1988 Immigration Act), was the first domestic manifestation of a pan-European policy to deal with the increasing numbers of asylum seekers arriving in the UK, and it is asylum which has become the big issue in the past two decades. Britain and most European countries had signed up to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. For the UK throughout the 1980s more than anything else the issue of

² Most of these migrants planned to move to Israel. In reality, only 76,500 actually left due to the 1990 Gulf War and international tensions in the Middle East.

asylum rather than immigration *per se* became the concern. The legislation in this period bears the imprint of an attempt to curtail and control these new movements.

More significantly, the **1987 Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act** meant that carriers (particularly airlines) were liable to civil penalties if they carried passengers who did not have a valid visa to come to the UK. The strategy behind these Acts was to extend UK borders beyond the existing physical borders of the sea, sharing the responsibility for control with carriers (Somerville 2007, p. 19). As a result, airlines would not sell tickets to those without visas. Thus the trade in false passports and documents began, as well as the trafficking trade, which many of the laws of the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century have dealt with.

The work-permit system was formalised in the 1980s, with set criteria for gaining a work permit based on local labour market conditions. However, as Somerville observed, it was barely changed from the system that had operated in the period 1948–1976, with the 1971 Immigration Act as the cornerstone of this policy (Somerville 2007, p. 20). A work permit was a strict entry requirement for alien workers. Alien dependent spouses and children had to present proof that they were married or related to the permit holder, and a proof of the primary worker's ability to support them so that they did not become a burden on public funds. Alien dependent spouses had no right of settlement, but could be temporarily admitted for the same period as the primary workers (with no right to work). Alien dependent children were denied the right of settlement, and could be considered only as conditional residents up to the age of 18 if they were joining both parents. Those between the ages of 18 and 21 were only allowed to join their parents in exceptional circumstances. Under the legislation other alien dependants (i.e. parents over 60 and other 'distressed' dependants) could not be admitted to the UK until the head of the family gained full residency rights.

In the 1990s and 2000s the work-permit scheme brought with it a strong labour market test, if employers wanted to employ a migrant from outside the resident work force (UK, or EEA – European Economic Area) for a job that was not on the list of shortage occupations. The job vacancy must have been advertised to settled workers. If the salary was £40,000 or under, the job must be advertised for a minimum of two weeks. If the salary was over £40,000, the job must be advertised for a minimum of one week.³

The other available routes to enter the UK for the Ukrainians in the early 1990s were via a tourist visa, business visa, or student visa.

³ The job must be advertised according to the code of practice specific to the sector and job. Each code of practice explains: a) the skilled jobs at National or Scottish Vocational Qualification (NVQ or SVQ) level 3 or above in each occupation that sponsors are allowed to issue a certificate of sponsorship for; b) the minimum appropriate salary rates, as defined by the 25th percentile of the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) or by an alternative code of practice; c) the acceptable media and methods for meeting the resident labour market test. If there is no code of practice for the sector or job at the time of advertising, the employer must advertise the job using Jobcentre plus.

1990s and 2000s: Managed Migration Approach and Points-Based System

Significant reforms and changes in British immigration policy took place under the Labour government between 1997 and 2010. A few important trends can be distinguished:

- 1) **tightening of immigration controls**
- 2) **selective admission focused solely on highly skilled migrants and migrants with skills that are in deficit in the UK**
- 3) severe **limitations in legal channels of entry for low-skilled** migrants from outside the EEA
- 4) access to the labour market for students limited to 20 hours per week
- 5) **unlimited access** to the labour market for spouses of primary workers (usually admitted under the work-permit scheme or the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme [HSMP]).

A particularly important aspect of British immigration policy, in terms of Ukrainian migration, was encapsulated in the White Paper 'Fairer, Faster and Firmer: A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum' (Home Office 1998), which led to the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act. Cohen (1997, p. 134) argues that the 1999 Act represents 'what is probably the greatest tightening of controls since 1905', with the significantly extended use of civil and criminal sanctions in immigration matters. This included expanding existing offences of entering the country by deception; sanctions on carriers, particularly road hauliers; and greater policy powers, including the use of force for immigration officers.

Further changes – departing from a sole focus on restrictions and reattaching economics to migration policy – took place with the 2002 White Paper 'Secure Borders, Safe Havens: Immigration with Diversity in Modern Britain' (Home Office 2002). The year 2002 also saw the introduction of the **Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP)** – an attempt to direct admission for residence with the prospect of settlement only towards highly skilled migrants.

As a result, for the HSMP, in contrast to the existing work-permit scheme, the applicant did not require a job offer to apply under the highly skilled worker category. Applicants were awarded points based on their qualifications, previous earnings, UK experience, age, English language skills, and available maintenance (funds). The HSMP did not attract a labour market test before the admission of a migrant to the UK. There were also other routes developed to attract skilled labour into the UK (e.g. business people; Fresh Talent: Working in Scotland; innovators, International Graduates Scheme; investors; writers, composers and artists). There were also separate schemes in place for temporary workers (e.g. au pairs, voluntary workers or working holiday makers).

These changes reflected the broader turn in the EU migration policy with the decision at the European Council in Tampere, 1999, to develop a common EU migration and asylum policy. In its communication on a Community Immigration Policy (COM (2000) 757) of November 2000, the European Commission explicitly proposed abandoning the zero immigration policies of the past 30 years. Instead, new immigration policies would be devised with which to better regulate migration through orderly and regular channels that were themselves responsive to labour market needs, reflecting the realities of labour market demand for immigrant workers, continuing migration pressures from the developing

world and demographic trends in European countries, particularly declining birth rates and ageing populations (Pellegrino 2004, p. 8).

The developments in Labour's third term continued along the same policy line, with the five-year departmental plan on asylum and immigration entitled 'Controlling our Borders: Making Migration Work for Britain' (Home Office 2005a). The five-year plan was followed by a major consultation on the detail of economic migration: 'Selective Admission: Making Migration Work for Britain' (Home Office 2005c), and the following year by a policy plan and introduction (since 2008): '**A Points-Based System: Making Migration Work for Britain**' (Home Office 2006). These policy changes are important from the perspective of new Ukrainian migrants to the UK. The Highly Skilled Migrant Programme was discontinued on 29 June 2008, and was replaced by Tier 1 (General) Highly Skilled Worker Programme (operating on generally the same bases as the pilot HSMP). The General Work Permit Scheme was suspended on 29 June 2008 and replaced by Tier 2 (General), embracing people coming to the UK with a skilled job offer to fill a gap in the work force that cannot be filled by a settled worker. Tier 2 also embraces ministers of religion, intra-company transfers and sports persons. For an explanation of further Tiers see Table 4.

The managed migration approach under Labour did not intend any quotas or caps of non-EEA nationals admitted to the UK (including Ukrainian nationals). With the change of government in April 2010, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government announced the introduction of caps for non-EEA nationals, administered on a monthly basis by the UK Border Agency. The interim cap for Tiers 1 and 2 came into effect on 19 July 2010 and is to last until March 2011. After this, the Government proposes to introduce, following consultation, the final system (UKBA 2010).

Table 4: Explanation of New Points-Based System

New Tier system	Old system	Implementation date
Tier 1: highly skilled workers e.g. professors, scientists and researchers	Highly Skilled Migrant, graduate schemes, business persons and investors	Programme Active from 29 June 2008
Tier 2: skilled workers with a job offer	Work Permit Holder	Programme Active from 29 June 2008
Tier 3: low skilled workers filling specific temporary labour shortages	Working temporarily in the UK undertaking low-skilled work	Currently not in use
Tier 4: students	Student wishing to study in the UK	Scheduled for end of March 2009
Tier 5: youth mobility & temporary worker: people allowed to work in the United Kingdom for a limited period of time to satisfy primarily non-economic objectives	Working holiday makers, training and work experience permits, youth mobility and temporary workers for example musicians coming to play in a concert or sportspersons.	Active from 27 November 2008

Limitations in Legal Channels of Admission and Irregular Migration

The tightening of the immigration controls limited the legal channels for Ukrainians to enter the UK. The 1990s and 2000s saw significant restrictions in programmes focused on the admission of migrants for residence and settlement. The dominant trend was towards selective admission largely focused on highly skilled migrants (either on HSMP or work permit bases), with the practical exclusion of low-skilled migrants on anything other than a temporary basis (e.g. via the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme, until 2004). The trend found its conclusion in the introduction of the Points-Based System in 2008, and the indefinite suspension of Tier 3 – focused on low-skilled workers filling specific temporary labour shortages.

In this way the UK closed itself to legal inflows of low-skilled labour from outside the EU. At the same time, with the 2004 EU Enlargement, the pool of low-skilled labour in the UK was largely thought of to be filled by the A8 migrant workers from the Accession States, i.e. Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia (cf. Map 4).

As a result of the specific design of the British immigration policy therefore, **almost by definition any inflows of low-skilled labour from Ukraine to the UK take place on irregular bases.**⁴ In terms of legal low-skilled work the **only exceptions** are made for **students**, who are allowed to work in the UK for a maximum of 20 hours per week (in any type of job) and to **spouses of primary applicants** for Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 4, who have unlimited access to the labour market (tied to the duration of the original spouse's permit).

Due to the existing state legal frameworks for admitting contemporary migrants from Ukraine it is therefore not surprising that the Home Office estimates that **most Ukrainians presently residing in the UK are family reunification migrants or irregular migrants** (IOM 2007, p. 7). Düvell argues that Ukrainian illegal immigrants seem to take over the jobs at the bottom of EU labour markets from the now legalised EU-8 nationals, including those in EU-8 countries (Düvell 2006). Thus, he sees Ukraine not only as the major supplier of migrant labour to Europe, but also the major sending country of irregular immigrant workers (Düvell 2006). This data suggests that migration policy significantly influences the dynamics of the migration flows between Ukraine and the UK.

The wider legal environment created by specific British immigration policy is however ambivalent. Official black letter law limitations and restrictions in the available legal channels of entering the UK for

Map 4: The Accession States and Ukraine



⁴ The youth mobility schemes (Tier 5) are also reserved for nationals of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Monaco.

work purposes for Ukrainian nationals are met with **inconsistent law enforcement of the immigration regulations for employing illegal workers**. The law enforcement – throughout the 1990s and up to 2008 – has always been low in the UK, and therefore did not effectively discourage the illegal employment of migrants. According to British law the enforcement of immigration regulations is passed to the employer. Until 2008, the law said that the employer who continues to employ unauthorised workers (or those whose status precludes them from undertaking the employment in question) may be committing a criminal offence, and could face legal sanctions up to £5,000 (Home Office 2005d). Although the British government introduced measures to strengthen the enforcement of section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 (as amended by section 147 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002), which made employers in general responsible for ensuring that they were authorised to employ a worker from outside of the EEA, prosecution rates following section 8 convictions remained very low. Between 1998 and 2005, 17 employers (including eight employers in 2004) were successfully prosecuted for illegally employing migrants under section 8. More than half of section 8 convictions in 2004–2005 resulted in fines of less than £700, with four employers fined the maximum of £5,000 (Home Office 2005d).

According to the Home Office 2006 report on employers' use of migrant labour, employers expressed no knowledge of illegal working, whereas actually some of them were (or had been) recruiting illegally. This was reportedly owing to their ignorance concerning registration procedures and their responsibilities as employers. Some employers admitted the procedures were too time consuming to deal with and that they sometimes 'turned a blind eye' to workers of unknown legality (Dench et al. 2006). On the other hand many employers who recruited through recruitment agencies assumed that agencies made appropriate checks (Dench et al. 2006).

In 2006, the newly introduced Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (section 15) changed the legal qualification of employing illegal workers from a criminal to civil offence (it came into force on 29 February 2008). As a result, the UK Border Agency could issue 'on the spot' fines to employers if the latter were found to employ an illegal worker and had not copied and kept the right identity and work permit documents. If a UK employer is found to be employing illegal workers, it is issued with a notice of potential liability by UK Border Agency officers. The civil penalties compliance team will then consider the evidence and decide whether to issue the employer with a notice of liability and a civil penalty of up to £10,000 per illegal worker. The charge of criminal offence still exists for those employers who knowingly employ illegal workers. They carry a maximum custodial sentence of two years, and/or an unlimited fine. Since the change in the legal qualification of the act of employing illegal workers from criminal to civil offence, the prosecution rates increased significantly. Since the implementation of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, between 29 February and 13 June 2008 notices of liability were served to 265 employers and penalties totaling £2,350,000 were exacted (Home Office 2008).

3. Institutions

In Section 1 where Ukrainian migration to the UK was analysed with reference to the THEMIS theoretical framework, it was noted that the two major waves of Ukrainian migration have been quite distinct from each other. Each of the waves – post-Second World War and post-1991 – represents their own, separate dynamics. This is particularly visible with regard to the Ukrainian migrant institutions in the UK. The **different role and character of the established institutions reflects the internal divisions within the Ukrainian community.**

In short, the ‘old’, established Ukrainian migration to the UK (post-Second World War) focused more on establishing **migrant institutions in the traditional sense of the term**: structures offering self-help, welfare advice and organisation of cultural activities. Over time the organisations developed and sustained transnational links with other Ukrainian diasporic organisations – particularly in the US and Canada. Links with Ukraine were practically non-existent until the late 1980s. With the *perestroika* movement in the Soviet Union and, more importantly, the Chernobyl catastrophe (1986), the Ukrainian institutions in the UK became involved in welfare and humanitarian aid for fellow Ukrainians ‘back home’. Transnational links with Ukraine were fully revived after the independence of Ukraine in 1991.

The new, post-1991 migration did not add much to the existing structure of Ukrainian migrant institutions in the UK in the sense of establishing new migrant organisations that could represent the new migrants’ specific interests or identity. Some of the newly arrived migrants joined the well-established associations, and became involved and engaged in the life of the community. However, this is not a widespread phenomenon, as we have learnt from the interviews with the Ukrainian community representatives (Scoping Study Interviews 2010). The general view is that the ‘new’ migrants do not get involved, ‘they do not have time’, as their priorities on arrival in the UK are quite different. The interviewees stressed the ‘target-oriented’ strategy of the newcomers: students tend to lean more towards the international student community, while the – largely irregular – migrant workers prioritise their earnings, and due to their legal status largely prefer to ‘keep a low profile’. Among the recent group of Ukrainian migrants it is rather the **migration industry** that takes precedence over voluntary migrant organisations.

Migrant Organisations Among the ‘Old’ Diaspora

Ukrainian migrants who arrived in the UK as displaced persons after the Second World War were initially accommodated in camps all over the country and worked on local farms. In the camps, they organised themselves and established educational programmes, choirs, folk dance groups, drama groups and even orchestras. The Ukrainian Relief Association, based at 218 Sussex Gardens in London, headed by Colonel Panchuk (a Canadian-Ukrainian), provided support and welfare services to those who needed it (AUGB 2010).

By autumn 1945, the resettled Ukrainian community was ready to organise itself and the idea of a national association was born. The inaugural meeting of the **Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain** (AUGB) was held in Edinburgh on 19–20 January 1946 and set itself three main tasks:

- To represent the membership and the Ukrainian community generally
- To act on behalf of the community in dealings with the authorities and the host community in the UK
- To work with similar Ukrainian community organisations around the world.

A key principle of the Association was that of mutual support and assistance. The vast majority of Ukrainian settlers had no family, so the community became an extended family for them. Members contributed 1/- (a shilling, 5p in decimal coinage but worth much more then) a week to a mutual aid fund which helped individuals and families in need (AUGB 2010).

A lasting example of the practical application of the mutual aid philosophy is the Association's **Sydenhurst residential home**, which was bought in 1949 through donations from members, to provide a home and light agricultural work for those Ukrainians who were too badly wounded or shell-shocked to find work, and who risked deportation (AUGB 2010).

In 1948, the needs of the Ukrainian community had outgrown Sussex Gardens, and the Association of Ukrainians bought 49 Linden Gardens, which is still the Association's headquarters today. In 1949, the library from Sussex Gardens was transferred to Linden Gardens, and is now a highly respected reference library. The Ukraine-related publications in the UK are therefore accessible from two major sources:

- **Shevchenko Library and Archive** (www.augb.co.uk/library-and-archive.php), with the largest collection of diaspora publications in Europe (administered by Dr Ludmila Pekarska, the Curator).
- **Ukrayinska Dumka** (www.augb.co.uk/ukrayinska-dumka.php) was first published in 1945 and is still the only Ukrainian-language newspaper in the UK. Many other periodicals and books were published over the years. Dr Oleksa Semenchenko has been the editor of Ukrayinska Dumka since the late 1990s.

The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain (www.augb.co.uk/about-the-augb.php) is by far the largest association of Ukrainians in the UK with branches in many UK cities (www.augb.co.uk/branches.php).⁵

From 1948, special interest groups were established, including:

- The **Association of Ukrainian Women** (www.augb.co.uk/ukrainian-women.php).

⁵ I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the members of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, **Lubomyr Mazur, Ludmila Pekarska, Oleksa Semenchenko** for their invaluable help in preparing this report. Also I would like to acknowledge that all the information about AUGB history and development (except where specified) comes from the AUGB website, www.augb.co.uk/a-brief-history.php

- The **Association of Ukrainian Teachers** (www.augb.co.uk/association-of-ukrainian-teachers-and-educators.php).

There is a whole range of related Ukrainian organisations located in the same area of West London, such as:

- The **Ukrainian Brotherhood**
- The **Organisation of Ukrainian Veterans**
- The **Ukrainian Book Society** (IOM 2007, p. 21)
- The **Ukrainian Community School and Nursery** (www.augb.co.uk/ukrainian-community-schools.php)
- The **Ukrainian Youth Association** in Great Britain (CYM) (www.cym.org/uk), which organises and promotes cultural and social events for young Ukrainians from throughout the diaspora.

As Ukrainians left the camps and settled in industrial towns and cities all over the country, they began to establish churches and community centres so that they could maintain their cultural and religious traditions, and pass these on to their children. The **Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church** and the **Ukrainian Orthodox Church** in London are important meeting points for many Ukrainians in Britain.

Migration Industry Among the 'New' Migrants

As noted above, the post-1991 Ukrainian migration to the UK has not been particularly active in establishing new organisations or institutions separate from the existing structures. Some of the post-1991 migrants joined and revived the established institutions, adjusting them to the needs of the newly arrived. This was very much what happened in the case of the Ukrainian community schools, which went from teaching Ukrainian to second-generation post-Second World War migrants, to also accommodating children of work permit holders, students and other highly skilled migrants (interview 2, 2010). AUGB itself is now run jointly by children of EVW scheme participants, who themselves are British nationals, and newly arrived, established professionals.

As observed by the representatives of the AUGB, this is not however the case with regard to the majority of newcomers. The latter are very much selectively engaged in the established institutions, displaying more of a 'consumer' attitude towards the plethora of organisations – preferring ad hoc actions or gatherings, and preferring socialising over engagement and commitment. For this wave of Ukrainian migration it is the migration industry that has replaced the old voluntary and welfare organisations, and which currently dominates among the newcomers.

The 'migration business/industry' concept has been put forward by Cohen in his book, *Global Diasporas*, where he states that: '...despite the rigorous official control of immigration, there has been an extensive and rapid development of a "migration industry" comprising private lawyers, travel agents, recruiters, organizers, fixers and brokers who sustain links with origin and destination countries' (Cohen 1997, p. 163). For Cohen it was a proof of **diasporas being a very successful and highly adaptive form of social organisation, suited perfectly to operate in postmodern globalisation times.**

With regard to the Ukrainians it would perhaps be equally justified to say that the adaptation took place also the other way round – it was the migrant institutions that had to adapt in order to serve the different, more specific needs of the newly arrived migrants. The shape and character of migrant institutions reflects therefore – to a certain extent – the different needs and type of the migrant group in question.

Despite the group's diversity, one could detect a certain pattern of organisation and identity. The new migrants come from a different Ukraine than the post-Second World War migrants. Some of them remember the Soviet period (1919–1991 in Eastern Ukraine, 1945–1991 in Western Ukraine) and its survival strategies. To most of them the experience of political and economic transition after 1991 is common – with its volatile politics, rapid economic changes and bewildering legislation. And although formal rules may change overnight as a result of political or juridical decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies (North 1990).

During the Soviet period, mobilisation became the essential tool of the state in integrating the people around centralised organisational structures. However, due to the almost complete subordination of social relations (political parties, voluntary organisations, trade unions, professional associations, local community associations) to the state, the side effect was a growing social isolation and atomisation of groups and individuals at the intermediary level of social tissue (civil society) (Wnuk-Lipinski 1991, p. 5).

With the transition to democracy and market economy since 1991, the rules of the game were suddenly changed, and often without due procedures in place. This required specific adaptation strategies, to 'catch up' with the new realities of the market economy. The adaptations were abrupt and revealed more strongly the internal divisions within the society – those who lagged behind became socially excluded. Ukrainians adapted to the new political and economic situation, but the adaptation was a specific one. In fashioning their responses to the new social realities the acceptance of crude free market rules was combined with reliance on close-knit networks of friends and family, as a familiar adaptation strategy 'inherited' from the Soviet past.

This could partially explain why the post-1991 Ukrainian migrants in the UK are not particularly proactive in creating their own organisations or engaging in sustaining the ones that have already been created. People disheartened by the forced participation in various organisations during the Soviet past seem to build mini-communities of friends, acquaintances and colleagues and refrain from getting involved more seriously with larger associations – they rely on friends and colleagues, or simply on people they know, if help or consultation is needed.

Their specific, forced and quick adaptation to the hard rules of the free market economy during the time of post-Soviet transition may instead help to explain why the majority of 'new' Ukrainian migrants display a 'consumer', passive attitude to the existing organisations and treat them as options on the market, part of an economic transaction or wider exchange system. They *'take what they like, usually come and socialise, but do not want to take responsibility for sustaining the organisations'* (interview 2, 3, 2010). Not surprisingly therefore, to cater for their specific needs it is the migration business – rather

than voluntary migrant organisations – that is flourishing. It includes travel agents, informal employment agencies (including the bogus ones), ‘Ukrainian’ houses (run by Ukrainians or other Eastern Europeans for Ukrainians), immigration advice offices (some respectful office venues, others run by human traffickers, and gangs of document forgers), Eastern European and Russian delicatessens, and tele-operators (selling region-specific phone cards). An IOM report (2007) suggested that in London alone there is a rapidly increasing number of ‘advice’ centres, legal practices and charities that assist people from Ukraine and the CIS, or even specialise in working with them. Forums and establishments, such as bookshops and video stores, restaurants, social clubs, language schools and nurseries are also constantly increasing.

This is not to say that the newly arrived immigrants have no interest in the political or social matters of their compatriots. The interviews revealed that during the time of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004–2005), there was a massive, ad hoc and spontaneous mobilisation of Ukrainian migrants in London (interview 2, 2010) echoing the events in Lviv and Kiev, expressing solidarity with the opposition. Migrants themselves organised demonstrations in front of the Ukrainian Embassy against the corruption in the government, which were attended by many Ukrainians, who found out about the events via text messages received from their friends and colleagues. The interviewees remembered the special atmosphere of these events, the high hopes, and the ‘wind of change’. However, after the success of the Revolution this human potential ‘somehow’ dispersed, and was not channelled into any form of social organisation, again demonstrating the ad hoc character of the engagement dominant among the newly arrived migrants.

The only form of social institution that somehow stands out from either ad hoc, short-term mobilisation or a passive, ‘consumer’ attitude is the religious activity of Ukrainian migrants. The Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox churches are usually full on Sundays, and the services are well attended (interviews 1, 3, 2010).


4. Remittances

For Ukraine the data on remittance inflows exists since 1996. The data gathered by the World Bank only capture remittances sent through *formal* channels such as banks and money transfer operators. Currently, no uniform and authoritative historical data on informal flows exist. Given the widespread use of informal remittance channels in many countries, the remittance data presented should be regarded as underestimates of the total flows.

Table 5: Remittance Inflows (US\$ millions), Source: World Bank (2009)

Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Ukraine	6	12	12	18	33	141	209	330	411	595	829	4,503	5,769	4,972

Chart 3: Remittance Inflows Patterns to Ukraine (US\$ millions) Source: World Bank (2009)



There was a huge rise in remittance inflows to Ukraine between 2006 and 2007 (443 per cent). According to the World Bank in 2008 remittances in Ukraine provided for a 3.2 per cent share of the country's GDP. Düvell (2006) finds these figures implausible considering that the figure for just one *oblast*,⁶ Ternopil, is \$100 million annually. In contrast, Keryk (2004) suggests that the figure could be €7 billion annually (state budget: €6.9 billion), calculating that migrants send an average of \$100/month. That would place Ukraine third among remittances receiving countries, just after India and Mexico, but before the Philippines.

It is very difficult to find longitudinal, bilateral information on how much of the Ukraine's remittance inflows is actually contributed by Ukrainian migrants in the UK. The World Bank bilateral remittance estimates (see Table 6) using Migrant Stocks, Host Country Incomes, and Origin Country Incomes⁷ (in millions of US\$) revealed that **in 2005** Ukraine received from the UK remittances amounting to **\$2 million**, which would constitute only 0.3 per cent of all the remittance inflows in 2005 (for comparative purposes the Ukrainian diaspora in the **US remitted \$64 million in 2005**, 10.8 per cent of the country's total remittance inflows, and the Ukrainian diaspora in **Russia remitted \$309 million in 2005**, 52 per cent of the country's total remittance inflows).

Table 6: Bilateral Remittance Estimates using Migrant Stocks, Host Country Incomes, and Origin Country Incomes (US\$ millions), Top 10 Remittance Sending Countries and the United Kingdom. Source: World Bank 2005

Country Sending Remittances	Country Receiving Remittances – Ukraine
Russian Federation	309
United States	64
Israel	30
Germany	28
Poland	27
Kazakhstan	17
Moldova	14
Belarus	12
Canada	10
Spain	8
UK	2

⁶ *Oblast* is the **English** formal term for a region or province, also popularly and widely used in Ukrainian.

⁷ These data are estimated using assumptions and arguments as explained in Ratha and Shaw (2006) 'South–South Migration and Remittances', Development Prospects Group, World Bank (www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances).

5. Individual Migration Histories – Trends and Patterns

The trends and patterns of Ukrainian migration to the UK have already been partially presented in Section 1, when THEMIS theoretical concepts were confronted with the empirical reality, and in Section 2, where UK immigration policy outcomes were presented in parallel with the history of Ukrainian movements to the UK.

Andrij's⁸ migration history is atypical of migrants of his generation (he himself admitted before the interview), and therefore fits perfectly in the wider narrative of Ukrainian migration to the UK, which so much escapes generalisation and lacks clearly distinguishable patterns. Andrij comes from Kiev, and before coming to the UK he studied Polish literature in Warsaw in late 1980s. He travelled a lot across Central and Eastern Europe. He first came to the UK as a tourist in 1987, having been invited by a friend he met during one of his international sojourns in the Czech Republic. At that time one still had to go to Moscow in order to apply for a UK visa. Andrij remembers long queues in front of the British Embassy:

'I would need to wait two weeks in front of the Embassy in order to have my meeting. No system of appointments was in place. People were managing themselves, there was a Queue Committee spontaneously formed by those who were at the top of the queue. They were reading out your name every morning. If you did not confirm your presence – your name was crossed out from the list, and you had to start queuing anew. I could not afford to spend that much time in Moscow. Two weeks! Well, I sneaked in one morning...'

A remembers that upon arrival in the UK he liked it here. He came to B, a city in the north of England. At that time in the late 1980s British streets looked completely different than they look now – *'to a Ukrainian'* – he explains. *'Now there are so many Polish people here, you have shops, and many clubs. Then, streets got empty in the evenings at least in B. There were no clubs.'*

Nevertheless Andrij liked it in the UK, and he came once more – this time to start his PhD in Russian Literature and Philosophy. He defended his PhD in the late 1990s and started working first for the local council as Eastern European Adviser and then for a radio station, as a Eastern European correspondent. *'Since 2004 things have changed a lot, there are a lot of Polish people, particularly in the north of England where I live. England feels more like home now, I hear Polish on the streets, it feels nice.'* In the mid 2000s Andrij received the offer to work as an editor of one of the journals published by the Ukrainian community in the UK, which he accepted. He now shares his time between B and London, where he works. He admits he is an atypical migrant; he is not like those Ukrainians who have been arriving in London in particular since the 1990s. *'I did not come to the UK to earn money. This is of course important, but I wanted to see the world, see the West. And I wanted to be legal, as ultimately I wanted to settle. It wouldn't be possible to do so, if I was working illegally. I have British citizenship now.'*

⁸ Name changed.

Where To? – Where From?


Ukrainian Pioneers in the UK (early twentieth century)

To reiterate, and systematise the argument, the dominant community narrative has it that its pioneers in the UK could be traced back to the beginning of the twentieth century, when a group of Ukrainians, bound originally for America, landed in **Liverpool**, and began their new life around the city of **Manchester** instead (AUGB 2010). The **pioneers came from Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia, Ukrainian – Galicia Region)**, which was then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They were part of the larger emigration of over 10 per cent of the population of Western Ukraine at that time, who emigrated to the US, Canada, and Latin American countries between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century (Malynovska 2006). During the scoping study we did not manage to get hold of any of the pioneers.

Major Wave of Ukrainian Migrants (1946–1951)

After the Second World War the Ukrainian diaspora in the UK was significantly enlarged by refugees from the displaced persons camps in continental Europe, who were recruited to come to work under the European Volunteer Worker scheme between 1946 and 1951. The majority of the migrants again came from **Western Ukraine: Galicia – Volyn, Bukovina, and Carpathian region** (cf. Map 5). During the war they were forcibly deported to labour camps in Germany and Austria (20,930 people). Some of the Ukrainian migrants to the UK were recruited from the prisoners of war who fought with the Germans and surrendered to the British troops in May 1945 (8,320 people).

Map 5: Map of Contemporary Ukraine (post-1991), with regional divisions. Source: Bilan et al. (2010)




The general feeling was that Ukrainians who arrived in the UK after the Second World War were involuntarily uprooted and torn away from their families and neighborhoods in Western Ukraine. In the UK upon arrival they were dispersed to different camps and then sent to work in mills, mines, agriculture and textile factories in the British regions that particularly suffered from a lack of work force – **the Midlands, north Manchester, Bradford, Bolton, and Nottingham**. IOM (2007) reveals the demographic spread of the Ukrainian community in the UK, which largely reflects this historical argument (cf. Map 6). There are still relatively numerous Ukrainian communities in the old industrial regions in the north of England, particularly consisting of the original EVW workers and their children (second generation).

By far the greater cluster of Ukrainian diaspora is in **London**. Although the post-Second World War workers were usually sent to work in the Midlands (and the majority of them could not even afford to settle in London – interview 1, 2010), the turning point that attracted more Ukrainians to London was the establishment of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, initially with the base in 218 Sussex Gardens in London (then known as the Ukrainian Relief Association), and since 1948 relocated to 49 Linden Gardens, which is still the Association's headquarters today.

The concentration of the 'old' wave of Ukrainian diaspora in a couple of specific locations in the UK largely stems from the fact that the migrants longed to stay together within the diaspora; to create structures and organisations for educational purposes; to fulfill their emotional and welfare needs; and to represent the Ukrainian people to British authorities. It was important to them to build churches, to practise their religion, to teach their children the Ukrainian language, to celebrate festivals, and to pass the tradition and culture on to their second generation. All these aims could be better fulfilled if geographical proximity was maintained. During the scoping study we did not speak directly to this first generation of Ukrainian migrants, but to their children, born in the UK in the 1950s, who also very much consider themselves as part of the Ukrainian diaspora despite the fact that they are all British citizens. Their parents established the migrants' organisations and institutional structures, as we know them today, which the second generation is now sustaining.

Map 6: Geographic Spread of the Ukrainian Community in the UK, 2007. Source: IOM 2007



New Wave of Ukrainians (post-1991)

With regard to the new Ukrainian migrants, the qualitative evidence has it that the majority of them also come from Western Ukraine. Despite the lack of practical ties between the ‘old’ diaspora and Ukraine during the Soviet times, the memory of ‘those who left these lands’ has been preserved in the neighborhoods, among friends, families, and in the community narrative (*partially real, partially imagined*) (interview 1, 2010). After Ukrainian independence in 1991, when the relationship between the Ukrainian diaspora and their homelands was re-established, some Ukrainians decided to follow in the emigrants’ footsteps to try their luck, ‘see the world’ (interview 4, 2010). The anecdotal evidence has it that while the majority of economic migrants (migrant workers) in the 1990s indeed came from Western Ukraine, and mainly originated from rural areas, in recent years the movement of the population has changed. The new Ukrainian migration is far more diverse with regard to specific localities in Ukraine. Students, business persons and professionals come from big cities (like Kiev and Lviv) and also from Eastern Ukraine (e.g. Donetsk).

Map 7: Ternopil'ska oblast.



The research conducted by Bilan et al. (2010) showed that one particular region in Western Ukraine has been a traditional area of emigration to the West (Bilan et al. 2010, p. 10, cf. Map 7) – **Ternopil'ska oblast**. Since 1995 the balance of migration in this region has been negative, and is also constantly decreasing due to negative fertility rates and natural population decrease (Bilan et al. 2010, p. 10). Labour migration became a crucial factor of socio-economic transformation and an efficient tool in the regulation of the labour force. Over the last decade, labour emigration has taken on a global character in Ukraine. Among emigrants from Ternopil'ska oblast, there is a significant number who leave for seasonal work – mostly bound for Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Russian Federation – but also for the UK (Bilan et al. 2010, p. 10). The identification of this specific locality in Ukraine arises from the scoping study; however it would be useful to confront this conclusion in Phase 2 (in-depth interviews).

As for the destination of the new wave of Ukrainian migrants in the UK, **London** is the place of greatest clustering (cf. IOM 2007; Bloch et al. 2009). With regard to where in London, Map 8 presents the


clustering of Ukrainians (classified as Other Eastern Europeans) in the Greater London Area, based on names and addresses of all adults entitled to vote (2001–2006).⁹

Of course this does not reflect the number of undocumented Ukrainian migrants; however, the experience of researchers working on the social and economic lives of young undocumented migrants in Britain (Bloch et al. 2009) seems to suggest that this specific Ukrainian community proved to be much easier to make contact with in London than elsewhere.¹⁰ The interviewers were largely recruited through snowball sampling either among interviewer's contacts, or through online social networks (odnoklasniki.ru), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Migrant Network (Bloch et al. 2009, p. 118).

⁹ www.londonprofiler.org has been prepared by the Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis (UCL). The source of peoples' names used in this atlas is the UK Electoral Register; the version used here is a running cumulative register from 2001 to 2006. It is based on an innovative technique to classify populations through the origin of their forenames and surnames as a proxy for their probable ethnicity. UCL has developed its own classification of names according to their cultural, ethnic and linguistic origin, termed **Onomap**.

¹⁰ Bloch et al. (2009) demonstrate that there were however practical difficulties in accessing the **interviewers**. Researchers with language skills found, however, that people were very protective about their identity and even when contacted did not want to participate in a formal interview.

Map 8: Ukrainians (Other Eastern Europeans) in London, 200 –2006. Source: www.londonprofiler.org



6. Assessment and Identification of Issues to be Explored in Phase 2

While the case of Ukrainian migrants in the UK does not constitute an exact fit within the THEMIS theoretical categories, and lacks quantitative data prior to 1991 (with the exception of the EVW figures), it nevertheless presents an interesting case for further exploration:

- It **challenges the clear-cut categories of the ideal type of migration system** (starter, established, declining, etc.) – *Why do Ukrainians perceive themselves as a declining community, when the figures suggest otherwise? What does it say about the role of the pioneers – aren't they wave-specific? What does it say about the relationship between the 'old' (post-Second World War) and the 'new' (post-1991) migrations? What, in this context, does 'Ukrainian migration system' mean? Doesn't the holistic picture simplify things too much?*
- Ukrainian migration to the UK was abruptly stopped in the late 1940s, with the Cold War and the establishment of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic as part of the USSR, despite the settlement of a relatively large population of Ukrainians in the UK between 1946 and 1951. *What does this say about the meaningful employment of the 'migration threshold' concept in explaining the development of a migration system? What is therefore the relationship between the internal and contextual feedback mechanisms? What does it say about the role of Ukrainian migrant networks?*
- Studying Ukrainian migration to the UK equally **makes the well-defined migration categories** (refugee, migrant worker, and student) **more ambiguous** – *Who were the post-Second World War Ukrainian migrants to the UK? Were they workers? Were they refugees? How did they identify themselves, and why? Who are the newcomers? Are they really largely irregular? Perhaps their legal status should not be considered in black and white categories (legal-illegal), but denote various other shades of grey? What does it say about the Ukrainian migrants' agency vis-à-vis state legal frameworks?*
- Ukrainians in the UK are an **understudied migrant group** (in contrast to Indians, Bangladeshis and Moroccans), and the project was welcomed with interest by the Ukrainian organisation representatives who were interviewed for the scoping study.

The qualitative, in-depth analysis could cast more light on the picture, explaining the different trends – escaping the clear-cut categories – of Ukrainian migration to the UK.

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
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