



From the American Dream to the Mexican Nightmare: The Effect of US Border Control Enforcement and Migratory Policies in Mexican Criminal Violence

San Ysidro, California 1991



San Ysidro, California 1999




Source: Andreas, *Border Games*, 2000

Francisco Alonso

EUI researcher


Oxford, IMI 10th Anniversary, January, 2016

Homicides per year in Mexico




Source: Instituto Nacional de Geografía, Informática e Historia (INEGI). <http://www.inegi.org.mx/>

Homicides and Foreign Direct Investment as share of GDP



Source: INEGI www.inegi.org, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). unctadstat.unctad.org

Homicides and Divorces




Source: www.inegi.org

“Perhaps the most important factor behind the rise of large-scale organized crime, at least in Mexico, is political (or institutional): the transition from autocratic, one-party rule to democratic, multiparty rule” (Kalyvas, 2015, 8).

Homicides and Effective Number of Parties


(Mexican Congress)



— Homicides — ENP

Source: www.inegi.org; www.cidac.org

Homicide Rates per 100,000 people in Mexico, 1926-2001




Source: Piccato, "Estadísticas del crimen en México: Series históricas, 1901-2001"

<http://www.columbia.edu/~pp143/estadisticascrimen/EstadisticasSigloXX.htm>

“The history of Europe in the 19th century would probably have been either far more turbulent or far more repressive and the trend toward representative government much more halting had it not been possible for millions of people to emigrate toward the United States and elsewhere.”

(Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Further Reflections...*, 1980)


Homicides and Mexican Immigration to the US 1991-2010





Source: www.inegi.org; Passel, 2012

Methods


2000





2010



2000



2010



- Event count models, 2,456 municipalities during 2000-2010.
- Participant observation, semi-structured interviews

The Great Expulsion

Before 9/11

- End of the guest-worker “Bracero Program”, 1964.
- U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) public relations campaign warning of the dangers of irregular migration. (1970s).
- 10-foot-high chain-link fence along the seven westernmost miles of the divide in California, backed by floodlights and increased helicopter patrols, Carter Administration.
- Construction in 1990 of a steel wall made of surplus military landing mat in the San Diego, 1990.
- “Operation Hold-the-line” in El Paso, 1993
- “Operation Gatekeeper” in San Diego, 1994
- “Operation Safeguard” in Southern Arizona, 1995.
- Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIR), 1996. Increase the power of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to restrict illegal immigration along the Texas-Mexico Border; reclassified several misdemeanours as “aggravated felonies” if committed by an irregular immigrant
- “Operation Río Grande” in Brownsville, Texas, 1997

After 9/11

- Secure Border Initiative , 2005 (Wide-ranging multi-year plan of walls, fences and other barricades)
- Secure Fence Act, 2006 (850 miles of at least two layers of reinforced fencing with patrol roads in between)
- Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Complete 370 miles of previous fencing and 300 miles of vehicle barriers along the divide by December 2008)

For decades, the risk of apprehension of every border crossing attempt remained very low (**one out of three**) and usually had no mayor consequences. An irregular migrant would still have a **66 per cent chance** to successfully cross the border. If (s)he was caught, (s)he would be simply sent back to Mexico. The probability of successfully crossing the border was very high after **three consecutive attempts**.

(Massey, Categorically Unequal... 2007)

Since 2005, Operation Streamline mandates the criminal prosecution of almost all irregular crossers in some border areas. After years of simply being returned to the Mexican side or (at worst) handled by the civil immigration system, an irregular migrant will secure to himself up to **six months** in detention for first-time offenders; **two years** to those charged with felony reentry and up to **twenty years** if he has a criminal record.

(Martínez and Slack, 2013)

Descriptive statistics of the Homicide Model 2000-2010

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<i>The Mexican Nightmare</i>					
Homicides	27,775	5.028119	36.23421	0	3,735
<i>The end of the American Dream</i>					
Ln out-migration	24,192	1.112749	1.164412	-4.033355	3.84303
Ln remittances	24,929	1.28978	1.242704	-3.907412	3.983679
Interaction Ln remittances & secondary schooling	24,929	0.4316487	0.4163484	-1.620646	1.751752
<i>Controls</i>					
Ln effective number of parties	22,325	0.8734422	0.2425705	0	1.384181
Young males	26,888	24.86815	3.010033	3.744411	39
Secondary schooling	26,886	0.3401703	0.1481172	0.0129683	0.8819649
Ln GDP per capita	26,816	8.582537	0.5247406	6.778979	10.71471
Inequality	26,986	0.4154553	0.0603606	0.243	0.705
Inequality2	26,986	0.1762464	0.0515801	0.059049	0.497025
Ln population	26,941	9.359636	1.532837	4.532599	14.41483

Fixed-Effects NB Regression Estimates of Annual Counts of Homicides by Municipality 2000-2010

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coefficient	Incidence Rate Ratio	Coefficient	Incidence Rate Ratio	Coefficient	Incidence Rate Ratio
<i>The end of the American Dream</i>						
Ln out-migration	-0.139*** (0.0158)	0.870*** (0.0138)				
Ln remittances			-0.158*** (0.0183)	0.854*** (0.0157)	-0.0788** (0.0368)	0.924** (0.0340)
Interaction Ln remittances & secondary schooling					-0.216** (0.0867)	0.805** (0.0698)
<i>Controls</i>						
Ln effective number of parties	0.224*** (0.0342)	1.250*** (0.0428)	0.210*** (0.0341)	1.234*** (0.0421)	0.210*** (0.0340)	1.234*** (0.0420)
Young males	-0.0214*** (0.00588)	0.979*** (0.00575)	-0.0244*** (0.00583)	0.976*** (0.00569)	-0.0213*** (0.00596)	0.979*** (0.00583)
Secondary schooling	0.148 (0.219)	1.160 (0.254)	0.298 (0.215)	1.347 (0.289)	0.567** (0.241)	1.763** (0.424)
Ln GDP per capita	-0.104** (0.0465)	0.901** (0.0419)	-0.0783* (0.0463)	0.925* (0.0428)	-0.0999** (0.0471)	0.905** (0.0426)
Inequality	-17.46*** (2.194)	2.61e-08*** (5.73e-08)	-17.84*** (2.191)	1.79e-08*** (3.91e-08)	-17.85*** (2.192)	1.77e-08*** (3.88e-08)
Constant	4.003*** (0.665)	54.75*** (36.41)	4.226*** (0.667)	68.43*** (45.63)	4.262*** (0.667)	70.95*** (47.32)
T x N	19,454	19,454	19,906	19,906	19,906	19,906
Log Likelihood	-30412.16		-30744.20		-30741.08	
Wald model chi2	981.89		985.86		1003.89	

Conclusions:

- Outmigration is **negatively associated** with homicidal violence. A possible interpretation is that Mexico previously benefitted from emigration to the U.S. because:
 - 1) **The departure of unsatisfied people increased political and social stability.**
 - 2) **Remittances may have helped in alleviating poverty** -which weakens states' financial and bureaucratic capacities and facilitates criminal recruitment.
- In the absence of migration to the US, it is very likely that migrant towns in Mexico would be worse off and more violent. For decades, **peace seemed to be an unintended outcome of outmigration and remittances.** Without the “American Dream” to the US, Mexico would probably have gotten into today's bottleneck years ago.

Thank you for your attention!

Questions and comments are
very welcomed at:

francisco.alonso@eui.eu