

**Kwacha ngwee: a snapshot at Zambia's contemporary migration patterns.**

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**By**

Danny M. Simatele

**University of Sussex  
School of Social Sciences and Cultural Studies  
Department of Geography  
Brighton  
BN1 9SJ  
Great Britain**

**Email: [Dms27@sussex.ac.uk](mailto:Dms27@sussex.ac.uk) or [dmulala@hotmail.com](mailto:dmulala@hotmail.com).**

## **Kwacha ngwee<sup>1</sup>: a snapshot at Zambia's contemporary migration patterns.**

### **Abstract**

Zambia is among the rapidly urbanisation countries in sub-Saharan Africa with almost 35 % of its 10.7 million people living in urban centres. Official statistics from the Central Statistic Office of Zambia has pegged the urbanisation rate at 40 %. This high rate has been attributed mainly to internal movements of people from different geographical settings in the country, with rural-urban movement being the main contributor. Unfortunately for Zambia, rapid urbanisation is taking place when the country is experiencing tremendous economic declines emanating from the oil crisis of the late 1970s, to the current deteriorations in all sub-sectors of the economy. This situation has been exacerbated by decays in the institutional framework, poor governance and the adoption of globally formulated economic policies which seem to be divorced from local realities. The effects of the local, national and global forces have thus combined and negatively affected productivity in both rural and urban areas. This has further subjected both rural and urban populations to various levels of poverty, vulnerability and deprivation. These developments have forced both rural and urban populations to engage in some form of movement with rural to rural and urban to urban flows increasingly becoming the dominant movement patterns in Zambia. In fact statistical evidence suggests the slowing down of the rural - urban migration pattern, despite the recent surge of interest in Zambia's copper mining industry which has been re-vitalised and has attracted huge international investments. On the other hand, emigration from Zambia by regional or African standards is very low. Few Zambians live abroad and migration from Zambia seems to a characteristic of the tertiary educated. This paper therefore, attempts to highlight developments in Zambia's population movements in the hope of re-focussing research from the traditional focus on rural to urban forms to one that includes other forms of migration such as rural to rural and cross-border movements. Both Rural to rural and cross-border movements are slowly increasing in importance, but their dynamics, especially in the Zambian context are little understood.

**Key words:** Zambia, migration, population movement, cross-border migration, macro, micro and meso levels.

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<sup>1</sup>The term is normally used to refer to the currency in Zambia. At Zambia's independence in 1964, many rural residents understood it as signalling the free movement of people from rural areas to urban areas with out any form of restrictions such as those imposed during colonial rule.

## **1.1. Introduction.**

Zambia is a land-locked country in southern Africa sharing borders with eight countries; Malawi and Mozambique to the east, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia to the south, Angola to the west, Congo-Kinshasa and Tanzania to the North. It's a former British colony and attained political independence on the 24<sup>th</sup> of October 1964, and for the most part was a one party state until multi-partism in 1991. The total land surface area is 753 000km<sup>2</sup> and the landscape is mostly flat with an altitude lying between 900m and 1400m above sea level. The climate and vegetation is subtropical with three different and very distinct seasons; a cool dry season, which normally is experienced from May to August, a hot dry season that falls between September and ends in April, and a warm wet season in which almost 95% of the country's precipitation falls. The annual rainfall varies from 1270mm in the north to 760mm in the centre and normally below 760mm in the south (Hamusankwa 1997:1).

Beginning in the 1980s, Zambia, like many other sub-Saharan African countries, underwent a series of structural and economic reforms, (e.g. Structural Adjustment Programmes-SAPs), which were aimed at increasing investment levels and improving allocation of investment resources. This was envisaged in the hope of bringing about economic equilibrium and growth (Milimo et al. 2002). However, the investment response to economic reforms has been poor largely due to the poor performance in the economy and the build up in Zambia's foreign debt (Andersson et al. 1999). Thus, the impact of domestic investment has been disastrous and adjustment programmes have regularly broken down because of domestic politics, and also because of the impact of the extreme debt burden that overshadows all policymaking in Zambia (Milimo et. Al. 2002). The combination of domestic politics and reform programmes have had devastating effects on the majority of the Zambian people in terms of the general standards of living which mostly has been manifested into increasing poverty levels both in rural and urban centres.

Despite the declines in the economy and the general deteriorations in the provisions of socio-economic services and facilities, Zambia is one of the rapidly urbanising countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with more than a third of her population living in

urban areas. The current rate of urbanisation has been pegged at 40%, while the national population is estimated at 10.9 million (CSO 2005). The population density is reported to be about 12.5 persons per square kilometre with the highest population concentration being in Lusaka and the Copper-belt provinces<sup>2</sup>, which have 65.4 and 52.9 persons per square kilometre respectively (CSO 2000, 2004, 2005). The concentration of people in Lusaka and Copper-belt provinces, including other intermediate towns has largely been attributed to the flow of people from either rural areas, or simply people re-locating from one urban centre to another. However, recent evidence suggests a slow shift in internal population movement in the country and involves migrants moving from either rural to rural, urban to urban, or urban to rural (c. Potts, 2004). On the other hand, anecdotal statistics on cross border migration seem to suggest a rather low rate of emigration from Zambia. This paper therefore, is an attempt to highlight the emerging migration patterns within and from Zambia in the context of social and economic changes that the country has experienced over the last few decades. It is hoped that by exploring these trends, a better understanding of migration dynamics in Zambia will be highlighted both for the benefit of policy and research.

### **2.1. Theoretical underpinnings and study data.**

Migration according to Fellmann et al. (1995:82) may be forced or voluntary, or in many instances, reluctant relocations imposed on the migrants by circumstances. In the work of the founding father of modern migration research and analysis, E.G. Ravenstein (1885, 1889), it was implicit that migration was in effect caused by economic development. To make a clear relationship between migration and economic development, he postulated that as industries and commerce develop and transport improves, migration increases in volume. And secondly, he observed that the major causes of migration were economic. From the two assumptions, Ravenstein (1889:288), as cited by Skeldon (1997), concluded that migration was a consequence of development and that “migration means life and progress” (Skeldon 1997:199,200). Using this analytical framework, Ravenstein (1889) formulated eleven

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<sup>2</sup> Two most urbanised provinces in the country. Copperbelt is the mainstay of Zambia’s economy involving copper mining, while Lusaka houses the capital city and is the seat of government.

principles of migration (c. Skeldon 1997:200), which were very much anchored on economic development as the basis on which migrants base their decisions to migrate.

Although a number of Ravenstein's assumptions no longer adequately explain contemporary migration trends and patterns, the emphasis on the economic dimension provides us with one approach from which to draw certain assumptions on contemporary migration dynamics, especially cross-border movements from regions that reasonably peaceful. Using the economic theme as a basis for population movement, Michael Todaro postulates that migration proceeds in response to urban-rural differences in expected income rather than actual earnings (Todaro, 2000). He argues that, "migrants consider various labour market opportunities available to them in the rural and urban sectors and choose the one that maximises their expected gains from migration" (Todaro 2000:305). The expected gains in this case are usually measured by the difference in real incomes between rural and urban work and the probability of a new migrant's obtaining an urban job.

The Todaro models assumes that both actual and potential members of the labour force in a given geographical location, compare their expected incomes for a given time horizon in the urban sector (i.e. difference between returns and costs of migration) with the prevailing average rural incomes, and migrate if the former exceeds the later. While the Todaro model is more robust than the Ravenstein model in the sense that it takes into account the availability of other labour market opportunities, its weaknesses like the Ravenstein model lies in the emphasis on economic aspect as the major determinant of population movement. Both models do not take into account the role that other factors such as environmental, kinship ties, security, social-networks, and household assets, etc play in influencing the decision to migrated.

In light of the weaknesses in the two and other neo-classical theories of migration not revealed in this paper, there is now emphasis to analyse contemporary migration processes from a theoretical perspective involving three separate and distinct scales which include; the macro, meso and micro level. The three levels of analysis, in addition to the traditional economic aspect, are believed to offer a better starting point in identifying and explaining factors influencing population movements within

and across national boundaries. The three tier theoretical approach has been conceived in the limelight that no single and coherent theory of migration presently exists or offers adequate explanations of observable contemporary migration patterns both at a local, national or global level (c. Massey et al. 1993).

In view of the above argument, the micro level in the analysis of migration flows rests on the decision-making individual. The focus at this level is the assumption that individuals make decisions based on their autonomy and freedom of choice aimed at improving and securing one's life style, status, comfort, wealth, stimulation, and affiliation etc. The decision to migrate is conceptually perceived as a function reflecting the potential migrants' values, desires and expectations in both areas of emigration and immigration (Massey, et al. 1993). In other words, the potential migrants is here perceived as making rational decisions which are aimed at ensuring the possibility that if the potential migrant moves, he or she will attain a certain improvement in the standard of living. On the other hand, the macro level and its extensions, focuses on opportunity structures and explain the phenomenon of migration from an economic, political, cultural setting, demographic and ecological perspectives (Massey, et al. 1993).

According to the analysis at this level, political-economic-cultural structures denote an array of factors in the emigration and destination areas and in the international political and economic systems of national states. This level, as argued by Massey et al. (1993), analyses migration, particularly international migration from a triadic relationship between governments and authorities in the emigration and immigration areas, the migrants' associations, and some times international organisations, all of which have varying degrees on influencing the decision to migrate. From a world systems perspective for example, it is argued that nation-states differ significantly regarding factors such as external power in the international system, internal administrative capacity, efficiency, political and economical stability and these differences have significant consequences on the emergency of migration flows (c. Taylor and Flint 2003, Massey et al. 1993)). An example in this respect is that the admission and integration policies in both emigration and immigration areas/countries differ from open to restrictive and a number of nation-states, particularly those in the developed world, tend to favour the admission of certain immigrant categories and

newcomers from certain countries, while making it difficult for other groups and territorial origins. These factors play important roles in decision making of would be migrants.

The third and final level of migration analysis is the meso level, which in principle is a set of social and symbolic ties among movers and groups, and the resources available to them (c. Massey et al. 1993). The analysis at this level is anchored on the structure, strength, and density of social ties, on the one hand, and their content, on the other. The argument here postulates that the decision to migrate is a rational decision facilitated by the social and symbolic ties among stayers and migrants with units and networks in the areas of origin and destination, and their relations between collective actors; *inter alia* kinship groups, religious groups, households, ethnic communities, and nations etc (c. Massey et al. 1993). Of the three levels of analysis, the meso level is the most vague but most notable when it comes to explaining processes of immobility and mobility and the mechanisms involved. Situated in between the micro and macro-levels, the meso level links to both, and focuses on how social action is facilitated and on resources such as social capital that people can muster to achieve their goals. The meso level also connects with larger aggregates such as; groups, formal organisations, institutions, and social movements, which can act as a pull for potential migrants.

It is important to bear in mind that the three levels of analysis discussed in this paper do not constitute the primary and only theoretical basis with which to analyse migration flows either on a national or international level. As pointed out above, there is no single coherent theory with which to study international migration and the theoretical underpinning outlined in this section of the paper must be understood as one such approach through which international migration and its local counterpart can be studied. However, from the theoretical discussion, it is apparent that the phenomenon of migration, whether internal or international, is a consequence arising from a number of factors rather the traditional economic one emphasised in neoclassic theories of migration. In the absence of a coherent theory and the realisation that migration flows are not only and purely a consequence of economic processes, there is need for the formulation of a theory that will incorporate other factors that influence the movement of people within national and across national boundaries.

The data used in this paper is secondary data and involved the review of large volumes of published and grey literature from the Central Statistics Office (CSO) of Zambia, collected through censuses. It is important to note that Zambian censuses are considered to be sufficiently accurate to be of real use in analysing urban and migration trends. Since the early 1960, Zambia has had five censuses which invariably have been made available to the public within considerably short periods of time despite the constraints under which CSO operates. The final report of recent census exercise was published in 2003, and like all other censuses, it includes urban-level data. It is important to note that although the CSO data contain some oddities, there are no serious anomalies or idiosyncrasies evident in the demographic profiles or spatially disaggregated data that would suggest the data are seriously misleading (c. Potts, 2004). In light of this argument, the main source of statistical figures included in this paper are from the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Reports, Census Reports, Quarterly Demographic Government Reports, and a wide range of other unpublished information from government agencies.

### **3.1. Migration in Zambia: a historical perspective.**

Before the arrival of Europeans in Zambia, the country had already been inhabited by a number of ethnic groups, which were well organised both culturally and politically. They had their own food production practices, technology, and had a high level of division of labour. Many of these groups were agriculturalists that applied simple farming methods using simple tools such as the hoe (for digging) and the axe (for cutting down trees). The main farming method was shifting cultivation (locally known as Chitemene), which involved slashing and burning of vegetation (Mwanza, 1979). Crops grown under this traditional system included; finger millet, sorghum, corn and cassava. These crops were mainly used for domestic consumption and in certain instances for trading under the barter system (Hamusankwa 1997, Simatele 2006). The role of each individual in the society was well defined. The men usually cleared and prepared the fields for planting, while the women and children did the planting. Alongside crop cultivation, pastoral agriculture was also practiced especially among the Tonga/ Ila of Southern province, the Lozi's in the Western, the Ngoni's in the East, and the Luvale's in the North Western parts of the country (Kajoba 1993).

Agriculture in the traditional system was complemented by hunting, and by gathering wild fruits, caterpillars, mushrooms and other wild roots etc. Thus, movement of people from one place to another during this period, as argued by Chilivumbo and Mijere was mainly a function aimed at restoring the ecological balance, and of individuals in search of subsistence, better shelter and improved security (Chilivumbo and Mijere, 1994, Mwanza, 1979). Furthermore, migration was also influenced by the fact that, “the traditional society was not completely shed off from hunger because of its limited technology that made storage of surplus foodstuffs difficult in a tropical climate” (Hamusankwa 1997:3). Migration was thus, one such measure that many households in the traditional society employed to ensure household food security and well-being (c. Kajoba, 1993). While, the above arguments cannot be refuted, it is also vital to remember that other factors, such as tribal conflicts, trade and slavery, which predated the arrival of European settlers also contributed significantly to population movements in pre-colonial Zambia. Based on existing literature on migration in Zambia, we can argue that population movements in this country is not a new phenomenon but has a long history, involving people moving across internal and international boundaries (Turok, 1989, Macwangi, et al. 1996, Simatele, 2001).

With the arrival of the first Europeans in 1850 and the eventual introduction of colonialism in 1890, population movements in Zambia took another dimension. Prior to the governance by the British Colonial Office, Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) was ruled by the British South Africa Company (BSAC), which employed a variety of tactical measures designed to encourage labour migration, first to the mines of South Africa, and later to the emerging mines on Northern Rhodesia’s own Copperbelt province. Macwangi, et al, (1996), observes that the mechanisms on which such migration encouragements were based involved the imposition of hut and poll taxes on very grown up male, failure to which harsh jail sentences and punishment were administered. Such measures had negative impacts on the traditional livelihood systems of many rural populations and also limited the room for them to adopt other rural livelihood options. Leaving their home communities to work in the mines of South Africa, the Katanga province, or the Copperbelt province was not an option that

men chose with pleasure; but it was simply how people coped with the given circumstances (Macwangi et al, 1996; Chilivumbo & Mijere, 1994).

The change in the administration of the colony from BSAC to British colonial rule in 1924 did little to change or improve the conditions of migrants, although there was a shift in emphasis from cross border migration to internal circulatory movement of labour (i.e. men) from rural to urban areas on a temporary basis, with migrants maintaining their contacts with their villages (Collins, 1986, Kay, 1967). The understanding was such that these migrants would return to their native territories upon expiry of their urban residence permits (Macwangi et al, 1996, Collins, 1986, Kay, 1967, Williams, 1986). By encouraging internal circulatory migration and investing in rural areas, coupled with urban travel restrictions, it was assumed that migrants would keep their families (i.e. wives and children) in rural areas with the prospects of the labour migrant returning to his native territory upon retirement (Mwanza, 1979, Macwangi, et al.1996).

Colonialism in Zambia established migration dynamics that came to be based on gender and age segregation and in some instances on race. Some scholars have argued that cities and towns in Zambia were designed and planned to accommodate white settlers only, while Africans were 'constitutional' expected to remain in rural areas (Tait, 1997, Williams 1986, Kay 1967, Turok 1979). Turok (1989:29) actually observes that, "from the early years, the mining companies, colonial administration, and white settlers opposed the granting of social and political rights to Africans. The colour bar became deeply entrenched in respect of social status and economic opportunities. The mining companies also opposed the creation of urban openings for Africans other than those needed in the labour process". Thus, by implementing this system of urban governance, the colonial administration instituted a foundation for a dual economy comprising of a relatively small modern sector and a large, predominantly subsistence rural sector.

The purpose of setting up such an economy was envisaged as the most prudent way of modernising and increasing the productivity of the subsistence (African) sector to the

level that will generate adequate income of those engaged in this sector. And at the same time, it was thought this would produce sufficient food and raw materials to support the entire economy (Turok, 1989). The subsistence sector would then be able to release surplus labour to the modern sector thereby triggering growth and expansion in the modern sector at a rate that would create adequate employment opportunities to absorb both released workers from the subsistence sector, and the natural growth of the urban labour force (c. Turok 1979, and Rakodi 1990). The crucial most challenge, however, in this kind of dualistic setting lay in achieving the most effective shift of the centre economic activities from the subsistence sector to the modern sector through reallocation of labour. In the Zambian case, for example, the country experienced no significant growth or improvement in subsistence productivity (c. Simatele, 2006). This development perpetuated very low incomes for rural populations and widened the rural-urban income gap and accelerated rural-urban migration towards the three most urban provinces in Zambia as seen in the Table 1.

It is evident in Table 1 that between 1969 and 1996, most of the predominately rural provinces in Zambia, experienced negative changes in their populations, while the three predominately urban provinces of Central, Lusaka and Copperbelt experienced positive changes in their population due to in-migration of 0.29%, 5.1% and 1.2 % respectively.

**Table 1. Estimated provincial population Change due to migration, 1969-1996.**

Province	Population 1969	Population 1980	Population 1996	Annual change due to migration.	% change due to migration /p.a.
*Central	358,655	511,905	865,266	+1,034	+0.29
*Copperbelt	816,309	1,251,178	1,678,870	+10,178	+1.25
Eastern	509,515	650,902	117,289	-5,470	-1.07
Luapula	335,584	420,966	593,470	-4,306	-1.28
*Lusaka	353,975	691,054	1,561,188	+17,914	+5.06
Northern	545,096	674,750	639,023	-7,811	-1.43
N.Western	231,733	302,668	420,043	-1,885	-0.81
Southern	496,041	671,923	1,002,501	-1,849	-0.37
Western	410,087	480,455	756,993	-7,805	-1.90

**Sources:** CSO, 1969, 1970, 1974, & 1980, 1998: Sample Census and population and housing census of Zambia & Living Conditions in Zambia.

\* Refers to Zambia's three most predominately urban provinces between 1969 and 1980. The other six were predominately rural. Lusaka and Copperbelt have remained the most economically developed provinces in Zambia.

This development could be attributed to the removal of colonial travel restrictions imposed during the colonial era at Zambia's political independence in 1964. At independence people were now able to move freely between the rural and urban areas and could take permanent urban residence and long term employment (Williams, 1986, Macwangi, et al. 1996). While the figures in Table 1 may seem insignificant when viewed in isolation of the whole picture, they are significant when considered in a broader context of Zambian migration. In fact other statistics show that of the total 3.5 million people in Zambia in 1963, 20.5% were resident in urban areas, and this figure increased to 29.4% in 1969. By 1980, Zambia's population had reached 5.7 million, and 39.7% of this population was resident in urban centres. From the figures above, it can be argued that rural-urban migration was very significant in Zambia between 1969 and 1980. Hendlund and Lundahl (1983) argue that the variables that acted as stimulants to rural – urban migration seem to have been purely based economical differences between rural and urban areas. This assumption conforms to the economic theme postulated in neoclassic theories of migration such as the economical model of Ravensteins' (1889), and the Todaro model. However, in the subsequent period of 1974-80, as shown in Table 1, rural-urban migration seemed to have slowed down by 1.4%. Reasons for this slow down could probably be explained by the decline in the performance of the Zambian economy, the non- availability of urban employment, and the emerging high cost of urban living (Turok, 1989, Potts, 2004).

From the discussion above, we can conclude that the colonial period is an important period to consider when studying migration dynamics in Zambia. It is important to note that it is this period that lay the foundation for future population movements that came to be manifested in the post-independent period. The colonial era not only triggered internal movements but also international or cross-boarder movements such as those directed to the cold mines of South Africa.

#### **4.1. Migration in Zambia: a contemporary perspective.**

Although population movements has a long history in Zambia, recent statistical figures suggests a decrease in these movements, especially rural-urban migration which is argued to have slowed down significantly. The statistics also seem to suggest that there has been a re-ordering of population movement manifested in an increasing importance of urban to urban and rural to rural migrations. These changes in the flow of direction seem to have conceded with the implementation of social and economic reforms, notably a fully fledged structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 1991. At the core of SAP is the belief that market forces are the most efficient way of running an economy. This implies that the state must limit intervention in the market, and let demand and supply, determine the price that will operate the market (Mehretu A, et al. 2000). Furthermore, these reform programmes, in the Zambian case and indeed in several other adjusting countries, required (and continue to do so) a deliberate and concerted effort by government to promote free trade, commercialise and liberalise the economy, privatise the public and parastatals organisations, streamline the public service, and remove subsidies on food, agriculture, education, health and accommodation, aspects that were mostly obtaining in urban centres in Zambia (Amberntsson 1999:43).

The implementation of reform programmes over the last 20 years, have had devastating effects both on urban and rural populations in Zambia. In rural areas for example, the impacts have been manifested through low agriculture productivity due to lack of agro inputs and also low or no incomes due to lack of stable markets<sup>3</sup> (c. Simatele 2006, and Milimo et al. 2002). Previously government provided subsidies on agricultural equipment, fertiliser and pesticides etc, and was also the principle buyer of agro products from the rural peasant farmers (Simatele 2006, and Milimo et al. 2002). But with government withdrawing from this responsibility and relinquishing this role to private firms and individuals, rural populations who predominantly depend on agriculture are finding it increasingly difficult to secure a market for their produce, let alone to negotiate an economic price for their produce. This development has not

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<sup>3</sup> The state is longer the major buyer of agro products from the peasant farmers. Under liberalisation, farmers are now required to secure their own markets but the majority of rural farmers do not have the capacity to do so. They are therefore, vulnerable to exploitation by briefcase traders.

only constrained the ability of rural populations to farm, but has also compromised their ability to attain household food security.

On the contrary, the impacts of reforms in urban centres have manifested themselves in increased unemployment and closures of industries. According to Simutanyi (1996), the privatisations and liquidations of the state enterprises have resulted in the loss of a total number of 25,611 workers between 1992 and 1994. These were declared redundant from both the private and public sectors, but the majority came from the parastatal and the public sectors. Table 2 below shows some developments in the Zambian industries between; 1994 to 1999. It is evident that between 1994 and 1999 there was an increase in the number of closed establishments in all industries except in manufacturing, and electricity. The closures of these establishments certainly had some effect on employment levels in the country as seen in Table 3 below.

**Table 2. Closed Establishment by Industry\*, 1994 – 1999 (cumulative)**

Industry	1994	1995	1996	1998	1999
Agricultural	10	11	23	155	183
Mining/Quarrying	0	0	1	11	13
Manufacturing	77	84	133	133	839
Electricity/Energy, Water	1	1	2	2	2
Construction	21	21	27	101	136
Retail/Wholesale +	257	268	646	2,562	3,389
Transport/Communication	8	38	45	169	209
Financial institution, insurance	16	16	74	263	329
Community, Social, Personal services	53	57	112	519	678
Cumulative Total	443	495	1063	3844	5,778

\* Employing at least 20 or more employees. Mostly government owned.

+Retail or wholesale industries employee numbers varies from 2 to 50 or more.

**Source:** Central Register of Establishment, CSO, (1999: 24).

In fact official statistics from Zambia's Central Statistics Office reveal that between 1991 and 1995, a total of 60, 000 workers had been removed from the civil service.

**Table 3. Loss of employment of closed establishments by industry 1994-99\*.**

<b>Industry</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1999</b>
Agricultural	515	529	656	4,939	6,576
Mining/Quarrying	0	0	6	236	249
Manufacturing	1,881	1,982	3,133	29,864	32,642
Electricity/Energy, Water ++	2	2	8	8	17
Construction	809	716	852	2,367	2,941
Retail/ Wholesale	1028	1160	6,462	16,319	22084
Transport/ Communication	61	4,214	4,299	5,032	5,633
Financial institutions, insurance	212	202	3,005	6,792	9,979
Community, social, insurance, personal services	791	811	1,568	3,367	4,418
Total	5299	9,616	19,989	68,927	84,539

\* The figures are cumulative and represent the total number of job losses.

++ These figures seem to either have a typo error or were under reported.

**Source:** Central Register of Establishment, CSO (1999:25).

On the other hand, trade unions registered a decrease in union membership in 1990 from 352, 900 to 312,697 in 1994. And by 1995, the figure dropped even further to 295, 747 (ibid). It is important to note that most of these job losses were in urban areas where formal employment existed. Thus, the lack of urban employment and increasing poverty, although data showing this relationship was difficult to find, could be argued as contributing to making urban living more difficult for the majority of the urban poor and not so poor people (CSO, 2005, Milimo et al., 2002, & Fallavier, et al., 2005). Employment figures in Zambia, suggests that out of a total labour force of 4,345,728 persons in 2004, 3,911,161 persons were unemployed (CSO, 2005). The unemployment rate was higher in urban areas (i.e. 21 %) than rural areas (i.e. 3 %) (CSO, 2004, 2005). Furthermore, unemployment rates across provinces indicate that Copperbelt (mining province) and Lusaka (the housing the capital city) provinces recorded higher rates of 22 % and 21 % respectively (CSO, 2005). In Lusaka, for instance, 65 % of the urban population is dependent on informal economic activities (Fallavier, et al., 2005). It can therefore, be argued that increasing urban employment opportunities has contributed to the declining standard of living in urban centres, hence the observed increase in rural to rural and urban to urban forms of population

movements. In 1998 for example, of the total 10.2 million people in Zambia, 638,000 individuals and 130, 000 households involved in migration moved to less economically developed provinces in Zambia, while Lusaka and Copperbelt, as individual provinces, attracted and received an additional 286,000 and 226,000 persons respectively (CSO 1999). North-Western and Western provinces<sup>4</sup> received 52,000 and 48,000 migrants respectively (CSO 1999).

From the statistics on migration in Zambia, there is some strong evidence suggesting that although urban-urban population movements has remained the dominant form of population change in urban centres, other forms such as rural to rural and urban to rural movements are increasing in importance as can be seen in Table 4 below. It can also be seen that between 1998 and 2005 urban to rural movements increased by almost 2 %.

Table 4 Direction of migration flow in Zambia 1998 to 2005.

Direction of migration (Moved from)	Total migration					
	1998		2002/03		2004/05	
	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number
Rural to rural	35	485,000	41	154,644	32	123,338
Rural to urban	14	-	14	52,436	15	58,186
Urban to rural	11	-	12	44,681	14	54,561
Urban to urban	40	638,000	33	122,254	38	147,036


**Source:** CSO, 1998, 2004, 2005: Living Conditions Monitoring Survey.

The general picture presented in Table 4 strongly suggests that urban to urban, and rural to rural migrations have become the dominant migratory patterns in Zambia. While factors responsible for this development may be varied, it seems plausible to argue that the stagnation and non expansion of the formal employment sector, and the

<sup>4</sup> North-Western province is the least developed province in Zambia, while Western province is the second least.

increase in urban poverty and deprivation have worked to repel many would be urban migrants from taking up urban residence (Fallavier, et al., 2005; Simatele, 2001; and Ambertsson, 1999). What is intriguing, however, is that the reduced immigration rate into Zambia’s major cities, particularly the Copperbelt province, has coincided with tremendous international investments in the copper industry owing to the increase in world copper prices (c. Fig 1 below). The mines have always acted as a pull for urban migrants since the attainment of independence and the declaration of ‘Kwacha Ngwee’.

**Fig 1. Copper prices in Zambia**



**Source:** Central Bank of Zambia; Quarterly report (2006).

With the recent developments in the copper mining industry, one would expect a high influx of population movement towards the Copperbelt province which houses nearly all the mining industries, and has traditionally been the largest employer in Zambia. However, recent statistics seem to strongly suggest that although the Copperbelt along with Lusaka province are still the final destination for many urban migrants, the two provinces have experienced some form of counter migration. In 2002/03, for example, of the total 299,462 migrants in Copperbelt, 16 % migrated from urban to rural areas, while 15 % of the total 186,373 migrants in Lusaka were involved in a similar movement (CSO 2004). During the same period, there was also an increase of migrants to less economically developed provinces. For example in 1999, of the total 136,012 migrants in central province, 9 % moved from urban to rural areas, while in 2004/04, a total of 19 % of 39,355 were involved in a similar movement (CSO, 2004, 2005). Other provinces such as Luapula, Western, Northern, and Southern and

as can be seen in the table below have experienced similar trends in their populations since the 1990s.

Table 5. Net in-migration indices by province-Zambia (1990-2000).

Province/Area	Mid-point population 1990-2000 (000)	Net migrants (000)	Net migration rate (per 000)
Rural Zambia	5168	+144.3	+28
Urban Zambia	3114	- 146.1	- 4.7
<i>Predominantly urban provinces</i>			
Copperbelt	1501	-206.0	-137
Lusaka	1170	+70.1	+59
Central	850	+24.9	+29
Southern	1047	-26.2	-25
<i>Predominantly rural provinces</i>			
Eastern	1120	-2.1	-2.0
Luapula	637	+41.8	+66
Northern	1035	+64.1	+62
North western	474	+39.4	+83
Western	680	-7.1	-10

Source: CSO, Zambia (2003).

The reasons for these movements are varied. In 1998, 29 % of the total 1,123,000 migrants said they moved from their previous usual place of residence due to the transfer of the head of the household and in 2004, this reason was alluded to by 35 % of the total 383,121 (CSO 1998, 2005). In both 1998 and 2004, 13 % and 16 % of the migrants respectively alluded to resettlement as the second reason for their movement (CSO 1998, 2005). A comparison of the figures above reveal a reduction in the number of people who said they moved because of the transfer of the head of the household from 29 % in 1998 to 35 % in 2004 (ibid). Whereas in the case of those that decided to resettle, the percentage increased from 13 % in 1998 to 16 % in 2004 (ibid). This revelation is suggestive of the fact that migration in Zambia is no longer largely responsive to the purported traditionally economic pull, but no other social and non economic attributes as those alluded to above.

While there is a re-ordering of internal population movements within Zambia, cross-border migration from Zambia seems to be very low. In fact existing statistical data show that overall emigration from Zambia is not high by regional or African standards, and is skewed towards the skilled. The total stock of Zambians, for

instance, living in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries is estimated at 27 % per 10,000 of Zambia's population.

Table 6. Migrants per 10,000 of source country population in 2000

	OECD	USA	Canada	UK	France	Switzerland	Netherlands
Angola	87.3	1.7	1.1	2.5	4.6	2.7	2.0
Botswana	15.8	5.9	0.2	6.0	0.7	0.1	0.4
Congo DR	18.0	0.9	1.1	1.1	3.3	0.6	0.7
Lesotho	3.3	0.5	0.3	1.3	0.1	0.4	0.2
Malawi	11.0	1.1	0.3	8.9	0.0	0.0	0.1
Mozambique	33.7	0.8	0.5	1.5	0.4	0.4	0.2
Namibia	10.6	0.5	0.9	3.9	0.4	0.7	0.4
South Africa	61.1	11.1	6.2	20.5	0.3	0.9	1.2
Swaziland	18.0	9.4	0.7	4.9	0.0	0.4	0.3
Tanzania	18.1	2.7	5.2	8.5	0.1	0.2	0.2
<b>Zambia</b>	<b>26.5</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>16.1</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>0.3</b>
Zimbabwe	47.1	6.5	2.2	27.1	0.2	0.4	0.4
All SADC	35.2	4.1	2.9	9.7	1.3	0.7	0.7
Africa	55.9	8.0	2.8	7.7	17.3	0.8	2.9

Source: Docquier & Marfouk (2004)

This is an emigration rate far below that of many other African countries, such as Kenya (56 %) and Zimbabwe (46 %) (Amin and Mattoo, 2007). In fact anecdotal evidence, and as can be seen in the table below suggests that about 10 % of all tertiary educated Zambians live outside the country compared to over 18 % for Eastern Africa (ibid).

Table 7. Emigration by education in SADC countries\* (2000).

	Primary educated	Secondary educated	Tertiary educated
Angola	2.10	3.30	25.60
Botswana	0.10	0.80	2.10
Congo DR	0.10	0.50	7.90
Lesotho	0.00	0.10	2.4
Malawi	0.00	0.80	9.40
Mozambique	0.50	5.80	42.00
Namibia	0.10	0.20	3.40
South Africa	0.40	0.50	5.40
Swaziland	0.20	0.20	5.80
Tanzania	0.10	1.00	15.80
<b>Zambia</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.30</b>	<b>10.00</b>
Zimbabwe	0.20	0.70	7.60

\* Migrants as % of all educated in each category

Source: Docquier & Marfouk (2004)

We can thus argue that cross-border migration from Zambia is an economic phenomenon as only 0.1 % and 0.3 % of the unskilled and semi-skilled Zambians are involved in cross-border. In fact Docquier and Marfouk (2004), using statistics from the World Health Organisation, observe that about 300 Zambian medical doctors practice medicine abroad. If this figure is anything to go by, and if statistics on international migration from Zambia were available, the total number of skilled labour from Zambia is probably higher. However, an eminent question that arises from the observed low emigration from Zambia is why are there few Zambians migrating across national borders. While the answer to this question might not be obvious, it would be plausible to speculate using the three tier model of migration discussed in the theoretical underpinning section of this paper.

From a macro perspective, one would argue that the introduction and adoption of a fully-fledged structural reform programme (e.g. SAPs) and other liberalisation policies by the Zambian government in the 1990s have probably created an enabling environment through which international investments in industries such as mining, and retail has been attracted. This in turn has facilitated a situation where the tertiary educated are placed in job positions (i.e. both in the public and private sector), that are related to their qualifications and training (c. Andersson 1993). While statistics on remuneration are difficult to obtain, one would speculate that this development, coupled with other issues such as those outlined at the micro and meso levels, have in one way or the other contributed to the tertiary educated remaining in the country (Falk and Larsson, 1992). While it is difficult to measure the actual effects of the reform programmes on population movements across Zambia's boundaries, one would argue, as observed by Anderson, that these programmes have resulted into the creation of huge disparities among the Zambian people. The poor for example, have been subjected to deplorable poverty levels, while the rich have thrived. These differences in wealth and poverty can be said to have negatively impacted the ability of the poor to move across national boundaries on the one hand, and on the other have lead to the educated and the rich in making a fortune within the country.

Another factor which probably is important in explaining the low rate of international migration from Zambia is the political and cultural aspects in the country. Zambia, unlike a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa has enjoyed peace and stability since independence in 1964. Compared to other countries such as the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe and Namibia, Apartheid in South Africa, civil strife in Mozambique, Angola, and Congo DR, Zambia has had no civil unrest and therefore, security concerns have been little. In many African countries, internal conflicts and wars such as those experienced in Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, and Sierra Leone etc, have displaced and forced many people to migrate across national boundaries (c. Gleditsch et al. 2007). Internal conflict and political instability has played a significant role in forcing people to migrate to other countries both within the continent and abroad. We can thus, argue that the lack of civil strife and other political or cultural instigated conflicts in Zambia may contribute to the low emigration rate of both the skilled and unskilled labour from the country.

Other factors such as those described at the meso level can be argued to contribute to the low emigration from Zambia. Unlike other migrants from other regions in Africa, such as those from West Africa (e.g. Nigerians, and Ghanaians) and East Africa (e.g. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania), social networks of Zambians abroad are usually non-existent or very weak. This development could probably be a result of the break down in kinship<sup>5</sup> ties which Potts (1995) adequately refers to as one of the factors contributing to reduced rural-urban migration in Zambia, Uganda and Tanzania. Thus, the emergency or development and emphasis on the nuclear family as a basis for determining family ties has increasingly resulted in declines in the content of traditional ties and transactions that previously instigated a sense of solidarity, reciprocity and obligation among Zambians. This development has therefore, resulted in weaknesses in collective and social networks that would facilitate access to a diverse range of resources that potential migrants would utilise in making the decision of whether to or not to migrate. Thus, from a micro level, the lack of these social networks and resources could be argued to have limiting impacts on the ability of the

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<sup>5</sup> Many families, particularly those of tertiary educated individuals in sub-Saharan Africa are increasing becoming nucleated. Extended families seem to be breaking and one reason for this development is urbanisation involving people taking up permanent urban residence (c. Potts, 1995, Ouchou & Gould, 1993)

potential migrant from Zambia to make a decision to migrate. The combination of these factors discussed above may in one way or the other explain where Zambia has experienced low emigration of its citizens to other countries. In fact current emigration from Zambia is lower than the African average of 55.9 % and the Southern African Development Co-operation (SADC) of 35.2 % (Docquier and Marfouk, 2004). Thus, emigration from Zambia is at present, considered not to be a major problem. However, the limited ability of the Zambian government to train more qualified and skilled labour is likely to have serious implications as the country endeavours to develop. Presently, and as observed by Amin and Mattoo (2007), there are only 12 physicians per 100,000 of the population in the country, and new health graduates number 7 per 100,000 of the population. These are quite low figures and will require immense effort to improve them. The formulation and adoption of policies that will retain both skilled and unskilled labour is therefore, the way forward for Zambia.

## **5.1. Conclusion**

It is obvious from studying migration in Zambia that there has been a re-ordering of internal population movements with urban to urban and rural to rural flows increasing in importance. Furthermore, statistical evidence suggests that another emerging form of population movement in Zambia involves urban residents migrating to rural areas, a type of movement that is very uncharacteristic to Zambia's migratory patterns. There are different reasons for these observed changes in the direction of migration movements in Zambia as discussed in earlier sections of this paper. However, it seems plausible to argue that the social, economic, environmental and climatic changes that are currently taking place in the country are at the core in the re-ordering of population movements in the country. Most notable of these factors are the reform programmes that Zambia fully embarked on in the early 1990s. These changes have had a dual effect on the Zambian community manifested in the poor becoming poorer and the rich becoming wealthier. The net effects, though no study has been done to detail the impacts of the reforms, we can speculate that they have contributed in re-ordering population movements within the country.

On the contrary, the lack of official statistics on emigration poses a huge challenge in determining the magnitude of cross-border migration from Zambia. The country, like many sub-Saharan African countries has no system with which to monitor the movements of its people across national boundaries. Although scanty statistics on this subject reveal that only 10 % of all tertiary educated Zambians live abroad, the figure might be higher if a proper migration monitoring system was in place. It is the lack of quality information on the actual extent of brain drain in Zambia, that international migration from the country is regarded not to be a problem. It is therefore, important that the Zambian government in partnership with both local and international organisations establish a framework with which to monitor international migration. It is important to realise that, although the emigration rate is low, brain drain will have severe implications for the development of the country given its limited capacity or ability to generate human capital. If cross-border migration, particularly of the skilled labour from Zambia is not addressed, Zambia's development is likely to be hampered.

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