Renewing the Migration Debate

Building disciplinary and geographical bridges to explain global migration

KNAW Academy Colloquium
16-18 October 2019
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Dear reader,

On 16-18 October 2019, we hosted an Academy Colloquium, core-funded by KNAW and co-funded by ERC, entitled Renewing the migration debate: building disciplinary and geographical bridges to explain global migration at De Trippenhuis in Amsterdam. The Colloquium brought together a group of 35 established and early career migration researchers from around the world to discuss topics around the following guiding question: How can we use the wealth of existing empirical and theoretical research to advance our generalized understanding of migration?

The Academy Colloquium aimed to enable a dialogue that overarched geographical, disciplinary and methodological divisions to achieve a better understanding of the nature, drivers and impacts of migration processes. It also aimed to overcome the artificial divide between research on migration in the ‘developed’ and the ‘developing’ world. To bridge these research divides, we created six broad thematic sessions 1, each with two speakers and a discussant and led by a panel chair, covering the following themes:

- Migration as part of social transformation;
- Migration and the aspiration-capability framework;
- Hope, uncertainty and migration;
- Linking macro-level drivers and micro-level migration decisions;
- Migration policymaking; and
- Citizenship and integration

We selected these specific themes because they have recently been subject of stimulating conceptual and methodological developments. The goal of the Colloquium was to

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1 The full program also included two sessions dedicated to the conceptual and empirical presentations from the Migration as Development (MADE) project, an ERC-funded research project led by Hein de Haas at the University of Amsterdam.
stimulate open discussions about the benefits, drawbacks, challenges, and future research avenues for each of these themes as well as for migration studies more in general.

For each session, the chair prepared an Input Statement which introduced the theme and proposed critical questions to provide background and stimulus to the speakers. The speakers were asked to prepare brief Research Notes and the discussants were requested to reflect upon the two speakers’ research notes and prepare a written discussant note. In this Compendium you find these four documents for each of the sessions. Speakers and discussants were given a chance to revise their notes after the Academy Colloquium. The latter are the versions you find in this Compendium. Nonetheless, we would like to remind the reader that the prime aim of the notes was to stimulate discussion and that various ideas presented in the notes need further elaboration and refinement. While these research notes should therefore not be considered or treated as full academic papers, we encourage readers to use these contributions as stepping stones to further develop these ideas, but to make sure to give credit where credit is due.

We hope you find the contributions in this Compendium to be of great value and that you will use them to achieve conceptual and methodological innovation in future migration research.

Sincerely,

Simona Vezzoli and Hein de Haas
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Migration and global change: conceptual advances and novel approaches in macro level migration drivers

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Objective of this session

This session explores new directions in the study of macro-level migration drivers that can capture the complexity of migration and its embeddedness in processes of social change. In particular, this session aims to explore the advantages and challenges of a social transformation perspective and discuss any potential future advances of this approach.

Thematic Framework – advantages and challenges

It is widely recognised that migration is a complex phenomenon. Its complexity reflects that migration is an integral part of society and is shaped by processes of social change, e.g. economic restructuring, technological advances, political shifts, etc. Research shows that it is not very fruitful to identify individual migration drivers, e.g. conflict or poverty, when we know that, albeit important, they shape migration in interaction with other factors. Moreover, a focus on drivers may sway us from considering long-term structural shifts that alter people’s livelihoods and influence migration in indirect ways, e.g. cultural changes that make agrarian life fall out of favour. It has been suggested that a way of overcoming such limitation can be found in the social transformation perspective. Its central objective is to study long-term migration trends by gaining a deep understanding of societal shifts at specific historical junctures and to identify how a wide variety of factors, from shifts in land tenure and inheritance patterns to labour market structure and cultural changes, shape migration both in direct and indirect ways (Castles 2003; Castles 2010; Castles, Ozkul and Cubas 2015; de Haas et al. manuscript in preparation). A social transformation can be defined as “a fundamental change in the way that societies are organized and resources are distributed that goes beyond the continual, incremental processes of social change that are always at work.” (de Haas et al. manuscript in preparation: 3). By identifying social transformations as they affect distinct dimensions of society – e.g. politics, the economy, culture -, we increase our awareness of the context within which migrations appeared or altered.

A social transformation approach is compatible with earlier explanatory models that sought to understand migration as part of development processes - e.g. demographic and economic transitions - gradually affecting most areas of the world and bringing people from the most distant areas into globally connected migration systems (Skeldon 1997; Zelinsky 1971). To some extent, we can also envision its complementarity with more familiar migration theories. For instance, in a society in transition from agricultural to industrial economy, households may decide to reduce risks by sending
one of the family members to work in a factory in an urban centre, while the rest of the family
continues to rely on farming as the main economic activity (Stark and Bloom 1985; Taylor 1999).
Or we might observe that, in this same context, one of the family members might have been swayed
to migrate because many in his or her cohort of friends has already migrated, pointing to migration
network effects and possibly a culture of migration (Massey et al. 1998). But what is then the added
value of using a social transformation perspective?

Its biggest advantage may be that it encourages us to observe the ebbs and flows of migration
at specific moments from a historical standpoint and to ‘normalise’ migration, rather than seeing it as
an exception and outcome of occasional temporary disequilibria. Within this historical frame, we can
also observe how certain segments of the population find migration appealing at particular moments
of state formation, or during the restructuring of the economy, or as access to education increases,
while for others these same conditions may encourage immobility. Within these diverse conditions,
a wide variety of migrations unfold – from local ‘commuting’ mobility and seasonal migrations to
permanent long-distance international migrations. For instance, the town of Cisternino (Apulia, Italy)
experienced deep socio-economic and cultural changes in the post-WWII period, which undermined
the livelihood of artisans and farmers, reduced previous regional and seasonal migrations and
engendered a short period of heightened long-distance internal and international emigration in the
late 1950s-1970s. However, by the 1980s emigration had greatly decreased because of improved
economic opportunities in the town, which included employment in the private sector but mostly the
growth of state provisions through public employment and welfare benefits. By the 1990s emigration
took on a different character: young people with higher levels of education chose migration for career
objectives, unlike the lower occupational ambitions of the previous generation of migrants (Vezzoli
2020). We can observe the continuous presence of migration, but also its rapid shifts in character,
composition and destinations. Thus, we also begin to appreciate the role of state expansion, class and
education in shaping migration.

In practice, however, multiple challenges accompany the adoption of a social transformation
perspective. To start, what is the definition, operationalisation and ultimately the identification of
a social transformation or social transformations? Second, the social transformation perspective
requires the understanding of society in its entirety and its evolution over several decades. This is
certainly a heavy undertaking. Third, it is not clear how to establish associations between macro level
social changes and micro level decision making, including decisions to migrate. With this session we
seek to discuss openly the advantages, drawbacks and novel ideas on the value and applicability of a
social transformation perspective to study past, present and consider possible future migrations.

Suggested questions

• How does a social transformation perspective enhance our conceptualization of migration?
How does it relate to and build upon existing theories? What is its added value?
• What are the disadvantages of adopting a social transformation perspective? Can these be overcome? And how can this approach be developed further?

• How do we operationalize a social transformation? Can we narrow it down to five (5) social dimensions – i.e. the political, the economic, the technological, the demographic and the cultural – as a viable solution to identify and study a social transformation in a real social context?

• How can we convincingly establish an association between a social transformation and observed migration patterns?

• Within the social transformation perspective, is there value in considering the sequencing, speed and direction of change to explain migration?

References


The Changing Context of International Migration

Speaker: Douglas Massey

The world has witnessed two epochs of globalization. Both were associated with profound political, economic, demographic, and social changes that accompanied the emergence of new and disruptive technologies; and both entailed large cross-border movements of people. The first era began around 1500, took off circa 1800, and reached a zenith in the first decade of the 20th century. It ended abruptly in 1914 with outbreak of the First World War, followed by three decades of protectionism, nationalism, depression, and ultimately another global war. The second era of globalization was built on foundations laid in the ashes of this Second World War, but did not reach its full expression until the 1990s after China’s turn toward a market economy and the Soviet Union’s collapse. By the turn of the 21st Century, the vast majority of the world’s nations were embedded within a truly global market economy.

Both eras of globalization were rooted in technological shifts that dramatically increased the efficiency transportation, communication, and production. The industrial revolution was made possible by a shift from animate to inanimate sources of power, as the labor of humans and beasts was replaced first by wind and falling water but later and more importantly by the burning of fossil fuels. The burning of coal (and later oil) created steam to drive powerful new engines that revolutionized transportation (enabling the creation of steamships and railroads), communication (using ships and trains to move messages more rapidly across space), and production (allowing a division of labor and factory-based manufacturing).

Initially transportation and communication were closely tied to one another. Messages and information still had to be physically transported from place to place, just far more rapidly than before. Although the invention of analog information technologies such as the telegraph in 1844, the telephone in 1876, and the radio in 1895 began to separate communication from transportation, as of 1914 when the first era of globalization came unglued, the telegraph was the principal information technology and its lines generally followed the railroad grid and required travel to and from stations both to send and receive messages. The value of world exports grew by 3.4% per year from 1800 through 1913, but thereafter trade fell and did not recover its 1913 value until 1923. After a brief surge of a growth between 1923 and 1929, the economy collapsed into negative growth during the Great Depression and the first era of globalization came to an ignominious end.

The depression years led directly to the massive bellicosity of World War Two. In 1944, however, delegates from 44 allied nations met in Bretton Woods, NH to design a set of multilateral institutions that could support and sustain a new regime of global trade and investment, creating the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ensure international liquidity and convertibility of currencies
and the World Bank to provide capital to help nations recover from the war and to promote economic growth worldwide. To guard against monetary devaluation, the architects of the new global regime established the US dollar as the global reserve currency backed by gold at a fixed rate of exchange.

With the war drawing to a close, in 1945 delegates from 51 nations met in San Francisco, CA to establish the United Nations, seeking to create another set of institutions capable of maintaining peace and security to prevent another world war. In addition to providing a forum for the adjudication of disputes, numerous UN agencies were created to promote international cooperation in domains such as health, education, agriculture, atomic energy, tourism, meteorology, labor, and migration. Finally, in late 1947 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was signed by 23 nations and took effect on January 1, 1948. Over successive rounds of negotiations eventually encompassing 123 nations, barriers to global trade and investment were slowly and steadily reduced, culminating in the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995.

Although these institutions provided a solid foundation for the expansion of global trade, actual globalization was slow in coming for a variety of reasons. Politically, the Cold War that followed the hot war of 1939-1945 effectively isolated the economies of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China from global markets. In addition, much of the world still consisted of dependent colonies rather than independent nations. Although decolonization began in the 1950s, the process was not substantially completed until the 1970s. Moreover, during the immediate postwar years, development efforts were dominated by state-led strategies rather than market-oriented policies. Keynesian economic philosophies prevailed in the developed world while Important Substitution Industrialization dominated thinking in developing nations. Rather than embracing participation in international markets as a means to achieve national economic growth and prosperity, ISI sought to protect fragile internal markets from global competition using tariffs, regulations, state spending, and controls the mobility of capital. Finally, well into the 1970s national and international markets expanded using industrial technologies developed before 1950, with marginal improvements in productivity over time. Internal combustion engines replaced steam engines; petroleum replaced coal as the principle source of energy; the telephone replaced the telegraph; television overtook radio as the principal source of news and entertainment; and economic growth continued to focus on manufacturing and factory production.

Beginning in the 1970s, however, and accelerating through the 1980s and 1990s, a new technological revolution took hold to transform the structure of national economies throughout the world. Digital electronics replaced older analog devices, thereby finalizing the divorce between communication and transportation. Digitization also dramatically increased the capacity to store, process, and transmit data and information. As a result, the basis for economic growth and wealth creation shifted away from the production of goods to the creation of knowledge and the processing of information, pushing the economic structure of post-industrial societies away from manufacturing and toward services.
The global circulation of knowledge, information, and lightweight consumer goods in the new service economy was facilitated by a revolution in long-distance transportation, as jet propulsion replaced propeller-driven air travel and rocket propulsion transported new communications satellites into orbit. These innovations greatly expanded the geographic reach of markets just as China, nations of the Soviet bloc, and former colonies in Africa and Asia entered the global marketplace.

Finally, the foregoing technological, economic, and political transformations coincided with an ideological shift away from state-led development efforts to toward a renewed faith in markets. In the developed world, economic policies focused on trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and the opening of markets replaced the older state-centered strategies of Keynesianism and ISI. This neoliberal package of policies was imposed on developing nations by technocrats working at the IMF and World Bank under the aegis of the new “Washington Consensus.”

By the turn of the 21st Century, the foregoing transformations had produced a truly global economy as international trade increased exponentially. Whereas global exports increased by just 1.9 trillion dollars between 1960 and 1980, the y increased by 14.3 trillion dollars between 1980 and 2008. During this time, the volume of international migration also increased. Whereas the global stock of international migrants increased by 165.5 million between 1960 and 1980, the increases was 661.8 million from 1980 to 2000; and another 549.1 million were added to the stock between 2000 and 2015. From 1960 to 2017 the percentage of the world’s people living outside their country of birth rose from 2.2% to 3.4%.

The latter percentage may seem rather low given the inequalities of income, wealth, and life chances that prevail across nations in the world today, but a major difference between the first and second eras of globalization is that the international movement of people is today restricted whereas prior to 1914 it was open, constrained only by certain qualitative exclusions. In the absence of numerical restrictions, immigrants flowed relatively freely between sending and receiving nations during the first era of globalization and unauthorized, irregular, or “illegal” migration was limited whereas in the present era it is ubiquitous.

We currently lack any reliable estimates of the current global stock of irregular migrants. Estimates put the number of unauthorized residents in the United States at around 11 million in 2017, whereas in the EU-27 the number was estimated to fall between 1.9 and 3.8 million persons in 2008. However, Europe experienced a surge of irregular migration in 2014, with the IOM arrivals to be in the neighborhood of one million, with another 390,000 arriving in 2016 and 175,000 in 2017.

Whereas most unauthorized migrants arriving in North America and Europe during the late 20th century were motivated by a desire to access opportunities, during the 21st century they are increasingly moving to escape threats, yield very different patterns of selectivity and population compositions. According to data from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the number refugees and asylum seekers fell from 228.8 million in 1990 to bottom out at 140.5 million in 2005, thereafter
the number surged to 174.1 million in 2010 and reached 301.7 million in 2008. From 2005 to 2018, the share of refugees among international migrants rose from 6.9% to around 10%.

In the United States, some 1.6 million apprehensions were recorded along its southern border and 98% of those apprehended were Mexicans, overwhelmingly males crossing surreptitiously in search of employment. By 2018 the number of apprehensions had dropped to 397,000, only 38% of whom where Mexicans. At present, 62% of those apprehended along the border are Central Americans and 64% are unaccompanied minors or persons traveling in family units, people who are not coming in search of employment, but in search of refuge from terrible conditions of economic deprivation and violence in their home countries.

At this point in the history of the second era of globalization, we appear to have reached some kind of inflection point, or at least a hiatus. The volume of international trade is no longer rising and, indeed, the total value of global exports has shrunk since 2008. Across the world we see a backlash against globalization, as evidenced by the rise of populist governments throughout the developed world, and perhaps most notably by the election of Donald Trump in the United States and the passage of the Brexit initiative in the United Kingdom. Although feelings of economic insecurity and vulnerability connected to technological change and global trade explain part of the backlash, much of it also has to do with the demographic changes brought about by international migration. Arriving into this more hostile context of reception will be no cohorts of immigrants moving to escape threats rather than coming to access opportunities. They will be less selected on the attributes of ambition and motivation, and will include more women, children, and families and fewer labor force age men.

These changes pose a significant challenge to current theoretical understanding and empirical understandings of international migration. Theoretical and empirical work to date has tended to focus mainly on labor migration. Neoclassical macroeconomics views international migration as a response to cross-border differentials in wages and labor demand while neoclassical microeconomics argues that migrants move in order to maximize lifetime earnings. The New Economics of Labor Migration sees migration as stemming from household-level decisions taken not simply to maximize earnings, but to manage risks and overcome market failures through the diversification of family labor portfolios.

Segmented labor market theory, meanwhile, links the demand for immigrant workers to the structural bifurcation of labor markets in post-industrial economies into primary and secondary sectors, with the demand for immigrants concentrated in the latter, sometimes supplemented by demand emanating in immigrant economic enclaves. World systems theory and other macro-level models link out-migration to the structural transformation of developing economies that cause displacements from traditional livelihoods. Social capital theory explains how migrant flows, once begun, become self-perpetuating through various processes of cumulative causation, whereas the theory of the demographic transition links the cessation of out-migration to declines in fertility that
produce population aging, thereby increasing average ages above the migration-prone year of 15 to 30.

None of these theoretical models seek to explain moves that arise from threats to individual wellbeing. Movements by refugees and asylum seekers have not been well addressed by current sociological and economic theories of migration, and instead have been relegated to a categorically different species of people whose fate is the subject of legalistic discussions about humanitarian needs and policy responses linked to treaties and laws. It is becoming quite clear, however, that risks to individual wellbeing are rising substantially around the world, owing to a complicated interaction between climate change, state fragility, criminal violence, and civil conflict.

This witch’s brew of circumstances has the potential to create very large movements of people over short intervals of time irrespective of the conditions of labor supply, demand, and earnings at places of destination and regardless of the existence of migrant networks. Whereas labor migrants tend to be positively selected with respect to motivation, education, ambition, and ability, threat-motivated migrants are not so selected. Instead, their selection depends on the nature, intensity, and timing of the threat, variations of which can produce widely different patterns of selection with respect to age, gender, class, education, class, and aspirations. In practice, however, refugees and asylum seekers tend include relatively more women and children than working age males.

Examples of new threat-based migrations include the massive flow of Syrians into Europe during and after 2015, the concomitant onslaught of African boat people across the Mediterranean Sea, the surge of women, families, and children from Central America arriving at the US-Mexican border, and the stream of migrants leaving Venezuela and fanning out to diverse locations throughout the Americas. The potential for social discord and conflict at places of destination is heightened by the rise of nativist politics and white nationalist sentiment in Europe, North America, Oceania, and other destinations, portending more ominous contexts of reception in the early 21st century than in the late 20th century.

The first era of globalization and mass international migration ended very badly, and a critical question moving forward is whether the rapid processes of globalization that prevailed from 1970 through 2010 will continue, or whether the world will once again erupt in paroxysms of violence and exclusion driven economic insecurities and racial fears to move today’s globalized national economies back toward autarky through the imposition of restrictions on the cross-border movement of goods, capital, and people.

Climate change is already well advanced and will continue for some time even if dramatic actions are taken right now to reduce concentrations of carbon in the atmosphere. The frequency of severe weather events is rising, as are the risks of flooding from heavy precipitation and rising sea levels tied to the melting of glaciers and snow-packs. Paradoxically draughts are also becoming more frequent and extending over wider geographies for longer periods. These climatic trends will
put ever greater pressure on social, economic, and political systems, increasing the likelihood of state failure and civil violence. Under these circumstances, it is clear that social scientists need to pay more theoretical and empirical attention to perceived threat as a motivation for migration and to stop relegating refugee movements to a separate category of investigation in the field of international migration. Human migration is always motivated by some combination of push and pull factors, but the balance seems to be tipping toward the push of physical threats rather than the pull of socioeconomic gains.
Introduction: the need to reconceptualize migration

This note argues that the adaptation of a social transformation perspective is an essential step in achieving a more fundamental understanding of the nature of migration as a social process. This allows for a socially embedded understanding of migration processes, which links causes, consequences and internal dynamic of migration processes, and can therefore provide conceptual avenues to go beyond the current theoretical impasse in migration studies.

For instance, various historical and contemporary migrations support the idea that societies experience ‘migration transitions’ as they go through demographic and economic transitions, generally yielding an inverted U- or J-curve shaped relation between levels of development and levels of emigration (Clemens 2014; de Haas 2010; Hatton and Williamson 1998; Massey 2000). High-emigration countries such as Mexico, Morocco, Turkey and the Philippines typically belong to the middle-income groups while the poorest countries (such as in sub-Saharan Africa) tend to have comparatively lower rates of long-distance international emigration (Fransen and de Haas 2018). This challenges conventional push-pull models as well as neoclassical theories which assume an inversely proportional relationship between levels of ‘development’ and levels of emigration.

This highlights the need to reconceptualize migration as an intrinsic part of larger processes of social change rather than a (temporary) deviation from a sedentary ‘normality’, in which migration is somehow an aberration, a response to development disequilibria which will largely stop when the (equally hypothetical, illusionary and ahistorically) neoclassical equilibrium is restored.

However, several scholars have criticized these transition models by pointing out that pre-industrial societies were highly mobile and migratory (Lucassen and Lucassen 2009; Moch 1992). In fact, most conventional migration theories seem (implicitly or explicitly) based on the ‘myth of the immobile peasant’ (Skeldon 1997: 7-8). This reveals a problematic, ‘sedentary’ assumption shared by all established migration theories (Bakewell 2008; McDowell and de Haan 1997; Petersen 1958). Recent evidence gives further reason to question the validity of transition theories. If development (as measured by indicators such as incomes, education and infrastructure) leads to more migration, how can we then explain that relative levels of global migration have remained remarkably stable at levels of around 3 percent in the post-WWII era? If development transforms countries from net emigration to net immigration countries, how can we explain that the number of net emigration countries has increased over the past decades (Czaika and de Haas 2014)?

While there is little doubt that, in general, processes of social transformation associated to
‘development’ and industrial capitalism initially increase human mobility, this cannot explain huge variations in migration patterns across societies. While some countries (such as Italy, Ireland, Morocco and the Philippines) have experienced very high levels of sustained emigration, other societies (such as France, Thailand and Ethiopia) have experienced much lower emigration levels than one would have expected based on conventional development indicators. From there, the relevant question becomes not so much whether ‘development’ leads to more or less migration, but how different forms and processes of social, economic, technological and political change shape forms, trends and patterns of migration.

Figure 1. The migration transition

![Figure 1](image)

Source: de Haas (2010)

**Conceptualizing social change**

Rather than asking ‘why people migrate’ (which begs for all-too-obvious answers that do not help our understanding of migration as a social process) the more relevant question is how processes such as imperialism, nation state formation, the industrial revolution, capitalist development, urbanisation and globalisation have reshaped migration pattern as well migrants’ experiences. By conceptualizing migration as a constituent part of change, understanding migration no longer becomes a goal in itself, but rather a lens through which to study and understand societies and the nature of social change more in general.

However, it has proven difficult and contentious to define and operationalize these processes of change. In popular and scientific discourse, the processes of change associated with the emergence of industrial capitalism in the mid-18th century have been often labeled ‘modernization’ or ‘development’. While these concepts strike a familiar, somehow intuitive chord, they have been frequently criticized
for their Eurocentric, colonial and teleological biases. However, in spite of such valid critiques, human societies around the globe have gone through fundamental transformations—as particularly manifested in a massive transfer from rural-agrarian to urban-industrial modes of production, societal forms and lifestyles—that are difficult to deny and thus have a certain ‘universal’ character.

This exposes the need for conceptual tools to study these transformations in a more systematic manner in order to improve our ability to compare and generalize. Such conceptual tools should be able to generalize while simultaneously being able to sufficiently account for complexity and variation. A second, related, requirement is the ability to simultaneously take into account the micro-level agency of migrants (and non-migrants) and macro-level forces in shaping migration processes. I therefore propose a two-pronged theorization, that sees migration

- **On the macro-level**, as an *intrinsic part* of broader processes of social transformation rather than a temporary reaction to geographical inequalities or ‘disequilibria’.

- **On the micro-level**, as a function of (1) capabilities and (2) aspirations to migrate within a given set of constraints –instead of some sort of automated reaction to, or linear function of, ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.

**Figure 2. Migration as an intrinsic part of broader social change**

The aspirations-capabilities approach

Elsewhere (de Haas 2003; de Haas 2014), I have argued how the aspirations-capabilities approach can help us to achieve a more agentic, and therefore more realistic, understanding of migration processes. Applying Amartya Sen’s (1999) capabilities perspective on development to the study of migration, such as perspective compels us to see migration as resource in itself, and as an integral part of human development for both intrinsic (‘mobility freedoms as wellbeing enhancing in their own right’) and instrumental reasons (‘migration as a means to something else’) (de Haas 2014).

The aspirations-capabilities framework is useful to understand how macro-level processes of change can have ambiguous, non-linear and frequently counter-intuitive impacts on migration
processes. For instance, it helps us to understand the paradox of why ‘development’ tends to generate emigration hikes, as development

- Increases migration *capabilities* by expanding people’s access to material resources, social networks and knowledge; while improvements in infrastructure and transportation make travel less costly and risky.

- Increases migration *aspirations* through improved access to information, while images and lifestyles conveyed through education and media tend to change and expand people’s mental and geographical horizons, change their perceptions of the ‘good life’, which, in a broader context of capitalist development, typically goes along with increases in perceived material needs.

Development processes therefore tend to initially increase both people’s capabilities and aspirations to migrate, explaining why ‘development’ in low-income societies tend to increase emigration (see figure 3).

**Figure 3. Hypothesized effect of ‘development’ on aspirations and capabilities to migrate**

The capabilities-aspirations approach helps us to move beyond deterministic approaches and push-pull models that, for instance, erroneously naively assume that demographic and environmental ‘pressures’ or political factors will automatically ‘produce’ migration without considering people’s willingness and ability to migrate. In fact, situations of extreme poverty, political oppression and environmental adversity are likely to trap people in situations of *involuntary immobility* (see Carling 2002, de Haas 2014) because they deprive people from the resources to move. Migration requires considerable resources. This also compels us to see migration as a resource and a livelihood strategy rather than merely a response to destitution or poverty; and to see migrants as actors rather than victims.
A social transformation perspective

The following necessary conceptual step is to operationalize social change. The central theoretical challenge is: How can we conceptualize ‘big change’ in such ways that it acknowledges complexity and variation, but that does not lose itself in detail and nuance, so that we no longer see the ‘wood for the trees’. While we have to overcome any ‘postmodern’ aversion or inhibition against ‘grand theorizing’, we also have to avoid the pitfalls of deterministic, top-down theories of the past that are not able to account for the high variations in which general, often global, change is manifested on the local, regional and national level.

While social change is always happening, the concept of ‘transformation’ alludes to more profound processes of structural change. Drawing on earlier definitions of social transformation by Polanyi (1944 [2001]), Castles (2010) and Portes (2010), we define social transformation as a fundamental change in the way that societies are organized and resources are distributed that goes beyond the continual, cyclical, or life-cycle related processes of social change that are always at work (de Haas et al. forthcoming).

Figure 4. The five facets of the social prism

![Diagram showing the five facets of the social prism: economic, political, technological, demographic, cultural.]

Source: de Haas et al. forthcoming

The key challenge is to elaborate conceptual tools that have sufficient eye for variation in the ways general processes of social transformation are concretely manifested and thereby avoid the determinism of ‘grand theories’ (the nuance goal); but that at the same time identify a limited number of key analytical ‘handles’ so as to facilitate comparative analysis (the parsimony goal).

As a first step, we need to define what we mean by ‘social’. The ‘social’ pertains to everything implying human relations. The next step is to operationalize the concept in such ways it would enable

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1 This section is based on a forthcoming paper by the MADE (Migration as Development) research team (see de Haas et al. forthcoming).
systematic comparative analysis. This implies that we need to ‘unpack’ the meta-concept of the ‘social’ by distinguishing key components of the social realm. With this goal in mind, we can distinguish five key interrelated dimensions that together form the ‘social realm’ and that provide vantage points to study the same meta-processes of social transformation from different angles.

- **the political**, defined as the organized control over people;
- **the economic**, defined as the accumulation and use of land, labour and capital in the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services;
- **the technological**, defined as the application of knowledge through the deployment of procedures, skills and techniques;
- **the demographic**, defined as the structure and spatial distribution of populations; and
- **the cultural**, defined as the beliefs, values, norms, and customs shared by groups of people.

### Table 1. The social transformation framework and its five dimensions

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<td><strong>Resources</strong></td>
<td>The growth and spread of industrial capitalism</td>
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<td><em>The accumulation and use of land, labour and capital in the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services.</em></td>
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<td><strong>Technological</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tools</strong></td>
<td>Mechanization, standardization and automation</td>
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<td><em>The application of knowledge through the deployment of procedures, skills and techniques.</em></td>
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To visualize this, we can conceive of society as a prism with five sides. The cultural, political, economic, technological, and the demographic then provide different lenses, or vantage points, through which to study the same process of change happening in societies (see figure 4). We have not distinguished a ‘social’ dimension because we have to conceive of the ‘social realm’ as englobing the cultural, political, economic, technological and demographic – so the different dimensions different ways to look at the same social reality. This is reminiscent of Polanyi’s (1944) conception of society not as distinct from, but as encompassing, the state and the economy.

In order to study concrete, historical experiences of social transformation, we can identity substantive processes of change or within each dimension. Referring to the ‘modern transformation’, for instance, altogether, the growth and formation of modern national states (the political dimension), the growth and geographical diffusion of industrial capitalism (the economic dimension), the mechanization, standardization and automation of techniques and procedures of production (the technological dimension), the rationalization, individualisation and scientific revolution (the cultural dimension) as well as demographic transitions and urbanization (the demographic dimension) are all part of the same meta-process of social transformation (see table 1). These dimensional transitions are interrelated and tend to reinforce each other. Together, they have been transforming social life around the globe in strikingly similar ways, regardless of the unique variations in which this ‘modern transformation’ has manifested itself across societies and historical contexts.

**Application of the five-dimensional framework to understand variation in migration patterns**

The way in which the ‘modern’ social transformation is concretely manifested varies to a considerable extent, yet no society is left untouched. The identification of 5 main social transformation dimensions can help to systematically analyse variations in which the ‘modern transformation’ is concretely manifested across societies. This can be done along the lines of

- The nature of dimensional transitions – for instance, although modern national state formation seems to be a universal phenomenon (see Tilly 1992) there is huge variation in the concrete
manifestations of this general processes, in terms of legal frameworks, bureaucratic structures and modes of (democratic or more autocratic) governance.

- The *speed* of dimensional transitions – for instance in some societies demographic transitions have proceeded much faster than in others, and in some cases there can be (temporary) setbacks or reversals in transition processes.

As part of the proposed two-pronged theoretical approach to study migration processes (see above), the application of the aspirations-capabilities can help us to understand how dimensional transitions can have theoretically ambiguous, non-linear and complex implications for migration processes. Examples include:

- The migration implications of variations in *absolute and relative income levels*: While poverty may prevent people from migrating, higher incomes increase migration capabilities, migration aspirations may decline if incomes increase compared to other areas or countries. These complex interactions yield potentially ambiguous effects on longer- and shorter-distance migration.

- *Welfare and social security* – theoretically, welfare and public services like schooling and health care and social security in *origin* countries can play a role in ‘retaining’ migrants, but such provisions can also provide the resources to migrate.

- *Education* – Rising levels of education coincide with increasingly complex divisions of labor and the increasing geographical expanse of labor markets. While education can provide a motive to stay, education also tend to increase people’s material and other life aspirations, which can encourage emigration.

- *Political freedoms, conflict and violence* – Intuitively, political oppression, conflict and violence should increase (refugee and other) emigration. However, the same factors may also deprive people from the capabilities to migrate.

The migratory consequences of social transformation processes are dependent on the impacts of change and transitions in other dimensions on people’s aspirations and capabilities to migrate. How process of social transformation will concretely shape migration patterns, also depends on the interaction between transition processes within each dimension. It is therefore not only the (1) nature and (2) speed of dimensional transitions that matter, but also the (3) *differential sequencing* of dimensional transitions resulting in different configuration of migration determinants at any given point in time.

For instance, one hypothesis can be that if economic transitions ‘lag behind’ migration aspirations-increasing cultural transitions this may lead to higher emigration aspirations (e.g. in Morocco and Italy) compared to cases where economic transitions proceeded relatively early compared to cultural transitions (e.g., Japan and the Netherlands), where emigration levels have been comparatively lower.
Conclusion

The social transformation framework provides a promising avenue to achieve a socially embedded understanding of migration processes. Taken together, the political, economic, technological, demographic, and cultural - the dimensions of social transformation - allow grasping ‘big change’ both in its ‘universal’ aspects as well as the diversity of its concrete manifestations.

The conceptualization of migration as an intrinsic part of broader social transformation processes also has the potential of increasing the relevance of ‘migration studies’ for public debate. After all, an improved understanding of the ways in which long-term migration patterns are driven by broader processes of change also increase our ability to assess the ways in which various kinds of ‘non-migration policies’ (such as labor market policies and social policies) shape migration processes in indirect, but powerful ways that often lie beyond the reach of migration policies.

This can lead to useful assessments of what migration policies actually can – and cannot – achieve. For instance, a mismatch between structural migration determinants and migration policy – such as low-skilled labour demand in the absence of legal migration channels and combined with weak workplace enforcement – is likely to translate into an increasing incidence of undocumented migration.

It is therefore crucial to assess how ‘non-migration policies’ shape migration. For instance,

- ‘Neoliberal’ labour market policies seem to have reinforced the growth of dual labour markets, thereby indirectly increasing the demand for migrant labour in precarious job and informal sectors;
- Social policies affect the demand for (generally female) domestic workers for care jobs. Countries with low levels of government-provided facilities for child and elderly care therefore tend to generate higher demand for migrants to do such jobs;
- Higher levels of social security, public education and health care can have an emigration-reducing effects (with migration fulfilling a social insurance role in contexts where such provisions are absent or weak or have been dismantled because of neoliberal reforms).

The ability of migration policies to shape migration is constrained by structural migration drivers. Perceived or real migration policy ‘failure’ is generally explained by an inability or unwillingness to understand the complex and often counterintuitive ways in which structural social, economic and political trends affect migration processes. Re-conceptualizing migration as an intrinsic part of social transformation processes therefore also serve as a powerful tool to raise public awareness about how non-migration policies shape migration processes and to increase the relevance of migration studies for informed public debate.
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Massey, Douglas S., Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward


It’s intriguing to explore how we might enhance our understanding of migration dynamics by embedding our analyses in the larger social transformations within which they take place. Our conference organizers, building upon Stephen Castle’s and Karl Polanyi’s important work, define social transformation as “a fundamental change in the way that societies are organized and resources are distributed that goes beyond the continual, incremental processes of social change that are always at work.” (de Haas et al. manuscript in preparation: 3). Their idea is that identifying social transformations as they affect distinct dimensions of society, such as politics, the economy, and culture, we will increase our awareness of the context within which migrations appear or are transformed. The added value of this approach is that it encourages us to observe the ebbs and flows of migration at specific moments from a historical standpoint and to ‘normalize’ migration—to see it as the rule, rather than the exception which arises from occasional temporary disequilibria. I agree. It also asks us not to take each driver of migration separately but to consider how they interact and mutually influence one another.

I find this approach compelling and I am also aware of its challenges. One big one is what qualifies as a fundamental social transformation. The way this is currently framed, it is as if we will know it when we see it, we will recognize that we were once at point A and now we are at point B. But just as this perspective encourages us to broaden our lens and see ebbs and flows of migration as integrally producing and a product of social transformation, so we should also see the elements of that transformation as changing along a continuum. We can think of things like nations, rights, and social welfare that have changed dramatically during our lifetimes and are still changing. So it makes sense to view social transformations as ongoing, unending processes which will shape and reshape how we understand and respond to migration and mobility. Even fundamental changes don’t end. What makes us think they do is when we decide to look up or back and take note or measure them. In response to this methodological challenge, Hein suggests that if we take the political, economic, technological, demographic, and the dimensions of social transformation together, we can grasp “big change” both as universal and as a diverse set of concrete manifestations at a specific time. I’d like to hear more about how we actually identify and measure these “substantive transition processes,” because that seems like a more realistic intellectual goal to me which is also a prerequisite for understanding how these individual processes function interdependently together.

I want to use these comments to reflect on the political dynamics that constitute social transformations of all sizes and that drive and manage migration. Some of my points are conceptual while others are methodological. I want to give credit here to Erica Dobbs, Ruxandra Paul, and Ken
Sun with whom I am developing some of these ideas.

My first is about changes in how political life is organized—the great or if we’re worried about over-claiming, the semi-great transformation in the spatial organization, parameters of, and power that different kinds of political units exercise over our lives. In 1900, there were seventy-seven officially recognized sovereign countries in the world. Today, there are 195. Nations come and go. So do other forms of political organization. Kingdoms and empires are theoretically things of the past but, of course, we still feel their political and cultural traces. And just because China has not officially colonized parts of Africa that does not mean that the type of economic and cultural dependency it is creating through its Belts and Roads policy does not dramatically affects the ability of nations to exercise their sovereignty in the way we know it.

So how should we understand the nation at this current conjuncture and what work are nation-states expected to do? What other territory-spanning political entities are nations in conversation or competition with and how do these configurations affect mobility and its control?

There are many people who still think of nations as closed containers that control their territories. Rootedness, stasis, and boundedness are the heroes in this story. But as Doug Massey writes in his comments, we live in an era of extreme globalization. Research done by many people in this room shows how so many aspects of life—be they social, political, religious, or economic cross national boundaries. So, as Yasemin Soysal suggests, instead of treating the nation and the transnational as contradictory trajectories, we should look at the interactions between them. The national and the transnational are not dichotomous but co-produced, in different combinations, at different times, in a variety of ways across regions. Transnationalizing occurs when nation-transcending frameworks, models, and standards transform national actors’ orientations and strategies. It does not undermine the nation-state but “reconstitutes its cognitive, cultural, and organizational premises.”

Therefore, while it is still a central fulcrum, the form and function of the nation-state is changing and this constitutes a major social transformation under way. What we are seeing is that while states are stepping back from some functions, they are taking on new ones in partnership or in competition with sub-national, trans-regional and transnational actors. At the same time that we see downsizing, we also see supersizing. The ever-expanding networks of embassies and consulates which provide economic and social services in addition to the legal protections they traditionally offered are one example of this growth. Take the case of what Alexandra Delano Alonso found in the main room of the Casa Ecuatoriana, the community affairs section of the Ecuadorian consulate in Queens, New York. A sign there reads, “Because health is a right, your government assists you wherever you may be.” Similar signs might be found in similar offices run by the Mexican, Salvadoran, Guatemalan, Honduran, Colombian, Peruvian and Uruguayan governments. They all increasingly support their emigrant citizens’ integration into US society by helping them access programs related to education, health, banking, labor rights, language acquisition and civic participation. Such policies not only facilitate formal acquisition of citizenship but also address the needs of emigrants with limited access.
to such services in the countries where they settle due to their precarious and irregular legal status. On the sending country side, these policies encourage continued homeland attachments which hopefully leads to a continuing flow of remittances and political lobbying on the country-of-origin’s behalf.

This brings me to my next points which are about changing understandings of social welfare and rights. Risk and uncertainty are universal problems but the social contract between citizen and state is also undergoing a major transformation vis a vis who is responsible for protecting whom, where, and what kinds of basic social protections citizens are entitled to. Social welfare as we know it is changing, undergoing what we might think of as a refamiliarization, deinstitutionalization, privatization, and marketization of care. In the last decades, we have witnessed a rise in austerity programs and increasing cut backs in the benefits and resources available for public welfare programs. At present, several Mediterranean and Nordic countries are working to develop a new model combining family care, informal migrant care, and formal skilled care. As the state steps back, individuals and households step in. More and more, we are seeing individual migrants and their families protecting themselves by combining resources available to them through the market, state, civil society organizations, and their social networks in their sending and receiving countries. It is not just the state that provides but a combination of source and destination country actors operating at the sub-national, national, and supra-national levels.

These changes are driven, in part, by changing understandings of rights and how and where they are endowed beyond the nation. Institutions of national governance often share the stage with institutions of regional and global governance that do anything from providing the ideological justification for transnational social protection policies to actually creating the institutions that implement them. On the other hand, international organizations are also sometimes the very ones pressuring governments to dismantle their welfare states and adopt austerity plans in exchange for financial assistance.

By no means do I want to argue that these conventions are nearly as effective as they are meant to be. They regularly fall far short. But they do shift our understanding of what political entities, functioning at what scales, are responsible for guaranteeing what basic protections. Transnational social protection becomes possible as an antidote to the retrenchment of the national social welfare not only because of the changing nature of the state but because of changes in international norms and understandings of rights that are endowed on the basis of personhood rather than citizenship.

These dynamics also call our attention to the increasing prominence of regions. Here in Europe you are all too aware of the importance of regions and with the costs and benefits of their expansions and contractions. But institutions of national governance increasingly share the stage with institutions of regional governance that can complement, contradict, or circumvent the role of the nation-state and supranational institutions. These can protect and provide for migrants or they can prevent migrants from entering a region or gaining any kind of secure foothold there.
Integrated regional markets for goods, services and capital, such as those we are seeing in Europe, Southeast Asia, the Caribbean and parts of South America rely on high levels of international migration. In order for these markets to function, states need to allow free movement of workers across borders and offer social protection that travels. Supranational institutions, writes Ruxandra Paul, that have at their core an economic integration project and aspire toward (or, in the case of the European Union, have established) a common market—the EU, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, the Ibero-American Social Security Convention, ASEAN etc.—all provide the basis for multilateral social security agreements that cover migrant workers. Economic integration needs some degree of social and cultural integration.

In sum, we can argue about whether these long-term structural and cultural reorganizations of nationhood, social welfare, rights, or regions constitute societal shifts equivalent to the social transformations that the conference organizers have in mind. We may also be deeply disappointed by the failure of these institutions and conventions to realize their promise. Still, I believe they represent fundamental changes in the scale, space, and structures of politics that, in turn, strongly influence migration drivers and outcomes and unsettle conventional wisdom about rights and which institutions, at which scales, are bound to protect them.

Let me briefly turn to two additional methodological reflections. The description of this conference sessions states that “Research shows that it is not very fruitful to identify individual migration drivers, such as conflict or poverty, when we know that, all be they important, they shape migration in interaction with other factors. Moreover, a focus on drivers may sway us from considering long-term structural shifts that alter people’s livelihoods and influence migration in indirect ways.” We are urged to identify how a wide variety of factors, from shifts in land tenure and inheritance patterns to labor market structures and cultural changes, shape migration in direct and indirect ways. We are asked to hold all of these factors simultaneously in conversation with each other.

This sounds to me like a call to apply an intersectional analysis to macro questions. The idea of intersectionality, which came out of studies of race and ethnicity, is that we have to look at the complex, cumulative manner in which the effects of different forms of discrimination combine, overlap, or intersect. We cannot understand educational outcomes, income, or health status without looking at how they are cumulatively and in combination shaped by race, class, gender, and religion. Is this what we are being asked to do methodologically and, if so, what can we learn from its application to questions of smaller scale?

This also resonates with Gurminder Bhambra’s vision for reconstructing sociology. She is inspired by Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s method of producing ‘connected histories’ from plural standpoints which are otherwise artificially isolated by the ways in which disciplines are structured. Like Subrahmanyam, Bhambra departs from a place of deep methodological discontent with modes of scholarship centered on ideal types. These, she observes, do the epistemic work of separating and isolating entities and occurrences which are, in reality, deeply connected. Ideal-type methods
and located epistemology are, therefore, bound together, working in concert to separate and isolate. Bhambra challenges us instead to do the remedial work of “[reconstructing] theoretical categories – their relations and objects – to create new understandings that incorporate and transform previous ones” She urges us to reconstruct our understanding of social worlds by identifying new connections between events, entities, and people(s). She, like Hein, urges us to redefine what migration means.

Finally, the work we are being asked to do here is not possible without a truly multi-disciplinary team and an abiding ethos of collaboration. Most of us are not historians and yet this kind of work deeply depends upon insights from that field. That means we must reconsider what we value as “exemplary scholarship.” Analyses produced by experts who study countries and regions for long periods of time are very important. We need people with deep linguistic, cultural, and historical fluency. But in today’s world, we also need deep analyses of several different places that illuminate the broad social patterns they share, or what Richard Wilk called “structures of common difference”. Writer Tony Judt, in an homage to Isaiah Berlin, described himself in one of his last books as “decidedly not a hedgehog. I have no big theory of contemporary European history to propose in these pages,” he wrote, “no single, all embracing story to tell” It doesn’t mean, he goes on to say, that European history has no thematic shape. Rather, “fox-like Europe knows many things” For me, Judt is making an important methodological point. We also need accounts that are more fox-like, which do not pretend to capture every detail of the places they describe but that produce valuable insights precisely because they see the forest and the trees – and the patterns that unite them.

This approach, not surprisingly, is imperfect. To do it right, you have to be clear about what you can and cannot claim based on your findings, to own up to what you know and cannot know. You have to do your homework, depending on the hedgehogs in a particular field, and trying to read in languages you might not speak. You cannot be a “cow-boy” ethnographer, who gallops in on a high horse, believing it is possible to see everything quickly and easily from your saddle. But most importantly, you must proceed with great humility, asking colleagues to guide and accompany you along the way. “In music”, write Barbara Tomlinson and George Lipsitz, to accompany other players entails more than simply adding new sounds to the mix. Accompaniment requires attention, communication, and cooperation. It means augmenting, accenting, or countering one music voice with another. It means doing the hard work of creating a far-reaching, truly international network of professionals, scholars, and friends who will support your work, and producing much more rich, insightful, and grounded scholarship as a result.
Migration as a function of aspirations and capabilities: new conceptual developments of micro level migration drivers
Objective of the Session

Research on migration decision-making often presents migration from poorer countries as a ‘existential’ response to economic deprivation or insecurity, and migration from wealthier countries as a ‘facultative’ or ‘rational’ response to educational or professional opportunities. This is a false dichotomy that obscures similarities in migration decision-making across country contexts, and inhibits the development of universal theoretical models.

In this session, we consider the opportunities and limitations of one theoretical approach that can help explain (im)mobility outcomes across a wide range of development contexts. Variously termed the aspiration/ability model or the aspiration-capability framework, a core insight of this approach is the systematic distinction of the ability (or capability) from the aspiration to migrate, which allows for more nuanced and realistic migration categorizations. In this session, we will consider various iterations of this theoretical approach, their respective contributions, limitations, and potential for wider application.

Background

In migration research, there is a distinct analytical approach to micro-level migration processes that makes a distinction between the evaluation of migration as a potential course of action and its realization in actual mobility or immobility (Carling and Schewel 2018: 947). Although studies that make this distinction do not always use the same vocabulary or core concepts to describe these steps, the underlying logic is clear. Termed a “two-step approach” by Carling and Schewel (2018), this separation of the migration process into two steps allows researchers to examine the social forces shaping migration decision-making processes separately from the capabilities and constraints that determine whether migration desires are actually realized. Since the early 2000s, one type of two-step approach is gaining particular traction. It describes the first step in terms of migration aspirations and the second in terms of ability (Carling 2002) or capability (de Haas 2003).

Carling (2002) first introduced the ‘aspiration/ability model’ to explain the prevalence of what he termed ‘involuntary immobility’ – the aspiration to migrate but the inability to do so – among people in Cape Verde. He argued that given the restricted nature of mobility in today’s world, it is more accurate to suggest we live in an age of involuntary immobility than an age of migration. In Carling’s model, a migration ‘aspiration’ refers to the “conviction that migration is preferable to non-migration; it can vary in degree and in the balance between choice and coercion” (Carling and Schewel
‘Ability’ refers to the context-specific opportunities and obstacles that determine whether an individual is able to convert an aspiration into reality. His model highlighted three (im)mobility outcomes: *mobility* (having both the aspiration and ability to migrate), *involuntary immobility* (having the aspiration but not the ability to migrate), and *voluntary immobility* (not aspiring to migrate). Mata-Codesal (2015) built on this distinction in her study of the heterogeneous experiences of immobility in Ecuador, identifying both involuntary and ‘desired’ immobility. She showed how, from a household perspective, mobility and immobility outcomes are often intimately intertwined. Schewel (2015; 2019) introduced a fourth category, ‘acquiescent immobility’ to describe those who have neither the aspiration nor ability to migrate.

In a slightly different application, de Haas (2003) applied the concepts of ‘aspiration’ and ‘capability’ (from Amartya Sen’s capability approach; see Sen 1999) to explain migration and development interactions in Southern Morocco, eventually theorizing an ‘aspiration-capability framework’ to explain micro-level migration processes (de Haas 2014). He showed how, in Southern Morocco, development led to increased incomes, access to education and media, infrastructure, and security, which tended to enhance people’s aspirations and capabilities (i.e., their financial, social, and human capital) to migrate (de Haas 2007, 2010). He argues that virtually all forms of migration may be conceived of as a function of migration aspirations and migration capabilities.

Applying Amartya Sen’s concept of ‘capability’ makes two important contributions. First, beyond explaining particular migration outcomes, which the aspiration/ability model already does well, the concept of capability more explicitly connects mobility dynamics to development processes, laying the groundwork to begin exploring why individuals transition across (im)mobility categories over time – in other words, why some people may transition from voluntary or involuntary immobility into mobility. Second, the concept of capability is normative. Amartya Sen’s capability approach argues that the ultimate aim of development should be the freedom to achieve well-being and suggests that development be evaluated in terms of people’s capabilities to do and be what they have reason to value (Sen 1999). In this light, the capability to migrate (and the capability to stay) may be conceived of as important ‘freedoms,’ with intrinsic value. People can derive well-being from having the freedom to move or to stay, regardless of whether they act upon that freedom (de Haas 2014).

In sum, the distinction between migration aspirations and actual ability reveals a range of (im)mobility outcomes, and those advancing this approach have put their primary focus on particular ones: Carling (2002) on the causes and experience of involuntary immobility, de Haas (2003) on why development often leads to more mobility, Schewel (2019) and Mata Codesal (2018) on the motivations behind voluntary and acquiescent immobility. Scholars have applied the framework in ‘forced migration’ settings (e.g. Farbotko 2018) or to describe (im)mobility dynamics ‘in transit’ (e.g. Schapendonk and Steel 2014). Yet, it is important to note that most research using the aspiration/ability model or aspiration-capability framework remains focused on the ‘Global South,’ reinforcing
a common divide in migration research – between migration’s drivers in the Global South and immigration dynamics in the Global North.

**Suggested questions for discussion**

- The term ‘aspirations’ is becoming more common in migration research, yet conceptual clarity often remains elusive. What does the concept of ‘aspirations’ contribute to research on migration decision-making? What are some of the methodological challenges to measuring aspirations, and how might these be overcome?

- As is common to the process of theory advancement, there is an overarching conceptual insight – in this case, the division of migration processes into two-steps – and then a variety of permutations, or more specialized debates, about how best to apply and advance this insight. Looking forward, should scholars attempt to integrate these different versions into a single framework or common vocabulary? Or is it more theoretically fruitful to encourage “two-step approaches” that simply make a distinction between the *evaluation* and *realization* of actual mobility or immobility?

- How might this theoretical framework, which has largely been used to explore the determinants of migration and immobility in the Global South, be applied to study individuals’ (im)mobility decisions in the Global North? Why might immobility, along the spectrum of voluntary to involuntary, be an important question to consider in ‘developed country’ contexts?

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Two-step approaches and the concept of aspirations in migration theory

Jørgen Carling

The research note is written as a response to questions that Kerilyn Schewel (2019) posed in preparation for the colloquium session. I begin with an additional question that sets the stage for the questions that Schewel raises.

How does the notion of ‘two-step approaches’ help us navigate migration theory?

Since the turn of the Millennium, the causation of migration has been addressed through a new strand of approaches. Migration scholars have challenged traditional models by splitting the causation of migration into two analytical steps. The first step is the formation of migration aspirations, desires or intentions; the second step is the conversion into actual migration. The earliest explicit formulation of a two-step approach used the terms aspiration and ability to denote the two steps (Carling 2002). A diverse range of subsequent studies share the broadly similar logic of explaining migration in a stepwise fashion (e.g. Black and Collyer 2014, Carling 2002, Creighton 2013, de Haas 2003, de Haas 2014, Docquier et al. 2014a, Koikkalainen and Kyle 2016, Randell 2016). However, these studies do not form a cohesive, cross-referenced body of literature, and has only recently been identified as a distinct mode of analysis and given the label ‘two-step approaches’ (Carling and Schewel 2018).

Two-step approaches have remarkable explanatory capacity because the conditions that make people want to migrate can be very different from the conditions that enable them to do so. As an example, consider the difference in international migration rates from urban and rural areas of Mexico (Creighton 2013). Compared to urban dwellers, rural residents are more likely to want to migrate, but less likely to realize these desires if they have them. If we try to explain on the basis of observed outcomes alone, we are muddling two distinct underlying processes.

Each of the two steps present theoretical and methodological challenges (Carling and Schewel 2018). In the following, I focus on those that are related to the first step – aspiration – which are also prioritized in Schewel’s (2019) input statement.

What does the concept of ‘aspirations’ contribute to research on migration decision-making?

In Paolo Boccagni’s (2017:2) words, aspirations are ‘emotionally thick representations of what one’s future might and should look like, given the present circumstances and the experience of the past as re-codified from the “here-and-now”’. In the study of migration, the concept of aspirations plays at least three distinct roles, depending on the analytical perspective. Distin-guishing between the three helps identify the strengths and limitations of the concept.
1. Aspirations as an umbrella term in two-step approaches

Two-step approaches apply diverse terms to the first step, including aspirations, intentions and desires (Agadjanian et al. 2008, Alpes 2014, Bal 2014, Becerra et al. 2010, Cai et al. 2014, Czaika and Vothknecht 2014). None of these are ideal for describing in general terms the conviction that migrating is preferable to staying. However, ‘migration aspirations’ might be the best. It has gained a foothold in the theoretical literature and benefits from being more abstract than alternative terms and therefore not as burdened by specific and potentially unsuitable connotations (Carling and Collins 2018, Carling and Schewel 2018).

2. Life aspirations and the instrumental value of migration

Aspirations in a broad sense – life aspirations – can be integral to explanations of why people develop migration aspirations. If migration is the means to an end, that end may be a component of life aspirations, such as leading a life free from violence, securing the education of the next generation, or having a professionally rewarding career (Carling 2014, 2017, de Haas 2003).

3. Aspirations as representations of migrants’ imagined futures

Migration theory is geared towards explaining migration, and, has, in this sense, served its purpose once individuals come to be migrants. But those individuals are still facing imagined futures and engage with them in ways that may be seen through the vocabulary of aspirations. This is a theme that might have limited direct relevance for explanations of migration, but which is essential for the broader understanding of migration experiences (Boccagni 2017, van Meeteren et al. 2009).

What are key challenges to measuring aspirations and how might these be overcome?

Two-step approaches to understanding migration can be pursued with a variety of both qualitative and quantitative methods. A particular challenge for quantitative research is how, exactly, the first step can be measured. This appears to be a specific, methodological challenge, but is actually intertwined with profound theoretical issues that can inform two-step approaches regardless of methodological preferences.

The challenge of measuring migration aspirations is best approached, I believe, by first taking a step back from specific concepts and considering quite broadly how migration figures in imagined futures. We can do so by referring to ‘migration aspirations and related concepts’, in the sense of the concept’s first role, identified above. Many studies have examined migration aspirations through surveys that have yielded interesting data. However, these studies have often given scant attention to the theoretical implications of how survey items are formulated (Carling and Schewel 2018).

In a recent paper (Carling 2019) I examined questions on migration aspirations from more

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1 The issue of return migration aspirations is a narrower concern that has more in common with the first role of aspirations, i.e. as an umbrella term in two-step approaches.
than 50 surveys and identified five analytical components that differentiated them. The purpose was to understand how it might be possible to address migration aspirations through a series of complementary questions. The most common deliberate differentiation in existing research is inspired by the quest for predicting migration outcomes: questions are asked in a sequential manner that leads, for instance, from general aspirations or desires, via short term intentions or plans, to specific preparatory steps (Carling et al. 2013, GMDAC 2017, Siska-Szilasi et al. 2017). These may be valuable distinctions to make, but the focus on rational planning towards departure can crowd out other important aspects of variation.

Based on my analytical review and field testing, I recommended that surveys include questions that cover different variants of mindsets with respect to migrating or staying – especially expectation, preference and consideration (Carling 2019). The detailed aspects of each one goes beyond the scope of this paper; the main point is complementarity. Attempts to measure migration aspirations benefit from taking a multi-dimensional approach.

Future work on measuring migration aspirations should engage more actively with the rich debates in social psychology about the measurement of attitudes. In particular, we must navigate the tension between cognitivist and constructionist views.

Should ‘two-step approaches’ be unified to a single framework and common vocabulary?

A recent review article on the migration–environment nexus concluded that research in that field ‘has been hampered by differences in the definitions, conceptual frameworks, study designs, data structures, and analytical methods and tools used’ (Borderon et al. 2019:529). If only there was standardization, the authors argue, ‘each empirical case study could be seen as a piece of a common puzzle’. Is this also the way forward for the research covered by this colloquium session?

The short answer is no. Migration research benefits from a diversity of approaches that have complementary strengths and limitations. More fundamentally, many of us would take issue with the positivist epistemology and cumulative view of science that informs the image of ‘a common puzzle’ to be completed piece by piece. Having said that, the term ‘two-step approaches’ was coined with the purpose of creating some degree of order (Carling and Schewel 2018). Diversity is of limited value when it amounts to fragmentation into separate literatures that fail to engage with each other. By pointing out the conceptual commonalities across two-step approaches, we facilitate interaction. Such interaction need not aim for standardization, but rather for a clarification of where the differences lie. There is diversity in at least four areas, which I address in turn.

2 They are (1) nature of the mindset; (2) temporality of the mindset; (3) nature of the action; (4) temporality of the action; and (5) conditionalality. Each of the five can take different forms. For instance ‘intention’ and ‘expectation’ are different variants of the nature of the mindset.

3 I will pursue this line of work within the project Future Migration as Present Fact (www.prio.org/fumi).
Diversity in purpose

Two-step approaches to understanding migration might differ in what they seek to achieve. These variations could explain and justify the differences in vocabulary and conceptual structures. An obvious example is the relationship between the aspiration/ability model and the aspirations-capabilities framework. The essential difference apparently lies in the choice of ‘capabilities’ versus ‘ability’, which I return to below. However, the contrast between ‘model’ and ‘framework’ is no less important, since it reflects a difference in purpose. The aspiration/ability model (Carling 2002) simply seeks to explain migration outcomes. Its core is simple enough to be expressed as a mathematical equation

\[
\text{migration} = \text{aspiration} \times \text{ability}
\]

in which all three variables can take the value of 0 or 1. In other words, migration requires the combination of aspiration and ability and will not occur with only one and not the other. Crucially, aspiration refers only to migration aspirations and ability denotes only ability to migrate. As with most theoretical models, the aspiration/ability model in its simplest form can serve as a reference point in a process of adding complexity. For instance, we can consider aspiration and ability as matters of degree, or assume that aspiration is not fully independent of ability (Carling 2014).

The aspirations-capabilities framework (de Haas 2014) by contrast has a broader remit. First of all, it is a framework in the sense that it maps a complex set of relationships and feedback mechanisms (de Haas 2014, Figure 2). Its origins lie in the study of ‘socio-economic impacts of out-migration’ (de Haas 2003) and the migration-development nexus rather than more narrowly in the explanation of migration. In line with this context, capabilities are understood more broadly than (cap)ability to migrate: they are central to the conceptualization of development, and therefore important to the consequences of migration as well as to its origins. Similarly, aspirations in the aspirations-capabilities framework are not simply aspirations to migrate, but also life aspirations more broadly (de Haas 2003, 2014). Referring back to the three roles of aspirations in the study of migration (page 2), the aspiration/ability model relates only to the first role, whereas the aspirations-capabilities framework merge the first two.

Yet other variants of two-step approaches to understanding migration are driven by an interest in quantitatively modelling or simulating migration flows (Klabunde et al. 2017, Willekens 2013). Such a purpose affects the choice of concepts.

Although we identified two step approaches as ‘approaches to understanding migration’ (Carling and Schewel 2018), there is substantial diversity within this common purpose – diversity in terms of seeking to only explaining migration versus also understanding its effects, and diversity in terms of seeking to help us think versus seeking to compute numbers.
Diversity in theoretical affiliation

Researchers who take a two-step approach to understanding migration have drawn upon disparate theoretical hinterlands. For instance, Klabunde et al. (2017) apply concepts from the theory of planned behaviour (e.g. Ajzen 1991), Docquier et al. (2014b) follow the logic of the matching function in labour market economics (e.g. Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001), and de Haas (2014) build upon the capability approach to development (e.g. Sen 1999). Such backdrops can contribute theoretical groundings that enrich the study of migration. However, they can also have exclusionary effects.

First, the theoretical hinterlands can be alienating because of how they are already inhabited. Regardless of what the matching function in labour market economics might bring to migration theory, it makes a difference that it resides in a space where non-economists will inevitably be outsiders. This mechanism also applies in non-disciplinary realms, such as the Human Development & Capability Association, that are defined by shared theoretical loyalties. In other words, the sources of theoretical influence often have inhabitants who preside over a heritage, relate to common cannons, and perhaps debate them in ways that alienate outsiders.

The theoretical hinterlands can also be exclusionary because of their thematic expanse and their epistemological bedrock. For instance, does a two-step approach that centres on a concept from economics imply, or require, an adoption of the discipline’s dominant approaches to agency? And does the use of ‘capability’ for the ability to migrate commit us to the whole-sale adoption of the capabilities approach and its theoretical tenets? For instance, Preibisch et al. (2016) call for applying the capabilities approach to the study of migration and development ‘without compromising the integrity of the approach’.

These theoretical hinterlands can work in ways that call for a religious analogy. Their inhabitants seek complex and elusive, yet fixed rectitude, in a way that’s similar to Christians who live by the motto ‘What would Jesus do?’. And the insistence on integrity is reminiscent of the disdain for ‘pick-and-choose Christianity’.

We can all find ways of engaging meaningfully with our preferred theoretical hinterlands, but their exclusionary effects is a strong argument against ‘unification’ of two-step approaches around particular theoretical allegiances beyond migration itself.

Diversity in methodology

In theory, social scientists take a research question as their starting point and subsequently select the appropriate tools from their methodological toolbox. In practice, research questions, conceptual frameworks and theoretical perspectives are often shaped by methodological preferences. The diversity in methodology thus overlaps with the diversity in theoretical affiliation. A demographer who aims for quantitative simulation might formulate the conceptual framework accordingly from the outset. An ethnographer, by contrast, is more likely to make conceptual choices without concerns
about measurability or operationalization.

*Diversity in the conceptualization*

Finally, several studies that may be placed under the rubric ‘two-step approaches’ distinguish between a greater number of steps. For instance, van der Velde and van Naerssen (2011) identify three ‘thresholds’ for migratory behaviour, and Klabunde et al. (2017) refer to three ‘stages’. As with the other dimensions of diversity in two-step approaches, this variation in conceptualizing the steps towards actual migration can be a source of enrichment.

Summarizing from the above observations, any efforts to unify two-step approaches should thread lightly and work at a high level of abstraction. The aspiration/ability model has potential to serve as a common reference point because of its bare-bones structure and its lack of entanglement with particular theoretical hinterlands.

*Reflections on the way forward*

I mentioned initially that ‘aspirations’ exist alongside other concepts to describe people’s attitudes towards the prospect of migrating. They include migration desires (Bal 2014, Cai et al. 2014), migration intentions (De Jong and Steinmetz 2006, van Dalen and Henkens 2008), migration plans (Thulin and Vilhelmson 2014), migration considerations (Solberg et al. 2013), and willingness to migrate (Drinkwater 2002, Fidrmuc and Huber 2007). All these concepts may be relevant, but they share a common shortcoming: they embody a conceptual lock-in to a specific way of relating to migration as a future prospect. Selecting any one concept at the outset obscures potentially important differentiation. All the established terms are binary, describing a characteristic that is either present or absent.

An alternative analytical strategy is made possible by the concept future migration, which is a shorthand term for migration as an imagined future event in individual lives. By fixing this concept as the reference point, we can ask how it is that people relate to it. A person might, for instance, desire, expect, or fear future migration. This perspective allows for shifting empirical analyses from a focus of whether people ‘have’ migration aspirations towards an open and multi-dimensional enquiry into how they relate to future migration. It remains to be seen how this shift conforms to, or challenges, two-step approaches in general and the aspiration/ability model in particular.

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4 This is the approach taken in the project Future Migration as Present Fact (FUMI). See www.prio.org/fumi for details. Until other publications appear, references to the concept of future migration can cite this research note.
References


Aspiring to a Life Worth Living: Some considerations about the aspirations to migrate or stay put

Diana Mata-Codesal

Two-step approaches offer a valuable analytic procedure to understand decision-taking processes related to migration and staying put. In this note I am focusing on the aspiration part of the model. The ability or capabilities part is more of a structural nature. Although not explicitly related to two-step models, this part has received more academic attention. I am outlining in this brief discussion note some issues regarding the content and formation of aspirations that I have encountered while researching immobility. I would also like to share two more concerns which do not apply solely to two-step models but to migration scholarship in general about definitions of im/mobility and methodological sexism or potentially induced gender biases.

The first element I would like to draw attention to is the fact that aspirations are often not to migrate per se but to pursue a specific life style. Two-step models are sometimes applied in a way that obscures this aspect by detaching im/mobility decisions from broader livelihood frames and strategies. I would suggest looking at how migration and staying put play out in people’s strategies to pursue “good lives”¹. How do migration and staying put relate to conceptions of what a life worth living is and the possible and feasible strategies to achieve it? How im/mobility relates to people’s ideas of lives worth living? Two-step approaches can increase their explanatory power if placed within this broader understanding. The analysis would not start with the aspirations to migrate or to stay put, but rather with explorations of 1) what is considered a good life or a life worth living, and 2) how to achieve it. Under this approach, migration becomes a variable into the larger function of achieving a “good life” or a “life worth living”. In the quest about how spatial im/mobility relates to aspirations to a good life, we need to consider the basic question of what im/mobility actually mean. Migration and immobility are not universal self-evident realities, but socially constructed ones. Class, race, age and gender affect how, and even if, spatial mobility is –locally and globally– perceived as migration².

The idea of a “good life” changes over the life cycle, it is heavily gendered and context-specific. Subjects’ personal features (including age, gender, educational level, role in the family/household and other relevant groupings, etc.) influence their conceptions of what a good life entails, as well as their assessments of the desirability and feasibility of the different circumstances under which to migrate (including destinations, maximum acceptable risk levels and mode for transportation).

¹ In emphasising migration instrumental role at the expense of its intrinsic value, I position myself along a growing but still limited number of scholars asking to de-migrantize Migration Studies and to migrantize Social Sciences in general (Anderson 2019; Cabot 2018; Çağlar 2016; Dahinden 2016).

² I have developed this reasoning in relation to gender in Mata-Codesal (2017).
and to stay put (in terms of material well-being and social consideration, among others). Personal and group features also impact on how im/mobility is socially considered and personally perceived, therefore affecting im/mobility decision-taking processes. It is important to emphasize that migration is not homogeneously related to spatial im/mobility. Therefore, there are people that have moved to a different country for work but who are not considered as migrants but as expats, or why the expression second generation migrants can label people who have been born and raised in their country of actual residence.

A second element to consider was already pointed by Carling in his pioneering work in Cape Verde: “Aspirations to emigrate are likely to be influenced both by the chances of success, and by the meanings of a situation of involuntary immobility” (Carling 2001: 128). Aspirations and abilities are not independent variables, they affect each other. Having the ability to do something, and being aware of it, determines the development of certain aspirations, i.e. perceived feasibility is an important element in the development of aspirations. Similarly, not having the ability (or not perceiving having the ability) also affects aspirations. In the absence of capacities to either migrate or to stay put, mechanisms of adaptation are generated that inhibit or modify the desire to do it (Mata-Codesal 2016). In my view, such interactions merit further attention.

Aspirations and abilities relate to each other, but they may not be coeval. Having the desire and the ability to migrate or to stay put does not automatically and immediately translate into moving or staying put, as some effort or steps may be required in order to turn ability/capabilities into actual im/mobility. For instance, having the ability to migrate internationally may mean that a person qualifies for a work visa. However, there are still journeys to the embassy to travel, money to pay and paperwork to do, which do take time and effort. Different people with the ability to migrate, may need to invest more or less time and effort transforming such ability into actual im/mobility. Time affects aspirations and ability, so accommodating different time horizons is one of the pending challenges for two-step models (Carling and Schewel 2018: 950).

Two-step models need to account for the fact that people’s aspirations and realizations may not even been contemporaneous but also that they may involve different family members. In order to do so, two-step models can benefit from working with relational understanding of the individual. The individual is thus considered as immersed in different tangled messes of belonging: s/he is enacting and expected to enact specific roles within a household and other socio-geographical groupings.

A third question to keep in mind is that it is not only about migrating or staying put, but to be able to do so under specific circumstances. Methodologically, we need to provide space for informants to, not only state their preferences regarding migrating or staying put, but also under

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3 I found the term network too neat to capture the fuzzy nature of belonging and prefer instead the expression tangled mess. I must say that I have used the term maraña in Spanish in my work (Mata-Codesal 2016) and that I am not sure which its best translation into English is.
which circumstances they would rather choose one or the other option. In my ethnographic work in Mexico, some people reported to be willing to migrate to the US, but not without papers, so they’d rather stay put. Some other informants would rather stay put in the village, but not under their current circumstances, so they reported wanting to migrate as a means to achieve certain levels of comfort deemed as inalienable (Mata-Codesal 2018). There is room to explore the conditions under which a person’s aspirations to migrate or to stay put arise and may switch, and how personal and group features affect relevant thresholds. Up to date this has been addressed by studies on immobility which take stayers as knowable and skilful agents and account for the agency involved in staying put (e.g. Mata-Codesal 2015; Somaiah et al. 2019; Stockdale and Haartsen 2018). This studies however need to broaden out by working with matching samples to be able to simultaneously research stayers and migrants.

Unfortunately, after almost two decades since it was explicitly pointed by Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002), methodological nationalism still pervades migration research. Two-step models are not immune. In fact, a great deal of research applying this theoretical model has so far just focused on aspirations to migrate internationally (see Carling and Schewel 2018). There is no methodological or epistemological reason why two-step models cannot be applied to any type of spatial im/mobilities. Two-step models can avoid the risks of methodological nationalism by mapping beforehand the range of im/mobilities which are local and personally relevant. Such ranges will be form from at least different combinations of destinations (e.g. local, regional, rural-to-urban, internal, international), reasons to migrate (e.g. for work, education or family reasons such as to follow the virilocal residence pattern after marriage) and durations (e.g. circular, permanent, temporary, seasonal). More interestingly, two-step models can shed light on how different types of spatial im/mobility relate to each other (e.g. in the absence of the ability to migrate internationally in a regular manner, substitutive aspirations to migrate internally may arise).

My final comment is about what I consider one of methodological nationalism’s concomitances, methodological sexism. Speranta Dumitru (2014) first coined this expression reflecting critically about the emergence of the “care drain” literature. She contended that studying how women fulfil their traditional family roles can become sexist when women are studied only as caregivers, only women are studied as caregivers, and women’s failure to fulfil their traditional family roles is judged regrettable (Dumitru 2014: 204). I argue that her initial definition can be expanded to incorporate gender-biases which are methodologically induced by the aprioristic selection of relevant mobility patterns, and in particular those derived from methodological nationalism. So far, the academic (and political) preponderance given to just one specific form of spatial mobility (labour permanent-ish international migration from the Global South to the Global North) has induced gender biases, in particular in its conception of immobility (left behind being women and considered as less migratory) while overlooking other relevant patterns of internal migration. This is, 1) taking international migration as the most relevant mobility pattern obscures other mobilities more often followed by women; 2) taking labour as the main motivation to migrate minimizes other reasons to move, including...
reasons women can be more likely to migrate for; 3) addressing immobility as a passive situation reinforces stereotypical understandings of women as less migratory and more passive subjects than men (Mata-Codesal 2016). In order to avoid pre-established narrowing wordings, and survey and interview questions that detach im/mobility from the personal and local value-structure (i.e. its links with good lives’ conceptions), I suggest that two-step models can benefit from research techniques such as life stories and other biographic methods. These qualitative techniques are suitable to capture local meanings, attached values and relevant trajectories and articulations of im/mobility. They can be used to uncover then the specific contents of what a good life entails, how personal variables shape such content and the available strategies to fulfil it.

In summary, I would suggest placing more firmly the aspirations to remain or to move into emic conceptions of “good lives”. That would expand the analytical ability of the model beyond the Global South. A life that is constantly threatend, even in its physical presence, cannot be considered a good life or a life worth living. It is easy to understand that people facing such circumstances develop pressing aspirations to move somewhere else. Saving distances, but using the same rationale, some of those who belong to the so-called precariat living in a city of the Global North may not considered a good life a life of never-ending labour precariousness, and therefore develop aspirations to migrate as a way to achieve a good life somewhere else. Elite global mobilities can also be addressed under this same approach. While the reasoning is useful for all sorts of situations, it remains to emically set the content of the concept of “good life”. This approach can also help us to address the questions of why some people may incorporate different forms of spatial mobility as means for achieving good lives, while some others do not.

Secondly, there is ample room for, and need to, complicating two-step models. Two-step approaches may be misleading as they tend to provide a neat picture of processes which are often messy, non-linear and can be quite predetermined. These are some of the “complications” that can be incorporated:

1. To work with degrees instead of yes/no categories. This could include considering the intensity of the desire to pursue certain types of lives, or the ease which with ability can be turn into actual forms of im/mobility.
2. To account for the importance of the modes under which im/mobility can be enacted in both the aspiration and the ability to migrate and to stay put. This is an imperative, since it is not only about migrating or staying put, but to be able to do so under specific circumstances.
3. Following from the previous point, we need to stop considering aspirations and abilities as independent from each other and to further explore the ways in which aspirations and abilities affect each other. It includes incorporating different time horizons into the model and to accommodate the fact that aspirations and ability may not be coeval and can be spread beyond the individual.
4. To continue with the incorporation of the motivations to, meanings of, conditions under which,
and strategies to staying put vis-à-vis similar explorations regarding different types of spatial mobility (not only the one that crosses international borders). We need to be particularly careful to avoid methodological nationalism and methodological sexism when exploring the meanings and ranges of im/mobility and how they relate to conceptions of good lives.

I have tried to represent most of my above suggestions in the following diagram:

**Diagram 1: Aspirations and ability to good lives**

![Diagram 1: Aspirations and ability to good lives](image)

Source: Own elaboration

It is important to note that the whole diagram is within a circle named “good life”, because as explained, aspirations are often not to migrate or to stay put *per se* but rather to be able to live a good life or a life worth living.

The two axes are simply labelled with to have or not to have the aspiration (in gradient yellow) or the ability (gradient blue). I have deliberately excluded to put aspiration/ability to migrate or to stay put because that is something that needs to be looked at in a case by case basis, related to local and personal understandings of what a good life looks like.

I have represented ability and desire with gradient colours because they are not yes or no variables but rather intensities. In the case of aspirations that is very clear to visualize. In the case of ability, if we think of two persons who both have the ability to migrate, still the effort, time and resources needed to be able to perform the actual movement can be different. Having the ability to
move or to stay put may not translate immediate and automatically into migrating or staying put.

The diagram superimposes colours because ability and aspiration affect each other. The green area in the upper right corner would be the most straightforward part of the model, where aspiration and ability directions match. This is a quadrant of voluntariness, where we would encounter either voluntary migrants or voluntary stayers. Again, let me to emphasise that we need to incorporate both the aspiration and ability to migrate or to stay put but also the conditions under which a person decide to do so. In the blue area located in the upper left corner, there is the aspiration, but ability is lacking. That would be an area of involuntariness: either involuntary migration if wanting to stay put but lacking the ability to do so; or involuntary immobility if wanting to migrate but missing the ability to turn these aspirations into reality. However, we do not have to stop our analyses there, imposing the involuntary label and that is. This can be a dynamic area, where agents actively try to re-position themselves, by either changing their aspirations or setting up strategies to increase their ability. The stronger the aspiration to more likely to affect the ability part. As mentioned above, I can foresee two basic adaptation mechanisms. In the first case, people can develop substitutive aspirations they can realize. The simplest example would be that of not having the ability to migrate internationally. People can then develop substitutive aspiration to migrate internally. Second mechanism involve people trying to increase their ability by changing the circumstances under which they are willing to. This is, they can change their thresholds of acceptability of the circumstances under which stay put or migrate. In the third quadrant of the diagram, the yellow area in the lower right corner, there is the ability but not the aspiration. In the case of having the ability to migrate, and the more to the right one person is located, the more likely that person engage with some type of mobility, maybe on a temporary basis, for tourism reasons, etc. As it is so easy to migrate, some person may just try to see how it looks like. Finally, the white area (which is in fact a non-coloured area) would be the acquiescence area where inertia is relevant and where we would be talking of acquiescent im/mobility.

References


‘Two-step’ to me at least, means dance. It’s a pattern of movement I’m familiar with from years of going to ceilidhs but it’s present in most Western folk dance from Cajun to Breton, even the cowboy dances of the Texas two-step. It’s common beyond Western traditions of dance – Palestinian Dabke or the Amazigh line dances enjoyed across Morocco are based on similar two-step patterns. The ‘shoegazing’ style of Manchester’s Hacienda, popular when I was an undergraduate, is essentially a shuffled two-step; there’s a two-step move in hip-hop (though you lift your knees rather higher) and while I can’t claim any recent knowledge of London underground clubs, UK Garage 2-step has the familiar 4/4 chuka chunk chunk chunk rhythm that encourages the quick quick slow slow characteristic of two-step. Now the question all this leads to is ‘what is it about two-step that makes it so central to such diverse dance forms?’ I could go on, and the relationship between music, dance and migration is a genuine interest of mine (Bailey and Collyer 2006), but this is obviously heading in a more metaphorical direction. I think the metaphor works, so bear with me.

There are three reasons that explain the near ubiquity of two-step in dance both ancient and modern around the world. First, it is simple, easy to explain, easy to teach and quick to pick up. Second, it can bear often very substantial embellishments while remaining recognisably itself. Finally and perhaps most important, like all great art, there is an essential truth to it: it is immediately appealing, we do it and it feels right. So these are the three tests to apply to the two-step approach to migration which will structure this short intervention: simplification, embellishment, truth. This requires a brief ontological clarification. Theory is imagined in a variety of ways, but there is plenty of common ground. As Carling emphasises with the evocative image of the jigsaw, we are not dealing with a universal positivist picture with gaps in that require filling. These three considerations combine to contribute to a more modest test of theory as explanation. My dance metaphor relates to the classic theoretical discussion about how far abstraction is useful: in order to have broader explanatory power any theory must be more abstract but for many approaches greater abstraction results in loss of explanatory power. There is a balance to be found. To anticipate the conclusion, the two step approach offers a generally useful heuristic but is more appropriate to the kind of abstractions required in quantitative work.

**Does the two-step approach offer a justified simplification? Does it clarify more than it conceals?**

The two-step approach involves two fundamental simplifications in relations between the three central concepts of aspiration, (cap)ability and migration. The first simplification is that these three concepts are discrete and the second that they each vary in straightforward ways that could be imagined along a single axis. Both of these are characteristic of quantitative analysis where such simplifications are
defended by the need to ask short questions with closed responses to hundreds or thousands of people. In terms of quantitative analysis (assuming we have no a priori objections to such analysis) these simplifications do not stand out as unusual.

The problem that the three variables are not separate but are co-created is one that is common to much quantitative research. It is often referred to as endogeneity of variables and can at least be tested for statistically. The notion that a desire to do something somehow arises separately from the ability to do it is widely contested, as Mata-Codesal points out. Yet, particularly where individuals are stationary, it is meaningful to try to identify if this has more to do with a lack of aspiration or an impression of inability to do so. The second problem, that these three concepts are too complex for a method which only allows them to vary in a single dimension, is also not unique to this situation. Quantitative research commonly investigates phenomena which are more complex than are allowed for in a limited range of options but this does not mean that the exercise is futile. Migration can be categorised in myriad ways that far exceed survey methods, but there is not usually any doubt if migration has occurred or not. Similarly with aspiration and ability – ‘do you want to leave this place?’ and ‘could you leave this place?’ are both meaningful questions with little possibility of confusion between the answers.

Beyond quantitative studies, there is much less justification to pursue this highly simplified approach and the loss of detail becomes more obvious. Carling refers to ethnography in his account with the apparent suggestion that this is an abstraction that could be used in detailed research with small numbers of people. The most abstract version of the two-step approach, expressed in Carling’s (2002) aspiration/ability model is based in the assumption that each of the three concepts (migration, aspiration, ability) can take the value of 0 or 1 in a simple equation. This equation neatly highlights how both aspiration and ability are required for migration to occur. At this very simplest, this approach has much in common with traditional neoclassical analysis of migration decision making in which an individual was also imagined as going through two steps: 1. regularly scanning the universe of possible destinations for information about salaries and 2. Comparing those salaries to current income. Where salaries were higher elsewhere people migrated to those locations (Borjas 1989). The fact that real world migration patterns were nothing like this model would suggest they should be was explained by the idea that most people were not ‘economic’ but ‘satisficer’.

At its simplest, the two step approach is open to similar critique. More qualitative research has the flexibility to avoid the same degree of abstraction and take account of the greater complexity. The motivation for migration inevitably makes a difference and someone fleeing individualised persecution, someone looking for work and someone keen to join family members living elsewhere will all have different thresholds that must be crossed before migration actually takes place. Aspiration is similarly varied. The desire to leave somewhere is not necessarily the same as an interest in moving to a particular place. Mata-Codesal’s point that people do not aspire to migration under any circumstances but only in particular contexts captures this potential complexity. Finally, ability is also much more of
a spectrum. Ability is not evenly distributed - potential migrants with close family or friends in one
particular location may find it easier to get to those destinations. Nor does ability have to be absolute
for migration to take place. Van Hear’s (2006) article ‘I went as far as my money would take me’
highlights the flexibility of ability in this context which is more than an either/or decision.

Can the two-step approach support embellishment without collapsing?

The two-step approach already covers a significant variety of analysis, although the common factor
is the heuristic separation of aspiration from ability to migrate. My own work on this is mostly
concerned with refugee movement and to capture the element of forced migration present there we
added a further consideration of ‘need’ (Black and Collyer 2014). The aim of this was to develop a
heuristic analysis of ‘trapped populations’ who were in a position where they needed to migrate even
if they didn’t aspire to – and many had not desire to migrate at all until it was forced on them. This
embellishment worked, in that it offered clarification of the central concept we were investigating,
though only in a certain context; it retained the central idea of the original while adapting it in ways
that extended it to the realm of forced migration. Beyond this simplified heuristic approach the idea
of ‘need’ is just as problematic as ‘aspiration’ and ‘ability’ in that it cannot be considered as an
absolute. Although measuring the need to migrate as 0 or 1 is exactly what systems of refugee status
determination set out to do, so it is certainly not a worthless simplification.

This approach is only really of use in large n surveys. It’s impact on more qualitative analysis
is much less apparent. In an attempt to bridge this gap in related recent work we developed these
ideas further. Using Q method, we were keen to explain the origins of migration. But aspiration and
ability were replaced by two different steps: attitude to the place where people were currently living
and self-efficacy, or the expectation that they will be able to influence their own lives. Q method sets
out to combine elements of quantitative and qualitative research. Individuals are asked to rank a range
of qualitative statements on a grid that forces a particular distribution of answers, so that they can be
analysed quantitatively to produce groups with comparable attitude scores. The research took place
in four cities. We then identified at least three groups of opinions in each location:

1. Those who felt that the place was improving and weren’t interested in migration
2. Those who felt that the place wasn’t improving but thought that they could get away relatively
easily when the time came.
3. Those who felt that the place wasn’t improving and thought that they would be unable to
move, despite their objective need to do so.

This method is still recognisably drawing on the two-step approach. Yet it is still based on a quantitative
form of analysis and any attempt to go in a more ethnographic direction again runs into the difficulties
of over-simplification.
Does the two-step approach reflect a broader truth?

Like the two step dance form, enduring value cannot only be explaining by issues around simplification or tolerance of adaptation but also requires a sense that this is right, it works, it helps explain things. There is something appealingly neat about collapsing migration decisions into two discrete stages which can then be investigated separately. At this relatively advanced stage of abstraction, the two step approach proves to be extremely valuable. Yet in methodological approaches freed from the constraints of numerical quantification it is possible to go into much more detail. The approach is focused at migration aspirations but it seems as if migration is only part of what needs to be explained.

Like many young people around the world, the undergraduates that I teach at the University of Sussex are enthusiastic to travel and gain new experiences. Undergraduates that I have taught in Morocco or Sri Lanka have similar aspirations but much less opportunity to fulfil them. Yet these aspirations do not concern migration in a strict sense – many have no desire to move abroad permanently or even long term, but to experience other countries and then come back. This pattern of movement is much more about mobility than about migration. Mata-Codesal’s analysis highlights how any definition of migration cannot be separated from the age, gender, ethnicity, legal status and other power related attributes.

Mata-Codesal goes further than this, highlighting how the aspirations are not for migration or even mobility but really for a ‘good life’ which may be achieved through migration or in other ways. Many of the residents included in our Q analysis considered the places they were living to be improving – for them migration (or mobility) was less urgent as they expected to have greater access to the good life that they aspired to without moving anywhere. This development of the two-stage process reflects a broader, more complex reality, although the focus on the ‘good life’ rather than migration makes any attempt at abstraction even more problematic and is only real compatible with much more qualitative approaches.

Conclusion

The two-step approach has developed an enthusiastic following and wide usage for a good reason. It is appealing to separate migration decision making into the two distinct processes. This is useful in certain contexts, particularly large surveys where in-depth discussions are not possible. But it is not so necessary in much detailed qualitative work. It’s important to recognise the heuristic value of the approach at the same time as pushing it into more ethnographic approaches which may involve testing it to destruction. In this sense, it does not fully meet the two-step dance tests. To return to the dance metaphor with which I began, the two step approach in migration is perhaps more akin to the popular but far from universal conga – best left to large groups of people.
References


Van Hear, N., 2006. ‘I went as far as my money would take me’: conflict, forced migration and class. *Forced migration and global processes: A view from forced migration studies*, pp.125-158.
3 Hope and uncertainty in im(mobility)
Objective of the session

Two factors – hope and uncertainty – remain intangible but often underline migration as they may shape how people assess their future and expectations. These under-explored factors may offer novel insights that could explain migration in wealthy countries as well as the decisions to stay of many people in developing countries.

Thematic framework – advantages and challenges

Hope has materialised as a concept in (forced) migration since the beginning of the 2000s, mostly in anthropology, in parallel with debates about hope in social theory (e.g. Hage 2003; Harvey 2000; Rorty 1998, 1999; Zournazi 2003) and an “emotional turn” in migration studies (Bondi et al. 2007; Boccagni and Baldassar 2015). Hope is characterised by simultaneous potentiality and uncertainty: To allow the articulation of any hopes for different futures always involve various degrees of uncertainty. The willingness to act on hope might depend on the assessment of uncertainty but also on the extent to which uncertainty is acceptable for an individual. Migration trajectories include many layers of hope: Hope is required to instigate a first journey beyond one’s local borders; hope is maintained to endure periods of immobility; it helps to create opportunities in places where possibilities for livelihoods are limited; and it might keep migrants “stuck” in their trajectories, unable to reach an intended destination and unable to return (Kleist and Jansen 2016). However, people might also choose to stay and to wait out the crisis rather than to leave (Hage 2009). For some, the preference to stay may also reflect despair or the absence of hope, a lack of imagined alternatives and negative perceptions about the migration process and life elsewhere (Schewel 2019).

The advantages of looking into hope and uncertainty in migration are multiple. First of all, a degree of uncertainty is always part of migratory processes: There is imperfect knowledge about current conditions both in places of origin and in possible destinations as well as the unpredictability of the future (Williams and Baláž 2012). Especially, conflict-induced displacement, transit, and refugeeeness create particular types of uncertainty (Horst and Grabska 2015). Uncertainty can be met with despair or hope and can have different outcomes for mobility. Second, emotions and hope are an integral part of the life experiences of migrants and their mobility choices, yet they are often overlooked when analysing mobility choices and migration drivers. Economic and political analyses of migration tend to downplay emotional factors. A focus on hope and uncertainty can thus potentially highlight the entanglement of non-economic and economic motivations which influence mobility patterns. Hope can also be a useful category for taking on a dynamic perspective on migratory choices: As people
move away from home or between new homes, hope and uncertainty – and the attachment to home – are on the move.

As an example, my research on mobility aspirations and mobility choices of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Lebanon, for example, shows that economic and political motives are intimately linked to emotional ones – especially hope – when considering to return, stay or move on. Many Syrians originally stayed put in Syria because they hoped that political change might come at some point. Hoping to return to Syria on the long run, on the other hand, motivated Syrians to stay in neighbouring countries in order to remain close to their home country. However, losing societal hope and holding dark imaginations about the future are part of the picture why Syrian refugees have adapted their return aspirations over time. In a protracted refugee situation, a large part of respondents lost hope that returning will be possible under safe conditions and hold pessimistic imaginations about a future Syria under al-Assad, particularly in Turkey.

While a focus on hope and uncertainty presents some clear advantages, in practice, multiple challenges and open questions accompany the adoption of such an approach. First of all, hope is a slippery concept to think with and about. Hope can relate to a social category produced and distributed by the state (Hage 2003) as well as an emotion (Boccagni and Baldassar 2015). Governments use hope (and its absence) as a discursive tool in political discourse, which might be distinct from how individuals feel and perceive hope (Arnall and Kothari 2015). We can also distinguish between “individual hope” for one’s own life and “collective” or “societal hope” for the society or world we live in. Research has to reflect on how these notions are linked to each other. Second, it is unclear when and under which circumstances hope gets translated into actual social practices and which consequences this has for mobility choices. Third, hope in migration studies has mostly emerged as a research perspective in anthropology and ethnographic studies. However, hope also entails ‘cognitive’ dimensions (Mar 2005). Migration research could learn from other disciplines in the social sciences and cognitive sciences to better understand hope as a factor for (im)mobility. Fourth, hope and uncertainty are neither spatially nor temporally consistent over time but are rather non-linear, multidirectional perceptions of time and temporality. Hope can, for example, be located in a distant future but can have concrete consequences for the present. How migrants and non-migrants think about the past might also change their hopes for the present and the future.

Specific questions

- What can we learn from other disciplines? How have hope and uncertainty been studied in psychology and economics? How to measure hope? Who has the capacity to hope?
- When and under which circumstances is hope translated into actual social practice?
- How are “individual hope” and “societal hope” linked to each other? What is the difference between “individual hope” and “aspiration”?
- What does a long-term perspective teach us about hope? Are there critical moments or conjunctures of uncertainty when hope is lost or gained? Which individual variables affect
(non-) migrants’ hopes, which contextual factors and macro-level conditions?

- How have hope and uncertainty been conceptualised and operationalised in existing migration studies?

References


“Hope is Cut” is the title of a book by Daniel Mains, about young and unemployed men in an Ethiopian town. In this book he convincingly shows how young men who have failed to finish their education believe that this is the reason that they are not able to realize their ambitions and achieve what is in general called “a good life” (Appadurai 2004, 2013). The discourse that education leads to development, both on an individual and a national level, is widespread in Ethiopia, as Kerilyn Schewel has also shown in the dissertation that she defended yesterday. The Ethiopian government has put great efforts in the expansion of the educational sector, building schools and universities all over the country, and educational enrolment has increased for both boys and girls. Yet, the quality of education remains low, and more importantly, the labour market has not kept up with the population growth with the result that young and educated people have difficulties finding jobs. The situation in Ethiopia is comparable to those in many other countries in the Global South where a so-called “youth bulge” prevents young people from realizing their ambitions in life. In the past decade many studies have focused on what is generally called “a youth crisis” in which young people, instead of being actively shaping their lives and futures (Bucholtz 2000) are “being stuck” (Hansen 2005) and “waiting” (Mains 2007; Honwana 2012; Grabska forthcoming). For many young people, including the young men in Mains’ study, migration, and in particular migration abroad, seems the only option to realize their aspirations and achieve “a good life”.

Most studies about young people’s migration aspirations focus on men, and also the concepts of waiting and being stuck have been mainly applied to men. Gender plays an important role in the study of migration and migration aspirations, yet it does not get the attention it deserves (Grabska forthcoming). While in many countries the ideology of the male breadwinner dominates, with men being expected to provide for their families as husbands, fathers and brothers, in the past few decades a shift has occurred, with an increasing number of women migrating to provide for their families back home. This so-called feminization of migration has received ample attention of scholars. Women migrate, for example, to work in the service and caretaking sector, in garment industries and manufacturing, and to become sex workers. The fact that women are not waiting but actively search for ways to earn an income, even when it means that they have to leave their families behind, cross borders illegally and take up work that has a low social status and is often stigmatized and marginalized, points to clear gender differences (see Conlon 2011; Grabska forthcoming). Women seem to wait less; they do not have the time and possibility to wait and sit still, hoping that a change will come. As Di Nunzio (2019, 15) rightly states: “those who wait are often those who can wait”. In addition, gender and age are important intersections explaining why young women, and in particular young and unmarried women, are actively looking for ways to improve their own lives and those of
their families. Research has shown that young and unmarried women often sacrifice themselves and migrate to help their parents by sending back remittances and in doing so also financially support the education of their male siblings (Grabska et al 2019; Fernandez 2019). Yet, this does not mean that women cannot be stuck and have lost all hope, as I will argue in the next part of this paper.

Between 2014-2015 we carried out research among adolescent girls and young women in Addis Ababa, who had migrated from rural areas to the city for a variety of reasons. This study was part of a larger project that looked into the motivations and experiences of adolescent girls that migrated internally and internationally in Bangladesh, Sudan and Ethiopia. The study in Ethiopia focused on domestic workers and sex workers and girls who had migrated to the Middle East when they were under 18 years old. None of the girls had finished her education, and all of them were frustrated about that. Similar to the young men in Mains’ study they thought that education would have helped them change their lives and those of their families. They were working as domestics and sex workers, and thus accepting so-called unskilled and low-status jobs at the margins of Ethiopian society. Similar to the men in Addis Ababa who Marco Di Nunzio studied they were not so much looking for “a good life”, but for “a better life”. And, as Di Nunzio states, “if you want to get that “better life” (…) you cannot stay still, waiting for it to appear. You must act or, as they (the men in his study, MdR) put it, “move around” (2019, 15). The fact that the men in Di Nunzio’s study had to act and could not sit still and wait is linked to their position in Ethiopian society, and in particular the fact that they were coming from the lower social classes and had no family or social network that could provide for them. Gender, age and class were thus intersecting and inspiring their continuous moving around trying to find ways to achieve “a better life”. This was also the case with the young women in our study, yet the difference with Di Nunzio’s study was that the men’s “moving around” was not a spatial move, while our research participants had migrated physically, from their places of origin to Addis Ababa or even to the Middle East. This spatial move intersected with transitions that were taken place in the particular phase of their life as adolescents, such as those related to education, work, marriage and having children (see Grabska et al 2019).

Age plays an important role in the phrase “hope is cut”, as used by Mains (2012). His study is about young men who were in their twenties and early thirties. Adolescents, being in a phase of their life characterized by physical, biological and social change, are less likely to say that their hope is cut. Even when they have not been able to finish their education, they often hope that life will improve and that they will be able to realize their dreams. Adolescents are in most cases still full of hope. In our research we found that most girls had been very hopeful and optimistic about their migration to the city, but that these hopes soon disappeared after arrival. Domestic workers were confronted with a heavy workload, isolation and in some cases abuse and exploitation, and sometimes ran away and took up other jobs, such as sex work. Those who came to the city without a clear plan also often entered sex work as they were under 18 years and lacked Identity cards, with which they could take up other types of paid labour in the formal labour market. Domestic work and sex work are both occupations that are not covered by the labour law, with the result that there are no entry requirements such as a minimum
age. While this can be seen as an advantage for those seeking employment, it also means that there is no legal protection, which increases the chances of abuse and exploitation. In our interviews with adolescent domestic workers the hope to achieve “a good life” was still present, but girls that were engaged in sex work were disappointed and frustrated and some had lost all hope in a better life. In some cases this led to despair, and a number of girls cried during the interviews, not knowing how to leave sex work and build up a life with what they considered “decent” work. They had often also lost hope to get married, which is generally seen as the main step towards full adulthood, because they were doing sex work, which is stigmatized and marginalized in Ethiopia. They prioritized economic independence, but this was hard to achieve in view of their occupational histories.

My colleague Katarzyna Grabska carried out research among young Eritrean and Ethiopian women in Sudan as part of the project on adolescent girls’ migration. Some of the Ethiopian women she interviewed felt stuck because they had hoped to make money and return to Ethiopia, but making money was much more difficult than they had expected. Eritrean women were frustrated because their initial plans to move on from Sudan to Europe had not be realized. They felt they were “waiting” and “losing time” (Grabska forthcoming). Also here gender and age play an important role. For both Ethiopian and Eritrean women it is important to marry and have children on time. Some Eritrean women became very frustrated and depressed because they were not able to move ahead quickly, and could not make long-term plans and invest in making a home (see Grabska et al 2019). Some of them had planned to stay only for a short time in Khartoum but felt forced to extend their stay and first help their brothers to migrate on to Europe before undertaking the journey themselves. Also Ethiopian girls often sacrificed themselves and financed the education of their male siblings, while they lost out on education and marriage. In a forthcoming article Grabska argues that young Eritrean women in Sudan “transform the notion of ‘female’ transitions into adulthood by circumventing waithood in the context of migration”. The young women that she interviewed were unable to attain the status of wife and mother, and therefore felt they were ‘wasting time’, but the fact that they were living on their own, without their parents or other family members, and were economically independent, they were producing alternative and autonomous pathways of transition. In doing so they were gaining greater autonomy and circumventing dominant gender norms.

While Eritrean migrant girls in Khartoum were often desperate and losing all hope to move on and improve their lives, being stuck in transit, their situation can still be considered better than those who have not been able to migrate at all. Immobility is receiving more attention in migration studies (see Schewel 2019), yet the focus is still too much on who can move and who cannot. What about situations in which most people are unable to leave, and are totally stuck, because of war and conflict? This is the situation in Yemen, a country that is very dear to me and that is already more than 4,5 years involved in a full-fledged war. For many Yemenis “hope is cut”, as they have lost all hope in peace and are unable to leave for a variety of reasons. For me, as a scholar of Yemen, doing research in Ethiopia was a conscious choice as it allowed me to do fieldwork, yet I increasingly feel the need to continue doing research on Yemen. One of the very few things that inspires me is the fact that
there are also Yemenis, both in and outside of Yemen, who do not give up hope and continue to ask attention for the situation in their country and organize themselves to stop the war. It is these Yemenis that I hope to work with in the nearby future.

References


Collective hope in ‘dark times’. Refugee political agency influencing migration trajectories

Cindy Horst

The role of ‘hope’ in times of war and oppression

Horrific acts of violence and their consequences take centre stage in endeavours to understand the societal impacts of war. The precariousness that conflict and displacement create, reconfigures societies in abrupt, dramatic, and contradictory ways (Grabska 2014, Lubkemann 2008, Vigh 2008) and thus, the experience of uncertainty increases drastically (Butler 2004). Such permanent risk and uncertainty are existential conditions, that is, fundamental experiential realms of human existence (Bauman 2007). However, the experience of violence, the need to take risks in times of war, as well as the speed and unpredictability of unfolding events, create an experience of radical uncertainty that is unique to societies at war and to the refugee experience (Horst & Grabska 2015). Social hierarchies may be reversed or temporarily dissolved, continuity of tradition may become uncertain, and future outcomes once taken for granted may be thrown into doubt (Horvath et al. 2009).

In the context of war and violent conflict, the need to act is often urgent, but action can be difficult because of a dearth of information and the extreme unpredictability of the future. Yet it is exactly in this uncertainty that the potential for innovation, creativity and societal transformation exists (Horst & Grabska 2015; Horst 2019). While the changing nature of things can lead some to desire to hold on to the familiar and resist transformation, it also creates space for negotiation and opportunities to push for change by those who do not conform to what is considered the norm (Grabska & Fanjoy 2015). Arendt’s (1943) figure of the refugee as ‘vanguard’, as ‘conscious pariah’ bravely leading the way toward new developments and ideas, helps us to theorize the creative potential of radical uncertainty in new ways (Salih 2013; Horst & Lysaker 2019). Hope plays a central role in this process.

Within studies of war and suffering, future-oriented moral and political action is rarely theorized even though it is present in people’s everyday reality during and after war (Horst 2019). During and after atrocities, some individuals take care of and protect others, often at great personal risk. Others are keen to contribute to a vision of a collective future that is fundamentally different from the here and now, and that builds on hope and a sense of individual responsibility to work towards a better society. The existential shock of witnessing abuses of human dignity and human rights, as well as the loss of citizenship rights and the protection of the state, can motivate human beings to become

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1 This text includes text from Horst and Lysaker (2019), and insights and data from the TRANSFORM project and work within the Centre on Culture and Violent Conflict. It also draws on the INSPIRE project, developed with Katarzyna Grabska (International Institute of Social Studies).
political actors. These individual experiences of shock and loss cannot merely be understood in terms of existential uncertainty and vulnerability; they also function as a potential call to act (Gilson 2013: 135; Nässtrøm 2014; Beltrán 2009). In Arendt’s political thought after the Holocaust, we find the same dynamic between vulnerability and potentiality, or ‘darkness’ and ‘illumination’, in Arendt’s words (Arendt 1968).

In Arendt’s view, humans are free to act and interact politically, and in this way, to instigate new beginnings (Arendt 2005). Their doing so, especially in ‘dark times’, can be understood in terms of bringing hope into the world. These insights are relevant for recent work in anthropology, which explores experiential realities of time, change and hope in cultural context (Kleist & Jansen 2016, Miyazaki 2004). These studies focus on the future-orientedness of acts and the importance of visions that go beyond what is presently given in people’s lives (Robbins 2013). We need to remind ourselves that such hopes and visions do not merely pertain to the individual and her/his dear ones, but in fact are often based on visions of a collective future. In times of war and violent oppression, what motivates people often goes beyond individual hopes and builds on imaginings of alternative ways of coexisting. For those who feel a sense of responsibility to strive or fight for this alternative future, migration can be vital, as I will illustrate through extracts from a life history interview with a Syrian artist.

‘Where can I contribute?’ Migration decisions of a refugee artist

Artists play a central role in periods of uncertainty and openness, both as commentators of events and as inspirators for change. Art can be part of co-creating images of an alternative future by forming a truly public space of engagement; producing civic conscience through open debate about models of cultural and social reconstruction (Arsenijevic 2010). Making art is a physical process of imagining and shaping possibility and in this way offering both a commentary on the past and the present, as well as acting and projecting change for the future. Artists are also often those at the forefront of challenging the status quo. I introduce the story of Diala Brisly, a Syrian artist currently living in Europe. Throughout her story, the importance of contributing through her art shines through, and she describes how the different steps in her migration trajectory partly were determined by this drive.

I started working in art in 2001 as an animator in a company. Then in 2005, I decided to be a freelancer because I wanted to take different kind of projects, which really helped me a lot to practice different kinds of art in general. Then when the Syrian uprising started in 2011, I always felt like what I’m doing, [...] is not satisfying for me. Because I wasn’t working on interesting topics, let’s say. Especially in Syria, you can’t really, you can’t really express much by your art or whatever, because of the dictatorship that we have.

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2 The ideas in this paragraph are copied from Horst and Lysaker (2019), where the work on Arendt was contributed by Prof. Odin Lysaker (University of Agder).
3 This story has been shared with the permission of the artist herself. Her work can be found [here](#).
I felt like, maybe without even knowing, [art] was my escape from all this mess in my life since I was a teenager. It made me feel really relaxed to do art. I think it started this way. But then when I started doing this as a career, I became very passionate to learn. Then learning wasn’t enough for me. I wanted to give meaning to my art. But it was really hard to express other things, because there are many things that we are not allowed to talk about in Syria. So the revolution helped me a lot, and gave me a big boost to do a lot of things that are meaningful. I wanted to talk about everything that we weren’t allowed to talk about before. When I realized that art could really help, it’s not just a picture on the wall, I wanted to discover more about this.

Once I was talking to someone who was a really young man in FSA, Free Syrian Army. He told me: “Yes, your art is nice and beautiful, but do you think it will change anything in our situation or bring down Assad? This is not going to happen”. I like challenges. My life is based on challenges anyway. When people they tell me: “Do this”, I do the opposite. […] I don’t like to know that this is impossible. It drives me crazy. So when he said that, I started to try to find a more useful way to create my art, and give it a bigger role than just expressing what is happening.

So when the Syrian uprising started, that was a very big kick for my art, and for many other people as well; other artists and journalists, writers, musicians. In 2012 I did my first art to express what is happening in Syria. It was coming from frustration. I wanted to say anything that could really express what is going on. Then, because we didn’t really have journalism, we had alternative journalism, some journalists started sharing my artwork to support their reports. So that encouraged me more to do art, and I had a good impact. I just started because I was really angry, but then I felt it was really, very, very... It’s stronger to express it through art because people pay more attention to this. So that literally encouraged me to do more and more.

But in 2013, I felt like we are living in a waiting room, and everything was going backwards. We didn’t really achieve anything by this activism and this revolution. It became really dangerous to stay. So I moved to Istanbul. And I thought from there, I could really meet other activists and we could work on things maybe from outside. We tried to meet and organize, protests and do things. But then I felt like we are doing these things just to feel good about ourselves. I felt like we are not really achieving anything. We just don’t want to forget what is happening.

I noticed how many kids, they are now displaced, and they had to skip school, and they are really the part of the Syrian people who pay the heaviest price for this. And I was really depressed in Istanbul that I can’t do anything from there. I didn’t want to go back to Syria, because I know if I am there, I’m not going to do any better. And Syria doesn’t need me to be there, or to get arrested there, or die there. It’s not the point. So I decided to move to Lebanon. Because people in refugee camps there, they need everything. I think Syrian refugees in Lebanon, they have the toughest circumstances compared to other refugees around. So I decided to move there and to work with kids.

My life started becoming better in Turkey, I started to have a stable life. But I don’t know, I
thought it’s better to go to Lebanon to try to help there. Maybe it’s crazy. But I don’t regret it. I feel like I did the right thing because it kept me closer to the Syrian situation and more involved with what is happening. Which is really very important for me. It was my priority. But, for some reason, it was really good for my career as well, which is something I didn’t expect. I just wanted to help in a way, and just survive with my living. But I don’t know, it helped me a lot and I got really a good exposure and recognition.

In conclusion: (re-)introducing political agency in migration theory

In this short research note, my aim has been to draw attention to the political aspects of migration choices, and the need to recognize particular kinds of migrants as political actors with hopes and visions that operate on the collective and not just individual level. Diala’s reflections provide just one example of how refugees express their visions for the future and their own responsibility for contributing to working towards such societal visions, as well as the influence this responsibility can have on migration trajectories. Diala’s story is coloured by her own position in society as a single young woman, and there are of course many unique traits to her life history and personality. I am certainly not arguing that all refugees are political agents whose migration trajectories are determined by their drive to contribute to their community or society. However, with this note I do want to point to the fact that migration studies overlooks an important driver of migration if it just focuses on individual hopes and dreams, as if these are not intrinsically connected to collective hopes and visions of an alternative future; especially in contexts of war and violent oppression.

In a recently published article with Odin Lysaker, we explore Arendt’s statement that ‘[r]efugees driven from country to country represent the vanguard of their peoples’ (Arendt 1943: 274; Lysaker 2015). A vanguard is a group of people leading the way toward new developments or ideas; it means to be in the front, or at the frontier, of something or someone, and is etymologically linked to the term ‘avant-garde’ (Heuer 2007). Refugees as vanguard can ‘gain a new standing vis-à-vis contemporary democratic states’, which implies that ‘[r]ather than being passive victims of a politics of exclusion they become political agents in their own right, capable of bringing something into being which did not exist before’ (Nässtrøm 2014: 550). This perspective may help to renew the migration debate in interesting ways, building not only on philosophy but also on the arts and the humanities more widely. Approaches from within the arts and humanities may enable us to broaden the ways we understand migrant agency to include hopes not just for the individual but for the collective she or he is part of.

References


A group of women tosses food to irregular migrants riding a cargo train in Mexico. As they see the train pass by their town, they bless them and HOPE they will be safe on the journey. The same migrants who received the food ‘hope’ they will be able to make it to the United States. Back home, migrants’ families ‘hope’ they will be safe and ready to find work abroad. Migrants die crossing the Sonoran Desert, pictures, prayer cards, and phone numbers often appear among their few possessions as reminders of the ‘hopes’ they had. A small forensic office in Pima County, Arizona, receives remains of people –mostly migrants– found in the desert. They work thoroughly and tirelessly in the ‘hope’ of providing some closure to families that never heard back from family members that embarked on a migration journey (Vogt 2012; Brigden 2013; Mainwaring and Brigden 2016a; Solano 2017; Olayo-Méndez, Haymes, and Vidal de Haymes 2014).

These situations, coming out of fieldwork in Mexico and the United States, point to hope as an emotion, an experience, or need. At the same time, ‘hope’ is experienced at distinct levels. One than corresponds to the individual or particular experiences of people part of a migration process and another that seems to be collective or societal that responds to the same process. At the same time, hope appears to be dynamic as manifested or accompanied by actions within the tension between hope and despair.

To adequately comment on the role of hope in migration, it is necessary to establish a basic conceptual framework starting with a couple of working definitions of hope:

Ernst Bloch, a German Philosopher and maybe the most well-known theorist of hope, says that ‘hope is the most human of all mental feelings and it constitutes the antithesis to despair, fear, and anxiety…he approaches ‘hope’ as an anticipatory consciousness towards the ‘not-yet-become’. For him,

Hope goes out of itself, makes people broad instead of confining them, cannot know nearly enough of what it is that makes them inwardly aimed, of what may be allied to them outwardly. The work of this emotion requires people who throw themselves actively into what is becoming, to which they belong … The work against anxiety about life and the machinations of fear … and it looks in the world itself for what can help the world.

(Bloch 1986: 11)

Another perspective comes from Richard Rorty, an American philosopher, who emphasized that hope is not based on any foundations—such as knowledge about probabilities—instead, it is an attitude
by which interlocutors express both their commitment to certain forms of future interaction and their belief in its possibility [this future will be different and better from the present situation] (Rorty 1999: 120).

Thus, hope is profoundly human, and despite of its focus on the future, it is radically present. It requires engagement from the individual and a belief that the future could be different from the current situation. Hope operates in a dynamic way where it is often in tension with despair, fear, and anxiety (which may be manifestations of uncertainty).

The two research notes shared for this panel challenge us to consider more closely three ideas related to hope: (1) The need to see hope in context; (2) hope in practice (including the possibility of losing all hope); and (3) the collective aspects of hope.

**Hope in context**

While Hope often is analyzed in contexts of uncertainty, its analysis requires considering different vantage points of view. It is one kind of hope or ‘lack thereof’ the one experienced by the Ethiopian and Eritrean adolescents and young women and another type of hope the one experienced by the researcher (even if she briefly appears in the research notes). It is also a different kind of hope the one experienced by Amani Jabban, a Syrian artist who moves to Lebanon, in her search for making a meaningful contribution through art the situation in Syria.

Even in cases where there is one particular pattern of migration, different actors may have different experiences and visions of hope. Humanitarian workers at migrant shelters in Mexico experience a kind of hope as migrants pass through various towns through the country, and their hope is different than the one that a migrant in transit may experience (Solano 2017; Kleist and Thorsen 2017). The evidence from research leads us to consider that also positionality matters in the analysis of hope in contexts of migration. The position of migrants, humanitarian workers, artists, or even sex or domestic workers structure and color the experience of hope.

Furthermore, while considering hope in contraposition to (un)certainty, analysis particular contexts provide insight into the intensity of the situation and the role hope plays in it. Uncertainty may be different in settings of extreme violence (war or social disturbances), irregular transit, immobility, protracted situations, or detention. After all, hope is not static. It may change, be transformed, weakened, or strengthened. This perspective emphasizes the temporality and elasticity of hope, which can only be grasped and analyzed in context (Kleist and Thorsen 2017).

**Hope in practice (the manifestations of hope)**

While hope projects into the future, it necessarily has a certain impact in the present. The visualization of the future is never disconnected from the present. The desire or trust for it to happen leads people to wait, to make decisions, to survive, to be creative, to reinvent themselves, to cope, to transform
It is common knowledge of how migrants describe their visions of the future: “I want to arrive and work, but if the authorities capture me... I do not have any other option ... I have to figure out how to move to make my dream reality,” said José, a Honduran migrant along the migrant trails in Mexico. It is also common to identify hope in migrants’ coping strategies “[Talking about the sadness of leaving family] ... we control ourselves and [go] with God. He is the one that helps us in the future. You never know what will happen. But, you trust that everything will be OK and continue,” said Rodrigo a Guatemalan migrant interviewed in Mexico.

Migrants’ tenacity and creativity to cope with the journey’s hardships attest to the practicalities of hope. However, it is not only in the migrants’ experiences of the journey that we see the practicalities of hope. The support of many local humanitarian actors as first responders to the distress of many migrants is also a manifestation of hope (Mainwaring and Brigden 2016b; Mainwaring and Brigden 2016a; Solano 2017).

Marina de Regt highlights how women, in particular young and unmarried women, actively look for ways to improve their lives and those of their families. Research has shown that women self-sacrifice for the sake of their parents, siblings, and their families (see research note). At the same time, women tend to be more resourceful when coping with precarity (Edin, Lein, and Young Conrad 1997; de la Rocha 1994). de Regt places an interesting inquiry when stating that some of the young women engaged in sex work were ‘losing hope’ because they felt stuck and without a future. These findings lead to questioning if ‘hope’ can be lost at all. It follows, if a vision of the future is lost, what is left to live.

However, to what extent this interpretation of ‘lost hope’ is the researchers’ opinion. In a clinical setting or intervention, some of those expressions of despair and hopelessness are tied to depression, anxiety, or PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder). Clinically, the symptoms of these disorders cloud judgment and impair the person to move on. In the case of the migration patterns in Mexico, Doctors without Borders, as well as the United Nations, have designed mobile clinical interventions aimed to provide emotional support and psychological first aid to migrants. The approach is strength-based, meaning that it looks at emphasizing the strengths the person may have. These types of interventions allow the person to cope with reality and help them to visualize a particular future [to find hope] (Solano 2017; Olayo-Mendez 2018).

The question remains: Can hope be lost at all? Or it is that the weight of the structure and constrains diminishes the ability of the person to hope. For Bloch, “even disappointed hope wanders around agonizing, a ghost that has lost his way back to the cemetery and clings to refuted images. It does not perish through itself, but only through a new form of itself.” (Bloch 1986: 195). In other words, hope does not die but transmutes to another type of hope, even if a lesser one. Here research on migration can benefit from dialogue with more practical sciences or disciplines like
psychology, counseling, or social work (see Jordans and Ventevogel 2014), which amid distress and precariousness seek to design interventions that can provide people with tools to cope with hardship.

The collective aspects of Hope

In the beginning, when discussing Bloch’s approach to hope, I highlighted that hope makes people broad instead of confining them. In a way, hope moves outwards, beyond the individual. This idea may help us understand Amani Jabban’s restlessness and desire to do something else. To desire and envision a place and work where art could acquire another dimension beyond the esthetics. Her desire evolves and moves from different locations until she finds herself in Lebanon, working among Syrian refugees. The hope here goes beyond the individual, goes to support the collective.

Similarly, instances of local humanitarian assistance in Mexico can be seen as collective aspects of hope. Migrant shelters (casas de migrantes) assist migrants hoping to reduce their vulnerability and to be a resource along the way. Their presence and their creativity to provide for those in need to confirm Bloch’s idea that hope makes people broader. From this, we can even infer how political and institutional agency may emerge. This type of hope seeks the collective good and not only the individual (Calderon Chelius 2016).

In this response to the theme of “Hope and Uncertainty in (im)mobility”, three things remain: First, identifying the biases in the frameworks of analysis of hope. Second, considering fields of inquiry that can enhance our analysis of hope and uncertainty in (im)mobility. Third, understanding the sources of hope.

First, it appears to be a bias in the analyzes of hope since many studies on hope come from western perspectives, dialogue with western philosophers, or base their analysis on western psychological approaches (see Eliott and Olver 2002). Understanding hope this way, colors our inquiries of hope even if the populations we study are diverse. Thus, to broaden our understanding of hope there is a need to consider African, Middle Eastern, Pacific-Asian, Latin American perspectives, etcetera. Here, we need to consider that some of these perspectives may come from wisdom or religious literature, which may not have the academic rigor or structure of western thought but which value is not lesser.

Second, from Bloch’s idea that hope is one of the most human experiences, emerges the need to recognize that hope as a framework of analysis transcends the field of migration. Hope may appear and could be analyzed in many other contexts and experiences not necessarily related to mobility contexts. Notwithstanding our theoretical frameworks on hope, uncertainty and (im)mobility could benefit from dialogues with Philosophy, Psychology, Theology/Religion, Literature and the arts in general, Social Work and even other helping disciplines.

Finally, rather than imposing a theoretical framework or belief system to explain what the sources of hope, it is critical that researchers allow (im)mobile people define and describe where
their hope or lack there off comes from. This approach could not only help us investigating hope, but also open the door to considering the role of religion, spirituality, and belief systems. Allowing our interlocutors to lead the exploration of hope could potentially provide insights into the ways in hope changes, diminishes, or strengthens and what are the factors that influence these changes.

Note on Gender and other populations

E. G. Ravenstein, in his work The Laws of Migration, states that women were more migratory than men, at least over short distances (Ravenstein 1885: 196–198; 199). Surprisingly, however, few scholars subsequently tested his gendered laws of migration. Despite of the advances in considering gender in the analysis of migration (see Donato et al. 2006; Lutz 2010), Marina de Regt rightfully brings the emphasis on male migration to our attention. Here, I push the argument even further on the need to consider those populations that, for different reasons, become invisible in the migratory processes or decide to stay. Attention is needed to making visible indigenous populations, people with disabilities, LGBTQI+ people, among other vulnerable populations in any of the contexts of uncertainty and (im)mobility.

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Challenges and insights of connecting macro-, meso- and micro-levels
Objective of the session

This session aims to explore the perennial difficulty of linking macro- and meso-level determinants with micro-level decisions. At specific moments in time and space people perceive a number of factors coming together to stimulate migration aspirations and decisions. What are relevant driver configurations which operate in time and space and trigger migration decisions of some people but not of many others?

Thematic focus

A terminology often used in studies of migration and migration decision-making is “migration determinants”, implying a close connection between or even deterministic causation of migration and some structural factors. However, this is misleading as it ignores human agency in the migration process (Carling & Talleraas 2016; de Haas 2011). We may therefore prefer the term contextual or external “drivers” of migration as “structural elements that enable and constrain the exercise of agency by social actors” and they work by “making certain decisions, routes or destinations more likely and bringing them within the orbit of people’s capabilities” (Van Hear et al. 2018, p.928). At the macro level, drivers are structural disparities between places (of actual and potential residence) that create a context in which migration becomes more likely. These incorporate both longstanding inequalities – such as between the global North and South – as well as cyclical or seasonal fluctuations. At the meso level, migration drivers facilitate or constrain migration. Lastly, at the meso and micro level, specific – often observable and identifiable – events or developments may trigger the decision to migrate or stay put. We may refer to this set of structural factors that have the power to affect migration decisions as ‘driver environment’. The extent to which potential migrants exercise their agency in response to this structural driver environment may reflect their individual capacities to migrate (Czaika and Reinprecht, forthcoming).

The migration literature has identified a number of fundamental dimensions of migration drivers such as economic, political, social, cultural, demographic, and ecological factors (for comprehensive reviews see e.g. Ghatak et al. 1996; Hagen-Zanker 2008; King 2012; Massey et al. 1993) their welfare and policy implications and their empirical relevance. We also develop some extensions to the theory beginning with the Harris and Todaro (HT. Based on the existence of a wide array of potential migration drivers and the reality of structural ‘opportunity gaps’, we may be puzzled why not many more people migrate to realise better income opportunities, or why not more (if not all) people living in a conflict area decide to flee, at least not at the same time, even if they could.
According to Gallup Poll, roughly 700 million people would like to migrate if they had the chance to do so. Hence, globally ‘only’ one in ten people currently want to migrate. This is a surprisingly small number given the fact that a supposedly much bigger (but unknown) number of people would have good reasons to migrate in order to realise economic, professional, political or social opportunities.

In order to improve our knowledge of migration processes more profoundly, this session aims to contribute to a clearer understanding of the fundamental role, i.e. the direction, intensity, connectivity, and repercussions, of multi-level drivers in the migration decision-making of individual and groups of migrants.

Specific questions

- What are relevant driver configurations of migration? How do migration drivers interact in time and space, and ultimately affect individual migration decision-making?
- Should we aim for a comprehensive multi-level framework of migration? How would such a framework look like?
- What can we learn from applications in other social sciences regarding the interplay of structure and agency?

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Some Preliminary Notes on Connecting Macro-, Meso- and Micro-levels in Migration Studies: A Challenge or Smoke and Mirrors

Ronald Skeldon

Introduction

The purpose of these notes is to facilitate discussion on the challenges of connecting the macro-, meso- and micro-levels in migration studies. More specifically, according to the outline for this session, to “explore the perennial difficulty of linking macro- and meso-determinants with micro-level decisions”. One can see the logic of wishing to integrate research at these various levels but the question must surely be raised whether we should seek to integrate them in the first place. At the macro-level, we are interested in aggregate human behaviour: how the movement of people impacts upon the distribution of populations, and the composition of the groups that move. These can then be related to other macro-level factors that can be associated with “driving” these aggregate flows, levels of GDP per capita, unemployment rates, and so on, but also to other individual factors that can be aggregated such as education or income. However, not everyone responds to these drivers by migrating and micro-level analyses seek to identify why some choose to move and others do not. It might be tempting to see whether meso-level analyses, which focus more on whole communities or organizations, however defined, and how their members move or stay, can act as a bridge between macro- and micro-objectives and results.

Part of this “perennial difficulty” arises from how “a migrant” and “migration” are defined across the various levels. The figure of about 3 per cent of the world’s population, or some 244 million people in 2015, defined as international migrants, has taken on a life of its own. Even once an estimate of the number of internal migrants has been added, the proportion of the world’s population that is deemed to consist of migrants rises only to around 12 per cent. Migrants are thus a “rare element” in a population, even if that proportion can vary markedly from one part of the world to another: migrants are “exceptional people” (Golden, Cameron and Balarajan 2011). These figures are useful at the most macro-of levels, the global level, to identify basic patterns and trends, but have to be used with a great deal of caution. They employ very broad spatial and temporal intervals to define a migration and they exclude many who have had prior experience of migration: the return migrant. The micro- and meso-levels of analysis employ different definitions of migration and can provide very different assessments of the role and importance of human migration and mobility in societies.

Hence, the identification of both macro-level patterns and trends and the need for more micro-

1 Based upon United Nations estimates around 2010 after estimates for the number of internal migrants were made (UNDP 2009).
or detailed information on migrant trajectories and processes are important, even if the difficulties of linking them persist. These difficulties arise as much due to methodological and disciplinary approaches as to any real difficulties to link macro- and micro-level data. These notes begin with issues around the definition of migrants and migration and end with a discussion of the existence of migration and “migrants” as meaningful concepts.

Basic definitions

We all intuitively understand what the terms, “migrant”, “to migrate” and “migration” mean. A migrant is a person who changes his or her abode from one place to another. The act of doing so is “to migrate” and the action involved is “a migration”. The United Nations organization responsible for migration, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines migration thus:

“any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.”

This is a very broad definition of migration, particularly as no time stipulation is given in the fourth point, so that anyone who is away from their habitual place of residence for just one night would appear to be included as a migrant. This is a point to which we shall return later but the definition is clear that both movements across state boundaries (international migration) and movements within states (internal migration) are included. How the latter are to be measured is, however, problematic: whether by sector, urban and rural, and by area, by administrative unit, and if so, by what level of areal unit.

Migration and levels

The volume of migration captured by any data-gathering exercise depends entirely upon the definitions adopted. For example, the volume of internal migration 1966-1971 in India captured by the 1971 population census can vary from 6.2 million through 17.7 million to 44 million depending upon the size of the spatial units employed for the measurement. The first figure includes only movements from one state to another; the mid-estimate includes this migration, plus movement from one district to another within each state; while the last measure includes both of these migrations plus all movements within each district. All are correct measures of internal migration over the period and can help to initiate the discussion of this issue of macro-, meso- and micro-levels of analysis in the field.

In the case of the internal migration in India given above, one might argue that the 6.2 million interstate migrants were macro-level, the 11.5 million intra-state but inter-district migrants were meso-level, and the remaining 26.3 million intra-district migrants were micro-level, but this would be deceptive. The intra-district migrants might be better considered to be meso-level but surely any comprehensive macro-level analysis of migration in India would consider the population movements
in all three of these spatial categories. For example, the characteristics of the migrants were different: the interstate migrants were dominated by males, by those who had higher levels of education and by urban-to-urban and rural-to-urban migration, compared to flows at the intra-district level that were dominated by women, the less-educated and by rural-to-rural movements. Thus, intervillage marriage migration dominated the movements at the local level, even if some urban-to-urban and rural-to-urban migration did exist.

Part of the “perennial difficulty” stems from the process of compiling migration data and our basic methodologies. Information on how people move, or have moved, is collected from individuals, which is then aggregated to give group patterns. These same data, depending upon their content, are then used to try to generate information on individual motivation to move. This, it will be argued, generates a disconnect that is difficult to resolve as the kinds of data required to identify patterns and processes, what could be seen as “policy-relevant” information, are very different from those required for an understanding of why specific groups, let alone individuals, move. While both types of data are equally valid, the methodologies and approaches required are different.

Methodologies and levels

Much understanding of the process of internal migration and of the characteristics of the movers can be derived from the same, macro-level data source. However, to go beyond the limited number of questions of importance to migration that are contained in the majority of censuses and large-scale surveys such as labour-force surveys, it is necessary to design micro-level survey instruments. These local surveys can generate a much richer source of data about migrants, their origins and trajectories of movement using specially trained interviewers, than is possible from macro-level instruments. However, questions of representativeness are always present: whether the area selected for detailed study is in any way “typical” or representative of the broader patterns of migration.

Ideally, detailed micro-studies can be designed to answer specific questions raised by the macro-level data but which cannot be answered by those macro-level data. For example, censuses and large-scale surveys collect data retrospectively: migrant status, whether individuals are migrants or not, and a number of characteristics of which education and employment are among the more important. Associations can then be made. However, all the data show in the case of education is the level of education attained by a migrant, not whether a person moved to pursue education. Hence, the micro-data at the very least should be able to elaborate on the process of the migration and not just on the characteristics of those who moved. The linking of process with pattern is much more than just a statistical exercise but will require much contextual information and local knowledge.

While micro-studies obviously have to be located in space, that need not be within a simple

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2 An issue that cannot be discussed here is that many population censuses only collect migration-related information on a sample basis. As migrants are not randomly distributed in populations, the data collected can generate spurious results upon expansion that can be only partially rectified through local knowledge or the existence of micro-surveys.
hierarchy implied in the Indian example above. If the research questions revolved around specific types of skilled migrants, such as doctors, or engineers, for example, these could be sampled nationally (even globally) so that the micro-focus is on specialized occupation. The field methodologies, however, would be different: rather than the survey being contained within a specific community or village based upon in-depth face-to-face interviews and field observations, more emphasis would be given to electronic forms of interaction through telephone, skype or email, augmented by as many personal interviews as possible among the widely-distributed participants. Archives also provide a fertile source. See, for example, a study of West African doctors in the diaspora (Patton 1996). Studies of specialist traders would be made through the study of local, regional and global spaces of interaction among peers, which might be better categorized as meso-level studies, even if they are supplemented by in-depth interviews at particular points in these spaces. Examples of such meso-level studies can be found among the essays of Tagliacozzo, Siu and Perdue (2019).

These issues apart, macro- and micro-level analysts are looking at different types of migrants. The number of international and even internal migrants caught in the type of data-gathering instruments that generate a 12 per cent estimate of migrants at the global level, are going to be very small indeed at the micro-level. These studies normally include purpose-designed surveys to capture precisely the types of migrants who would be missed by the macro-level instruments, primarily because they move within small areas or within short intervals of time. Most importantly, they can capture return and circular migration. An early example would be Chapman’s (1976) recording of every absence of 24 hours or more from villages in the Solomon Islands.

Studies such as these illustrate that societies and economies are characterized by a series of inter-locking circuits of migration and/or mobility which support and enhance the idea of “fixity” to a home area (Harms 2019). Thus, any clear dichotomy between being mobile and immobility fades: these are integrated dimensions in a single system. These circuits of trade, pilgrimage, government transfers, entertainment and services shift and expand when they come into contact with other systems through conquest, colonialism or the diffusion of capitalism, which open the door to other opportunities (see the essays in Tagliacozzo, Siu and Perdue 2019). Evidence of such mobility from several parts of the developing world is presented and reviewed in Skeldon (1990). Thus, decisions to move or not to move become virtually irrelevant because populations are already mobile, even if in various ways. Micro-studies made throughout the trajectories of movers have shown how decisions and reactions are constantly changing depending upon the shifting context in which movers find themselves and upon the opportunities being offered, or taken away (Wissink 2019). Serendipity, as much as the calculated action that might be associated with capabilities and aspirations, can be seen as an important “driver” of behaviour.

Of silos and approaches

Much of the “perennial difficulty” in linking the various levels stems as much from the different approaches adopted to study at these levels, which are to a large extent a function of disciplinary
bias. At the risk of gross overgeneralization, economists and demographers appear happier dealing with statistical approaches to pattern and processes at the macro-level, while anthropologists and sociologists are more likely to be found at the micro-level. However, this does not mean that economists are not to be found dealing with data generated from more micro-level surveys. Nevertheless, in many of these cases, the understanding of context that a command of local languages and experiences of lived realities at the local level give is so often missing. On the other hand, those with detailed local knowledge and long exposure to life at the local level seem uncomfortable to link what they reasonably assume to be non-representative micro-studies to broader contexts based on macro-level data. Hence, the disconnect between those who practise at the two levels has emerged.

The logical solution might appear to lie in meso-level approaches that can link upwards to macro-level data and downwards to the micro-level. Nevertheless, those who work at the meso-level appear to more comfortable with qualitative data and methods. An uncomfortable truth appears to be that, despite migration studies being ostensibly multi-disciplinary, communication across disciplinary boundaries is still limited with most, but particularly economics, in a silo of its own. Nevertheless, history, perhaps because it deals with events separated by time, appears capable of dealing with grand events, as well as how individuals react to them. This expertise illustrates a long tradition in the discipline of dealing with the role of “great” men and women in the context of broader currents of political, economic and social change. For a recent example in the migration field, see Gatrell (2019).

However, perhaps the largest silo is that of literature. Despite the vast number of novels that deal with the experience of migration - and parenthetically, one might add that the “novel” may have evolved out of the literature of travel, which itself covered early accounts of migrations (Adams 1983) – the impact on the more social science discipline of migration studies has been minimal. One of the few reviews of migration in literature argues that it was only relatively recently that migration had become a subject considered worthy of discussion in literary circles (Sievers 2013). This review focused more on the experiences of migrant writers and how migration is treated in literature. Equally, one might argue, it is rare to find migration scholars turning to novels for a greater understanding of human movement. One might wonder why those with questionnaires to measure the drivers of individual movements, or focus groups to elicit more general awareness, have not turned to the greatest historical and contemporary writers of the times to help them in this process.

Migration enhanced: migrants diminished

Migration clearly occurs at all levels: populations redistribute; towns and cities expand; villages depopulate; in all of which migration plays a role. Migrants, however, are more problematic. Refugees are not considered migrants by some, UNHCR, for example, and have to be considered in a separate category. Others who move have never been considered to be migrants. Tourists would fall into the definition adopted by IOM given earlier in these notes, but are not considered to be migrants, even though at over 1.2 billion arrivals in 2016, they represent the largest annual movement of people in the world. They may not be migrants but they not only provide a corridor for some who intend to engage
in longer stays but also create migration through generating employment in the hospitality sector and also by pushing local populations out of particular “hot spots”\(^3\). Nevertheless, we have seen above that micro- and meso-studies identify a wide range of movers, making migrants a highly diverse population – students, the skilled, the contract worker, the trafficked and exploited, the irregular, the entrepreneur, the trader, the service personnel, the refugee, the settler, the unaccompanied minor, the temporary visitor – that it is virtually meaningless even to attempt to consider them within a single category. Everyone moves; it is just that some move more than others, over longer distances and for longer periods of time. We are, in the words of the Scottish writer Alison Louise Kennedy, “All migrants now”\(^4\).

Migrants essentially form the population, and it makes little sense to see some as mobile and others immobile and to work out why some should choose to move and others not: we all move but, at the micro-level, how these movements evolve is as much the result of serendipity as calculated action. At the macro-level, with its much-reduced number of migrants, the “noise” of the micro-level is filtered out in the context of the “signal” of the general characteristics of regions and movers on to which rational decisions can be imposed. However, at the level of lived realities, individuals and groups are in long-standing and institutionalized circuits of mobility that may be best conceptualized through micro- and meso-level analyses through which clear differences between the mobile and the immobile erode. The “signals” of macro-level migration may be policy-relevant but the “noise” of the migrants may be the more interesting academically. While it may indeed be a case that “never the twain shall meet”, they are, nevertheless, essentially focused on the same thing, even although through two very different lenses. Some form of integration and accommodation is essential, which opens the door to the two great synthesizing disciplines of history and geography to take a lead.

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\(^3\) Tourists in the context of migration and other recent forms of mobility are discussed in Skeldon 2018.


**Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations: The Case of Eurasia Since 1500**

*Leo Lucassen*

**Introduction**

“Migrations have been part of human history from the earliest times. However, international migration has grown in volume and significance since 1945 and most particularly since the mid-1980s. Migration ranks as one of the most important factors in global change.”  

(Castles and Miller 2003: 4)

This quote from Castles and Miller’s widely used handbook summarizes the dominant perspective in migration studies among both social scientists and historians: the most significant expression of migration are people who cross national boundaries, and as such the twentieth century, and especially our own time, has witnessed the apogee of human migrations. This view, however, implicitly reproduces the entrenched conviction among many scholars in the social sciences and the humanities that human behavior, including migration and mobility, changed dramatically with the rise of “modern” society in the nineteenth century. This “mobility transition”, to use a phrase coined in the seminal 1971 paper of Wilbur Zelinsky, assumes that Europeans (and certainly people in other – less developed – continents) were overwhelmingly sedentary until the Industrial Revolution. This idea fits well with the “modernization paradigm”, as advocated by postwar functionalist social scientists and historians, mostly building on Marxian or Weberian concepts of linear human progress (Lucassen and Lucassen 2009).

With the notable exception of geographers and demographers, most scholars interested in migration have followed the state definition, using statistics on international migrations that mirror the state’s preoccupation with people who cross national borders with the intention to settle. Internal migrants, migrants who move abroad temporarily are thereby excluded from the analysis. This is closely linked to simultaneous emergence of nationalism and its obsession with ethnic (or racial) homogeneity, which has led to a myopic view of migration by European states and their offshoots elsewhere. Nation states increasingly became primarily interested in migrants from other states who are expected to settle for good and as such become the object of assimilation or integration policies. From a historical perspective, however, states, and more specifically the nation state, are not the best unit of analysis when it comes to understanding the causes and effects of migrations. Not only does a state perspective easily lead to “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003), more importantly it privileges people who cross national boundaries (international migrants) over people whose geographical mobility may be at least as important, but who remain within the confines of the state.

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1 This text is an updated summary of Lucassen & Lucassen 2017.
To sum up, in the wake of the state, most mainstream migration scholars who work on the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries have severely limited their definitions of what constitutes a migrant
and limited themselves largely to one-way (A to B) settlers, thus ignoring return migrants, temporary
migrants, circular and internal migrants. There are, however, important exceptions to this general
picture. First of all, early modernists, untouched by nation-state ideology and the focus on low-skilled
labor migrants, have produced many studies on internal, temporary, and organizational migrants
(Hoerder 2002; Bade et al. 2011). Moreover, geographers, sociologists, and family historians who
are interested in micro mobility and who take the household as their point of departure have done
groundbreaking work on other forms of migration and mobility. Their perspective, however, has had
a hard time being incorporated into mainstream migration studies.

For various reasons this self-imposed definitional limitation obstructs a better understanding
of why people who cross cultural (but not necessarily national) boundaries migrate and what the
consequences are for themselves, the people they temporarily join, and the people they might return
to. Patrick Manning’s work in particular is relevant in this respect, because he argues that cross-
community migrations are the root cause of social change (Manning 2005 and 2006; Castles et al.
2015). The basic idea is that the prolonged interaction (peaceful, but also contentious, violent, and at
times destructive) between people with different cultural backgrounds is bound to produce new ideas,
insights, and practices, and thus often leads to social change, in the broadest sense. How this process
evolves depends on power relations, status differentials, and the proneness of migrants to adapt versus
the specific institutional membership regime of receiving societies.

By applying the cross-cultural perspective to Eurasia in the past five centuries (1500-2000)
we are able to make comparisons between large territorial units, such as Western Europe, Russia,
China, and Japan. This broader and long-term perspective will offer us a very different view on
migrations from that offered by the modernization perspective and the myopic state-centered and
North Atlantic international migration definition. Secondly, and closely connected to the first point,
we will show why short-term and organizational forms of migration, too, are of crucial importance
in understanding social change. First of all, however, we need a clear and formalized definition,
typology, and quantitative method that guarantees we are measuring more or less the same thing.

The CCMR Method

The cross-cultural migration rate (CCMR) method calculates the likelihood of an individual
experiencing at least one cross-cultural migration in the course of his or her life (from a city to an
empire or continent), which we express as the proportion of the population in a certain territory. The
original formulation concentrates largely on four basic categories that encompass the major cross-
cultural movements within a given territory (T) (irrespective of scale), measured in 50-year periods
(Lucassen and Lucassen 2009, 2014a):

1) To cities (within T, generally from rural areas)
2) Colonization (moving to rural areas within T)  
3) Seasonal (within T, generally between peasant and farmer regions)  
4) Temporal Multi-Annual [TMA] (soldiers, sailors, and artisans within T).

This migration typology differentiates between four forms of migration within a chosen geographical unit of analysis: to cities (1); to the land / rural centers (colonization) (2); seasonal (3); and Temporary Multi-Annual (soldiers, sailors, and tramping artisans) (4). In order to calculate total migration rates, we also measure and include people leaving (emigration) (5) or entering (immigration) (6) that same geographical unit and who can subsequently be subdivided into one of the four core types. For a full understanding of the causes and effects of cross-cultural migration within a given area, immigration and emigration therefore have to be “unpacked”. Only then can we know how many of the immigrants or emigrants went to (or came from) cities or rural areas, and moved as soldiers, sailors, or seasonal workers. The relationships between the six categories is visualized in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Cross-cultural migration rate (CCMR) method for a given territory and time period

The CCMR method is a very crude one as it measures only the bare minimum level of cross-cultural migration and therefore does not address explicitly the fact that many people experienced multiple different types of cross-cultural migrants in their lifetime. The advantage, however, is that one can apply it at different scales, from villages and regions to continents.
Building a theoretical model

Cross Cultural Migrations (CCMs)

The CCMR method may be a good place to start for mapping the extent of circularity in general, but it also offers a starting point to study in more detail the circulation of people and ideas at lower levels of abstraction and for smaller units of analysis. In order to do this, and to understand the effect of different forms of “cross-cultural migration”, we need to go beyond merely quantifying the proportion of the population that experienced at least one cross-cultural move during their life. A first step in developing a middle-range theory in which cross-cultural migration is studied as a root cause of social change/development is to attribute “weights” to the four basic types of CCMs (to cities, colonization, seasonal, and TMA).

Migrants’ capital

As the example of organizational migrants shows, in order to predict the impact of cross-cultural migrations we should also map the characteristics of the migrants in terms of symbolic capital (status), human capital (skills), social capital (networks), cultural capital (language, religion, worldviews), and military capital (power). Migrants to cities with high levels of human capital will cause changes different from those with low skills, and the same is true for migrants with deviant ideas.

Membership regimes

The third analytical tool necessary to build a theoretical model is the notion “membership regime”, which links the CCMRs and migrants’ capital to the prevailing complex of rules, regulations, customs, and values surrounding the entry and long-term settlement of migrants in a new polity. The reason for including the opportunity structure of the receiving polity is that the impact of cross-cultural migrations depends largely on the freedom of newcomers to deploy their human and cultural capital at the receiving end in interaction with those present. The degree of openness (North et al. 2009 on ‘open access’ regimes) of the receiving society, which might be a city (migration to cities), an agricultural frontier, a plantation or labor camp (migration to land), an army, shipping company (TMA), or a commercial wage labor market (seasonal), determines to a large extent the opportunities for exchanging (and accumulating) ideas and human capital. Membership regimes are important because they determine the extensity, intensity, and equality of the interaction between migrants and the native population.

In the Figure 2 we have summarized the three analytical building blocks necessary to formulate a middle-range theory that aims at explaining the impact of cross-cultural migrations on receiving (and sending) societies in terms of social change or social development.

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2 In the end we will also have to include membership regimes at origin, because they have an impact on the various forms of capital of the migrants, as the example of the Black American GIs shows.
Eurasian comparisons

In the remainder of this paper we will apply some of these preliminary thoughts to the aggregate results recently published in a volume in which the CCMR method is used to map migration in Eurasia (Lucassen and Lucassen 2014b). A closer look at developments in Eurasia shows that comparisons in time and space at the aggregate level are the most useful for identifying broader trends and generate new questions, which then have to be tested at lower levels of abstraction. In the following figure total CCMRs for Europe, Russia, China, and Japan are visualized. They show a growing divergence from the eighteenth century, with rates in East Asia decreasing considerably and those in Europe and Russia remaining stable (see Figure 3).
As Figure 4 shows, this gap widened even further in the nineteenth century before slowly converging, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. For China, Japan, and Russia, the steep increase cannot be explained by immigration from abroad. Instead of “immigration”, which was very low in all three cases, CCMs in Asia consist predominantly of people moving to cities. In other words, whereas large parts of Europe had already become urbanized – primarily by migration – between the seventeenth (the northwest) and nineteenth centuries, the take-off in Russia and East Asia took place mainly in the twentieth century (Japan was a notable exception, with early urbanization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). A second important difference between Europe and the other three large Eurasian territories relates to colonization.
The trends over time in the different Eurasian regions tell us a number of interesting things. First, and this is in line with the general historical development, the European ratios are not only much higher than those in East Asia, at least until the mid-twentieth century, they also display different forms of cross-cultural contact. In Europe, migrants to cities and migrants as soldiers and sailors (TMA) dominate. In both cases we can speak of an intensive mixing of people from different cultural backgrounds in spaces with a high population density. Moreover, due to the generally open-access nature of cities and armies (especially in Western Europe) and the on average relatively high level of human capital of the migrants these cross-cultural migrations were characterized by multiple interactions with a high impact. It seems reasonable to assume that this caused considerable social change/development and stimulated social development: knowledge, ideas, and labor floated freely and the intense (military and otherwise) competition between cities and between states promoted economic growth and the accumulation of technological expertise. All four features of social development mentioned by Morris, especially social organization, war-making capacity, and information technology, made important advances and largely explain the widening gap in terms of military power and wealth between Western Europe and large parts of Asia.

In Russia and China, even when the total CCMR was high (as in Russia), the building blocks differed. As noted earlier, colonization had been much more important, but this type of cross-cultural migration most probably had much less of a transformative effect (see Table 1). Not only was it more
extensive than intensive, often there was little, or highly asymmetrical, interaction with the people already present in the frontier areas. The same is true for seasonal migrations, whereas people moving to cities constituted a much smaller part of the total. On top of this we need also to realize that Russian and Chinese cities were much more segregated along religious and ethnic lines, and so cross-cultural interactions in urban spaces were less frequent and intense than in Western Europe (Lucassen 2013; see also Rowe 1984: 213-15). In China this limited access to urban institutions and as a consequence higher levels of spatial and social segregation have continued during the recent revolutionary phase of mass urbanization. Due to the distinctions between rural and urban administrative units (the hukou system), rural migrants who settle in cities are to a large extent de facto excluded from urban citizenship and services (housing, welfare, including schools for their children) and channeled into the secondary (low-paid and offering no prospect of upward social mobility) tier of the labor market (Whyte 2010; Swider 2011; Zhang and Wang 2010; Shen 2014).

Conclusion

In this article we argue the need for a less state-centered definition of migration in order to understand better the relationship between cross-cultural migrations (CCMs) and social change or social development in the long run. We have therefore developed a new definition of migration that enables researchers to systematically compare CCMRs (cross-cultural migration propensities per capita) through time and space. This CCMR method is not blind to political factors. Far from it. But it puts issues of state policies and citizenship in a much broader social context. We can thus conclude that while the opening quote, taken from Castles and Miller, might in itself not be completely off the mark, it is highly idiosyncratic and myopic, as it privileges modern migrations crossing state borders over internal moves, and it – implicitly – seems to favor migrants who intend to settle for good. In itself theirs is a legitimate choice, especially if the core explanandum is the way the long-term settlement process in another modern state evolves.

If one is more interested in social change over time, wrought by cross-cultural migrations and their effect on both migrants and on sending and receiving societies, then such a definition is inadequate. Moreover, even if one limits oneself to long-term settlement (in terms of assimilation, integration, or otherwise) (Alba and Nee 2003; Lucassen 2005; Foner and Lucassen 2012), the gaze of the state falls short as well, because the power and interest of territorial states in controlling migration is a very recent phenomenon and in most states emerged – at least in Western Europe and North America – in the late nineteenth century with the “nationalization” and “bureaucratization” of international migration (Rosental 2011), resulting in a statist migration control regime around World War I (Lucassen 1998; McKeown 2008). Before that, migration controls were exerted much more at the level of cities or, especially in empires (such as Russia), internally (Torpey 2000; Garcelon 2001). Especially in early modern Europe, membership regimes were built locally, and so for comparisons over time that are intended to reveal the similarities and differences in the settlement process of migrants with our current world the nation state model has severe limitations.
The second result of this article is the development of (admittedly) preliminary ideas on how to construct a middle-range theory that links the different kinds of cross-cultural migration as distinguished in the CCMR method to social change and social development. The three analytical building blocks we propose and that we linked to the four dimensions of social development suggested by Ian Morris are, of course, open to discussion. For the moment, the model seems to work, at least at the aggregate level, but the proof of the pudding is in the eating at the meso and micro level.

In the more empirical parts of this article we have concentrated on the effects of societies receiving migrants, in this case Eurasia between 1500 and the present. Individual migrants and non-migrants in sending and receiving societies have been largely left out. Finally, and paradoxically, integration and assimilation leads in the long run to diminishing opportunities for social development through cross-cultural experiences. A possible consequence could be the slowing down of social change, or even a kind of ‘cultural involution’ (after Geertz 1963), as due to globalizing migration cultures converge further and thus cultural boundaries become less salient or disappear entirely (as was already the case in migration to cities within culturally homogenous nation states in the twentieth century). Logically speaking, this is also an implication of the model, presently to be developed further.

References


In the introductory part of Professor Skeldon’s note, the point asking if we should seek to integrate macro- and meso-determinants with micro-level decision is more than relevant. This is an important matter to be asked at the first place. However, after reading the note it seems that the response is less straightforward than one might think.

Consequently, a legitimate question would be to ask what should be done both in terms of theory and practice to overcome the difficulties to link the macro- and meso-determinants with micro-level decision. One suggestion could be to look at the impact of macro levels patterns on micro patterns; using meso levels as channels of transmission explaining the relationship between macro and micro factors.

The section on methodologies and levels in Prof. Skeldon’s note implicitly highlights the complementarity between macro, meso and micro level data sources. One idea emerging from this is to think about ways to carry out studies integrating both macro and micro level analysis; and not having macro vs micro or meso studies. This echoes the paragraph at the end of the note on the dichotomy between “signals” of macro level and “noise” of migrants. One could think about the complementarity of these two aspects and to what extent they both help understand migration, elaborate efficient policies and take into account migrants’ agency and the way it shapes mobility.

Related to this latest point, it would have been interesting to think in the note about a discussion on the role of agency and its association with capabilities and aspirations while considering macro, meso and micro levels. We know that the relationship between structural factors and agency is a complex one. If on the one hand, migrants’ agency shapes structure at the origin and destination, on the other hand, structural constraints faced by migrants limit the extent to which they can exercise their agency. In this case, one may wonder how structural factors at the macro levels, constraints (meso levels) and specific events (micro levels) would relate to the agency of migrants and what would that mean in terms of migration decisions

1. **Issue of definitions**

Both Professor Skeldon and Professor Lucassen notes emphasize the importance of definition. Most of the time, the definition of *migrants* and *migration* ignores a large part of people who move such as returnees, temporary migrants, internal migrants, or circular migrants.

It is thus very helpful to have a reminder of the definitions and the challenges they pose. *Migrants* and *migration* terms are often taken as well understood, which is not necessarily always the
case. For instance, the statement “All migrants now” and the figures related to international migrants (3% of the world population or 12% including internal migrants) do not necessarily match; and this is likely due to an issue of definition of a migrant itself.

While it is crucial to get our definitions right at the first place, it is important to know what we put in those definitions, and how we can make them evolve and match the reality of migration over time. This point is linked to the distinction between migration and mobility. It seems that the frontier between migration and mobility is “blurry”. Let us consider someone who would like to move because of wage differentials between his place of origin and destination, inequality or unemployment issues (macro factors) but cannot migrate due to lack of funding and social networks (micro factors). Or let us assume that this person, because of tougher migration policies and almost impossible access to visa choose to use irregular means to move. Or the case of a migrant who would like to go back home for holidays or personal matters but cannot do so due to the lack of regular documents and the difficulty to re-enter the destination country after moving out. Should we consider that these cases refer more to migration or (im) mobility issue? Migration may not be the issue but rather mobility or im (mobility).

The issue of definition cannot be discussed without referring to the distinction between international migrants and other types of migrants. We hear much more (at least in the public debate) about international migrants’ flows compare to internal migration, returns migration, or circular migration. As clearly explained in both notes, there are numerous studies on internal migration; urbanization phenomenon, circular and return migration but they are still not as mainstreamed as it could be expected. To extend this diagnostic, it is worth noting that many scholars prefer focusing on matters relevant to current debates, which is very legitimate and crucial with the need of evidence based policy, above all in an era of opinion-based policy, “fake news” and “post-truth” extremely harmful to the policy debate with serious consequences on people’s daily lives. That being said, one may wonder to what extent the academic agenda could be more influencing the policy agenda; and in this specific case bring light to the other types of migration such as circular, internal, return migration or short-term mobility. Interestingly these types of migration cannot be entirely disentangled from international flows and are part of many challenges linking macro, meso and micro level factors. For instance, internal migration such as rural –urban migration can lead to more pressure on wages in cities and excess of labor supply and then put a pressure on international migration (or at least the willingness to migrate abroad), which will have policy implications not only within countries but also across countries.

Finally, on the issue of definition, the point in Professor Skeldon’s note regarding tourists who are not considered as migrants is very relevant. Some studies used tourists arrivals and departures as proxy for business travels and to a larger extent short –term mobility. This type of mobility is linked to many outcomes such as knowledge diffusion, innovation, or trade, strengthening the relevance of the argument made in the note. This example is another illustration of the need to carefully consider various situations while defining migrants and migration in general.
2. **The role of interdisciplinarity in migration studies**

Professor Skeldon’s note highlights the fact that many disciplines interested in migration issues keep working in silos. I would like to suggest bringing a little bit of nuance on this part. Even if indeed “economists and demographers appear happier dealing with statistical approaches to pattern and processes at the macro-level”, more and more economists are looking at the impact of macro factors at a micro level and how macro factors affect households and individuals’ decisions exactly linking macro and micro levels. In this case the relationship between the various levels are made within discipline and represents an opportunity toward more interdisciplinarity. Moreover, micro approaches from other disciplines are critical to understand and explain findings at a macro level (and actually to makes a good sense of the numbers). This illustrates ways to bridge the gap between disciplines (and even the gaps within discipline sometimes).

It should be acknowledged that within the economics discipline itself there are more and more streams and approaches mixing up with other disciplines. For instance, we have seen (since the 70’s) the importance gained by fields such as behavioral economics with the seminal work of Tversky and Kahneman (1971; 1974); Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Lab-experiment and randomized control trials borrowing methodology from medicine are making a “revolution” in the way the economics discipline is evolving. Economic history is bringing new perspective to the discipline (with interesting studies on migration, e.g Abramitzky et al., 2014; Abramitzky et al., 2013; Boustan et al., 2012). Fields such as development economics often rely on sociology, anthropology; political science, history, or geography. Consequently, bridges are being made within disciplines and while this is far from being enough, that is a good step toward less silos.

It is worth mentioning that there is an interesting discussion related to the “literature silo”. The latter and art in general are indeed often overlooked while they could bring many insights in our understanding of migration and/or mobility issues, and should thus be further considered in migration studies.

3. **On the Cross Cultural and Migration Rate (CCMR) methodology**

The CCMR methodology developed by Professor Lucassen is very interesting. Two discussion points related to the methodology came out while reading the note. The first one is that it could have been useful to put a greater emphasis on the way the Cross Cultural and Migration Rate (CCMR) methodology helps connecting the macro-meso and micro level decisions. For instance, one may wonder how the mapping exercise of migrants’ capital can be used to connect macro-meso and micro levels. To be more specific, the link between macro-meso and micro levels could be done when comparing developments in Eurasia in time and space at the macro level to have a good sense of the trends but also to look at more carefully what is happening at the meso and micro levels.

The second point is related to the fact that it is difficult to consider social change without taking into account the role of political factors. It would be interesting to see an extension of the
model that will factor in the political factors while addressing the limitations of the Nations state model. The reason why I raise this point is that as it is now, it seems that cross-cultural migration and migrant's capital would “necessarily” lead to social change and development. It would be thus useful to know if this is systematically the case or if they are other factors (than the membership regimes) that could prevent or facilitate this relationship.

References


Global approaches to migration policies
Objective of the session

This session explores the potential for and challenges of a more global theorization of migration policies, their evolution, determinants, and effectiveness. In particular, this session seeks to move the scientific debate beyond criticising the biases of existing research or enumerating what is missing. Instead, it hopes to develop constructive methodological and conceptual suggestions on how to achieve a more integrated scientific debate and theorizing on migration politics across geographical, political, developmental, or cultural divides.

Thematic framework: The main pillars and key challenges of the discussion

What are the main trends and drivers of migration policies, and to what extent are policies effective in shaping immigration and emigration? These questions are central to contemporary debates about migration. Although globalization scholars have suggested that nation-states and national borders have lost their importance (Sassen 1996; Soysal 1994), states remain the prime reference point for popular and diplomatic demands of migration control and borders continue to be major barriers in people’s lives (Bonjour 2011; Torpey 1997). Improving our understanding of the evolution, drivers, and effects of migration policies around the globe remains thus central for the study of human mobility.

The wealth of research on migration policies can be clustered around three topics: (1) Scholars investigating the evolution and substance of migration policies have shown that migration policies on paper are often more liberal than restrictive discourses suggest (Cornelius et al. 2004; Messina 2007). They have also highlighted that to understand how states approach migration, it is key to acknowledge that migration policies are typically ‘mixed bags’ of measures that target various migrant categories (along national, ethnic, skill groups or migration motives) in quite different and often contradictory ways (de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli 2016; Helbling and Kalkum 2018).

(2) Researchers exploring the drivers of migration policymaking have identified four primary sets of migration policy determinants: the role of socioeconomic interests at the domestic level, operating via interest groups and public opinion; the importance of foreign policy and diplomatic interests; the role of potentially conflicting interests among and within state institutions; and the impact of international norms and ideas on national policymaking (Boswell 2007; Castles 2004a; Freeman 1995; Hollifield 1992; Joppke 1998; Massey 1999). Debates about the respective weight of these factors, as well as how they interact in migration policymaking, are ongoing.
Lastly, research on the effects and effectiveness of migration policies has remained so far inconclusive, with some scholars showing that states are generally effective in regulating migration, while others argue that borders are ‘beyond control’ (Castles 2004b; Czaika and de Haas 2013; Helbling and Leblang 2019). Central to this debate are discussions of unintended policy effects, so-called ‘implementation gaps’ and the role of bureaucratic state strength (de Haas et al. 2018; Eule 2014; Infantino 2019).

Theorizing within these three research clusters has almost exclusively focused on immigration policies in ‘Western liberal democracies’. Despite the emergence of studies on emigration and immigration policies in non-Western or autocratic settings since the late 2000s (Acosta Arcarazo and Freier 2015; Chung 2010; de Haas and Vezzoli 2011; FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014; Gamlen 2008; Miller and Peters 2018; Natter 2018; Thiollet 2016; Tsourapas 2019), migration policy research continues to operate within a dichotomous worldview.

This worldview suggests a conceptual distinction between migration policies in the ‘Global North’ and the ‘Global South’, in ‘democracies’ and ‘autocracies’, in ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, or in ‘origin’, ‘transit’ or ‘destination’ countries. For instance, migration policy across the industrialized world is mostly framed as concerned with selecting migrants that serve economic and other ‘national’ interests. In poorer world regions – such as sub-Saharan Africa or South-East Asia – migration policy is more often framed in the context of ‘emigration and development’. This binary worldview neglects the fact that most countries experience and regulate both immigration and emigration. More generally, such essentializing categories obstruct a more integrated scientific debate on migration policies across the globe.

However, scattered empirical research in a variety of political, developmental, geographical and cultural contexts suggests that similar dynamics are at play when it comes to why and how immigration or emigration is politicized, which tools and measures states adopt to address migration, and what effects they have on migration patterns on the ground. Indeed, these dichotomous categories hide the facts that, worldwide, modern nation-states are faced with similar questions by the arrival and presence of foreigners on their territory, and that people have similar reactions of curiosity and suspicion towards ‘the other’. Thus, policy makers around the world may face similar dilemmas when designing, legitimizing, or implementing migration policies in the context of the modern nation-state. At the same time, differences in migration policies do not necessarily run along the lines of political systems or political geographies, but might be better captured by other factors, such as a country’s labour market structure or a state’s political ideology and involvement in the economy.

**The way forward: Specific questions for reflection**

This session seeks (1) to build bridges across existing insights on the evolution, drivers, and effectiveness of migration policies across the globe, and (2) to delineate promising conceptual and methodological avenues for future research on migration politics that advances a more integrated
Each research endeavor needs to be based on solid conceptual grounds. The goal to work towards more global, integrated theories of migration policies is certainly necessary to achieve a more comprehensive empirical understanding of the role of the state in international migration. However, what are, in your view, the theoretical reasons for breaking up the world (di)visions that currently structure research on migration policies and what theory innovation can we expect to gain from overcoming these? Vice-versa, are there also sound theoretical reasons for not working towards a more global theorization of migration politics and for sticking to current world (di)visions?

We are not lacking empirical research insights on migration policies around the globe, their evolution, determinants, and effectiveness; rather, these insights are too eclectic and efforts to bring together what is already out there are too rare. What are according to you the most innovative and promising methodological approaches that could advance theoretical insights on migration policies based on the wealth of existing empirical research on migration policies? What type of comparisons should be privileged - in terms of the countries to compare, the aspects of migration policy to look at or the theoretical hypotheses to test - and why?

Lastly, given your understanding of the current state-of-the-art on the role of states in migration, which research gaps on the evolution, drivers and effects of migration policies can you identify that would be central to tackle in order to advance migration policy theories. The nature of this colloquium invites us all to develop new ideas and think outside the box. In this vein, are there specific aspects of the modern nation-state, its relation with markets, rights, and foreigners, that you think are currently overlooked in the debate on migration policies but could be central to foster a more integrated scientific debate? Thought-provoking, controversial hypotheses based on the wealth of existing research out there are particularly welcome.

References


Rethinking Units of Analysis in Comparative Studies of International Migration

David FitzGerald

According to the United Nations, there are 195 countries in the world. Even this number is subject to qualification, as to begin with, two of the countries are non-member states (the Vatican and Palestine.) Setting aside the issue of what is the N, scholars, pundits, and policymakers have elaborated multiple ways of slicing and dicing the world’s countries into categories to make their diversity more apprehensible. Splitters while always point out the internal heterogeneity in these categories, and lumpers will always protest that it is impossible to build theories without recourse to aggregation. Rather than simply adopting a hard splitter or lumper line, I find it more useful to reflect on the work these categories do, or could do, for the purposes of studying international migration, and to consider what is lost, and what could be gained, by using different categories.

The issue goes beyond the largest scales of aggregation that divide the world into two or three categories. It includes constant, casual references to continental categories such as Europe or regional entities such as East Asia without specifying the boundaries of those categories and what it is about the countries within them that make the groupings meaningful categories of analysis. In work with John Skrentny, Kristen Surak, and Javier Moreno, we explored the logic of regional comparisons across North America, Europe, and East Asia, with policy guiding the reunification of family members of lower-skilled immigrants as the empirical reference point (Skrentny forthcoming). Scholars have sharply criticized the late Samuel Huntington’s idea of the Clash of Civilizations, yet the same civilizational groups are assumed in much scholarly work on migration.

Theorizing global regions: What are the warrants for lumping regions together? There are many, and the following list is not exhaustive, nor are the factors mutually exclusive. Unfortunately for the goal of clean theorizing, some of the categories are mutually constituted. As a starting point, regional categories might be based on:

- Similar historical experiences
- Similar institutions
- Similar culture/ civilizations
- Similar economies
- Spatial contiguity or proximity

Each of these factors can be convincingly shown to matter for some aspect of migration policy, but their relevance, the mechanisms, or the strength of their effects should never be assumed. The following sections question the logic of using the major dichotomies and trichotomies to divide the
world for the study of international migration policies.

**Occident/ Orient**

The civilizational division of the world into a supposedly rational Occident and barbaric, exotic Orient has long been discredited, most devastatingly by Edward Said (1978). Migration scholars do not use these categories explicitly, though in practice, the vast majority of migration scholarship continues to study societies that in the nineteenth century would have been considered occidental by Europeans, and the concept of “the West and the rest” is still used in history and economics.

**Core/ Periphery/ Semi-Periphery**

One of the major sociological contributions to international migration theory derives from the work of the late Immanuel Wallerstein on a single world system comprised of core countries in Europe and their settler societies, peripheral countries that are sources for extracting raw material, and semi-peripheral countries between them, including countries that have moved over time from peripheral to semi-peripheral status. This perspective has been enormously generative for a systems understanding of international migration, but it can also lead to intellectual ossification. On the one hand, economic globalization has become much more multi-directional and complex than the Triangle Trade. Migration can follow trade routes, but migration also generates new trade, whether through nostalgia markets, brokering, brain circulation, or other mechanisms. The world systems perspective becomes more useful when it is not restricted to economic power, but also takes into account military power, and to a lesser extent, the other two triad’s of Michael Mann’s (1993) four sources of power—ideological and political power. My current book project with Rawan Arar, Refugees: A Sociological Systems Approach, adopts this perspective to help explain patterns of refugee movement and state policies.

**First/ Second / Third Worlds**

The Cold War division of the world into the U.S.-dominated First, Soviet-dominated Second, and Third World has greater potential analytical leverage. The division has the advantage of being more closely rooted in empirically observable differences in geopolitical orientations, notwithstanding the issue of how to categorize countries that were more or less neutral in the Cold War. Popular references are still made to the First and Third Worlds, with a shifted meaning to rich in the former and poor in the latter, and the practical disappearance of the Second. This is a major theoretical loss for theorizing international migration.

One of the major camps in theorizing why migrants leave a particular place at a particular time and move to a particular destination is world systems theory, as discussed above. The driver in these accounts is capitalism, which disrupts economic relationships based on feudalism, mercantilism, subsistence agriculture, and other configurations that contribute to relatively more sedentary societies. Capitalism—constituted by free labor, the buying and selling of private property, and markets—pushes migrants out of disrupted places and pulls them into new labor markets that are often distant
and which involve crossing international borders. As Aristide Zolberg (2007) explained, the economic logic of capitalism has an elective affinity with the political logic of liberalism, and the two combined in nineteenth-century Europe to produce what he terms the Exit Revolution, which did not reach what was the Second World until Communism fell in Eastern Europe, and Chinese exit restrictions were eased under Deng Xiaoping.

Yet as Ernest Gellner (1983) pointed out, many of the effects attributed to capitalism are actually the result of industrialization, which may or may not be specifically capitalist. Studies of mobility under non-capitalist industrialization highlight the similarities and differences with capitalist systems. Much more could be learned by theorizing Second World movements, such as the intra-COMECON (Soviet-dominated Council of Mutual Economic Aid) labor exchanges; the larger scale student flows to the Eastern Bloc, China, and Cuba from the Third World; and other Communist mobilities, including Cuba’s program of sending doctors and teachers abroad. While numerically small compared to flows to the First World from the Third, the theoretical and historical lessons from comparing the First and Second worlds during the Cold War would be rich.

The lessons are not simply historical. For example, the design and implementation of migration policies under socialism with Chinese characteristics remains understudied, particularly outside China and in the English-language literature that dominates the international academy. Contemporary Chinese outmigration includes university students, laborers, technicians, and managers, in addition to entrepreneurs at multiple scales, to countries around the world. What are the similarities and differences in migration for the purpose of building infrastructure and resource extraction in the developing world in a context of para-statal companies, compared to other forms of movement? To what extent does migration policy under this particular form of capitalism/socialism require a rethinking of received arguments about embedded liberalism or the teleological climb from indentured servitude to free (to starve) labor? China is also becoming a country of in-migration, especially from Africa. What are the politics of these movements compared to the politics of the massive internal migration within China that is numerically greater than all international migration combined?

**Global North/ Global South**

The division of the world into two categories in which the Global North is constituted by the members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, less Turkey and Mexico, and the Global South is constituted by the rest is a gross over-simplification, though lumping has its utility to show the big picture, which is why I’ve used this term in my own work despite its obvious limitations. The Global North/ Global South maps on to the more hopeful distinction between developed/developing. In both of these formulations, one of the major challenges is to situate countries that have quickly become extraordinarily wealthy, yet which historically have been highly marginalized in the world system. The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and other rentier states, such as Brunei, are key examples.
One often hears that most migration takes place within the Global South, while most migration studies focus on migration from the Global South to the Global North. This situation clearly needs redress, and my sense is that a shift is underway, though too slowly, in current research. A major question is whether, and how and why, intra-South migrations are qualitatively different from South-North migrations. Most intra-South migrations are from poorer countries to richer countries in the South. Wage differentials may be just as great as they are in some prominent South-North migrations that have been the object of much migration theorizing, such as the Mexico-US case.

There is also a paucity of research on elite and professional migration, both within the North and from the North to the South. “Migration” is rarely defined by migration scholars, but interesting groups tend to fall out of the analysis, with important exceptions in the work of scholars like Lucassen and Lucassen, such as soldiers, merchants, missionaries, exchange students, “lifestyle expats,” retirees, and so forth. These groups have been important historically, during the process of colonization, but also in a wide range of other contexts, including much post-colonial European and North American migration to Latin America. Millions of North Americans, Europeans, Australians, Japanese, and others live abroad at least for much of the year, but they tend to fall out of accounts of transnationalism that self-impose blinders to only examine the experiences of poor and middle-class migrants. Policies regulating these groups of people may have little in common with policies regulating labor migrants and refugees.

**Continental and Regional Groupings**

While discussions of the pros and cons of dichotomous and trichotomous divisions of the planet are common, scholars are much more likely to take for granted regional groupings such as “East Asia” or “Europe” (Skrentny forthcoming). What is the basis for these categories? Does it really matter, and if so, why, that countries on the same tectonic plate are grouped together? What binds together regions, such as the one defined in a gallery of New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art’s as the “Arab Lands, Turkey, Iran, Central Asia, and Later South Asia”? The infelicitous title reflects the politics and practical problems of attempting to define a region based on a putatively common culture (Islam), when Muslim people are not restricted to living in this region, in which many other religious groups reside. After 500 years of globalization, and a phase in which the movement of people, ideas, goods, and militaries is faster and more frequent, geographic groupings may be of decreasing analytical utility.

Countries in geographic proximity may share historical experiences whose legacies shape their policies and politics, but far-flung places may have more experiences in common than countries that share a region. Anglophone settler societies scattered across the temperate zones of the northern and southern hemispheres have more in common regarding immigration than do Bulgaria, Norway, and Ireland. Common institutions, such as parliamentary versus presidential systems, do not neatly map onto regional groupings. Non-regional groupings based on similar economies, such as capitalist, socialist, or rentier states, or sub-groupings of capitalist economies following Esping Anderson’s
(1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, may be more useful than geographic region. Proximity may matter, for example, in shaping the spatial dynamics of remote control as countries push out their immigration enforcement in widening concentric rings to avoid becoming “a closed sack” (see FitzGerald 2019 in Refuge beyond Reach). The critical quality of space in this domain may not be reflected in other aspects of immigration policy, such as efforts to attract highly-skilled workers, where space may even be irrelevant.

**How blinding is methodological nationalism?**

Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller (2003) have warned of the danger of “methodological nationalism” in shaping the study of migration, which has generated work at other levels, particularly the subnational. What are the perils and promises of shifting the level of analysis? Certainly, the relevance or primacy of the national must be demonstrated and not assumed. In the domain of immigration policy, paying primary attention to the policies of central governments is entirely reasonable, though useful work explores “immigration federalism,” for example, or even variation across unitary systems.

Questions remain about how much local policy variation matters outside the countries of the Global North. There is also a paucity of research on these questions outside of the most contentious policy areas, such as “sanctuary cities” and head scarves. I suspect that for most immigrants, their lives are more affected by subnational variation in policies that are not labelled as immigrant policies as such, but rather, policies in the realms of education, housing, and urban planning. The challenge for subnational research only begins with the shift downward in the level of analysis, followed by trying to understand the complex interaction of the national and the subnational. As a practical matter, setting boundaries around the domains of policy to be considered, in a large universe of potentially relevant domains, each of which can be understood in terms of national/subnational interactions, quickly leads to an enormous matrix that threatens to overwhelm a research project.

Yet the specification of relevant policy domains beyond the obvious national immigration policies can revitalize efforts to recategorize units of analysis at a global scale. For example, for particular projects, the globe might be divided into countries, or in some cases even subnational units, with school systems that track students from an early age into vocational or university preparatory tracks; countries with autonomous judiciaries; economies that are based primarily on extractive industries versus services or manufacturing; and so forth. A grouping of Chile, Taiwan, and Israel could yield insights for some purposes greater than investigations into a South American, East Asian, or Middle Eastern “model.”

**Policy diffusion**

A final reason to be skeptical of standard global or regional groupings when assessing immigration policy is the role of policy diffusion, transfer, and convergence (see Cook-Martin and FitzGerald 2019). Scholars of policy convergence study why policies sometimes become more similar or the
same across units. The most notable form of policy convergence results in the nearly homogenous institutions of what John Meyer (1987) called the “world polity,” in which templates of perceived modernity spread from the core countries of the West to the rest. International organizations and experts are carriers of theories about how nation-states should work, and these are propelled by the ideological power ascribed to them by political actors.

Other explanations for convergence include coercive imposition by powerful states, uncoordinated modeling, and cooperative harmonization in which governments agree to align their policies. Harmonization occurs extensively in the supranational institutions of the European Union (EU) due to intergovernmental decisions to adopt the same policy or their imposition by supranational organs such as the European Court of Justice. Within the EU, extensive harmonization also happens informally through expert networks and modeling on policies of other EU member states. In these cases, regional categorizations, such as the EU, Mercosur, or ECOWAS, make sense for the study of some immigration policies.

Lawmaking is often influenced by laws elsewhere without a uniform outcome or even a converging trend, particularly in the absence of formal institutions to harmonize law. Elkins and Simmons (2005) note the temporal and spatial “clustering” of policies, which requires explanations of why they cluster without converging on one outcome.

In the study of diffusion, emulation refers to policy makers in one country voluntarily modeling their policies on those of another country or institution. Strategic adjustment occurs when actual or anticipated changes in the policies of other countries push a government to adapt accordingly. This mechanism may have a spatial component, to the extent that policies in one country redirect flows to neighbors, but the importance of proximity cannot be assumed. For example, when the United States closed its doors to Japanese immigrants, they redirected to Brazil. The identified conditions for diffusion are neither necessary nor sufficient. One proposition, the unidirectional power assumption, is that countries with greater power and higher status create policies that weaker or lower status countries follow. The direction of influence runs from the more to less powerful. A second assumption in the diffusion literature is that geographic or cultural proximity increases the likelihood that countries will adopt similar policies. All of these assumptions must be interrogated in specific contexts. Previous work has found that immigration policy traverses both geographic and cultural divides (Cook-Martín and FitzGerald 2019).

These bridges may be coming more common given the thickening global networks of experts on international migration policy, the establishment of more INGOs and multi-lateral organizations dealing with these issues (including the IOM, become a Related Organization of the UN in 2016 and which has baptized itself somewhat misleadingly as the “UN Migration Agency.” Such organizations and networks have historical precedents to be sure, but their global reach in a post-colonial world is unprecedented.
References


Research in migration politics predominantly examines immigration and integration policies in Western democracies, at best widening its scientific enquiries to migration corridors that are often defined by colonial history. Just like any social science field, empirical ethnocentrism mirrors the geography of scientific employment and institutions, the economics of research funding and the politics of academic publications. Apart from raising ethical issues, these limitations constrain our understanding of processes and dynamics of international migration politics, firstly, by neglecting empirical realities that are statistically relevant – notably migration politics in the Global South – and secondly, by creating methodological and epistemological biases. Documenting less-researched cases offers an obvious remedy to the problem. Yet the future of research on migration politics is not only about more research on “non-Western others” that boxes the results in “area studies” or a “comparative” sub-field. It is about using single-case studies and comparative research across types of states and political contexts to weed out some of the most blinding assumptions of migration theories and to open up new research avenues. This could mean taking migration processes rather than political regimes, geographical location or development levels as the independent variable and constructing broad comparative frameworks where migration politics become the dependent variable. This could first be achieved by considering seemingly “most different” political contexts across countries and comparing, for instance, democratic apples and authoritarian pears. It could also be achieved by paying more attention to migration histories and tracing political processes and institutions across time and contexts with greater care. As such, a truly insurgent and disruptive comparative claim would go beyond merely including more Southern case studies into pre-existing paradigms and epistemologies of migration politics but rather expanding, amending or recasting migration theories based on the new knowledge generated.

1. Gaps and biases in migration politics research today

Understanding migration requires looking across the various units of analysis that are traditionally distributed across academic disciplines and taking into account multiple levels of enquiry, from the most intimate to the global (see session 4 in this volume). Such a complex comparative agenda across space and time necessarily involves multi-disciplinary epistemologies and methodologies. As more experienced social scientists have written, this is the main challenge for migration studies in the

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1 Generally speaking, anthropology for individuals or artefacts, politics for states and sometimes other political units, sociology for all sizes of social groupings or social relations, human geography for spaces and places, etc.
next decade. 2

Although insights from anthropology and the critique of biases induced by methodological nationalism have infused a “transnational awareness” into migration studies, states are still generally studied as operators of migration outcomes and mostly considered as whole units of analysis, encompassing institutional but also cultural characteristics.3 Additionally, the citizen-migrant dichotomy still shapes academic discussions on contemporary polities, rights, memberships and identities (Anderson, 2013). The most-cited scholarship on migration politics looks at power configurations and influences within the state: state-business relations (Hollifield, 1992) or state-courts relations (Joppke, 2001) or political cultures of incorporation across states (Brubaker, 2002; Castles, 1992; Schain, 2012). Scholars hardly look beyond the usual suspects in the Global North, like the United States, Canada, Germany, Australia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands or France, which offer the “best” opportunity for publication and to be “relevant” in the field.

When scholars step across the borders of Western-centric social sciences for single-case (Klotz, 2012; Vigneswaran, 2019) or comparative studies (Chung, 1994; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012), they often (though not always) use Western analytical frameworks to describe the inputs, drivers, substance and effects of migration policies in the Global South. Unlike anthropologists, geographers and sociologists, political scientists rarely take cities, neighbourhoods, groups (including diasporas), regional groupings, inter-governmental or transnational institutions as units of analysis for migration politics, so these are seldom included in migration theory.

Despite an increasing wealth of research in political science as a discipline (Hollifield and Wong, 2013), the following holds: 1) migration research still generally focuses on Western case studies; 2) states are still the main unit of analysis; 3) state characteristics are still generally considered as independent variables. As such, a number of starting premises in political research have generated pervasive assumptions about migration politics across the world. These assumptions implicitly shape the field of research and migration theories, as the following table attempts to show.

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2 Adrian Favell writes that migration studies can be a “field which is uniquely well positioned to chart the landscape of a social science beyond container nation-state-societies; in which interdisciplinarity and multiple methods can be used to engineer a non-methodologically nationalist social science incorporating methods and conceptions, not only from sociology and political science, but just as much from geography and anthropology, as well as economics and demography.” (Favell, 2014, p. 4)

3 An open question remains about the possibility of adopting “methodological transnationalism” as the preferred lens to study migration politics, as the state remains largely the unit of analysis even when combined with international and transnational dynamics and inputs.
Table 1: Main research assumptions on migration politics (K. Natter and H. Thiollet)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Global North / more developed</th>
<th>Global South / developing and less developed / emerging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of flow</strong></td>
<td>Mostly Immigration and Asylum</td>
<td>Mostly Emigration and Exile or Asylum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Regime</strong></td>
<td>Democracies / liberal</td>
<td>Authoritarian regimes / illiberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political economy</strong></td>
<td>Autonomy of states, markets and societal actors</td>
<td>Embeddedness of markets, societal actors and states (developmental states, patrimonial states etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State capacity</strong></td>
<td>Strong states but efficacy bounded by individual and collective rights</td>
<td>Weak states / Strong states debate⁴. Weak individual and collective rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policies</strong></td>
<td>Mostly immigration policies</td>
<td>Mostly emigration policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly efficient (but effectiveness debate)</td>
<td>Non-policies / inefficient policies⁵ / all-powerful policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main drivers considered</strong></td>
<td>Religions: deliberative and interest based (lobbies, partisan politics), the rule of law (labour law, citizenship rights, asylum law, domestic courts and international organisations)</td>
<td>Economics: economic development, households, patronage, recruiters, smugglers, informal migration industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economies: labour market demand and supply, firms, migration industry</td>
<td>Formal and informal social institutions: Family, kinship, companies, brokers, migrants’ and refugees’ networks, diasporas and transnational social groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taking political regimes as independent variables not only generates normative biases on policy making and policy outcomes but also constrains research strategies by focusing scientific scrutiny on certain objects, actors and processes. In democratic settings, for instance, the key factors for migration politics are considered to be institutional or political-party bargaining, business or civil society lobbying, the impact of courts or the media, and the role played by expert knowledge; in undemocratic contexts, the key factors for migration politics are considered to be informality, criminal networks, family/patrimonial/kinship dynamics, structural economic determinants (poverty, development level), and, last but not least, international interventions (whether development, humanitarian, security/peace-related).⁶ Scholars do look into the role of courts or the media in non-democratic settings, but they

⁴ In the Global South, on-going debates try to characterise strong, weak or failed states based on a definition of state robustness bounded by methodological nationalism. Authoritarian states are sometimes deemed more “efficient” and able to “do as they say/wish” while democracies are trapped in liberal paradoxes. At the same time, developing or even emerging states are often seen as weak and unable to constrain informal and formal social institutions and dynamics like kinship, big men, corruption.

⁵ Migration research largely underestimates the role of immigration policies in the Global South (Weiner, 1985, p. 450) sometimes even denying the very existence of such policies (Brochmann & Hammar, 1999, p. 12)

⁶ Expectedly, a Western centric developmental bias applies to migration politics: developing countries – even they have democratic institutions and procedures- are often not considered full-fledge liberal democracies.
are less likely look at patrimonial networks, corporative bodies or informality in shaping migration politics in democratic societies – and if they do, the analysis has a normative undertone, as a deviation from standard democratic practice.

2. **New research venues**

These assumptions generate research gaps. Less-studied countries or regions or under-researched types of flows delineate privileged *zones* of investigation to advance migration scholarship:

- Emigration politics from the Global North/developed countries ("expatriate studies") which are often depoliticised and analysed through a merely economic lens.
- Immigration to and integration politics in the Global South (e.g. the Gulf immigration countries)
- Immigration and integration politics in the Global South
- Emigration politics from the Global South
- Asylum politics and refugee integration in the Global South

Even if most of the blind spots are located in the Global South and thus call for more empirically-grounded research “there”, blind spots are not only “geographical” but also concern issues, institutions, processes, interactions and power relations that are not context-bound:

- *Migration policies* are rarely studied in poor non-democratic post-colonial states;
- *Immigrants’ political and social incorporation* in developing countries is hardly ever studied;
- *States’ relationships with migration industries* have been under-researched in contemporary Northern contexts. In particular, *brokers and intermediaries* are less likely to be studied in contemporary Western democratic contexts than in developing countries;
- *Studies on migration industries* have focused on illegal or informal institutions; governmental and market actors are often considered as interchangeable in patrimonial or developmental states;
- *Influence of civil society and courts* are generally disregarded as irrelevant objects of study in authoritarian context;
- *Refugees’ integration* is less likely to be studied than immigrants’ integration; *informal processes and institutions determining migrants’ integration* are less likely to be assessed than formal ones.
- Last but not least, except in critical research on economic or transit migration, refugee studies or migration crises (Andrijašević & Anderson, 2009; Chinini, 2008; Collyer et al., 2012; Lindley, 2014), *migrants and refugees* themselves are often under-studied as political agents and subjects – notably so in authoritarian contexts.
Single and multiple-case comparisons in migration politics across time and space will not only help fill these gaps but also change our assumptions, expand existing research methods and widen the scope of migration theories.

To expand the validity of migration theories, scholars have exported and tested Western-grounded frameworks in non-Western contexts. Several authors, for instance, have expanded theoretical discussions on the making of migration policy and “migration states” (Hollifield, 2004) through empirical cases from the Global South: Audie Klotz (2013) has contributed to international relations theories of norm diffusion by looking at migration politics in South Africa; Katharina Natter (2018) has tested the effect of political systems (and not just regimes) on migration policy making in Morocco and Tunisia; and Fiona Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas (2019) have offered new typologies of states built from examples from the Global South. Theory testing and expansion could and should be employed “the other way around”: one example of that is the analysis of intermediation in Asia (Xiang and Lindquist, 2014) as a ground for a globally relevant theory of the migration industry and its relation to the state (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Sørensen, 2013; Surak, 2018). Political scientists have paid attention to private actors in the context of the privatisation of migration management in Europe, both legal (Lahav, 1998) and illegal (Andersson, 2014; Triandafyllidou, 2018). Political anthropologist Biao Xiang has explicitly charted an innovative theory of state/non-state relations in Asian migration politics from an ethnographic approach (2014). Similarly, “retheorising international migration from non-western experience” by grounding their insights in Singapore and other Asian cases, Brenda Yeoh and Gracia Liu-Farrer have sought to bring about original theories in migration studies on the politics of space, mobility and immobility along gender, ethnicity and class identities (2018). We can also remember that Myron Weiner’s much-cited work on migration politics and security stemmed from in-depth knowledge of the political demography of India (1978).

Building upon these experiences, I believe that comparing migration politics in immigration countries like the United States, Singapore, Russia, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Cote d’Ivoire, Qatar, or Germany could shatter our assumptions about migration policies, their drivers and effectiveness and the strength or weakness of states across regimes and times. Such discussions could recast analyses about “implementation gaps” by looking at both formal and informal tracks and institutions in policy making, at state and non-state actors, practices and discourses, and exploring migration governance from street-level bureaucracies to official discourses. Looking at the politics of migrant integration, asylum and refugee settlement in Kenya, Sweden, the United States, Sudan, Iran, Germany and Bangladesh could question our assumptions on the drivers of integration in the context of mass reception, notably assessing the impact upon integration outcomes of political and legal contexts, perceptions and statuses, and formal and informal processes of inclusion and exclusion.

In the last section, I focus on a research avenue that may prove particularly fruitful to overcoming the usual dichotomies and doing away with some of the limitations existing in migration theory.
3. Migration politics as state making

Migration is commonly seen as a challenge to sovereignty (Geddes, 2001; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Sassen, 2015), a threat to national identity or state security (Adamson, 2006), or even as a life-biological threat. Emigration is also conceptualised as a threat to regimes and nation-states, a domain where the authority of states seeks to be extended often at the expense of non-state actors, as studies of diaspora politics show (Cohen, 1996; Lafleur, 2013; Mangala, 2017; Tsourapas, 2018). But apart from a few exceptions, theorists have rarely taken the critical stance seriously enough to change the premises of their research: what if “mobility makes states” rather than immobility? This argument, made by Darshan Vigneswaran and Joel Quirk (2015) based on a collection of African cases, has unfortunately remained cornered in an “area study.” That intuition, however, is globally relevant for the politics of immigration, integration and emigration alike and should be expanded. By determining international relations between states, delineating the contours of the nation, shaping state capacity and authority over “their” population at home and abroad, and organising state-societies relations, migration politics can be seen as a promising way to understanding state making.

Thinking about migration politics as a determinant of state-making processes across time answers Abdelmalek Sayad’s invitation to rethink, denaturalise and rehistoricise the state (Sayad, 1999). Just as Charles Tilly denaturalised the history of modern state-making in Western Europe to describe it as predatory and violent, migration scholars could revisit migration politics as state-making through, on the one hand, the progressive control over people’s (im)mobility within and across borders (Torpey, 2000) and, on the other, through the policing of social interactions by hierarchical statuses, spatial segregation, and discrimination based on race, gender, status, religion, ethnicity, etc.

Firstly, immigration makes states through politics and processes of formal and informal incorporation or exclusion. Processes of boundary making and belonging drive the building of polities. Such a perspective obviously moves away from the idea of incorporation into pre-existing social “containers” according to pre-defined political norms regarding diversity (ethnic, multicultural, republican, etc.) and regulated by organised states. It calls for combining governmental and everyday politics in order to understand the politics of otherness (integration, exclusion) as co-producing nations. Alongside formal integration policies and labour market dynamics, the everyday politics of spatial segregation and access and political and social interactions and practices offer a bottom-up, practice-based and spatialised viewpoint on migration politics as nation builder. These are the sites where the processes of boundary making, polity building and institutionalisation of politics can be observed: ethnographers have shown, for instance, how refugee politics in Europe and elsewhere are determined between official policies and asylum laws, humanitarian interventions and the everyday politics that impact access to material and immaterial resources in migrant camps, jungles and informal urban encampments (Agier, 2011; Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010).

By way of transnational extension, the building of the nation and the state also happens “from afar” via diaspora politics. In Eritrea, in the Philippines, in Turkey, in Senegal, in India, in China,
in Algeria, as well as in France or Italy, emigration politics enforce political control over nationals abroad, extract remittances, and organise or prevent political participation through external voting (Collyer, 2014). But beyond diaspora politics, emigration and transnational dynamics also change states and change our assumptions on the territorial dimension of state building. Beyond the well-known case of Israel, various state-building processes (Palestine, Eritrea, Sri Lanka, Kurdistan) need to be approached through the diasporic lens. Diasporas make states; diasporas can also make, or change, political regimes. Such insights feed into scientific debates on democratization and transnational politics. More generally, the relationship between emigration, immigration and revolution that started to be discussed during the Arab Springs (Sigona and De Haas, 2012; Thiollet, 2013) or debates around transnational activism and external voting should be taken to the next level by using existing theories of revolution or creating new ones.

Finally, “migration as state building” as an approach is particularly relevant to conceptualising and investigating state building in settlers’ states and colonial and post-colonial contexts to complement the well-known accounts of migration politics in the United States (Zolberg, 2008), Australia and the United Kingdom (Appleyard, 1964), Canada and Germany (Triadafilopoulos, 2004) and more recently Latin America (FitzGerald & Cook-Martín, 2014). The comparative historical gaze has helped unveil the role of brokerage and race or ethnicities in democratic migration politics. Scholars of migration politics would benefit from building even more upon the work of global historians who have brought migration and citizenship into the analysis of state building processes in former colonies or metropolises (Al-Shehabi, 2019; Buettner, 2016; Cooper, 2014; Harper & Constantine, 2010; Mongia, 2018). As Fiona Adamson, Gerasimos Tsourapas and I have argued (2018), imperial and local politics meshed to shape exploitative and hierarchical colonial migration states in Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Seeing migration politics as a structuring feature of state-building processes amounts to investigating what migration does to the nature of the state, its practices and policies, to political regimes and state-society relations, therefore reversing the usual perspective on “migration control.” In this perspective, I have argued that mass immigration to the oil-producing Gulf monarchies is more than a consequence of labour market demands (Naufal, 2011) and that immigration policies are not mechanically “determined” by oil rentierism (Shin, 2017): rather than incidental, they are constitutive of a regional social order (SaadEddin, 1982) and modern state-building processes happening in immigration and emigration states (Thiollet, forthcoming).

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Discussion Comments

Erin Aeran Chung

Although the majority of English-language scholarship on immigration focuses on flows from the Global South to the Global North, or from East to West, intra-regional and South-South migration are the dominant forms of international migration in the contemporary world. According to the United Nations Migration Report, over 40 percent of the 244 million international migrants in 2015 lived in developing countries and, among them, almost 90 percent originated from other developing countries. The number of internal migrants in developing countries, moreover, is roughly three times that of international migrants at an estimated 740 million in 2015. China’s internal migrants alone is almost double the total number of international migrants worldwide.

As noted by the speakers and organizers of this panel, a truly global theorization of migration requires, at the minimum, that we develop methodological tools and theoretical frameworks that better reflect these empirical realities by grappling with understudied cases outside of North America and Europe and critically reevaluating our assumptions about migration politics. This imperative has been widely acknowledged by scholars in the field. The question at hand is how. Specifically, Natter has asked the speakers to consider three central areas in “global approaches to migration policies”: 1) extant area categorizations in the dominant scholarship; 2) promising methodological approaches; and 3) areas for further research on the role of the state that are missing in the extant scholarship, with the invitation to consider “thought-provoking, controversial hypotheses based on the wealth of existing research out there.”

FitzGerald and Thiollet have tackled this challenge with admirable creativity—we would expect nothing less from them—by proposing bold suggestions that I anticipate will become the basis for productive debates not only for the duration of this conference but for years to come. While FitzGerald focuses on the epistemological, political, and practical questions pertaining to global categorizations that shape the way we approach comparative research on migration, Thiollet grapples with the problem of empirical applications, i.e., what is the value added of bringing understudied cases to the migration debate and how might we tackle the many challenges and opportunities of doing so within our given frameworks and methodological approaches? Both agree that dominant approaches to the study of migration policies that either overlook cases outside of “Western liberal democracies” or apply binaries such as Global North/South, developed/developing, and countries of immigration/emigration have, as Natter writes, contributed to “essentializing categories” and hampered “a more integrated scientific debate on migration policies across the globe.” I would like to hear more from both about “innovative and promising methodological approaches” that they think would help us to move forward and invite them to consider how their own training as comparativists in sociology
and political science, respectively, along with their interdisciplinary immersion in area studies and migration research have helped them to develop methodological tools and research agendas that travel between disciplines and move beyond isolated cases. But first I’d like to discuss some of the particular points that they discuss in their research notes.

FitzGerald calls for a radical remapping of what we consider the “global,” going beyond 19th and 20th century categories to comparative approaches that focus on carefully paired cases based on economic, political, social, and historical variables rather than geographic proximity alone. He calls into question the dominant categories upon which much of the migration scholarship rests, whether explicitly or implicitly, that are based on specific historical contexts and world views—that is, the 19th century “Occident/Orient” dichotomy, the world systems core/periphery/semi-periphery categories, and the Cold War First/Second/Third World divisions as well as contemporary Global North/South contrasts and continental and regional groupings. Although he acknowledges the utility of such categories for studying, for example, migration among socialist and post-socialist societies—what he refers to as “Second World movements”—or intra-South migrations, he challenges researchers to consider what gets lost when we uncritically apply such categories in our research on migration. He is especially critical of geographic groupings that take for granted the “boundedness” of continents and regions that are made up of countries with significantly different political systems, economies, and societies. He suggests instead that we shift the level of analysis to consider, for example, common institutions, subnational units, and global networks.

FitzGerald’s critique of existing categories and suggestions for shifting the level of analysis reflect the broader concerns of social scientific research, especially research that straddles area studies and disciplines such as political science and sociology, in the 21st century. The proliferation of events over the last few decades have challenged the core concepts, methodologies, and even the traditional subfield divisions of our disciplines. For example, political scientists are increasingly debating the relevance of established definitions of politics and the variables we use to explain what we call the political.

At the same time, FitzGerald raises some important questions that are specific to the study of migration that I think can be expanded further as we attempt to “delineate promising conceptual and methodological avenues” for “building disciplinary and geographical bridges to explain global migration.” In answer to his question, “What are the warrants for lumping regions together?” in studies of global migration, FitzGerald includes similar historical experiences, institutions, culture/civilizations, and economies as well as spatial contiguity or proximity. Power and politics loom large in the aforementioned dominant categories but could be more explicitly explored as we think about theoretical innovations. Who is doing the “lumping” and why? Which forms of migration matter? When does movement become migration? And how do the asymmetries of migration research inform what we study—e.g., immigrants versus migrants, immigrant incorporation, migration policies, naturalization rates, etc. If the Global North/South division can be characterized as “gross over-
simplification,” why do scholars and practitioners of the “Global South” continue to apply such categories? While he raises critical points about the analytical utility of geographic groupings, I think it would be useful to consider the prior questions of how territorial borders are defined, redefined, and enforced and their implications for migration policies and politics. What is to be gained by doing away with geographic groupings and what might be lost? Particularly for the study of migration policies and politics, it may be premature to forego such groupings given the significance of intra-regional migration and co-constitutive policies (as he points out when he discusses policy diffusion and harmonization of policies within specific regions such as the EU).

These are the types of questions that Thiollet addresses in her research notes. Rather than simplify the “wealth of existing empirical research on migration policies,” she offers an expansive set of suggestions for promising areas of study. The following comments are based largely on my interpretation of her research notes—thus, a type of dialogue—so I encourage her to explain and expand on the points that I raise.

Thiollet is primarily interested in how we can conduct comparative research on migration policies that is both truly global (thus taking understudied—Global South, developing countries, non-Western countries, post-colonial societies, autocratic systems—cases seriously) and that critically engages extant normative assumptions. She argues that the dominant approach to comparative research in migration studies is based largely on dichotomies between the Global North and Global South and poses the provocative question of whether “a sociology of migration policy making with no normative assumptions” is possible. She suggests four promising paths: 1) hypothesis testing of dominant theories of migration using cases that have not commonly been studied together (e.g., across regime type); 2) expanding large-N comparative databases to include non-OECD countries; 3) rethinking theories of the state through the lens of migration; and 4) redefining what we mean by the “migration crisis.” All four are promising suggestions that offer exciting possibilities as well as theoretical and practical roadblocks. As Thiollet notes, a growing number of scholars have applied models derived from U.S. and European cases to a variety of contexts while others have generated dynamic theories from non-Western contexts that have shaped debates central to the study of migration. But, as we have seen from migration policy indices that have begun with North American and European cases and expanded to other contexts, simply adding cases to existing databases can pose significant methodological problems given the inconsistencies and divergences in terminology, standardized data, political institutions, policymaking environment, and so forth. Nevertheless, she suggests that the payoff would outweigh the costs for theory building. We may find that migration politics in Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand is the exception and not the norm and that theories of liberal convergence were in fact based on historical snapshots and not long-term trends.

I found Thiollet’s third suggestion about the state-migration nexus especially interesting in part because I think it addressed my discomfort with the panel’s focus on migration policies.
Although I am sympathetic to the need to find a basis for comparison across “geographical, political, developmental, or cultural divides” and agree that policies allow us to expand the numbers and types of cases that we can compare, I think that focusing primarily on migration policies could potentially obscure “integrated scientific debate” and reinforce “dichotomous worldviews.” As Thiollet suggests, migration policies may be less consequential in cases where the rule of law holds little weight and where informality prevails (see also Adamson and Tsourapas 2019). A comparison of migration policies across a wide range of cases may also be based on the very assumptions that we seek to challenge in regards to state capacity, coordination between government agencies, and policymaking sequencing. For example, we may be assuming a strong state that is relatively autonomous from particularistic social interests, has the capacity to enforce immigration policies and enact immigration reforms, and derives its legitimacy from upholding liberal democratic principles. Also, existing approaches tend to assume that migration policies reflect deliberate decision-making by policymakers who engage in grand “balancing” acts when migration policymaking, in fact, tends to be haphazard, inconsistent, and contradictory (Ruhs and Martin 2008).

At the same time, the study of migration across space and time offers fertile ground for rethinking the state and state-society relations. In calling for more research on how states make migrants, how states manage migration and mobility during the process of state building and rebuilding, and how non-state actors, migrants, and non-migrants shape the institutions of migration control, perhaps Thiollet is asking us not only to expand the cases that we compare in studies of migration politics but also to expand our questions to reconsider the core concepts in our fields and disentangle them from Eurocentric frameworks. Rather than question the relevance or “fit” of our cases to dominant theoretical frameworks and models in the study of migration politics, the question at hand is whether or not existing concepts and methodologies in the field can sufficiently explain migration politics in a variety of contexts (Chung 2017b). This will require systematic comparisons of cases that have not commonly been studied together or that may necessitate collaboration across continents and disciplines, much like what we are doing at this colloquium. And it will encourage research agendas that treat citizenship, migration, and racial hierarchies as mutually constitutive—not discrete—phenomena.

Indeed, by examining the linkages between migration, citizenship, and racism through comparative, interdisciplinary research on East Asian industrial democracies, my own work interrogates conventional understandings of phenomena commonly associated with Western classifications, on the one hand, and probes culturalist assumptions about East Asian politics and society, on the other. By extending the boundaries of how and where we study migration, citizenship, and racial politics, I aim to broaden our comparative lens to consider recurrent patterns of social, political, and cultural conflict not only in societies long deemed multiracial or traditionally considered sites for immigration, but also in societies assumed to be racially and ethnically homogenous. My work thus explores immigration politics in countries that do not acknowledge the presence of immigrants, highlights racist discourses that circumvent direct references to race, and examines the citizenship practices of those excluded.
from formal membership in the state.

The study of migration and citizenship in any context offers opportunities to critically engage key concepts that are central to the social sciences such as power, identity, democracy, ideas, and institutions. The point of departure for theoretical development, interdisciplinary collaboration, and methodological innovation requires us to question our assumptions about what it is that we are studying, how we define and measure our variables, and, perhaps most importantly, where we mark the boundaries of our research on migration and citizenship (Chung 2017a).

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Global approaches to integration and citizenship
Objective of the session

In this session we will discuss novel theoretical approaches to integration and citizenship using a global perspective. What are the contributions of integration experiences in non-OECD countries to conventional integration theories? And vice-versa, what insights can we derive from integration processes in wealthy countries when studying more informal and less state-guided initiatives that we know from developing country contexts? These questions will guide the discussion.

A global perspective on integration and citizenship

Many societies around the globe experience immigration today or have experienced it in the past. Debates regarding integration and citizenship, which take place mainly at the national level, are relevant at a global scale as well. The arrival of newcomers raises questions of belonging, incorporation, citizenship, and adaptation and may challenge the sovereignty of states that are confronted with increasingly diverse populations. Integration debates are concerned with the incorporation of immigrants and the extent to which newcomers should or can adapt. Debates regarding citizenship – or nationality – circle around the question as to who becomes a member of a nation state, under what conditions, and which rights are associated with citizenship.

Despite the global character of international migration, the academic work on integration and citizenship has a strong geographical focus on European countries and more traditional ‘Western’ immigration countries such as Australia, the United States of America and Canada. Processes of incorporation of immigrants as a result of so-called ‘South-South’ migration are less well documented. Migration debates in developing country contexts mostly address issues such as how migration affects development through remittances, brain drain and the return of entrepreneurial migrants. These ‘development-driven’ debates generally concern ‘South-North’ migration, while processes of migrant incorporation that result from regional migration are neglected.

This geographical focus on ‘Western’ societies might limit our broader understanding of processes of integration and citizenship. First, national socio-economic contexts may play a large role in shaping integration processes. Bakewell and Landau (2018. p. 2) for example argue that “[…] economic precarity, varied forms of mobility and socio-economic allegiances, and frail or fragmented formal institutions […]” in the African context might lead to processes of community formation that are dissimilar to those documented in the integration literature. Second, national strategies to integration and citizenship vary significantly across states as well. Whereas some states have firm,
either liberal or illiberal, guidelines in place for the incorporation of their foreign populations, other states employ a ‘laissez-faire’ policy approach, or define integration policies more at an ad hoc basis. These integration and citizenship policies may change over time and may be highly sensitive to political tides, macro socio-economic changes, or specific events (see, e.g., Beine et al. 2016 for a study on European countries). Moreover, national policies interact with more informal strategies of incorporation that operate at the local level (see, e.g. Hovil, 2017; Tati, 2017). Given this wide variety in - formal and informal – strategies of migrant incorporation, it is imperative to look beyond the ‘Western’ experience in order to understand processes of migrant incorporation.

Finally, the context in which national approaches to immigration are established (or not) plays a large role in shaping integration and citizenship policies. “Each state’s nation-building mythology, history and institutions help to define the route it will take toward achieving the fuller integration of those within its borders” (Mathews, 2013, page x). Research on the development of citizenship practices in South Africa, for example, show how, over the course of history, citizenship practices were entwined with policies on racial segregation and marginalization (Klaaren, 2013). Similarly, the factors underlying the ‘aggressive civic integration’ policies that European countries have recently adopted are complex and have their roots in recent and old European history (Triadafilopoulos, 2011). These civic integration policies are top-down, state-led interventions and often intertwined with immigration policies to ensure selection ‘at the gate’ (Joppke, 2017). Moreover, procedures to acquire citizenship are increasingly based on the ability of migrants to converge to the values, norms and cultural practices of the host society (Tonkens & Duyvendak, 2016). The historic, political and social context in which immigration and integration policies come about should therefore be examined across a wide variety of contexts.

Given the complexity and context-specific nature of integration and citizenship processes, it is imperative for researchers to look beyond the ‘Western’ experience and to combine insights from a wide variety of national contexts to fully understand the processes that underlie the (successful) incorporation of immigrants. Moreover, integration outcomes should not be studied in isolation or as a direct outcome of national policies, but should be placed in their wider socio-economic and political contexts, as well as their place in history. During this session, entitled ‘Global approaches to integration and citizenship’, we aim to shed a global perspective on processes of integration and citizenship acquisition and on how these contribute to theory.

Specific questions

- What are recent insights, or new perspectives, from scholarly works regarding integration and citizenship?
- To what extent do integration processes differ across contexts? Are there any universal patterns that can be discerned as well?
- Do we need different lenses to study processes of migrant incorporation across different
contexts?

- How can we study migrant incorporation as part of broader migration processes? E.g. what role do integration policies play in shaping migration processes? How well do these state-led policies and patterns facilitate or hamper migration?

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Research on migrant integration often focuses on how migrants with diverse ethnic, cultural, and national identities integrate into North American and European societies. Scholars analyse integration by focusing on migrants’ acculturation and socioeconomic integration (Alba and Foner 2015; Penninx, Berger, and Kraal 2006). In addition, Western-oriented scholarship also emphasises the nature of citizenship and integration policies as proxies for analysing integration contexts (Gregurović and Župarić-Iljić 2018; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Kraal and Vertovec 2017). While analytical emphases on acculturation and integration policies continue to dominate integration research in Western countries, the quick ascendance of xenophobic populist political parties across the Global North suggest ethnoracial prejudice and systematic discrimination are constraining and obstructing migrants’ efforts to acculturate and make new lives in host societies. This essay posits that contemporary challenges for immigrant integration cannot be fully understood through analyses of acculturation or state-centered integration policies. Rather, migration scholars must draw on critical race scholarship (CRS) to account for how processes of racialisation are constraining migrant integration in the Global North and beyond. I argue that contemporary immigrant integration in Western societies corresponds with a racialised incorporation in which migrants are sorted into socially constructed racialised categories, which are hierarchical and unequal.

The 2016 British referendum to leave the EU, the election of Donald Trump, and political gains made by far-right anti-immigrant parties across Europe were all premised on the racialisation and scapegoating of migrants. These racialisation processes relied on discursively framing migrants as criminals and potential terrorists unwilling to conform to Western cultural norms and sensibilities (Nail 2016). While the session’s stated objective asks panelists to “look beyond the ‘Western’ experience” (Fransen 2019), I take a different approach and suggest Western-based migration scholars must resist temptations to focus exclusively on the Global South. I posit that efforts to move analytic emphases away from the Global North enables migration scholars to avoid uncomfortable discussions of ethnoracial groups, ethnoracial inequality, and racism. Given that the share of international migrants in high-income countries has increased to 64% (up from 58% in 2000) while the migrant proportion in low-income countries has declined during the same time (United Nations 2017), it is important to draw on the contemporary “Western experience” to refine and reformulate existing integration theories in ways that will make them more applicable to migrant integration in both the global North and South. In this essay, I argue that conventional approaches to migrant integration must be reimagined through CRS. By doing so, migration scholars can better analyse how the transformation of ethnonational migrant groups into racialised categories constrains integration by assigning migrants to unequal group positions in the receiving society.
Racialisation: Constructivist and Structuralist Accounts

Racialisation is a central concept in CRS—described as a discursive classification process in which physical features (skin colour, hair type, etc.), religions (e.g., Islam, Judaism, etc.), and national identities are used systematically to assign groups to socially constructed categories that correspond to unequal access to resources and opportunities (Castles, Haas, and Miller, 2013; Cornell and Hartmann, 2007). While the racialisation concept stems from social science scholarship on race relations in the US and the UK, migration scholars in North America and Europe have recently started using the concept to analyse the integration of migrants into Western societies (Brown, Jones, and Becker, 2018; Chaudhary, 2015; Garner, 2007; Sáenz and Douglas, 2015).

Two analytic approaches characterise CRS. On the one hand, constructivist accounts of racialisation are rooted in Fredrik Barth’s (1969) notion of ethnicity as a relational boundary-making process and Omi and Winant’s (2014) ‘racial formation.’ When applied to migrants and integration, constructivist interpretations of racialisation examine the discursive processes by which migrants’ ethnic and national identities are classified and sorted into socially constructed racialised categories. On the other hand, structuralist race scholars contend that the integration process entails the racialisation and sorting of heterogeneous ethnonational migrant communities into new or pre-existing hierarchical social categories (i.e., Black, Latinx, Arab, Muslim, non-Western, etc.). The structuralist perspective stems from American sociologist Herbert Blumer’s (1958) essay in which he suggests that racial prejudice in the United States is reflective of racial group positions, rather than individual psychology. Blumer argued that racial prejudice and discriminatory behaviours stemmed from dominant group members’ (White Americans) efforts to protect and preserve their superior group position in the US racial hierarchy. A vast literature supports the structuralist critical race perspective, highlighting how whites occupy superior group positions relative to non-white groups through racialised discourses, discriminatory actions, and various forms of social closure across many domains of social life.

Racialised Incorporation of Migrants in the Global North

Researchers are increasingly analyzing immigrant integration through the lens of racialization and racialized group hierarchies. Specifically, researchers seek to go beyond cultural explanations for migrant-native disparities by recognizing how the sorting of groups shapes migrant integration into hierarchical social categories. In an analysis of immigrant entrepreneurship in the US, I introduced the racialized incorporation perspective (Chaudhary 2015) as a way of describing the hierarchical nature of racialized categories into which migrants and their children were being sorted. I posit that while contemporary migrants and their children may experience the various outcomes that segmented assimilation predicts (Portes and Zhou 1993), the hierarchical nature of racial categories in the US context may explain why certain migrants are more likely to experience upward or downward

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1 Omi and Winant define racial formation as the process by which social, economic, and political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories and racial meanings
The sorting of migrants into racialized categories is observed in the US in the case of various migrants from Latin America who are racialized into Latino and Hispanic categories. Similarly, diverse African and Afro-Caribbean migrants are sorted and categorized as Black. Additionally, Asian immigrants representing dozens of different nationalities are collapsed and categorized in the US as “Asian Americans”. Since each category corresponds to a hierarchical group position (Chaudhary 2015), migrants are likely to experience integration outcomes that are determined by the relative position of the racial category with which they are associated. Moving north to Canada, researchers observe that despite the inclusive nature of Canada’s multiculturalism policies, South Asians, Muslims, and Afro-Caribbean migrants are racialised into categories such as ‘visible minority’ and ‘South Asian,’ which correspond to disadvantages and discriminatory treatments (Ameeriar 2017; Galabuzi 2006; MacDonald 2015).

Moving across the pond, European scholars using CRS confront additional challenges as a result of the general reluctance to use the concept of ‘race’ in academic, political, and public discourse or government data (Silverstein 2005). The reluctance to make race a central object of scholarly analysis stems in part from what Hondius (2009) describes as a ‘silent agreement’ in Western European societies where skin colour is deemed unimportant and irrelevant. Yet, a reluctance to use the term ‘race’ in policy or academic circles does not mean that racialisation is not taking place. Thus, the failures of multiculturalism and integration are often explained by blaming immigrants for self-segregating or being unwilling to acculturate to European secularism and cultural sensibilities (Meer and Modood 2015). However, a CRS approach to immigrant integration in Europe can enable scholars to move beyond acculturation and state-centred integration policies by investigating how structurally embedded group positions are constraining the social mobility and overall integration of immigrant communities.

Recent studies in Europe reveal many cases of racialized integration, which are commensurate with immigrant experiences in the US. For instance, in an analysis of mortgage markets in three Dutch cities (Arnhem, The Hague, and Rotterdam), Aalbers (2007) finds that mortgage loan rejections were far more likely in what the Dutch mortgage industry termed ‘high-risk neighbourhoods,’ which unsurprisingly have high concentrations of immigrant-origin minorities. In relying on place and ethnoracial categories to exclude immigrant-origin communities from mortgage loans, the Dutch mortgage industry converges with similar racially-biased lending practices documented in the US, Similar examples are found throughout France, where categories such as Arab, Muslim, African, Algerian, and North African are commonly used to denote differential status and an inferior group position of migrants from Muslim-majority countries (Body-Gendrot, 2013). Accordingly, researchers have found ample evidence of racialisation and the sorting of disparate non-white and Muslim immigrants into racialised categories, which in turn, correspond with disadvantages and unequal opportunities in many domains of French society (Body-Gendrot, 2013; Galonnier, 2015; Bleich,
Similar studies in the UK, Italy, Germany, and other European countries suggest immigrants are routinely racialised and incorporated into hierarchical group positions in which their social mobility and life chances are significantly constrained (Garner, 2007; Meer, 2013; Silverstein, 2005).

While skin colour, ethnicity, and national origins are some of the key ascribed status markers which often become racialised across North America and Europe, religion is also an essential marker of difference that is central in the racialisation of migrants throughout the Global North (Selod and Embrick 2013). Indeed, as has been indicated with regard to anti-Semitism, countless studies demonstrate how integration policies and the retreat from “multiculturalism” are colour-blind efforts to racialise Muslim immigrants. Indeed, in a classic trans-Atlantic analysis, Zolberg and Woon (1999) emphasise the racialization of migrants in Europe and the US by describing how Islam and Spanish are symbolic barriers to integration. More recently, Alba and Foner (2015) point to sustained disparities among many Muslim immigrants and dominant group societies across Europe. Hence, the narratives portraying Muslim immigrants as threats to public safety and state security effectively racialised them into a category that is at or near the bottom of group hierarchies within most European migrant-receiving countries (Kaya 2015). However, racialisation processes, as described in the Global North, may also penetrate migrant-sending countries in the Global South.

**Racialisation Incorporation in Non-Western Societies**

With increasing scholarly interest in migration from the perspective of lower-income and non-Western receiving societies, it is crucial to examine how applicable Western-based perspectives are for non-Western migration experiences. I posit it is reasonable to expect that racialisation processes and the sorting of groups into unequal categories is not purely an American nor European idea. In other words, these same processes likely exist in non-Western countries based on perceptions of group hierarchies and affiliated social constructions imported from Western influences (i.e., colonialism, imperialism, globalisation, information technology). Accordingly, recent studies of migrants in non-Western countries support my assertion of the presence of racialisation processes outside of the Global North.

For instance, African, Southeast Asian, and South Asian labour migrants in oil-producing countries in the Middle East are racialised and sorted into unequal group positions because of their non-Arab identities (Jureidini 2005). Rana (2011) finds that many Pakistani labour migrants are deceptively recruited for contracts in the Gulf States that resemble nineteenth-century indentured servitude. Despite their shared Islamic religious identities, Pakistanis are racialised and perceived by the Gulf states and their publics as intellectually and culturally inferior to Arabs (Rana 2011). This hierarchical racialisation corresponds to widespread abuse and the unequal treatment of many non-Arab labour migrants throughout the region (Fernandez 2011; Mahdavi and Sargent 2011; Sönmez et al. 2011).

Similar racialisation processes exist in East Asia. For instance, researches observe that
third and fourth-generation Peruvian migrants of Japanese descent who migrate back to Japan are perceived as racialised others and marginalized within Japanese society (Arudou 2015). In this case, the Japanese state actively constructs hierarchical race categories in which the Japanese ancestry of Latin American migrants is considered different and inferior to native-born Japanese (Kajita 1998). Concomitantly, dominant group members in China associate the racial identities of African migrants with negative attitudes and stereotypes (Zhou, Shenasi, and Xu 2016). And finally, in South Korea, the racialization of migrants results from the government’s selective use of multiculturalism discourse. While female marriage migrants are framed as members of a “multicultural family,” labor migrants are racialised and excluded from these types of discourses (Ahn 2013).

In sum, I posit that regardless of whether a migrant receiving-society embraces the concept of race, racialised incorporation—sorting of migrants into unequal social categories—are ubiquitous across the globe. By maintaining a critical lens on the racialized incorporation of migrants in the Global North, migration scholars can develop new theoretical perspectives for investigating and understanding how racialisation informs the integration processes of migrants across the Global North and South. In doing so, migration scholars can draw attention to long-stand racialisation processes which characterize group positions within receiving societies and the power relations between migrants’ origin and receiving societies.

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Renewing the Migration Debate


Differentiated Migrations, Bifurcated Citizenship Pathways and the Politics of (Non)Integration in Asia

Brenda S.A. Yeoh

Postcolonial migrations in Asia

The challenges that contemporary migrations pose to meanings and practices of citizenship in Asia have to be understood in the context of the historical development of nation-states in the region. When large-scale labour migration within the region and beyond (mainly to the Middle East) started in the 1970s, many Asian countries – including several which had only recently cut their colonial apron strings – were still in the process of consolidating projects of nation-state building (Asis and Battistella 2013: 31). Nation-building projects in Asia differ both from the European model of supposedly homogeneous and insular states, as well as the North American and Australasian settler colonies featuring versions of multiculturalism that privilege ‘white’ subjects as the core of the nation. Southeast Asian postcolonial nation-states such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore strained towards welding together a nation-state from ‘an already existing plurality’ rooted in the diasporas and people movements of colonial times, while East Asian polities such as Japan and South Korea constructed a sense of nationhood on the basis of idealised narratives of ethnic homogeneity that denied the presence of ethnically-different others (Collins, Lai and Yeoh, 2013: 15).

In this context, the specific labour migration system that developed in Asia was one that minimised challenges to the fragile imaginary of the nation-state in the making, by rendering migrants as transient sojourners whose place in host societies is to sell their labour but make no claims on the receiving nation-state. In other words, the migration regime that emerged in Asia was premised on keeping migration temporary, and apart from creating a privileged pathway for highly skilled migrants to gain residency and citizenship, most Asian receiving nation-states ‘rule[d] out settlement, family reunification and long-term integration, including acquisition of citizenship, for less skilled migrants’ (Asis and Battistella, 2013: 32).

At the same time, from the perspective of the sending nation-states, temporary migration does not necessarily connote short-term exits, and in fact may be characterised by long or indefinite duration, repetition, circularity and sometimes de facto settlement in host societies. In this light, some sending states are actively engaging their citizens abroad by extending the right to vote and allowing dual citizenship, often in view of cultivating transnational flows of remittances and reaping investments from their diaspora populations. In the case of the Philippine state, for example, turning citizens into labour commodities for the global marketplace by institutionalizing employment abroad through the Philippine Overseas Employment Program has become a major strategy to address poverty and unemployment, and to siphon in remittances vital to sustaining the Philippine economy.
As part of diaspora-centred development across Asia, nation-states are promoting diaspora strategies and in some cases extending extraterritorial citizenship to emigrants and diasporic descendants (Ho, 2011; Hickey et al., 2015).

**Migrants’ access to legal citizenship in receiving states**

In the context of Europe, Soysal (1994) has argued that national citizenship has given way to postnational citizenship, where immigrant groups without formal citizenship status are able to mobilize around claims for particularistic identities by appealing to universalistic principles of human rights and connecting themselves to the wider public sphere. This argument has little traction in Asia; instead the view that citizenship describes a one-to-one umbilical relationship that allocates persons to states and confers specific bundles of rights and responsibilities tied to national territory is seldom challenged in policy discourses. In exercising exclusive power of sovereignty in determining borders and terms of membership, the nation-state wields citizenship rules as a legal instrument of exclusion that sharply separates citizens as insiders from those deemed outsiders.

While most Asian countries allow for (but not necessarily encourage) naturalisation, and some extend special consideration to long-term residents (as exemplified by the longstanding Korean community in Japan), the requirements for naturalisation – which often include residency criteria, economic wherewithal as indicated by highly skilled employment or substantial investments in host countries, and a proclivity for integration as demonstrated by a knowledge of language and culture – tend to operate in a black box of considerable opacity. Gaining a foothold in the legal framework of citizenship in receiving states is out of the reach of the vast majority of labour migrants in low-waged jobs. In contrast, pathways to permanent residency and citizenship are most clearly discernible for highly skilled or professional migrants, as they are often valorised as ‘talent migrants’ essential to providing nation-states with the competitive edge and innovative capacity to advance in the global knowledge economy (Yeoh and Huang, 2012). These talent attraction policies, however, have reconstituted the boundaries and meanings of citizenship in contested ways. The global race to attract talent migrants has led to a marketization of citizenship through ‘citizenship-for-talent’ exchange schemes, and this has precipitated scepticism over the integration and loyalty of newly minted ‘talent’ citizens. The creation of privileged pathways to citizenship has also raised ethical and distributive concerns, and this has fuelled increasing tensions between old-timers and newcomers in the nation-state (Yeoh and Lam, 2016).

Among student migrants, pathways to citizenship have become more common in the policy armature of Asian governments, linked in many cases to these same notions of the so-called global war for talent. International students are regularly framed as potential human capital who not only enhance the knowledge economies of aspirant nations but, given their relatively young age, are well-placed to also address concerns about decades of low fertility in several countries in Asia. Yet, while the discourse and policy initiatives around student migration and citizenship in Asia have followed similar trends, there is considerable unevenness in the extent to which students pursue these
opportunities, in the hurdles they face institutionally and in employment, and in the potential for countries of education to trump the pull of home. While the instrumental acquisition of citizenship opens up internationally or regionally mobile career pathways for more privileged student migrants, those with fewer resources and less sought after qualifications are likely to face growing levels of noncitizenship. As Collins et al. (2016) observe, the growth in intra-Asia student mobility have not been accompanied by an expansion of clear pathways to citizenship and social inclusion; rather the presence for study, work and residence of these students represents part of a growing trend towards temporary forms of migration.

Apart from the citizenship pathways exclusively paved for those who possess talent or capital, the other available route to legal citizenship in Asia – one ridden with far more uncertainty and risk – lies through entering into marriage unions with citizens of the host nation-state. In recent decades, East Asian industrialised economies such as Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore have experienced a significant increase in the rate of non-marriage and delayed marriage, partly as a result of the growing mismatch in marriage expectations between the two largest groups of singles: on the one hand, independent-minded, financially well-resourced graduate women with sophisticated expectations of marriage partners, and on the other, less educated men in lowly paid jobs with a preference for women willing to uphold traditional gender roles and values. Following the logic of the ‘marriage gradient’ (Constable, 2005), these men who find themselves marginalised in the local marriage market turn to less developed countries in the region for sources of brides, and in the process creates the impetus for intra-regional marriage migration. The links between this form of marriage migration and citizenship, however, tend to be constrained by gendered hierarchies central to the patriarchal family, as well as gendered notions of women as domestic caregivers and biological and social reproducers. Marriage migrants straddle the ambivalent position of being ‘outsiders’ within the state and family—entitled to stay and “theoretically become new citizens… [but] not yet members of the society (Wang and Belanger, 2008). Incorporated into the private sphere of the family as wives and dependents of their citizen-husbands, this highly gendered mode of ‘familial citizenship’ accounts for their vulnerable status both within the family and nation-state, as well as the restrictions to their rights to formal citizenship in accessing paid work and social subsidies (Yeoh, Chee and Vu, 2013).

As Suzuki (2015) shows, despite prevailing rhetoric extolling the foundational nature of the Asian family as a haven and source of support, the family in neoliberal times is under pressure to disenfranchise previously taken-for-granted rights, entitlements and belonging particularly in the case of less powerful members such as the young and the old, while increasingly placing demands on ‘worthy’ participation as a membership criterion. As she illustrates, despite legal victory over the right for children of mixed Japanese-Filipino parentage to claim Japanese citizenship, some of these youths returning from the Philippines to Japan on the premise of newly acquired legal citizenship found themselves confronted with exploitation and infringement of their substantive rights. Accessing legal citizenship through familial incorporation hence often presents the migrant with a rocky road complete with U-turns and detours that may in the end detract from any real gains from citizenship.
status.

**Migrants at the margins of citizenship in host societies**

Rather than a static framework of rights and obligations, it has been argued that citizenship is better understood as ‘a terrain of struggle’ (Stasiulis and Bakan, 1997), shaped by state-led as well as socially embedded ideologies of gender, race and class, and negotiated on an everyday basis within public and private spheres. Scholars interested in the social realities of migrant experience have argued that ‘social citizenship’ cannot simply be read through a singular focus on the legal framework governing citizenship status. Instead, citizenship rights are negotiated across a multifaceted terrain and at different scales from the local to the transnational.

For the migrant, social citizenship is often availed – albeit in partial ways – through membership of their own communities. Despite restrictions on length of stay and rotating door policies intended to ensure transience and disposability, migrants have established communities of their own in host society, often along ethnic and nationality lines, leading to ‘the transforming of temporariness into de facto permanence’ (Asis and Battistella, 2013: 47). Often supported by civil society groups with an interest in promoting migrant welfare and rights, these migrant enclaves provide sources of information, mutual assistance, essential services, social networks and cultural activities that substitutes for the lack of support and safety nets emanating from the nation-state framework. Migrant activist groups can also play an important role in expanding migrant rights through advocating for more inclusive modes of citizenship in Taiwan (Hsia, 2013) or pushing the agenda on substantive issues such as the day-off campaign for migrant domestic workers in Singapore (Koh et al., 2017). Even in countries such as Japan where the national imaginary remains highly exclusionary towards migrants, local government initiatives in developing policies of ‘multicultural co-existence’ to ‘secure the rights of all residents [including migrants]’ result in more inclusive modes of incorporation while not presenting a direct challenge to the nation-state (Nagy, 2013: 61).

Through a comparative study of three groups of Filipina women who have migrated to South Korea – factory workers, wives of citizen-men and hostesses working at American military camptown clubs – Choo (2016) shifts the focus from legal citizenship to examine how migrant claims-making in the broader pursuit of dignity, security and mobility is enacted and challenged in the warp and woof of everyday life. As she argues, the politics of inclusion and exclusion worked in different ways for the three groups, not so much in accordance to legal status, but rather through the prism of on-the-ground struggles over labour processes, civil society and community mobilisation, and the construction of symbolic boundaries separating the morally ‘tainted’ from ‘respectable’ citizens.

**Non-integration futures?**

To further our understanding of the links between migration, citizenship and integration in Asia, it is important to give attention to the uneven dynamics of nation-state formation in postcolonial times. I conclude with two main observations regarding migration and non-integration futures in Asia:
First, while limited pathways to residency and citizenship are available to the privileged, policies that enforce transience and non-integration – whether explicit or tacit – govern the fates and fortunes of the overwhelming majority of capital-poor migrants, who confront the *inevitability of continually navigating transnational routes* to and fro ‘home’ and ‘host’. With little chance of sustainable employment in their home countries where they hold citizenship papers and even less likelihood of becoming an immigrant-turned-citizen in the host-countries where they have secured (low wage) employment, “necessary transnationals” become figures locked into unending circuits of transnational care, affection, money, and material goods in order to sustain both their precarious lifeworlds at the edge of host society as well as their “left-behind” home-families (Yeoh, 2015).

Second, a study of migrant (non)integration needs to take into account not just state policies at work but also the *politics of space in everyday encounters* in situations marked by a high degree of socioeconomic inequality and the continuing salience of racial/ethnic and social hierarchies. Migrant populations are often subject to a politics of invisibilization where they are relegated not only to the sociopolitical but physical periphery. Urban redevelopment and placemaking projects often aim to reduce the visibility and presence of migrant “hotspots” in the city. The construction of labour camps and worker dormitories on the outskirts of the city also reflects similar exclusionary policy practice imprinted onto urban space (Yeoh et al. 2017). At the same time, despite – or because of – the lack of integration into the host community, migrants come together in informal but resilient ways in the interstitial spaces of the city, thereby cultivating a sense of being and belonging to the city at the local scale, while bypassing the national community to which they lack access. In sum, the twin processes of enclosure and enclavement are not just symptomatic of the migrant’s place in the cities and places of Asia, but formative of what may be termed non-integration futures in a regime of temporary migration.

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Renewing the Migration Debate

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I really enjoyed the first two days of the conference: not only the content (stimulating debates) but the style of ‘collective learning’ was quite exemplary as well. Thanks for including me as an integration scholar in your community of migration scholars.

Over the past two days I realized once more how deeply connected our fields actually are: it is important to pay attention to integration processes if one wants to renew the migration debate; policies and attitudes regarding immigration can be explained to a large degree by how politicians think about the success or failure of migrants’ integration.

Hein emphasized that the field of migration theories is under-theorized; this seems in opposition to the study of integration processes where quite some theorizing, conceptualizing and ‘modeling’ have taken place. But, I have to admit, the scholarly work on integration and citizenship has suffered from various shortcomings (so, the field is not undertheorized but poorly theorized). It has overemphasized the formal aspects of policies and it has suggested far too much internal cohesion in integration and citizenship policies across (a) policy fields, (b) scales and (c) times within countries. This has resulted in failing attempts to ‘model’ differences among countries, e.g. Koopmans et al. claim that countries have coherent ‘integration models’ (the Dutch then allegedly have a multicultural model, the French pursued republican policies, etc.). We have extensively proven that this is empirically speaking nonsensical.

Along the same lines of simplification Brubaker’s famous book Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany is highly problematic: it is mostly emphasizing differences between the two nation-states in terms of access to citizenship and their consequences, producing stereotypes about ‘the French’ and ‘the Germans’, and their attitudes towards immigrants and integration (in which the jus soli tradition of France would produce a more welcoming climate to immigrants than the jus sanguinis tradition in Germany…. Well, how to understand then the German Willkommenskultur and the enormous numbers of refugees welcomed there, compared to the few refugees welcomed in France…?)

Reading the interesting papers by Ali Chaudhary and Brenda Yeoh, and based on my own and others work, my main claim today would be that if we take a more ‘global approach to integration and citizenship’ our main empirical task is not so much to explain for differences among countries but to better understand their striking similarities: irrespective of specific policies (or their absence), in all countries where immigrants have the right to stay and plan to do so, we see remarkable parallel integration processes in terms of acculturation. In other words, integration patterns are not direct
outcomes of national policies, but mainly shaped by broad sociological processes. Irrespective of national policies – more interventionist or more laissez-faire-, everywhere newcomers –at least those who have the right to legally stay- adapt to their countries of arrival in important aspects: culturally, economically, linguistically, etc.

This is not to say that the national level doesn’t matter or that there are no differences among countries in terms of immigrants integration at all. For sure, there are: national myths and imaginaries regarding who is considered truly native, a ‘core people’, differ among countries. These attitudes are, however, not informed by policy models but by dominant cultural notions who belongs and who doesn’t belong. So, the national level remains important particularly because of what policies and concepts express in terms of inclusion and exclusion; the categories they use (natives and non-natives) and the often racialized hierarchies they maintain, as correctly stressed by Chaudhary (with, notably, Muslims below postcolonial black immigrants in some Western countries…, so no simple color hierarchy…. ).

The exact hierarchies may differ across countries, but everywhere we see differentiations within countries. Not all immigrants get equal opportunity to integrate: everywhere talented immigrants are privileged, low-skilled immigrants marginalized and often excluded from citizenship, both political and social. In that sense policies do matter, but there is not much national about these policies, they are everywhere quite the same…

How to explain for these similarities? How to explain the rise of nativism across so many countries in various parts of the world? These are too big questions to answer in this context, particularly because similar developments can have various causes.

Here I want to focus on a second shortcoming in the integration literature: differences are not only exaggerated among countries, differences within countries, produced by immigration, are exaggerated as well. Why are so many scholars obsessed by (explaining) differences? Let’s take the example of recent theorizing in terms of superdiversity. The claim of superdiversity scholars is increased and permanent pluralism in all countries that experience immigration. Is that true? Or is superdiversity theory, that by the way does acknowledge similar trends among countries, exaggerating differences within countries? I think so. Let me explain where this confusion stems from.

As superdiversity researchers observe, many people in Western societies are experiencing increased diversity in their everyday lives. This is, at least at the start, true of the immigrants themselves. As sketched by Vertovec and others, immigrants to many Western countries have become more diverse in terms of country of origin, ethnicity, language, religious background, and migration channels, resulting in an increased variety of legal statuses, diversification along age and gender lines, and more diverse levels of human capital. Some of these differences are present upon arrival, some are produced by family reunification and marriage, and others have to do with the passing of time, in some cases developing in response to the receiving country and its institutions. But are they creating
permanent differences? They may well in fact be experienced by immigrants as the end of being different: alongside male immigrants, there are now also female immigrants; alongside the young and middle-aged, there are older people and children; alongside the lower-educated, there are now many with higher education. What may appear as ‘super-diverse’ in the eyes of migration scholars could be experienced as a return to regular, non-deviant, and therefore non-diverse situations by immigrants themselves.

It needs to be recognized, in addition, that some diversification is actually produced by mainstream assimilation, in other words by the adaptations some immigrants and their children make to the mainstream in order to improve their opportunities, understood in the broadest sense. Some members of immigrant-origin minority groups eventually adapt to the dominant norms, values, and practices of receiving societies, changes that are often associated with the experience of upward mobility channeled through societal institutions. Indeed, socially mobile members of the second generations in the Netherlands are the most progressive members of their groups, thus bringing some mainstream values into their homes and communities. Not surprisingly, ambitious members of the second generation, who recognize that the gatekeepers impacting their chances to rise employ mainstream standards for assessing talent, accommodate themselves to an important degree to the mainstream culture, especially since, in general, this does not require wholesale abandonment of their familial and ethnic cultures.

How do the members of immigrant-origin groups experience increased internal diversification, caused by the assimilation of some? On the one hand, we know that this can produce painful forms of difference, for example incomprehension between children and parents who have received very different educations. On the other, we also know from the literature that differences among immigrants caused by the assimilation of some can be broadly welcomed: parents are proud that their children move up and into the mainstream, even when they move out of the neighborhood, stop speaking the homeland language and embrace the norms and values of the country of arrival.

Hence, this experience of diversity arises from processes of assimilation as well, which are not uniform within groups and introduce or exacerbate differences and inequalities among immigrants and their children, which range from different language competencies (in the mainstream language and the mother tongue) to different levels of educational credentials and occupational qualifications in the receiving society.

It is, however, not only the immigrant population that seems to recognize its experiences in the notion of super-diversity. Many in the native majority consider their country as increasingly diverse as well, and not all of them are pleased with this development. Some of the natives experience differences in everyday life, particularly when they live in disadvantaged neighborhoods or when they share institutions (schools, hospitals, the army) with immigrant and second-generation minorities. Others see these changes more from a distance—through the mass media.
Here, it is important once more to stress that the processes of immigrant and second-generation assimilation partly cause the experience of diversity in the mainstream: individuals of immigrant background now live almost everywhere (not only in the poor neighborhoods of the big cities), have various educational backgrounds, and move into diverse professions.

All citizens of Western countries are now very much aware that minorities are an important part of their societies. But does this awareness—driven by both demographic changes and processes of assimilation—necessarily tell us something about how these new groups are experienced and appreciated by natives? Writings on superdiversity seem to imply that the majority will get used to these differences, particularly where the majority group becomes a numerical minority itself.

Even though it is indeed the processes of assimilation that play a key role in increasing the frequency of interactions between the native population and (successful) immigrants and their children, many natives focus on what they see as the eruption of diversity in their daily lives and give less attention to the commonalities created by assimilation. Particularly when certain group characteristics are culturalized and politicized, individuals from certain immigrant backgrounds are viewed and treated as ‘different’, even when they themselves think and feel that they conform to the mainstream.

Assimilation therefore produces experiences of diversity within the mainstream, but these experiences are not uniform. In some contexts, people do not grow indifferent towards each other’s differences. On the contrary, they often remain aware and even wary of (alleged) differences. In such cases, it may appear that the ‘mainstream’ is expanding since newcomers share comparable socio-economic positions and socio-cultural convictions with the native group; but the appearance can be an illusion. In other contexts, the mainstream does actually expand, as social, cultural and relational boundaries between groups and between individuals blur, producing feelings of mutual acceptance. But, as the papers of this session emphasize, the opening of the mainstream is often very selective and the integration processes tell us more about the status quo in receiving countries than about the immigrants as such.