



# Working Papers

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## Money Matters:

### The Role of Funding in Migration Governance

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# The IMI<sup>n</sup> Working Papers Series

The IMI<sup>n</sup> working paper series presents current research in the field of international migration. The series was initiated by the International Migration Institute (IMI) since its foundation at the University in Oxford in 2006, and has been continued since 2017 by the International Migration Institute network (IMI<sup>n</sup>). The papers in this series (1) analyse migration as part of broader global change, (2) contribute to new theoretical approaches, and (3) advance understanding of the multi-level forces driving migration and experiences of migration.

## Abstract

Since the 1990s, the agencies of the United Nations (UN) have increasingly been financed through earmarked contributions from an increasingly diverse set of donors. Since the concept of voluntary contributions was absent from the UN charter owing to the concern that it would undermine multilateralism, current funding trends raise concerns about the functioning of the UN as a multilateral system. Despite this concern there is a limited but growing body of literature that examines the relationship between funding and governance. Taking migration as a case study, this paper uses a newly created data set of earmarked contributions to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) between 2000 and 2016 (n=13,306) to examine thematic and temporal patterns in the contributions of IOM's main donors. The fragmented nature of migration governance may well be a product of the earmarked nature of its funding, and, without concrete changes in how migration is financed, is likely to remain fragmented. However, this fragmentation can be viewed from two broad perspectives. On the negative side of the ledger, it may be observed that contributions to IOM have largely focused on issues relating to the management of certain aspects of migration that are reflective of the specific interests of its donors lending weight to the argument that the fragmented nature of global migration governance may be a product of the largely earmarked nature of migration financing which has allowed bilateral interests to dominate multilateral responses to migration issues. On the other hand, earmarked funding has arguably also allowed the international community to extend protection to displaced populations not covered by the refugee convention.

**Keywords:** migration; governance; international organizations; resources; funding; International Organization for Migration (IOM)

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# 1 Funding Multilateralism: A Changing Landscape

In the early days of the United Nations (UN), the principle of mandatory contributions was central to the idea of a multilateral system in which all members were to be considered equal, and decision-making designed to be a collective endeavour. Mandatory, often referred to as ‘assessed’ contributions are a legal obligation associated with membership and non-payment usually results in a penalty such as the removal of voting rights. Within the UN system, mandatory contributions are usually determined based on the ‘capacity-to-pay’ model, with contributions often capped at minimum and maximum levels to prevent freeriding and over influence respectively. The very notion of voluntary contributions was not present in the UN charter and early funding rules prohibited the earmarking of funds for fear that funding could be used by wealthier states to exercise influence over the UN (Graham, 2017a). Already in the first decade of the UN’s existence, however, programmes were created outside of the mandatory scheme and, by 1960, voluntary contributions exceeded mandatory contributions for the first time (Graham, 2015). While voluntary contributions were initially conceived of as a supplement to mandatory contributions, the main difference is that the volume and timing of contributions can be determined by the member state themselves allowing flexibility to amend contributions depending on national circumstances. The downside of this is that voluntary contributions are less predictable and there is no obligation to contribute.

In the 1980s, the United States of America (US) started to withhold its mandatory contributions to challenge the fact that the budget draft was created with only limited input from major donors and that, when voicing concerns about increasing budgets, were outvoted in plenary by other states. This led to a reform at the 1986 General Assembly whereby the US and other main funding states would be represented in the Committee on Programme and Coordination (CPC) and thus consulted earlier in the process of developing the programme and budget– ‘what had been achieved was functional equivalent of weighted voting’ (Taylor, 1991, p369). However, beyond this, the US also sought financial reform and began to determine the percentage of the assessed contribution that would be paid to an organization based on its compliance with desired financial reforms. This opened the door for more flexible funding arrangements for the UN system (Taylor, 1991).

While voluntary contributions were quick to overtake mandatory contributions in terms of volume, until the 1990s, these contributions were still primarily unrestricted, hereafter unearmarked, meaning that decisions regarding how the money was spent rested with the governing body of the recipient organization. In what Graham (2017a) describes as a ‘sea-change’ (p366), however, the 1990s witnessed a shift from unearmarked voluntary contributions towards the increasing use of earmarking stipulating how the contribution could be used. Between 1994 and 2009, unearmarked voluntary contributions were relatively stable, decreasing by just two percent. On the contrary, earmarked funds increased by more than 200 percent (Graham, 2015). Of the 49.3 billion USD contributed to the UN System in 2016, mandatory contributions represented less than a third (28.3%) of total revenue for organizations within the UN System, while voluntary contributions represented more than two thirds (64.3%) of total revenue. Voluntary contributions were predominantly earmarked, representing 84.1 percent of all voluntary contributions and more than half (54.1%) of all contributions to the UN system (CEB, 2018).

As voluntary funding increased, the pool of funders also widened. For example, funds from foundations, corporations and civil society represented 14 percent of all earmarked contributions to the UN system in 2013 compared to just 7.5 percent in 2010. Prior to 2010, and after 2013, the way in which funds from these sources are categorised changes making it ‘difficult and cumbersome’ to track trends over a longer time-period (Seitz and Martens, 2017, p46). In 2014 and 2015, global funds are added to this

category of financing which accounts for 10.6 percent of earmarked contributions in 2014 and 16.1 percent in 2015. It is not clear which specific source of financing accounts for the drop in 2014, however, global funds such as the ‘Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria’ have become an increasingly important funding instrument accounting for eight billion USD in 2016 (Reinsberg, 2017). Global funds are ‘governed by independent boards in which donor countries control a majority of the votes... (and) act outside the established multilaterals but contract the latter as their implementing agencies’ (Reinsberg, 2017, p85).

The growing shift towards an increasingly reliance on voluntary earmarked resources from a broader range of funders has been viewed as both a challenge and as an opportunity for the UN. On one hand, the allowance of voluntary funds has allowed the UN to grow beyond levels sustainable by mandatory financing alone. However, while voluntary funds allow flexibility, they are also and more vulnerable to fluctuations due to political and economic factors (Seitz and Martens, 2017). Secretary General, Antonio Guterres recently called for a Funding Compact for the implementation of the SDGs to, among other objectives, improve the ‘*predictability* of resources’ (UN, 2018; own emphasis). This includes a request to increase core<sup>1</sup> resources from 21.7 to 30 percent and to double the share of non-core pooled funds from eight to 16 percent (UN, 2018).

Responding to these challenges, this paper examines the relationship between funding and migration governance taking the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as a case study to explore the following overarching research question:

*How do changing trends in the financing of intergovernmental organizations affect their behaviour and what implications does this have for migration governance?*

The research question requires deconstruction to avoid conceptual ambiguities. The first inherent assumption embodied in the research question is that intergovernmental organizations can act independently exercising influence over their creators (member states). While realist scholars tend to view intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as creations of states with little importance as independent actors (Keohane and Nye, 1974; Mearsheimer, 1994), there is an increasing body of literature that recognises IGOs as independent actors (c.f. Huntington, 1973; Merlingen, 2003). Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, in their 2004 book, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*, were particularly influential in drawing attention to the behaviour of IGOs and their ability to influence states. This debate has created space for research which examines the bidirectional power relationship between states and IGOs making it interesting to explore the factors that may influence this relationship.

The second assumption is that financing is a key factor influencing the behaviour of IGOs and thus their capacity to exert influence of governance. Researchers interested in understanding the behaviour of IGOs often study funding patterns, using money as a proxy for ‘institutional multilateralism’ (Keohane, 1990, p741); ‘bureaucratic autonomy’ (Ege and Bauer, 2017, p75) or the ‘exercise of power’ (Browne, 2017, p37). One pragmatic reason is that funding is empirically observable and with advancements in the standardization of accounting regulations (for example, in 2006 the UN adopted the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS)), increasingly comparable. However, examining funding also serves to fill a research gap where ‘the link between the formal delegation of power and IO’s actual

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<sup>1</sup> Another way of distinguishing between funding types is core and non-core. Core funding represents funding that is unearmarked, thus mandatory assessed contributions plus non-earmarked voluntary contributions, while non-core funds are earmarked contributions (Graham, 2015).

power to shape global governance outcomes has remained unclear due to a limited focus on IO capabilities' (Heldt & Schmidtke, 2017, p52).

In order to address the research question, the remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Having already established that the financing of IGOs has generally shifted from mandatory to voluntary contributions, with an increasingly wide pool of funders, the next section reviews theoretical and empirical research examining the relationship between funding and governance models. In the remainder of the paper, a newly created dataset on earmarked contributions to IOM from 2000 until 2016 (n=13,306) is used to empirically explore trends in financing in the area of migration.

## 2 The Implication of Funding for Governance

Broad changes in the financing landscape have undoubtedly influenced the behaviour of IGOs in different ways. For example, an increase in voluntary funds can lead to loss of oversight over the activities of an IGO leading to fragmentation, short-term thinking and incoherence as well as the additional bureaucracy associated with reporting to multiple funders (Ege and Bauer, 2017; Seitz and Martens, 2017). However, the main argument put forth in the literature regarding the challenges of voluntary funding relate to their effect on governance models.

Governance within formal IOs such as the UN and Bretton Woods institutions is widely described as multilateral<sup>2</sup> since member states have voting rights and through formal governing bodies, collective decisions are made thus subsuming the interests of more powerful Member States (Keohane, 1990; Ruggie, 1992; Browne, 2017). However, authors such as Graham (2015) argues that funding rules disrupt the functioning of a multilateral system since it necessarily creates new governing relationships between funders and IOs that often circumvent formal governing bodies. The main argument being forwarded here can be best understood from the perspective of the principal-agent problem. One of the main features of multilateralism is the existence of a *collective principal* that exercises control over an *agent*. In this context, the collective principal is the governing body of the IGO which consists of Member States and the agent is the remainder of the organization. The governing body makes collective decisions about the IGO's activities and is composed of 'equal' members each possessing one vote. In cases where funding comes from a wide range of sources, one can easily conceive of a situation in which there are *multiple principals*, each able to exert influence over an agent (Graham, 2015).

Graham (2015) argues that different categories of funding have different implications for governance models based on three key areas of difference: 1) the ability to allocate contributions across member states and determine budget size; 2) the ability to distribute funds and create programmes; and 3) the ability to judge the effectiveness of these programmes and exercise financial accountability. Mandatory contributions fit well into a collective principal model whereby each of these abilities are retained by the governing body and as such is well aligned with multilateral principles. For voluntary contributions, this picture is less clear and the ability to allocate contributions and determine budget size as well as the ability to judge the effectiveness of programmes and ensure financial accountability is transferred to the contributors of the funds, whether member states or other actors. For non-earmarked

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<sup>2</sup> Keohane (1990) defines multilateralism as "the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions" (Keohane, 1990, p731). Ruggie (1992) adds that, "what is distinctive about multilateralism is not merely that it coordinates national policies in groups of three or more states...but that it does so on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations among those states" (Ruggie, 1992, p567).

contributions, the governing body retains the ability to distribute funds and create programmes, however for earmarked contributions, this ability is also lost. Thus, voluntary funding rules are much more likely to create scenarios where the agent (the IO) is ‘governed’ by multiple principals (member states and other actors) thus undermining its multilateral character.

The argument that increased earmarked funding from diverse sources undermines multilateralism finds broad support in the academic literature (Goetz and Patz, 2017; Graham, 2017b). However, the implications of these shifts are viewed differently. On one hand, the disruption of multilateralism through changing funding patterns can result in institutions reflecting existing power relations (Browne, 2017). In other words, powerful Member States, able to make substantial earmarked contributions, can dictate the direction that an organization takes to reflect their own national interests. Sridar and Woods (2013), for example, coin the term ‘trojan multilateralism’ to describe the effect that earmarked funding has in allowing bilateral interests to enter the multilateral system; and Kahler (1992) writes of ‘minilateral “great power” collaboration within multilateral institutions’ (p862)

Others frame these shifts in more neutral, or even positive ways. Moisés Naím (2009) famously described minilateralism as ‘the magic number to get real international action’. The late Sir Peter Sutherland also drew inspiration from Naím, viewing minilateralism as a solution to an impasse among Member States on certain aspects of migration governance:

‘That is why I suggest tackling problems at the lowest level where they can be solved. Sometimes that means the local or national level, but on some issues States need to work together, bilaterally, at the regional or even the global level —seizing on the initiatives of pioneers and champions, and working through what has been called “minilateralism”, whereby small groups of interested States work together to develop and implement new ideas that can then be debated, and perhaps adopted, in more formal settings’ (United Nations, 2017, p30)

In other words, ‘flexible funding rules that offer greater donor control allow supporters of the expansion the ability to pursue the broader IO agenda they prefer without provoking opposition from member states that hold more conservative preferences’ (Graham, 2017a, p367-368). Another argument that can be made, however, is that a broader set of funders and more flexible funding rules can also reduce the influence of traditional funders (Michawlowa, 2017; Heldt and Schmidtke, 2017). Through a longitudinal study exploring changes in funding rules within the UN, Graham (2017a) argues that the origin of restricted voluntary funding actually originated from cases where strong states were preventing movement in a particular direction and draws attention to the role of the Netherlands in conditioning funding to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to finance technical cooperation on industrial development, a topic that was otherwise at a stalemate between the US and the USSR.

Funding diversification can also be viewed as an opportunity for IOs, allowing them to grow and to exert influence over member states: ‘IO staff are empowered to appeal directly and strategically to narrow but powerful audiences in ways that benefit the organization by increasing funding and the scope of agent activities’ (Graham, 2015, p188). Using staffing data from a sample of 15 IGOs, Ege and Bauer (2017) find a positive correlation between voluntary funding and staffing levels whereby a one million dollar increase in voluntary funding results in an increase of 1.68 staff members. Heldt and Schmidtke (2017) use staff numbers as a proxy of an organization’s power based on the theoretical argument that more staff (specifically permanent staff) means more capabilities, which in turn increases the ability of the organization to exercise influence over other parties.

While this argumentation focuses on the staff as a proxy of organizational capacities, voluntary contributions can also allow the ‘placement’ of a donor’s nationals within an organization which can also be a means of influencing an organization. Using a negative binomial regression model with data from UNICEF, UNDP, UN-AIDs and UNFPA, Thorvaldsdottir (2016) finds that being a major donor country increases the number of staff with that nationality in an organization by 23 percent. He uses this to argue that voluntary contributions are an avenue through which member states exercise influence over IGOs. This argument does however assume that individual staff members are able to exercise influence over the direction of the organization and therefore, while correlation is established for the selected IGOs, it is much more challenging to prove that having more staff from a country translates into greater influence over the direction of the organization. Due to the small sample of IGOs, it is also not clear how generalizable these findings are. For example, in 2015, the top ten nationalities represented among UNHCR staff were primarily countries that either produce or host large number of refugees as oppose to those that provided most of its funds<sup>3</sup>.

### 3 Migration as a Case Study

While the effects of funding trends on governance are complex and bidirectional in terms of relationships of influence between states (and other actors) and IGOs, the broad theoretical argument being made is that, *ceteris paribus*, the higher the proportion of earmarked funding in a specific area, the more likely governance in that specific area will be fragmented. It is well recognised in the literature that international migration governance is fragmented (cf. Aleinikoff, 2007; Betts, 2011; Koser, 2010, Thouez, 2018). A few reasons are cited in the literature in explanation for this fragmentation. State sovereignty is perhaps the most common cited justification for state reluctance. Another commonly cited argument point to the role of Cold War politics in the establishment of the institutions that comprise the main actors in today’s migration landscape (cf. Karitani, 2005; Long, 2013). Differing interests between countries of origin, and countries of destination, with the former wanting more opportunities to migrate; and the latter often wanting to restrict migration have also hindered international cooperation on migration (cf. Hansen, 2011). However, scant attention has been given to empirically examining the relationship between the funding of IGOs and migration governance.

Furthermore, migration is an interesting case study for several reasons. Graham (2017a) argues that contentious topics are more likely to be funded through voluntary contributions. Migration is an area where there are often clear differences between the interests of countries of destination (primarily donor states) and countries of origin (primarily recipient states) (Betts, 2011). Additionally, Michawlowa (2017) argues that the effects of earmarked contributions are likely to be higher in two specific scenarios. First, when earmarked funds represent a high proportion of the income of the organization. In 2016, 64.3 percent of the contributions to organizations in the UN System were voluntary of which 84.1 percent were earmarked. Apart from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (refugees and other displaced populations), the International Labour Organization (ILO) (labour migrants) and IOM (from September 2016), no UN agency had a concrete mandate to work on migration issues. For IOM, 97.2 percent of its revenue in 2016 came from voluntary contributions, of which 99.5 percent were earmarked. For UNHCR, 98.7 percent of its revenue in 2016 was voluntary

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<sup>3</sup> The countries with the higher numbers of their nationals employed at UNHCR in 2015 were Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, France, Jordan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan (CEB, 2018b). The main donors to UNHCR in the same year were United States of America (45.3%), the United Kingdom (8.8%), Japan (5.8%), Germany (4.8%), Kuwait (4.1%), Sweden (3.7%), Norway (3.0%), Denmark (2.5%), the Netherlands (2.4%), and Canada (2.3%) contributing 82.7% of the total contributions (UNHCR, 2015).



contributions, of which a slightly smaller share (81.8%) was earmarked. ILO received much smaller share of voluntary funding (37.7%), all of which was earmarked, and a much larger share of mandatory funding (59.5%).

While IOM, UNHCR and ILO have a concrete mandate to work on migration issues, many other UN agencies work on migration issues, evidenced by the significant growth of the Global Migration Group (GMG) from six members at its creation as the Geneva Migration Group in 2003, to 22 members in 2018<sup>4</sup>. This brings us to Michawlowa's (2017) second argument: that the effects of earmarked contributions will be higher where funding is limited and finite since organizations will compete for resources. While it is challenging to make overall statements about trends in migration financing (Rosengaertner, 2017), it is evident that there is both increasing funding for migration (den Hertog, 2017) and given the sheer number of actors with an interest in migration, competition seems inevitable.

While many organizations have substantial technical portfolios on migration related topics, and it would be ideal to conduct an analysis of changing trends for migration as a thematic area, this is challenging for a number of reasons. First, there is no existing source of data on migration-related expenditure for all GMG members. For most members, migration is not a strategic priority for the organization and thus, even internally, tracking migration-related work can be challenging. Alternative sources of data, such as national reports on financial contributions to IGOs also have limitations. The US, as the largest government donor to the UN, has only relatively recently started to publish data on its contributions to international organizations at the project level. Furthermore, since migration expenditure 'straddles public and private resources, domestic and external spending, and development, humanitarian and security cooperation' (Rosengaertner, 2017, p141), databases on 'bilateral aid'<sup>5</sup> such as OECD's Aids Activity Database also only provide a partial overview of migration related contributions.

However, IOM financial reports provide disaggregated project level data on all earmarked funding received by donor which is the source of the analysis presented in the remainder of the paper. The drawback of not being able to include other IGOs in the analysis is that the focus necessarily becomes about the behaviour of the organization, as opposed to the behaviour of states in their relations with IGOs. However, even in the absence of concrete data on the sources of migration funding within these organizations, given shrinking core budgets, it seems fair to assume organizations without a mandate on migration would be less likely to allocate significant amounts of their core funding to migration related activities. The focus on IOM is therefore, in part, pragmatic. However, it is also relevant.

In September 2016 IOM joined the UN as a related agency, 65 years after its deliberate creation outside of the UN system. IOM began its life at the Migration Conference of Brussels on 5 December 1951 as the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME). The original purpose of the organization was to provide operational support to the newly established United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in achieving its normative protection mandate by facilitating 'the orderly migration of large numbers of displaced, unemployed or under-employed persons in Western Europe' (Carlin, 1989, p35). ILO's proposal to take on this function, as it had previously done in the 1920s for Nansen, the first High Commissioner for Refugees under the

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<sup>4</sup> The Global Migration Group is an inter-agency mechanism through which the heads of international organizations (mostly UN agencies) meet to coordinate on matters related to international migration. It is unclear whether the GMG will continue operations in light of the UN Migration Network endorsed by the recently adopted Global Compact on Migration.

<sup>5</sup> The OECD defines earmarked contributions by member states as 'bilateral aid' (Graham, 2015). Specifically money channelled through multilateral organizations but intended for a specific purpose is categorized as 'multi-bi aid' (Eichenauer & Reinsberg, 2014, p4).

League of Nations, had been rejected at an intergovernmental conference held in Italy earlier that year – largely due to opposition from the United States of America (Perruchoud, 1989). A Congressional Decision released shortly after the conference made US objections to ILO's involvement clear:

“The US Congress was not prepared to release \$10 million in funding to an organization whose members included the Soviet bloc states Czechoslovakia and Poland, and instead favoured the establishment of a much more tightly controlled inter-governmental—rather than international—organization which would focus solely on the transportation of migrants and refugees” (Long, 2013, p18)

Over time, IOM grew, losing its provisional status (1952) and European focus (1989) and expanding from an initial membership of 16 in 1951 to 169 as of December 2017. Despite the significant growth of the organization, little academic attention was given to IOM prior to 2010. As Feldblum (1999) argues, as ‘a creation of cold war politics, (the organization) was largely dominated by US interests and has been dismissed by scholars as a significant international actor in its own right’ (p5). It was generally thought of as little more than a ‘travel agency’ (Feldblum, 1999; Elie, 2010; Caillault, 2012). Yet there have been increasing calls for the more substantial investigation of IOM (Elie, 2010; Andrijasevic & Walters, 2010).

While a burgeoning body of literature on IOM has emerged since 2010, the majority of these studies have focused on a specific aspect of IOM's work, for example: in implementing information campaigns (Nieuwenhuys & Pécoud, 2007; Pécoud, 2010); human trafficking (Schatral, 2011) and irregular migration (Caillault, 2012; Brachet, 2016); return migration (Caillault, 2012; Collyer, 2012); temporary migration (Valarezo, 2015; Gabriel & MacDonald, 2017); or border control (Frowd, 2014) using primarily qualitative methods (archival analysis, ethnography and key informant interviews). While many of these studies indirectly discuss IOM as a governance actor, there has been limited attention given to the role of IGOs more broadly, and IOM specifically, in migration governance that connects to broader literature on the behaviour of IGOs<sup>6</sup>.

## 4 Methodology

There are also methodological challenges associated with analysing the relationship between funding and influence. First, while money may be earmarked for a specific purpose, the way it is spent may vary according to the interests of the specific implementers and beneficiaries. Wunderlich (2012), for example, examines the bridging role played by, particularly IOM, in Ukraine and Morocco, in translating the interests of the European Commission into project proposals that make sense for both the local context and the organization. While beyond the scope of this paper, which looks at broad trends in the thematic contribution patterns of IOM's main donors, it is important to remain aware that, where money is channelled for use in a specific geographical area, that influence can still be exerted over the way that it is used. Furthermore, money is fungible; it can be reallocated. It is too simplistic to argue that funding shapes the preferences of recipients, since we do not have a counterfactual - how they would have allocated their resources in the absence of donor funds. As Michaelowa (2017) illustrates: ‘when donors build a road, the government may just build one road less’ (p116). A further challenge relates to causality. Do changes in funds affect the behaviour of IGOs, or does the behaviour of IGOs influence funding patterns or do these processes exist in parallel mutually reinforcing one another (Michaelowa, 2017)? In other words, one might expect that increased funding for a particular dimension of migration such as human trafficking or refugee assistance would correspond to a change in the

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<sup>6</sup> Some notable exceptions include Betts (2011), Hall (2013, 2015), Pécoud (2010) and Fine and Pécoud (2018).

activities of an organization. However, one might equally expect that an IGO interested in expanding may also seek to influence the agenda of a funder through creating narratives and defining specific policy problems to which the organization can respond (Broome and Seabrooke, 2013). Again this issue falls beyond the scope of this paper.

With these limitations in mind, I compiled data from IOM's annual financial reports from 2000 until 2016. The time-period was selected since it represents the timeframe during which migration has received increased attention within the UN (cf. Martin, 2014; Betts and Kainz, 2017, Thouez, 2018; McGregor, forthcoming) and, pragmatically, also the timeframe within which digital financial reports are readily available. It also includes some important events which one might expect to influence migration patterns and subsequently migration financing including the tail end of the Yugoslav Wars, the post 9/11 war on terror, EU enlargement, the financial crisis of 2007-2008, and the Arab Spring and subsequent conflict in Syria.

The data covers a few key areas including:

- Assessed contributions by Member State;
- Voluntary contributions (earmarked and non-earmarked) by Member State and other donor categories;
- Project descriptions (n=13,306) for all voluntary earmarked contributions made by Member States plus the European Union (until 2005) and European Commission (from 2006). This includes refunds.

To analyse trends in contribution patterns, project level descriptions were coded into different categories:


1. **General activities** (capacity building; consultations and meetings; policy development; research; staff and offices; and gender mainstreaming).
2. Activities targeted at a **specific category of migrant** (refugees, IDPs, asylum seekers, irregular migrants, labour migrants, returnees, victims of human trafficking)
3. Activities targeted at a **specific thematic area** (health; youth and education; integration; livelihood interventions; development, post conflict/disaster reconstruction)
4. Activities targeted at a **specific event** that causes displacement (natural disasters, emergency responses)
5. Activities targeted at **managing migration flows** (migration management and specifically border controls, information campaigns and transportation.
6. **Special initiatives** (elections, reparation/compensation schemes)

The codebook used to categorise projects can be found in Annex 1. More than half of the projects (51.6%) were labelled with one category, a third (32.9%) to two categories, 12 percent to three categories and just over three percent to four or more categories. Just over four percent of the projects could not be assigned to a category. This was largely due to broad and/or unclear descriptions although a manual review of these projects did not identify any significant patterns that may introduce omission bias to the analysis. The main reason for overlap related to projects that were targeted at a specific category of migrant as well as to a specific event for example a US funded initiative in 2016 is described as 'improving the conditions of vulnerable internally displaced persons, returnees and host community members in northern Mali through the displacement tracking matrix and return information, support for Protection assistance and referral systems'. This project involves capacity building, data collection and analysis (research) and targets IDPs and returnees. While it is important to be aware that the categories are non-exclusive, the purpose of coding is to identify whether there are any patterns in terms of what specific Member States fund and whether this changes over time.

## 5 IOM: Where does the money come from?

Figure 1 maps IOM’s reported revenue from 2000 until 2016. While mandatory contributions more than doubled in this time, this is primarily due to membership expansion. In 2000, IOM had 79 members compared to 166 in 2016. However, mandatory contributions pale in comparison to voluntary contributions. Non-earmarked voluntary contributions, although on average representing less than one percent of voluntary contributions, have remained relatively constant and are consistently provided by a small sample of Member States most notably the US, Austria and Belgium and, until 2006, Switzerland. Voluntary earmarked contributions, however, are clearly the most important source of revenue for IOM, accounting for between 91 and 97 percent of total revenue. Voluntary contributions have generally increased over time, however, are subject to more fluctuations than other sources of revenue. The largest percentage increase took place between 2003 and 2004 where revenue increased by 56 percent (245 million USD) however in absolute terms, voluntary contributions grew by a further 272 million USD the following year representing a 40 percent increase. The largest growth in voluntary revenue in absolute terms occurred between 2009 and 2010 when revenue increased by 334 million USD (34%). The largest downward trend took place between 2005 and 2006 when voluntary earmarked contributions decreased by 27% (over 250 million USD).

Figure 1: IOM Revenue by Category, 2000-2016




Source: Data Compiled from IOM Financial Reports

The most significant source of voluntary earmarked contributions to IOM are Member States (

Figure 2). Other sources of revenue include non-member states (primarily Gulf countries but also China prior to joining the organization in 2016), UN and other international organizations, refugee loan repayments, specific funds and interest income. The majority of the 2003-2005 increase can be explained by growth in non-Member State contributions. For example, contributions from the European Union tripled from 26.9 million USD in 2003 to 83.0 million USD in 2005. The main reason for this increase was an expansion in the number of EU Electoral Observation Missions that were organized through IOM however projects relating to return also increased in the same period. Additionally, a significant source of revenue for IOM in 2005 was the Foundation “Remembrance and Responsibility”, which financed a compensation programme for former slave and forced labourer and others affected by

the Nazi regime. IOM was one of seven partner organizations and was responsible for processing compensation claims from non-Jewish victims around the world (excluding the Czech Republic, Poland and the Republics of the former Soviet Union) (IOM, 2005). In 2005, IOM received 306 million USD from the Foundation, explaining a large part of revenue increase in that year and the subsequent decrease between 2005 and 2006 when IOM received approximately 37 million from the Foundation. Between 2009 and 2010, almost half of the increase in earmarked revenue can be attributed to major community and economic development projects in Peru (USD 158 million) and Argentina (USD 11 million) and considerable support for disaster response in Haiti (USD 60 million) and Pakistan (USD 14 million).

Figure 2: Earmarked Income for IOM, 2000-2016




Source: Data Compiled from IOM Financial Reports

Between 2000 and 2016, almost four fifths (77.9%) of IOM’s earmarked contributions from Member States came from high income countries, just short of a fifth from upper middle-income countries (18.7%) and the remaining three percent from lower middle or low-income countries (Figure 3). The sharp decline in voluntary earmarked contributions from lower middle incomes and corresponding increase in contributions from upper middle-income countries in 2008 is primarily explained by the fact that Peru and Colombia (two of IOM’s largest contributors of earmarked contributions) moved income classification in 2008 from lower to upper middle income. However, a further 13 upper middle-income countries joined IOM between 2008 and 2016 and several countries also transitioned from being lower middle-income countries to being upper middle-income countries<sup>7</sup>. The increase in contributions from

<sup>7</sup> The following 13 upper middle-income countries joined IOM in between 2008 and 2016: China, Saint Lucia and Tuvalu (2016); Fiji, the Marshall Islands, and FYR Macedonia (2014); Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname (2013), Seychelles and the Maldives (2012), Botswana (2011) and Namibia (2009). The following 14 Member States became upper middle-income countries between 2008 and 2016: Nauru and Samoa (2016); Georgia (2015); Paraguay (2014); Belize and Thailand (2012); Ecuador (2010); the Islamic Republic of Iran and Azerbaijan (2009); and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Algeria, the Dominican Republic, Peru and Colombia (2008). Jordan became an upper middle-income country in 2010, although reverted back to being a lower middle income country in 2016.

low income countries in 2011 represents a 36.9 million USD contribution from Bangladesh for the repatriation and reintegration of Bangladeshi returnees from Libya.

Figure 3: Voluntary Earmarked Contributions by Income Classification, 2000-2016



Source: Data Compiled from IOM Financial Reports and World Bank Development Indicators

The top 10 Member State contributors of earmarked income to IOM based on their average annual voluntary earmarked contribution between 2000 and 2016 were the United States of America, Peru, Australia, Colombia, the United Kingdom (UK), Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden (Table 1). Although not a Member State, the European Union (until 2005) and the European Commission (from 2006), is an important contributor of earmarked funds to IOM allocating an average of 72.8 million USD per year between 2000 and 2016, making it, after the United States of America (259.3 million USD) and Peru (74.7 million USD), one of the largest contributors to the organization. Combined, the EU and the top 10 Member States contributed 68.3 percent of all IOM's voluntary contributions, and 86.6 percent of voluntary contributions from Member States (plus the EU).

Table 1: Top Member States Contributors of Earmarked Funding to IOM

Country	Average Annual Voluntary Earmarked Contributions to IOM (USD) (2000-2016)
<b>United States of America</b>	259,345,542
<b>Peru</b>	74,721,559
<i>EU/EC</i>	72,815,652
<b>Australia</b>	46,770,496
<b>Colombia</b>	45,683,350
<b>United Kingdom</b>	37,437,579
<b>Japan</b>	28,464,262
<b>Canada</b>	28,019,535
<b>Netherlands</b>	20,420,357
<b>Germany</b>	18,808,267
<b>Sweden</b>	16,264,388

However, only looking at the average annual voluntary contributions masks variation in how these contributions are allocated over time. Charting the contributions by each of the Top 10 Member States between 2000 and 2016 highlights some interesting trends (see Annex 2). For example, for Peru, Colombia, Japan and Germany, contributions are concentrated in specific time periods whereas the United States of America and Canada follow a general upward trend. Other countries have more erratic contribution patterns. These patterns reflect the volatility of voluntary contributions which, as the theoretical arguments outlined in the previous section, may have implications for job security and fragmentation in service delivery.

## **6 IOM: How is the money earmarked?**

Next to fluctuations in terms of absolute contributions to IOM, there is also variation in the thematic earmarking behaviour of Member States. Table 1

Table 2 presents the percentage totals contributed by each of the top 10 Member State contributors plus the European Union and European Commission between 2000 and 2016 to the top 10 thematic areas of work. This highlights several differences between the earmarking preferences of IOM's main contributors of earmarked contributions. Some countries exhibit very clear preferences in their earmarking behaviour and others have more diverse portfolios. For example, the US and Canada earmark a far larger proportions of their contributions towards refugee related projects, primarily resettlement, while EU Member States show a clear tendency towards the financing of projects related to return, primarily through different forms of assisted voluntary return programmes targeted primarily at rejected asylum seekers. A possible explanation for this difference is that EU Member States receive a proportionally higher number of asylum seekers whilst the US has historically provided the largest number of resettlement places for refugees. Australia's portfolio is more diverse but with a clear preference for using IOM's services in the area of irregular migration, with refugee resettlement captured under transportation costs. Peru and Colombia, both upper middle-income countries, stand out since, in the case of Peru, the primary focus is on capacity building and infrastructure, and for Colombia on 'youth and education' and IDPs. In the case of Colombia this makes a degree of sense given the country context and overrepresentation of young people among those displaced by ongoing internal conflict in the country, however, the Peruvian case is more puzzling with most funds targeting large scale construction projects in the country. The following paragraphs elaborate on some of these variations in more detail focusing primarily on three broad areas of activity: refugee and emergency assistance; return; and migration and development but also highlighting other key features of the earmarked contributions of IOM's top Member State contributors.

**Table 2 Percentage Contributions by Top 10 Thematic Areas, 2000-2016<sup>8</sup>**

	Capacity Building	Return	Refugee	Transport*	Emergency	Post-Crisis	Infrastructure	IDPs	Youth and Education	Natural Disaster	Health	Irregular Migration
<b>TOTAL</b>	19.6	18	17.2	4.0	13.5	11.8	6.6	6.4	6.3	4.7	4.6	3.6
<b>US</b>	9.0	7.3	41.1	1.1	12.1	20.4	5.6	6	4.4	3.9	5.5	0.6
<b>Peru</b>	85.0	0	0	0	0.4	11.8	27.4	0	0.5	0	<0.1	0
<b>EU/EC</b>	18.5	13.4	4.5	2.6	27.9	6.5	0.7	9.1	2.1	7.1	1.6	1.4
<b>Australia</b>	4.1	18.4	3.1	14	4.7	3.8	0.4	3.2	1.0	2.7	11.3	36.3
<b>Colombia</b>	22.7	1.9	<0.1	0	11.6	11.4	14.7	28.3	51.5	6.7	8.2	<0.1
<b>UK</b>	8.8	46.9	6.2	2.2	31.4	4.6	0.3	5.4	4.9	13	3.1	7.6
<b>Japan</b>	19.5	22.7	4	2.7	32.5	17.3	1.7	8.5	7.9	18.3	2.7	1.3
<b>Canada</b>	8.8	6.3	32.3	34.7	21.2	4.2	3.4	3.3	2.2	6	2.3	2.4
<b>Netherlands</b>	9.0	67.4	1.6	2.0	8.9	4.2	0.4	3.6	3.4	1.6	4.0	2.6
<b>Germany</b>	1.8	70.0	1.3	1.4	13.7	8.9	0.4	5.7	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.3
<b>Sweden</b>	8.3	24.2	12.0	7.5	19.9	1.0	0	9.1	4.7	6.6	19.1	1.0

## 7 Refugees and Emergency Assistance

### *United States of America*

The United States of America is by far the largest contributor to IOM, consistently providing more than a third of the organization’s voluntary earmarked revenue from Member-States. Earmarked contributions to IOM have generally increased each year, increasing more than tenfold between 2000 and 2016 (from 50 million USD to more than 500 million in 2016). The decrease between 2011 and 2013 is largely due to the closure of several large emergency assistance programmes tied to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and floods in Pakistan. Between a third and a half of US annual earmarked contributions were channelled to the US Refugee Programme (


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<sup>8</sup> Transportation is included as an 11<sup>th</sup> category and situated next to refugees for the reason that some countries may employ the services of IOM in the resettlement of refugees without specifying this in the project title labelling contributions as ‘Reimbursable Transportation Costs’. This is true for Canada, where only 13.6 percent of projects are categorized as both ‘refugee’ and ‘transport’. Thus, the overall importance of refugee resettlement is far larger than the 32.3 percent coded as ‘refugee’. Simply merging these categories, however, would obfuscate projects which deal with transportation of other groups such as IDPs, or those displaced by natural disasters. This is one of the complexities of using non-exclusive categories and needs to be taken into account when interpreting the results presented in the paper.



Figure 4) which funds the resettlement of refugees to the US. The remaining funding is often directed to support in emergency situations such as the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the earthquake in Haiti and floods in Pakistan in 2010, typhoon Haiyan which struck the Philippines in 2013, the 2014 outbreak of Ebola in West Africa. The US also often funds projects related to post-emergency and post-conflict reconstruction.

Figure 4: Earmarked Contributions to IOM by the United States, 2000-2016



Source: Data Compiled from IOM Financial Reports

### *Canada*

Although on a smaller scale, Canada, as the seventh largest contributor to IOM exhibits a similar pattern as the US. The majority of Canada’s earmarked contributions are also targeted towards the resettlement of refugees in Canada with the clear majority representing reimbursable transportation costs but also contributions for the long running Canadian Orientation Abroad Programme (2001-present) and the Canadian Resettlement Programme (2011-present). The peak in 2016 relates primarily to increased contributions in response to the Syrian crisis including a 28 million USD contribution towards the emergency evacuation of Syrians to Canada. Next to refugee assistance, Canada also regularly enlists the services of IOM to assist in contexts afflicted by natural disasters such as the Haitian earthquake and Pakistani floods.

### *Australia*

While not the focus of Australia’s earmarked contributions, the country channelled a significant portion of its earmarked contributions to IOM towards the resettlement of refugees to Australia, with transportation costs alone amounting to over 100 USD million between 2000 and 2016 with further contributions channelled towards the provision of health screenings and cultural orientation courses for Australian bound refugees. The focus of Australia was tackling irregular migration, contributing almost two thirds (63.2%) of the 457 million USD allocated to irregular migration between 2000 and 2016 and representing over a third (36.2%) of the country’s earmarked allocations. A large part of Australia’s contributions was allocated to the processing of Australia-bound irregular migrants between 2001 and 2008 (149.4 million USD) as well as to the return of irregular migrants from Indonesia (76.3 million USD).

### *Japan*

Although Japan only became a member of the IOM in 1993, an office was established in Tokyo in 1981 to provide support for the resettlement of Indochinese refugees. It is likely that, the perceived success of IOM's activities in Vietnam, as well as the organizations role in repatriating migrant worker from Kuwait after the Iraq invasion in 1991, were influential in Japan's decision to join the organization. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the focus of Japan's earmarked contributions to IOM relate to emergency situations with peaks in 2005 (Indian Ocean tsunami), 2010 (floods in Pakistan and earthquake in Haiti) and 2016 (emergency assistance to displaced persons in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Syria).


### *European Union/European Commission*

After the United States and Peru, the European Union (EU) (until 2005) and the European Commission (EC) (from 2006) represented IOM's third largest contributor of earmarked contributions, amounting to over 1.2 billion USD between 2000 and 2016. Compared to individual Member States, however, as the following paragraphs will demonstrate, the EU/EC have earmarked a smaller share of their total earmarked contributions to IOM for return, representing 13.4 percent of overall contributions or 123.8 million USD, almost equal to its contribution towards EU electoral observations missions (12.5%). A much larger share (27.9%) of the EU/EC's contributions have targeted emergency assistance for 'stranded migrants' in Lebanon, Libya and Greece, as well as those affected by natural disasters in countries such as Haiti, the Philippines and Pakistan. In the past four years, EC contributions have increased significantly considering increased arrivals of persons seeking asylum. This is reflected in a significant increase in emergency funds allocated between 2013 and 2016 but also in contributions towards capacity building in the area of migration management in the countries with external EU borders or neighbouring the EU as well as those hosting a large number of refugees (specifically Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey).

## **8 Return**

Four European countries appear in the top ten Member State contributors to IOM: the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden. For all four Member States, the main thematic area to which earmarked contributions were directed was return. For Germany and the Netherlands this represented more than two thirds of their contributions to the organization between 2000 and 2016 (70% and 67% respectively). For the UK, return represented almost half of their contributions (47%) and for Sweden, almost a quarter (24%). Although these four countries represented the largest contributors in absolute terms, it is evident that return is a primarily European concern, with approximately 40 percent of all European funded earmarked projects pertaining to return compared to just 8 percent for all other Member States (figure 5)

Figure 5: Proportion of Earmarked Contributions among EU28+3 Allocated to Return, 2000-2016



Source: Data Compiled from IOM Financial Reports

Next to a shared focus on return, however, there are differences in the types of interventions that Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden fund through IOM.

### *Netherlands*

The Return of Asylum Seekers from the Netherlands Programme (REAN) accounted for 40.6 percent (141.0 million USD) of the Netherlands' contributions to IOM and receiving an average of 8.3 million USD in funding each year between 2000 and 2016. In addition to this, the Netherlands also funds several smaller programmes for returnees including Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) but also several targeted return and reintegration (R&R) programmes usually targeted at specific populations (such as unaccompanied minors, or Afghans) and programmes targeting the return (often temporary) of qualified experts.

Next to return projects, the Dutch government also channelled a significant proportion of its earmarked contributions towards capacity building projects, primarily relating to law enforcement. Between 2003 and 2015, the Dutch government allocated 21.9 million USD to ongoing capacity building work with the Indonesian National Police Force. Furthermore, the Dutch government also earmarked contributions for emergency assistance to IDPs primarily in Iraq between 2003 and 2010 (6.6 million USD) but also to Sri Lanka in 2009 and 2010 (3.6 million USD).

### *Germany*

While the Netherlands has consistently funded return through IOM between 2000 and 2016, Germany's contributions were concentrated into two time periods. In 2000, Germany contributed 44.1 million USD to IOM (13.8% of its contributions between 2000 and 2016) primarily for the return of Kosovars. In 2016, Germany contributed 74.6 million to IOM, representing almost a quarter (23.3%) of its contributions since 2000. Most of these funds were channelled through the 'Reintegration and Emigration of Asylum Seekers from Germany (REAG/GARP)' programme, which peaked in 2000 at 39.9 million USD and again in 2016 at 42.7 million USD.

While return represents the largest share of Germany's contributions, since 2009, a larger proportion of the organization's contributions have been earmarked for other purposes. In 2009 return projects only

represented a third of Germany's contributions owing in part to a smaller contribution for the REAG project (6.3 million USD) but also due to two large projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo (5.2 million USD) and Iraq (4.9 million USD). Since 2009, Germany have increasingly funded projects relating to refugee admission, combatting irregular migration and human trafficking, the latter two thematic areas broadly focusing on Northern Africa or Eastern Europe and Central Asia, potentially in response to EU enlargement. Although representing a relatively small proportion of overall contributions, Germany has also used earmarked contributions to finance staff positions (Associate Experts and Junior Professional Officers) within IOM.

### *United Kingdom*

Although the UK only re-joined IOM in 2000 after leaving the organization in 1968 along with several other Member States who felt that the organization had served its original purpose, its re-entry into the organization reflects both the growth and diversification of the organisation. It also coincided with a growing portfolio of technical cooperation projects making it IOM's fifth largest contributor of earmarked funds between 2000 and 2016. Next to allocating almost half of its contributions towards return, the UK, like the US and Canada, also used IOM to channel funding to emergency situations generated as a result of natural disasters and conflict. For example, in 2014, the UK allocated 13.4 million USD to the provision of shelter for those displaced by Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines also providing support in the aftermath earthquakes in Pakistan (2005) and Nepal (2015) and several other natural disasters. Between 2004 and 2016, 38.6 million USD was allocated to refugees, with funding channelled through IOM for the Gateway Protection Programme (7.5 million USD between 2012 and 2016) and a further eight million USD allocated in 2016 for the resettlement of Syrian refugees to the UK. The UK also provided support to emerging resettlement countries including a three million USD contribution to camp management in Jordan and a further three million USD to a 'vertical fund' supporting emerging resettlement countries.

### *Sweden*

With return projects representing just under a quarter of its earmarked contributions, Sweden has a more diverse portfolio of activities than many of its European counterparts. In 2016, Sweden's earmarked contributions increased by 68 percent compared to 2015 contributions. A large part of this increase can be explained by a 16.3 million USD contribution to the same vertical fund as the UK supporting emerging resettlement countries, however, since 2011, Sweden has also channelled money through IOM for refugee resettlement and family reunification

However, next to projects relating to return, emergency assistance and refugee resettlement, health-related interventions represent a significant share of Sweden's contribution. Five countries represent 80 percent of earmarked contributions for health-related interventions. These are the United States of America (41.2%), Australia (15.4%), Colombia (10.9%), Sweden (10.9%) and the UK (9.0%). However, proportionally speaking, health-related interventions represent a much higher proportion of earmarked contributions from Sweden (19.1%) as compared to the other countries<sup>9</sup>. Approximately two thirds of Sweden's health related contributions were allocated to projects relating to HIV/AIDs, the majority of which was earmarked for multiyear projects in Southern Africa. Between 2003 and 2009, Sweden contributed nine million USD to the Partnership on HIV/AIDS and Mobile Populations in Southern Africa (PHAMSA) and 21.0 million USD to the Partnership on Health and Mobility in East

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<sup>9</sup> Australia (11.3%); Colombia (8.2%); United States of America (5.5%) and the UK (3.1%)

and Southern Africa (PHAMESA) between 2010 and 2016. Next to this, Sweden earmarked 6.5 million to IOM to facilitate medical missions to emergency contexts.

### *Japan*

Although Japan contributed more proportionally to emergency assistance, the country also contributed a significant share of its contributions to return (22.7%). However, unlike European countries, these contributions primarily finance the return of migrants from lower income destination such as Iran and Pakistan to Afghanistan; Rwandans from several neighbouring African countries, return from West to East Timor and the repatriation of stranded migrants from Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea and Sierra Leone in Liberia. Since 2005, Japan has also funded a small return programme for victims of trafficking which has an average annual budget of 230 thousand USD.

## **9 Infrastructure and Development**


### *Peru*

Interestingly, Peru contributed the second largest share of voluntary earmarked contributions between 2000 and 2016 however contributions are concentrated in specific time periods peaking at over 250 million USD in 2010 and 2015, representing almost a quarter of IOM's earmarked contributions in these years. These peaks relate to large scale 'community and economic' development projects implemented in Peru. In 2010, Peru enlisted the support of IOM to renovate Lima's town hall in a project worth 245 million USD. In 2014 and 2015, 128 million USD and 57 million USD respectively, was channelled to IOM for support in building and equipping a convention centre in Lima, and more than 80 million USD (2015) to the construction of new headquarters for the Peruvian Central Bank. Additionally, in 2014 and 2015, several large-scale technical cooperation projects were initiated to strengthen the Peruvian police force and to support community stabilization initiatives across the country with total value of over 144 million USD. Although the classification of these projects as 'migration and development' is questionable, these projects explain the peaks in the reported expenditure on migration and development in 2010 and 2015, although are not captured in the thematic coding of migration and development projects<sup>10</sup> (figure 6)

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<sup>10</sup> Projects were labelled as migration and development related if they contained one of the following keywords: development, diaspora, remittance, benefit (to capture projects 'enhancing the benefits of migration'), qualified (to capture temporary return programmes for qualified nationals) and MIDA (capturing the Migration for Development in Africa programme). The use of 'development' as a key word also captures some capacity building projects relating to policy development and there actually overstates migration and development related initiatives.

Figure 6 Migration and Development Expenditure vs Earmarked Contributions.



### Colombia

While the patterns of contributions from Colombia resemble those of Peru with peaks in 2008 and 2012, the nature of earmarked contributions differs. After decades of conflict, it is unsurprising that the two largest programmes funded by Colombia relate to assistance for internally displaced persons (IDPs) within the country, which were financed in 2007 (61.6 million USD) and 2008 (66.2 million USD). However, in absolute terms, contributions relating to youth and educational interventions account for more than half of Colombia’s contributions to IOM compared to 28.6 percent for IDPs, although the two are undoubtedly connected. With one in every three displaced persons in Colombia being a child, it is unsurprising that many interventions seek to target displaced children, though campaigns against the recruitment of children into armed groups, and through the development of educational infrastructure.

## 10 Conclusion

Member States use voluntary earmarked contributions to use IOM for different purposes lending weight to several of the theoretical arguments presented earlier in the paper. While IOM was previously dismissed as an organization primarily reflecting the interests of the US (Feldblum, 1999), it is evident that IOM’s portfolio of work is also shaped by other Member States, albeit almost solely high-income countries. That being said, the US remains IOM’s most significant donor. As more countries transition into upper-middle- and high-income status, it is plausible that the sources of IOM’s funding become more diverse, although it is unlikely that it will become more balanced in terms of reflecting the interests of both countries of origin and destination. It may well be that, as the income levels of countries rises, they become more attractive to migrants (including returnees) become net immigration countries, and thus that their interests relating to migration change as their ability to earmarked resources increases.

It is well established that migration governance is fragmented and, that different aspects of migration are governed in different ways. Largely speaking, the ‘refugee regime’ is considered to be the area of migration that exhibits the most multilateral characteristics (Betts, 2011). Governed by the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the status of refugee is well defined. For IOM, the Convention was one of the main reasons for its foundation and thus, it is unsurprising that a large part of IOM’s earmarked contributions targets the resettlement and in some cases return of refugee populations. However, for those migrants who find themselves in refugee-like situations, but who do not meet the criteria established by the convention, such as IDPs who are displaced with the boundaries of their country of origin, or those displaced due to factors related to natural disasters, access to international protection is less well defined. Hall (2015) argues that IOM’s functional (or operational) mandate, as opposed to UNHCR’s normative mandate, made it much easier for states to fund IOM to provide assistance to these groups<sup>11</sup>. Support for this assertion is found in the earmarked contributions of several of IOM’s main governmental donors, mostly notably by the US, Canada, Japan, Sweden and to a lesser extent by Australia and the UK. However, it would be necessary to analyse the expenditures of UNHCR to confirm this.

However, next to a shift from IOM’s original mandate in geographical and categorical terms, the services of IOM are also increasingly employed for broader migration management concerns. Hess (2013) argues that “the term ‘migration management’ denotes, on one hand, a shift with regard to content, and, on the other hand, a far-reaching as well as structural as well as practical transformations concerning the political style and type of actors involved’ (p97), noting a broad shift from a focus on halting migration, to a desire to selectively control migration. For both European Member States, the European Commission) and Australia, this is reflected in the portfolio of activities financed through IOM. Where Australia earmarks significant funds to controlling ‘irregular migration’ towards Australia, the European Commission is focused on tightening its external borders. In the European case, next to an overall focus on return, earmarked funding increasingly targets countries neighbouring the EU, with money channelled towards the support of ‘emerging resettlement’ countries, as well as towards the facilitation of the return of rejected asylum seekers. European Member States are also increasingly financing capacity building efforts in the area of migration as well as return programmes from countries such as Morocco and Libya. These highlight the way in which earmarked funding to IGOs can be a channel through which more powerful Member States exert influence over other Member States.

Perhaps the most surprising finding, is that, while a large part of the public narratives of IOM are framed in development terms (McGregor, 2017), this area of work is only peripherally represented in the activities of the organization with the majority of these funds represented by infrastructure development in Peru, and to an extent in Colombia. Questions remain regarding why Peru and Colombia chose to use IOM for services one would not necessarily rhyme with its mandate, and why IOM chose to accept them. A perhaps cynical interpretation would be that these interventions allowed IOM to increase its profile as a development actor, allowing the organization to grow (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).

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<sup>11</sup> UNHCR started to engage in discussions about climate induced displacement from 2007 onwards after then High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres made the point that the causes of displacement were changing, and that climate-change was an increasingly relevant cause of displacement. This was followed by organisational changes, such as the appointment of an advisor, albeit with limited power, to investigate areas where UNHCR could engage with the discussion on climate change however there was no change to the organisation’s mandate and thus operational activities remained extremely limited, generally only covered in cases where climate-related factors increase the flows of groups who had access to *prima facie* refugee state (e.g. Somali’s in Kenya). IOM, on the other hand was able to mobilize resources in this area, even coining the concept of ‘climate refugees’, a categorisation that UNHCR took exception to (Hall, 2013; Hall, 2015).

However, it may also have to do with the flexibility and cost efficiency associated with IOM's non-UN status.

What is clear, however, is that the way that migration is governed is reflective of the interests of powerful Member States, and although the broadened refugee regime brought forth by the 1967 protocol still represents the most multilateral form of migration governance that exists to date, it seems unlikely that such an agreement would be reached again given changes in the composition of the UN system and the way it is financed. The fragmented nature of migration governance may well be a product of its earmarked nature of its funding, and, without concrete changes in how migration is financed, is likely to remain fragmented. This is perhaps why the late Sir Peter Sutherland called for 'the establishment of a Financing Facility for Migration, whose purpose will be to channel funding and technical assistance from States, international financial institutions, multilateral development banks, and private sector actors to help all States get equipped to fulfil the migration-related commitments they have made in the 2030 Agenda and that will be further specified in the global compact on migration' (United Nations, 2017, p25). It is significant that IOM is now the designated 'lead agency' on migration within the UN system with a key role to play in the negotiation of a global compact on migration, however this does not guarantee that migration governance will necessarily become more multilateral in nature, particularly if nothing changes in the way it is funded or in the constitution of IOM.



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## 12 Annexes

### Annex 1: Codebook, Project-level Categories

Category	Keywords
<b>Return</b>	Return
	Reintegration
	Repatriation
	Reinsertion
	Returnee
	Reinstallation
	Readmission
	Post-arrival (only used in a return context)
	AVR(R)
	REAG
	AVRFC
	ZIRF
	VAARP
<b>Trafficking</b>	Trafficking
	ASPIDDA
	HELP
	Regional Clearing Point
<b>Refugee</b>	Refugee
	Quota
	Resettlement
	Gateway
	HEP
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced
	IDP
<b>Staff and Offices</b>	Staff
	Associated Expert
	Expert
	Secondment
	Seconded
	Office
	Premises
<b>Consultations and Meetings</b>	Consultation
	Dialogue

Category	Keywords
	Symposium
	Seminar
	Workshop
	Conference
	Meeting
	Committee
	Working Group
	National Contact Point
	GFMD
	Bali Process
	Berne Initiative
	Söderköping
	National Contact Point (EMN)
<b>Border Management</b>	Border
	ID
	Biometric
	Document Verification
	Document Examination
<b>Health</b>	Health
	HIV
	AIDS
	STD
	Sexually transmitted
	Disease
	Ebola
	Medical
	TB
	Tuberculosis
	Malaria
	Plasmodium Falciparum
	Cholera
	Hospital
	Pandemic
	Hygiene
	Well-being
	Psychosocial

<b>Category</b>	<b>Keywords</b>
<b>Youth and Education</b>	Education
	School
	Classrooms
	Educational
	Child
	Youth
	Youngsters
	Minor
	Adolescent
	Teacher
<b>Research</b>	Research
	Survey
	Study
	Book
	Analyze
	Analysis
	Analyse
	Evaluation
	Report
	Data
	Literature Review
	Comprehensive Review
	Trends
	Tracking
	Patterns
	Migration Profiles
	University
Across Sahara	
<b>Rights</b>	Rights
	Human Rights
<b>Law and Policy</b>	Policy
	Policies
	Law
	Mechanism
	System
	National Strategy



Category	Keywords
<b>Capacity Building</b>	Capacity
	Capacities
	Administrative
	Equipment
	Training
	IMP
	E-learning
	Course
	Guide
	Toolkit
	Enhancement
	Modernization
	Modernize
	Supporting
	Facilitating
	Improving
	Strengthening
	Empowering
	Technical Cooperation
	Ministry
Consular	
Police	
<b>Migration Management</b>	Migration Management
	Management
	EMM
<b>Natural Disaster</b>	Disaster
	Natural
	Typhoon
	Earthquake
	Hurricane
	Cyclone
	Drought
	Mitch
	Tsunami
	Flood
	Mitigation

<b>Category</b>	<b>Keywords</b>
<b>Transport</b>	Transport
	Travel
	Passenger
	Reimbursable
	Relocation
	Movements
	Passage
	Charter
<b>Irregular Migration</b>	Irregular
	Undocumented
	Illegal
	Smuggling
	Messaging
<b>Asylum Seekers</b>	Asylum
	Asylum Seekers
	Asylum Seeking
<b>Labour Migration</b>	Labour Migration
	Labour Migrant
	Migrant Worker
	Recruitment
	IRIS
<b>Integration</b>	Integration
	Orientation
	Inclusion
	Excluded
	Exclusion
	Marginalized
	Re-employment
	Diversity Management
	Intercultural
	Vocational activation
<b>Development</b>	Development
	Diaspora
	Remittance
	Benefits
	MIDA

<b>Category</b>	<b>Keywords</b>
	Qualified
<b>Infrastructure</b>	Infrastructure
	Renovation
	Construction
	Convention Centre
	FONAPAZ
<b>Post-Crisis/Conflict</b>	Transition
	Peace
	Reconstruction
	Stabilization
	Post-conflict
	Rehabilitation
	Revitalization
	Combatants
	Demining
	Disengagement
	Reconciliation
	Rubble
	Cohesion
<b>Emergency</b>	Emergency
	Rapid
	Rescue
	Shelter
	Accommodation
	Camp
	Stranded
	Humanitarian
	Crises/Crisis
	Non-food
	Immediate
	Urgent
	Evacuation
	Medevac
<b>Livelihood</b>	Livelihood
	Entrepreneur
	Enterprise

<b>Category</b>	<b>Keywords</b>
	Income-generation
	Small Business
	Small Producer
	ACAP
<b>Protection</b>	Protection
	Vulnerable
	At risk
<b>Information</b>	Information
	Campaign
	Awareness-Raising
<b>Election</b>	Election
	Electoral
	Voting
	Observation Missions
<b>Reparation</b>	Reparation
	Claim
	Compensation
	Restitution
<b>Syria</b>	Syria
	Syrian
<b>Gender</b>	Gender
	Wo(men)
	Wo(man)
	Fe(male)
<b>Unallocated</b>	Unallocated
	To be allocated
	Unspecified
	Not specified
	Miscellaneous
	Ad hoc
	Earmarked
	Income tax reimbursement
	Funds received
	Voluntary contribution

## Annex 2: Trends in Earmarked Contributions for Top 10 Member States, 2000-2016

